Defending Latin American Human Rights and Democracy Activists

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

• Executive Summary
• Overview
• Human Rights Defenders in Latin America
• Defending the Defenders: Trends, Models, and Patterns
• The Cases of Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Human Rights Defenders

Executive Summary 

Purpose of Assessment

This assessment builds on existing bodies of literature, interviews with key informants and stakeholders, two case studies, and Freedom House experiences to better understand the nature of the defense and protection of Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) and pro-democracy Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Latin America.

The study undertakes an institutional and organizational landscape analysis to: determine which entities, organizations and individuals are involved in the protection and defense of HRDs and CSOs (with a particular focus on relocation); identify strategies and approaches to support the defense and protection of HRDs and CSOs within their countries and in exile; analyze the gaps and challenges of existing approaches; and develop recommendations to strengthen the protection and defense of HRDs in Latin America.

Given time and resource limitations, the assessment was relatively narrow in its scope. As such, it is not intended to be an impact or capacity assessment; much less, an evaluation of specific programs and/or initiatives. Rather, it describes HRD protection systems in Latin America, highlights opportunities for future HRD activities and major areas that merit further regional and national attention, and HRD protection systems in Latin America. The assessment also highlights opportunities and offers strategic recommendations.

Findings in Brief

HRDs and pro-democracy CSOs face increasingly hostile environments throughout Latin America, including legislation that criminalizes their work, intimidation, harassment, and physical attacks among other human rights violations. According to human rights organizations, in 2020, Latin America was the most dangerous continent in the world for human rights defenders, accounting for more than three-quarters of all murders of HRDs worldwide.1  The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these challenges, as governments deployed authoritarian measures under the guise of enforcing COVID-19 restrictions, to inhibit movement, curtail freedoms of expression and assembly, and implement militarized security policies.

Worsening human rights conditions have also spurred unprecedented levels of migration and displacement—including of HRDs—across the region, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Growing migrant and refugee populations in Latin America have been especially vulnerable in the context of COVID-19, as border closures and lockdowns made living conditions even more precarious and curtailed mobility and access to information and services.

In recent years, HRDs and challenges they face in Latin America and globally have garnered increasing attention. 

Yet, the definition of what makes someone a HRD remains elusive and varies from country to country. According to practitioners, researchers and academics interviewed and engaged for the assessment, the United Nations definition offers a solid foundation for defining who can be considered an HRD.2 While it is difficult to generalize, several findings from the assessment point to some emerging and evolving parameters to help further understand who is considered an HRD in Latin America. These include:

• HRDs can include social justice leaders and artists;
• HRDs are perceived as agents of change in their communities;
• HRD can be perceived as an individual and as part of a community seeking to advance human rights, with collective needs; and
• HRDs in Latin America undertake a tremendous amount of work, often with little or no monetary compensation.

Refining this definition will become increasingly important as a growing field of actors and stakeholders contribute diverse initiatives to protect HRDs. Some of those include:

• International protection organizations
• Temporary relocation providers and shelters
• CSOs
• Bilateral and multilateral donor organizations
• HRDs themselves

Gaps in knowledge, understanding and support remain, yet this assessment found that HRDs themselves are driving efforts to close those gaps and expand knowledge. HRDs’ burgeoning agency in shaping their own protection has prompted a shift from perceiving HRDs under threat as victims, to viewing them as agents of change, and sources to understand how human rights movements organize and strategize in restricted and undemocratic environments. Thanks to HRDs’ increasing involvement in protection strategies, temporary relocation providers, national protection organizations, HRDs are more frequently raising the notion of holistic protection or integral security, which go beyond physical or traditional security to include initiatives such as medical, psychosocial, and psycho-emotional support. National protection organizations and CSOs are also increasing their advocacy efforts to call on State protection mechanisms to incorporate holistic approaches.

