Policy Recommendations

To counter the spread of antidemocratic practices in Europe and Eurasia, democratic countries—especially the United States and European Union (EU) member states—should consider pursuing the following policy priorities.

Help Ukraine win.

Defeating authoritarian aggression in Ukraine, on Ukraine’s terms, is an imperative for the freedom and security of Ukraine, of Europe, and of the world. The Kremlin’s military offensive is a direct attack not just on Ukrainian civilians and their physical infrastructure, but also on their collective effort to build a robust democracy. The Russian leadership was emboldened in part by weak international responses to its previous invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. It is now vital for Ukraine to receive the financial and technical assistance it needs to achieve victory.

Anything less than outright victory in Ukraine would perpetuate the security threat from Russia, discourage or undermine democratization efforts in neighboring countries that remain exposed to escalatory coercion by the Kremlin, and encourage other authoritarian rulers in the region and around the world to use force in their own efforts to suppress democracy and human rights.

In addition to providing direct aid to Ukraine’s war effort, democratic governments should:

• Defer to Ukrainians regarding the terms of victory and peace. According to a recent opinion poll, 97 percent of Ukrainians believe they will win the war, and 74 percent envision the restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders as defined in 1991. Policymakers should exercise great caution when considering any cease-fire or peace negotiation intended to give the Kremlin an “off-ramp,” particularly if initiated by the current regime in Russia given its repeated violations of past agreements.
• Recommit to respecting the territorial integrity of all countries and condemn the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. A failure to endorse this basic principle of international law by any state in the region would legitimize authoritarian aggression and raise the risk of additional attempts to redraw borders through violent conflict.
• Respond swiftly to requests for assistance from Ukraine’s government and civil society. Many European countries, the United States, and other democracies outside the region deserve considerable credit for their solidarity with Ukraine to date, but assistance must be delivered with greater speed as Kyiv prepares to reclaim more of its territory, seeks accountability for Russian war crimes, and undertakes massive reconstruction efforts. Visit freedomhouse.org to learn more about necessary assistance.
• Support the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian leaders for the crime of aggression. States that endorse this effort should dedicate diplomatic resources to win the necessary votes at the UN General Assembly. Democratic governments should also assist the existing investigation at the International Criminal Court (ICC) into other war crimes in Ukraine. The US government should give its full support to the ICC process. In December 2022 Congress loosened the laws that have long limited US engagement with the court, but more robust support from the United States would strengthen the ICC’s effectiveness. effectiveness.
• Crack down on efforts to evade sanctions against Russian entities. The sanctions are designed to increase the economic cost of the invasion and constrain Moscow’s ability to sustain and resupply its military. Any effort to evade them, whether by foreign governments or individual companies, harms that crucial goal and carries global implications.

Renew commitments to democratic reform.

An important finding from this year’s Nations in Transit report is that many countries’ solidarity with Ukraine and prodemocracy foreign policies were not matched by meaningful efforts to reverse democratic backsliding at home. The protection of rights, freedoms, and lasting security in the region will depend on a shared adherence to democratic principles, which must not be neglected even in wartime.

Democratic leaders should take the following steps to reinforce regional and international standards of governance and repair the damage caused by 19 consecutive years of overall decline.

Reinvigorate the EU accession process and related democratic benchmarks in the Western Balkans. Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted EU candidate status in 2022, but existing aspirant countries in the Western Balkans have long been in a holding pattern, with domestic elites resisting democratic reforms and EU officials failing to move the process forward. The resulting stagnation is dampening citizens’ hope for improvement and creating opportunities for authoritarian meddling. To address this problem and strengthen accession procedures for all new candidates, the EU and interested national governments should:

• Expand accession-related reporting and consultation. Given the apparent lack of progress toward implementing requisite EU accession reforms among some Western Balkans states, and the region's integration being perceived as a lower priority by Brussels, regional governments and the EU should adjust reporting requirements to include greater input by nongovernmental actors; facilitate greater participation by and feedback from citizens in the Western Balkans on the state of reforms; and increase public-facing communication from the EU on any progress or setbacks in the region.
• Prioritize greater economic integration and investment in candidate countries. The EU process should deliver tangible benefits to citizens, including visa-free travel, as a reward for democratic improvements and an incentive for further progress. Simultaneous investments in areas like energy diversification can reinforce the connection between stronger democratic institutions and economic prosperity. Where appropriate, donors should place conditions on their assistance, provided they are clearly articulated, and ensure that citizens have an opportunity to participate in planning and implementation.