However, these nascent efforts to design more comprehensive approaches to HRD protection have only begun to fill gaps and leverage opportunities available to protect and defend HRDs more effectively. As HRD work in Latin America is increasingly being criminalized and restricted, this assessment sought to offer systematic analysis of security and protection dynamics in Latin America that might inform efforts to improve HRD protections. In so doing, the assessment revealed some initial findings about the current landscape of security for and protection of HRDs:

Security

• The most traditional definition of security, physical, remains dominant, although HRDs are beginning to learn other aspects and dimensions.
• HRDs sometimes lack knowledge about integrated security strategies and tools.
• The pressure that accompanies HRDs work can push them beyond limits of physical and psychosocial safety
• HRDs, especially women and indigenous people, have sought to rethink “security,” moving away from a military and policing view, toward a more comprehensive and gender-balanced notion.
• Job stability should be included as a key component of security.
• CSOs interviewed for the assessment highlighted the pattern of defining security as only the absence of threats and risks.

Protection

• State-run protection mechanisms are often prescriptive, offering a predetermined menu of protections from which HRDs can choose that do not necessarily respond to the specific needs of HRDs or the risks present in their differentiated contexts.
• International protection organizations have implemented good practices around protection and security in general, aided by the expansion of internet accessibility. This has facilitated more effective communication with CSOs on the ground, allowing consistent and more systematic meetings that can inform more appropriate assistance.

Few approaches to defend HRDs in Latin America have been evaluated systematically. Such analysis could be used to develop future program and strategic plans. These evaluations could also help donors, governments, and CSOs to refine HRD support objectives and performance measures. 

This assessment’s findings identified different levels of commitment by the State to the protection of HRDs in Latin America, including cases where commitment is not existent to cases where the State has begun to respond and construct a national protection regime to respond to both internal and external dynamics.

This assessment revealed some trends emerging in protecting and providing support to HRDs in Latin America. For example:

• The increased need to support and strengthen national measures, including expanding shelters for HRDs to seek a safe haven once an immediate risk occurs.
• The focus of some protection systems has shifted from addressing individual protection, to understanding and supporting more community-oriented protection measures. This includes expanding protection mechanisms to include indigenous communities' perspectives.
• Most initiatives are being driven with support from external actors, rather than national or local authorities.
• HRDs in Latin America are not receiving the necessary protection from the State entities authorized to provide the requisite protection and, in some instances, State officials have been involved in the threats and attacks against HRDs.
• State protection mechanisms are often limited due to a focus solely on physical security.
• In many countries, demand for legal services by CSOs and HRDs exceeds supply.
• Internal, temporary relocation, rather than external relocation, is the best option for HRDs at risk, when feasible.
• Regional shelters for HRDs exist in Latin America and operate at full capacity.

This assessment also sought to offer an initial analysis of the adequacy and effectiveness of existing assistance for HRDs at risk in Latin America. Findings include:

• Short-term assistance is most effective: Temporary relocation initiatives are more effective in the short term than in the long term because they respond to an immediate urgent threat with a limited investment to resources. Relocation initiatives and support are difficult to sustain in the long term, as the number of cases of threats and attacks against HRDS continues to rise sharply, taxing existing services, which must prioritize immediate, short-term responses. Most internal and external relocation initiatives last three to six months. While some include reassessment after 6 months, and some HRDs get protection measures for more than two years, most do not include long-term plans.
• Locally-driven relocation initiatives or those where local CSOs coordinate closely with other temporary relocation initiatives, are the most effective in providing HRDs with emergency funds, resources and relocation support.
• Pre-relocation contextual analyses contribute to more appropriate protection measures that address actual risks, and are viable in each specific context.
• Civil society participation in assistance: In countries that have a State-run protection mechanism, CSOs report that some governments have failed to include or incorporate the participation of civil society or lack adequate conditions for CSO participation. This has resulted in lack of communication between CSOs and State authorities.
• Legal assistance and representation to help HRDs counter the State’s criminalization of their work is crucial to allowing them to continue their work either in their home country or from abroad. These legal processes can often take years. Legal support is needed for the HRD who faces false charges or imprisonment.
• CSO capacity building. Larger, more prominent organizations working on protection often need the support of local organizations that can refer cases or connect smaller, nascent CSOs to assistance. When local CSOs have stronger tools and mechanisms to share information and accompany at-risk HRDs, assistance, including relocation can be more successful.

Strategic and Policy Options for Programming

Based on the regional trends identified in this desk assessment, the following strategic options are recommended for consideration. In Part A, the Freedom House assessment team proposes a set of Non-Project Activities at the regional level, or sub-regional level, that would help to further progress in raising awareness about HRDs, their needs, challenges, and approaches to support them, and their work.

In addition, Freedom House proposes eight strategic recommendations in Part B, along with illustrative activities.

• Strategic Recommendation 1: Protection of HRDs
• Strategic Recommendation 2: Emergency Funds
• Strategic Recommendation 3: Temporary Relocation of HRDs
• Strategic Recommendation 4: Expand Temporary Relocation Initiatives
• Strategic Recommendation 5: Return and Reintegration of HRD Back Home
• Strategic Recommendation 6: Permanent Resettlement
• Strategic Recommendation 7: Provision of Long-Term Support to HRDs
• Strategic Recommendation 8: Funding Ideas for Donors

• 1Front Line Defenders. Global Analysis 2020. Dublin, Ireland, Front Line Defenders, 2021.
• 2The term “human rights defender” has been used increasingly since the adoption of the Declaration on human rights defenders in 1998. Until then, terms such as human rights “activist”, “professional”, “worker” or “monitor” had been most common. The term “human rights defender” is seen as a more relevant and useful term. For more information on the United Nations’ definition see https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/srhrdefenders/pages/defender.aspx

Overview 

Introduction

Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) promoting fundamental freedoms, rights and democracy continue to face enormous challenges across Latin America today. Activists have experienced legislation criminalizing their work, increasing intimidation, human rights violations, and forced displacement by both State and non-State authorities in authoritarian and hybrid regimes.1 According to human rights organizations, in 2020, Latin America was the most dangerous continent in the world for human rights defenders, accounting for more than three-quarters of all murders of HRDs worldwide.2 The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these challenges, as governments deployed authoritarian measures under the guise of enforcing COVID-19 restrictions, to inhibit movement, curtail freedoms of expression and assembly, and implement militarized security policies. In 2020, restrictions on free speech, and arbitrary or violent enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions by police and non-State actors were common throughout the region.3 Indeed, civil society in general, and HRDs specifically, faced extraordinary challenges to mobilize during the pandemic and to transition their work under lockdown, facing both physical and virtual security hurdles.4 With the increasing use of digital technology by HRDs, governments have found it easier to surveil targets, including those in exile.5

Worsening human rights conditions have also spurred unprecedented levels of migration and displacement—including of HRDs—across the region, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Growing migrant and refugee populations in Latin America have been especially vulnerable in the context of COVID-19, as border closures and lockdowns made living conditions even more precarious and curtailed mobility and access to information and services. The region is home to 20 percent of the 82.4 million people forcibly displaced globally, including the second-largest external displacement crisis in the world after the Syrian crisis –5.6 million Venezuelan migrants fleeing economic crisis and repression. Neighboring Colombia houses 31 percent of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, placing a heavy burden on a country already struggling with human rights abuses—especially of HRDs.6 In addition, according to the UNHCR, human rights violations have forced over 100,000 Nicaraguans to flee their homeland.7 Nicaraguans also continue to flee their country for Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama, as the government cracks down on opposition groups in anticipation of the presidential elections in November 2021.