• Caution against alternative trade agreements that undercut the EU process. The long delays in EU integration for the Western Balkans have given rise to separate projects aimed at increasing trade and cooperation among states in the subregion. These have the potential to damage the feasibility and credibility of the EU-backed Berlin Process for regional integration, which was initiated in 2014.

• Fund initiatives that address institutional problems with an impact on daily life. For example, effective programs focused on improving the rule of law, combating systemic corruption, and developing national anticorruption strategies can demonstrate to citizens that the reform process is addressing their concerns and holding local officials accountable if they fall short of democratic standards.
• Foster nongovernmental and subnational initiatives that support democracy and human rights. Priorities could include increasing the resilience and effectiveness of civil society, encouraging sustainable independent media and investigative journalism, funding projects that counter disinformation of domestic and foreign origin, promoting transparent and accountable governance at the local level, and increasing political and civic participation by young people. Creating opportunities for nongovernmental exchanges of knowledge and experience among Western Balkan states and with EU member states would strengthen the sense that these societies belong to a wider European community based on democratic principles.
• Improve coordination on sanctions designations. Individual governments should work closely with the EU on sanctions policy to demonstrate a clear and unified dedication to upholding democratic values in the Western Balkans.

Take decisive action to end attacks on democracy and the rule of law within the EU. Despite their differing stances on the war in Ukraine, the governments of Poland and Hungary remain the two worst offenders when it comes to rule-of-law violations among the Nations in Transit region’s EU member states. The EU should continue efforts to condition financial assistance to these countries on their compliance with European standards for the rule of law and human rights. For example, it should remain committed to Article 7 proceedings, which aim to punish member states that violate the common values of the EU by suspending certain rights guaranteed by the Treaty on the European Union. It should also impose fines where necessary for noncompliance with rulings by the European Court of Justice. Diplomats based in Hungary should continue to engage with independent organizations, activists, journalists, lawyers, and political opposition leaders, demonstrating support for their democratic rights and amplifying their legitimate concerns. And the United States and EU members should explore, as needed, additional sanctions against Hungarian nationals or residents who may be assisting Moscow’s war effort, as with the US sanctions imposed in April 2023 against senior officials at the Russian-owned, Budapest-based International Investment Bank.

Seize opportunities to push for reform in Central Asia. Following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, some Central Asian governments began to reevaluate their economic and security dependence on Russia, especially in light of the Kremlin’s hostile rhetoric regarding its responsibility for Russian-speaking minorities in these countries. This presents democratic governments with a window of opportunity to help shape—with broad civil society engagement—this subregion’s future direction. To advance the cause of democracy in Central Asia, democracies should:

• Increase diplomatic engagement with Central Asian governments. The US State Department has already intensified its participation in the C5+1 Diplomatic Platform, for example, and democracies should work together to undertake further initiatives of this kind in the coming years.
• Increase the use of conditioned aid and trade to reduce the region’s dependence on Moscow and Beijing. Democratic states should encourage foreign investment and increase direct budget support as appropriate in Central Asia, tying their aid to anticorruption initiatives and other requirements that encourage reform and protect human rights. This will help to globalize Central Asian economies and support further engagement beyond Russia and China. All Central Asian countries but Kazakhstan are heavily indebted to Beijing, and many economic migrants from the subregion rely on the Russian labor market for poverty alleviation. The EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument is one existing vehicle for this kind of economic assistance.
• Increase funding for programs that support nongovernmental democratic actors. Such projects could encourage greater political pluralism, particularly at the local level; expand respect for basic human rights; facilitate collaborative efforts by civic groups to address public concerns; strengthen civil society resilience against physical and digital threats; and foster independent journalism and cross-border partnerships between investigative journalists. Foreign assistance should also enable educational and cultural exchanges like the US Peace Corps, and provide training to young people on civic and political participation.