The democratic outlook for some countries in the region is discouraging. According to Freedom House’s 2021 Freedom in the World report, nine countries in Latin America were classified as Free, 11 countries as Partially Free, and three countries as Not Free.8 In 2021, while five of the 23 countries in Latin America saw improvements in their scores,9 13 showed declines, with El Salvador leading that group with a net decrease of 3 points, followed by Venezuela with a net decrease of 2 points, and with Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru all decreasing by 1 point respectively. According to Freedom House, since 2006 Venezuela and Nicaragua have both shown the greatest declines in freedoms in the Western Hemisphere, - 40 and -33 respectively.10 Transnational repression appears relatively rare in Latin America compared to other regions, although it is possible that the phenomenon is less visible due to the region’s enormous humanitarian crises, including the international displacement of millions of people due to political repression, organized crime, and natural disasters. Several extreme cases emerged from the brutal political crackdowns in Nicaragua and Venezuela, but there is still no systematic analysis or evidence of transnational repression practices.11

Purpose of Assessment

The assessment provides a baseline overview of regional trends in shelter and relocation programs to defend and protect HRDs and pro-democracy CSOs in Latin America. Based on a current literature review and interviews with key informants and stakeholders, the analysis of two case studies, and Freedom House’s experience over the past two decades, the assessment provides recommendations for an effective, realistic and comprehensive regional approach to defend human rights and democracy activists in Latin America. Although not exhaustive, it serves as a starting point to document recent trends, assess current programming approaches and identify potential entry points for new support opportunities. The results provide answers to the increasingly pressing question in many contexts of what to do when HRDs are seeking or require relocation or shelter, whether within their countries or abroad.

Given limited time and resources, the assessment is relatively narrow in scope. As such, it is not intended to evaluate impact or capacity of HRD protection initiatives, much less to assess specific programs and/or initiatives. Rather, it describes (based on secondary information available in compliance with the Statement of Work and time constraints) gaps in support and protection for vulnerable activists and HRDs in Latin America and highlights major areas that merit regional and national attention. In addition, it maps out priorities and strategic recommendations.

The report is divided into five parts:

Section II provides an overview of HRDs in Latin America, including the working definition of an HRD, as well as dynamics of security and protection.

Section III describes trends in and current approaches to defending and protecting HRDs and pro-democracy CSOs in Latin America, including who provides assistance and how, what the assistance consists of, how long it lasts, the adequacy and impact of the assistance, and how exile effects the work of HRDs forced to flee their home countries.

Section IV looks at the specific cases of Venezuelan and Nicaraguan HRDs in Colombia and Costa Rica, respectively, to illustrate their needs, challenges, and opportunities.

Section V focuses on emerging issues and lessons in the protection of HRDs and challenges for the future.

Section VI provides strategic programming options to strengthen shelter and relocation programs to defend and protect HRDs.

Methodology

The assessment developed by Freedom House, with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), was carried out in four phases. First, an initial desk study and literature review to synthesize information available in written documents; Second, thirty (30) semi-structured interviews with key informants and stakeholders in Spanish and/or English for a non-representative sample; Third, two case studies. Based on the information collected, Freedom House produced the assessment report.

A key methodological feature of this assessment was its consultative process. From January to April 2021, the team reviewed more than 60 documents (See Bibliography Annex 2) and conducted more than 30 interviews with key informants and stakeholders. All of the interviews were conducted virtually with encrypted videoconferencing technology. The average duration of each interview was one to two hours and many of the interviews were transcribed. Five interview guides were designed and tailored to the specific background or experience of the respondents. Freedom House supported the selection process for the interviews with informants and stakeholders, which included individuals with a vast array of experiences and expertise (HRDs, researchers, academics, representatives from international protections organizations, temporary relocation providers and shelters, legal services providers, donors, and CSO representatives). Interviewees also represented geographic diversity, spanning the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America, South America, Europe, Canada and the U.S. (See List of Interviews Annex 1). In addition, the assessment incorporated findings from two case studies, produced by local consultants in Colombia and Costa Rica. Each case study was the product of a literature review and a consultative process consisting of interviews with key informants, including HRDs, a specific survey applied to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan HRDs exiled in Colombia and Costa Rica, and focus groups of Nicaraguan HRDs in Costa Rica.12

Prior to identifying and selecting informants and stakeholders to interview, the Freedom House Team mapped potential stakeholders, key informants and organizations proposed for interviews (Annex 3). The mapping, while non-exhaustive, helped the team to ensure geographical and thematic representation, as well as to capture a diversity of services and programs. The mapping also helped to categorize organizations that either provide shelter to HRDs at risk in Latin America or assist organizations that operate shelters in the region. They are included as illustrative models for Freedom House to consider as it explores supporting shelters in Latin America (Annex 4).

Throughout the process, the team met consistently to outline themes, review and discuss information and finalize the report. Based on the literature review and the interviews with key informants and stakeholders, the team identified gaps in support and protection for vulnerable activists and HRDs, assess expected benefits and risks of new initiatives to fill those gaps, and identify potential sources of financial and technical support for protection mechanisms that need improvement or expansion in Latin America.

The Freedom House Team members included experts and specialists Jonathan Eoloff, Ana Cristina Nuñez, Juan Navarrete Monasterio, and Ana Quiros Víquez; Gerardo Berthin, Freedom House Director for Latin America and Caribbean Programs; Alessandra Pinna, Freedom House Deputy Director for Latin America and Caribbean Programs; and Olivia Magnanini, Freedom House Research/Program Associate.

Acknowledgments

The research team wishes to acknowledge the assistance and guidance provided by members of Freedom House’s Latin America Team: Christopher Hill, Caitlin Watson, Silenny Ramirez, Katie Turner, Pablo Leon, Juan Pablo Luque, Jerusha Burnham, Aurelia Annino, and Andrea Martalo. The Team thanks the key informants for their time and for sharing valuable insights.

• 1For the purposes of this report, we are using as basis the definitions provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In an authoritarian regime state political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for human rights abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent judiciary. In hybrid regimes, elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Corruption tends to be widespread, and the rule of law is weak. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on civil society and journalists, and the judiciary is not independent. See the Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in health? London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021.
• 2Front Line Defenders. Global Analysis 2020. Dublin, Ireland, Front Line Defender, 2021.
• 3Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz. Freedom in the World 2020: Democracy under Siege. Washington DC: Freedom House, 2020, p. 20.
• 4Ibid, p. 8.
• 5Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer. Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression. Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2021, p. 8.
• 6R4V Interagency Portal, https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform
• 7https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1059051
• 8Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy Under Siege. Washington DC: Freedom House, 2021. Countries classified as “Free” were Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Belize, Argentina, Panama, Brazil, Surinam and Guyana; countries classified as “Partially Free” were: Peru, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, El Salvador, Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras, and Haiti; and countries classified as “ Not Free” were: Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege
• 9Belize (+1), Bolivia (+3), Chile (+3), Ecuador (+2) and Surinam (+4).
• 10Freedom House, 2021.
• 11Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, 2021, p. 52.
• 12The two full case study reports, including their methodology, can be found at Freedomhouse.org.

Human Rights Defenders in Latin America 

Who exactly is a Human Rights Defender (HRD)?

Despite the growing attention towards HRDs in Latin America and globally, the concept of an HRD remains elusive. In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the “Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protection Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (commonly known as the “Declaration on Human Rights Defenders”).1 The definition of the term derives from Article 1, which states that: “Everyone has the right, individual and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels.” In attempts to provide guidance on the interpretation of the definition, the United Nations further suggests that, while there is no specific definition of who is or can be an HRD, the Declaration on human rights defenders refers to “individuals, groups and associations ... contributing to ... the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals.” It is a broad categorization, and accordingly, the most obvious HRDs are those whose daily work specifically involves the promotion and protection of human rights, for example human rights monitors working with national human rights organizations, human rights ombudsmen or human rights lawyers. However, what is most important in characterizing a person as a HRD is not the person’s title or the name of the organization he or she works for, but rather the human rights character of the work undertaken.2

According to some practitioners, researchers and academics, the United Nations definition offers a solid foundation for defining who can be considered an HRD. While it is difficult to generalize, several findings from the assessment point to some emerging and evolving parameters to help further understand who is considered an HRD in Latin America. Meanwhile, field research highlighted a set of additional common characteristics often considered when thinking about human rights defenders and their work. Although there is considerable variation from country to country, a number of findings from the assessment point to some parameters to understand HRDs and their work in Latin America. These include:

• HRDs can include social justice leaders and artists;
• HRDs are perceived as agents of change in their communities;
• HRD can be perceived as an individual and as part of a community seeking to advance human rights, with collective needs; and
• HRDs in Latin America undertake a tremendous amount of work, often with little or no monetary compensation.