Support human rights defenders.

Across the Nations in Transit region, but especially in settings with more repressive environments, human rights defenders are often the standard-bearers of democracy, advocating for a better future despite the risk of reprisal or punishment by authoritarian governments. Democracies should adopt the measures below to assist these local actors as they work to uphold fundamental freedoms in their countries.

Provide financial support and protection to front-line activists and journalists. Democratic governments must take additional action to support activists and independent journalists working in undemocratic settings, where they may be subject to violent political persecution, torture, and arrest. It is crucially important to empower civic initiatives in authoritarian countries and strive to position such movements for success, rather than stepping in only when activists are in great danger. Nevertheless, ongoing crackdowns on the freedoms of expression and association in the region underscore a persistent need for diplomatic and financial assistance for at-risk activists and independent journalists, whether they remain in their home countries or have been forced to work from abroad. Specific steps might include the following:

• Provide direct services and care to activists under duress. Governments and partner organizations could supply emergency assistance, for example through reputable funds such as the Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund; temporary relocation opportunities; psychosocial and psycho-emotional support; medical assistance; digital security installation, support, and training; and legal advice.
• Create a special visa category for human rights defenders facing imminent danger.  There are efforts underway in the US Congress to endorse such a mechanism. A visa category for democratic activists should allow multiple entries and have a lengthy duration, providing those in need with the option of a swift temporary relocation. Even without a new visa program, democratic states could increase the transparency and consistency of their procedures for issuing humanitarian visas to civic activists.
• Limit the unintended impact on activists of sanctions against their home countries. For example, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a number of Freedom House partners noted an increase in denials of service by banking institutions due to their nationality. Governments should proactively work with the private sector to ensure that human rights defenders and democratic activists are not improperly penalized as companies seek to avoid violating sanctions.
• Assist independent media serving citizens in authoritarian countries. This could include financial aid, technical support, skills training, mentoring, and logistical support for outlets operating from exile. Freedom House commends recent global initiatives, launched at the first and second Summits for Democracy, that were dedicated to strengthening independent media worldwide, such as the Media Viability Accelerator, which helps independent media outlets become financially self-sufficient; Reporters Shield, which provides investigative journalists with insurance coverage against defamation lawsuits aimed at silencing their reporting; and the International Fund for Public Interest Media, which provides financial assistance to independent outlets. Democratic governments with donor capacity should continue to contribute to these efforts.

Seek accountability for human rights abuses in the region. Democratic governments, in partnership with regional and local civil society organizations, should continue to pursue accountability for human rights abuses and justice for victims of state repression and political persecution in Europe and Eurasia. Major violations from 2022 include the deadly crackdowns on protests in Kazakhstan, in Uzbekistan’s autonomous region of Karakalpakstan, and in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. In addition to the atrocities associated with its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin forcibly suppressed antiwar protests within Russia, and authorities have continued to persecute the LGBT+ community, most severely in the North Caucasus republic of Chechnya. In Belarus, the illegitimate regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka has been detaining and mistreating civic leaders, peaceful protesters, their family members, and their lawyers since the fraudulent presidential election of 2020. To ensure that perpetrators do not enjoy impunity for such crimes, democratic governments should:

• Use targeted sanctions as part of a comprehensive strategy of accountability for human rights abusers and corrupt officials. Democracies should impose sanctions in a coordinated manner for maximum impact. States that do not yet have laws allowing targeted sanctions for human rights abuses and acts of corruption should enact them, and those with laws already on the books should provide the resources necessary for full enforcement.
• Leverage multilateral institutions to support collective responses and documentation. Examples include the repeated invocation of the Moscow Mechanism at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to officially document rights abuses committed by Russian and Belarusian authorities, and the UN Human Rights Council’s October 2022 decision to appoint a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Russia.