What are security and protection dynamics in Latin America for HRDs and how are they understood and practiced by all actors who seek to support HRDs?

Deteriorating conditions for human rights defenders around the globe have garnered increasing attention to the protection and security of HRDs. It is now considered its own field, including various actors, such as international protection organizations, temporary relocation providers and shelters, CSOs, multilateral bodies, donors, and HRDs themselves who contribute to strengthening protections for HRDs. Greater engagement on this issue has spurred new thinking on how best to provide protection and security. For instance, some organizations have begun to address security at the individual and collective level, and new aspects of security, such as psycho-emotional security and the security of family members, are being considered important elements of a protection system.

Gaps in knowledge, understanding and support remain, yet this assessment found that HRDs themselves are driving efforts to close those gaps and expand knowledge. HRDs’ burgeoning agency in shaping their own protection has prompted a shift from perceiving HRDs under threat as victims, to viewing them as agents of change, and sources to understand how human rights movements organize and strategize in restricted and undemocratic environments. Thanks to HRDs’ increasing involvement in protection strategies, temporary relocation providers, national protection organizations, and HRDs are more frequently raising the notion of holistic protection or integral security, which go beyond physical or traditional security to include initiatives such as medical, psychosocial and psycho-emotional support. National protection organizations and CSOs are also increasing their advocacy efforts to call on State protection mechanisms to incorporate holistic approaches.

However, these nascent efforts to design more comprehensive approaches to HRD protection have only begun to fill gaps and leverage opportunities available to protect and defend HRDs more effectively. As HRD work in Latin America is increasingly being criminalized and restricted, this assessment sought to offer systematic analysis of security and protection dynamics in Latin America that might inform efforts to improve HRD protections. In so doing, the assessment revealed some initial findings about the current landscape of security for and protection of HRDs:

Security

• The most traditional definition of security, physical, remains dominant, although HRDs are beginning to learn other aspects and dimensions.
• HRDs sometimes lack knowledge about integrated security strategies and tools.
• The pressure that accompanies HRDs work can push them beyond limits of physical and psychosocial safety.
• HRDs, especially women and indigenous people, have sought to rethink “security,” moving away from a military and policing view, toward a more comprehensive and gender-balanced notion.
• Job stability should be included as a key component of security.
• CSOs interviewed for the assessment highlighted the pattern of defining security as only the absence of threats and risks.

Protection

Protection is the treatment for insecurity, and this assessment revealed that, like the definition of an HRD, the definition of “protection” is evolving. The term is increasingly viewed as a ‘bundle’ of protections, informed by the specific context in which it is being applied, rather than as a “one size fits all” solution. Moreover, protection mechanisms have begun to consider both collective and individual protections. The emphasis, where possible, should be on prevention strategies, including mitigating measures, rather than on protection. Other key findings on protection worth highlighting are:

• State-run protection mechanisms are often prescriptive, offering a predetermined menu of protections from which HRDs can choose that do not necessarily respond to the specific needs of HRDs or the risks present in their differentiated contexts.
• International protection organizations have implemented good practices around protection and security in general, aided by the expansion of internet accessibility. This has facilitated more effective communication with CSOs on the ground, allowing consistent and more systematic meetings that can inform more appropriate assistance. Yet, the development and expansion of the internet has also made HRDs and protection systems more vulnerable to digital attacks and surveillance by state or non-state actors, necessitating stronger digital security protections.
• Some HRDs in Latin America are engaging in new practices, including “elective protection.” An example is the San José de Apartadó peace community—located in Colombia’s northern region of Urabá in the Department of Antioquia, which built a physical enclosure around the community and declared themselves neutral.3 This example also illustrates the importance of understanding HRDs not only as individuals but as organizations and communities as well. Many communities in Latin America are expressing the need to think of protection as a communal, in-community or collective way.

• 1United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/Declaration/declaratio…
• 2United Nations Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 29 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet29en.pdf
• 3More information about the peace community, https://pbicolombia.org/accompanied-organisations/peace-community/

Defending the Defenders: Trends, Models, and Patterns 

This assessment’s findings point to different levels of commitment by countries to the protection of defenders in Latin America. First, there are countries with no government commitment to protection, such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, all classified as “Not Free” by Freedom House in its Freedom in the World report. Second, there are countries that have begun to respond to risks HRDs face by constructing national protection mechanisms, such as Costa Rica and Colombia (see section IV below). These countries have been classified as Free and Partially Free, respectively, by Freedom House.

The results of the assessment also confirmed that the defense and protection of HRDs and pro-democracy CSOs in Latin America is a relatively new area of study, research, and practice, emerging in Latin America only a decade ago. This assessment found that the expectation emerging from the Latin America region as it faces new challenges is that the defense and protection of HRDs at home or abroad has to be multi-level and multi-actor. While the national and local actors are expected to play a key role, regional and international actors are expected to complement and support protection programs. This aspiration provides the basis to move towards an ideal system of protection for HRDs in the region (see box to the right). It also offers a unique opportunity to strengthen and more importantly to build effective protection systems.

Who provides assistance and what does it consists of?

This assessment found that there are new and growing efforts to protect and support HRDs in Latin America. For example, the region is seeing rising numbers of new initiatives to strengthen national measures and expand shelters for HRDs to seek a safe haven in the face of immediate risk. In addition, findings reveal growing efforts include the perspective of indigenous communities in designing protection mechanisms. This has begun to shift the focus of some protection mechanisms from a focus on protecting the individual toward a more community-based model that accounts for the collective nature of human rights defense within indigenous and other HRD communities. While some examples of collective protection experiences exist in places like Honduras and Mexico, many of these processes are not being led by civil society or local authorities, but rather by external actors. The assessment revealed an opportunity to leverage this budding shift in protection strategies to pilot new collective protection initiatives, born more organically from the way the human rights movements, communities, collectives and networks organize themselves.

In spite of these emerging opportunities, evidence collected for the assessment suggests that HRDs in Latin America do not receive key HRD support services such as, emergency funds, physical security support, psychosocial and psycho-emotional support, medical assistance, digital security installation, support and training, legal advice and assistance for criminalization, from the State. Moreover, in some instances, State officials have even been involved in perpetrating the threats and attacks against HRDs. Lack of support and instances of complicity have sown frustration and anger among HRDs in Latin America and distrust in State-run systems. Additionally, formal State mechanisms will not work in the face of rampant corruption and impunity. The efficacy of any State mechanism of protection is fully undermined in authoritarian and closed environments, where access to justice in nonexistent, crimes are not investigated, identification and arrest of perpetrators are delayed, and those convicted escape. Ineffective justice systems fly in the face of formal protection mechanisms offered by the State.

In the arena of international legal protection, the discussion centers around the question of how effective precautionary measures1 issued by the Inter-American System are. Often, the efficacy of this measure is determined by the national context, the government involved, and how much impact or relevance they will have on the protection of the HRD.

When the State collaborates with precautionary measures, which is the exception in Latin America, protection is still limited unless the State extends other complementary protection measures. The Inter-American system lends a status to the HRDs as they are recognized in a situation of vulnerability, but ultimately how HRDs are protected is left entirely up to each State. The assessment found that where offered and available, formal State mechanisms of protection have not necessarily worked because they focus solely on physical integrity, and they have failed to address the other impacts of working under threat of attack or death threats.