Advocate for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners. Democratic governments, in coordination with human rights organizations, must keep a public spotlight on the staggering number of detained human rights defenders, journalists, and democracy activists in the Nations in Transit region and seek their unconditional and immediate release. Democratic governments should routinely and proactively raise the cases of political prisoners—citing specific names wherever feasible—and other human rights concerns during bilateral and multilateral engagements with perpetrator governments. Democratic governments should also step up requests for information or for specific actions related to prisoners’ medical condition and treatment. Finally, UN member states should officially recognize October 30 as the International Day of Political Prisoners. Additional practices that democratic governments may adopt to advocate for the release of political prisoners can be found at freedomhouse.org.

Combat the proliferation of transnational repression in Eurasia. According to Freedom House’s latest public data on instances of transnational repression through 2022, five out of the top 10 global perpetrators of transnational repression are states in Eurasia. The governments of Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have committed 212 of the 854 known incidents of direct, physical transnational repression since 2014, and 233 of the 854 took place in the broader Nations in Transit region. Many of these cases involved close cooperation between the state security services of different countries. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine contributed to the phenomenon, as some of the hundreds of thousands of Russians who fled their country to avoid mobilization, conscription, or persecution for antiwar views have been targeted by the Kremlin while living abroad. Separately, the government of Tajikistan accounted for 27 percent of the global instances of transnational repression in 2022, and the diaspora of the Pamiri ethnic minority, whose homeland is the Gorno-Badakhshan region, bore the brunt of this cross-border intimidation. For more information about policy responses to transnational repression, visit freedomhouse.org. Among other steps, governments should:

• Endorse Freedom House’s Declaration of Principles to Combat Transnational Repression. The document provides a working definition of transnational repression and outlines preliminary measures governments may take to address the problem.
• Establish a mechanism to track domestic incidents of transnational repression. Without a tailored system for collecting such data, governments will be ill-equipped to identify and respond to cases, and many attacks may go undetected.
• Develop a plan to spread awareness of transnational repression across state agencies. An effective policy response will require informed participation by law enforcement bodies, intelligence services, and officials working with refugees and asylum seekers. These agencies must be prepared to assist potential victims and avoid becoming unwitting enablers of transnational repression.
• Apply added vetting to arrest and extradition requests from authoritarian states. A country’s designation as a Consolidated Authoritarian Regime in Nations in Transit, or as Not Free in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report, should prompt extra scrutiny of its official requests. Democratic governments should use their votes and influence within Interpol to limit the ability of repressive member states to target dissidents abroad. States should uphold their responsibilities under international law, as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights where applicable, to refrain from returning individuals to countries where they are likely to face ill-treatment.
• Use sanctions and diplomatic tools to hold individual perpetrators accountable. Foreign officials who engage in or enable transnational repression should face penalties including visa bans and asset freezes, and diplomats who do so—for example by intimidating exiles in the country where they are stationed—should be declared personae non gratae and promptly expelled.
• Strictly regulate technology that could enable transnational repression. Governments should curb the use of and trade in advanced surveillance tools, including commercial spyware products, which have been employed by perpetrator states to track dissidents abroad. Democracies should also protect communications platforms that offer end-to-end encryption, which helps to prevent improper monitoring by state actors.
• Support efforts to document incidents inside the authoritarian states of Eurasia. While democracies need to improve tracking of transnational repression in their own territories, they should also sponsor civil society initiatives aimed at documenting incidents in countries where authorities have little interest in addressing the problem. It is especially important to do so for states, including Belarus and Russia, that do not or no longer participate in multilateral accountability mechanisms like the European Court of Human Rights.