Certain HRDs and CSOs are inclining to build protection systems within the community, in order to take advantage of existing tools for protection and avoid options that lead into internal relocation or relocation to another country. CSOs in countries like Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and Colombia, are playing an instrumental role in proposing alternative initiatives around protection and security (including private initiatives), especially in the face of ineffective and under-resourced formal State mechanisms which tend to focus solely on physical safety.

While some key HRD services can also be provided through NGOs, the tradeoff for many HRDs and CSOs interviewed for the assessment is that the State’s obligations and responsibilities under the law are lifted and substituted. In some cases, CSOs have noted that HRDs have protection schemes provided by the international community and where the State in no way participated or had knowledge of the risks that the HRD had been facing. For CSOs, this can be problematic when seeking to attribute State responsibility in an international area where the underlying measures provided by civil society were inadequate or ineffective. CSOs contend that if a State alleges lack of knowledge of the situation or about the specific case, it will likely impede assigning responsibility to the State under the law and the State will remain unaccountable. In exceptional cases where CSOs operate in countries where the State has a national protection mechanism, the assessment found that the protection mechanism has worked for HRDs mainly as a result of their advocacy, intervention and pressure before the State.

There is an increasing demand by HRDs and CSOs for legal and psychosocial services. Unfortunately, the assessment found that in many countries the demand for legal services exceeds the supply. There are very few attorneys (and psychologists) with expertise in accompanying or representing HRDs. There is a need to expand legal assistance and services to HRDs at the community level as well. There is a push to open smaller, discrete shelters in countries throughout Latin America for HRDs at risk, but the pandemic and the lockdown have slowed down the initiatives.

Despite opposition from some sectors, there is a trend toward including self-care2 as a form of protection. Opposition to incorporating self-care as a protection practice comes from those who argue that it can deflect responsibility from the perpetrator to the actual victim for not having taking care of him or herself.

How was the assistance provided?

Temporary Relocation Initiatives

Temporary relocation initiatives support HRDs to move to a safer location—either within or outside of their countries of work—in response to imminent threats. In general, temporary internal or external relocation initiatives can involve emergency funds, physical security support, psychosocial and psycho-emotional support, medical assistance, digital security installation, and legal advice and assistance with immigration status and criminalization cases back home. Some organizations that support internal and external relocation of HRDs also help secure safe transportation and food assistance.

While international organizations fund some relocation initiatives, this assessment revealed that those efforts are often little known to and relatively infrequently engaged by HRDs. Instead, HRDs themselves take on much of the frontline work (collecting information, finding resources, establishing communication with potential relocation partners) to relocate themselves or their peers. HRDs interviewed for the assessment mentioned that they often learn about relocation services and support through their own research or network contacts, rather than through international organizations. Meanwhile, many smaller grassroots human rights organizations were not familiar with internal and external relocation support and assistance services for HRDs at all. Relocation almost always occurs in response to an urgent or imminent situation and, therefore, must occur swiftly. Yet, with limited access to information about available services and budgetary constraints, many organizations do not have time to relocate themselves or seek outside help in the moment. While the assessment found that some of these smaller organizations request the assistance of larger CSOs in these cases, this was not a common practice.

HRDs in rural, indigenous areas expressed particular lack of knowledge or access to internal or external relocations support. Some of these HRDs are familiar with only the more well-known cases, including the environmental defender who was present when Berta Cáceres was killed in Honduras. Some HRDs have had to pursue relocation on their own, often traversing the precarious and dangerous path through Central America and Mexico to seek protection in the U.S. When relocation is warranted in some circumstances with indigenous human rights defenders, it is often a collective decision. HRDs living in remote, rural areas have found that some assistance provided by international protection organizations has been too centralized, where HRDs need to travel to the capital to obtain services or assistance. HRDs in these rural areas recommend that initiatives strengthen local associations and organizations, and that initiatives are conducted in rural areas that are most affected by widespread abuse, corruption and extractive industrial activities.

The assessment revealed that relocation initiatives that tend to be most successful are those that are tied to local in-country partners who can verify information, recommend specific actions appropriate to the context, maintain consistent communication with affected HRDs. These locally-grounded efforts are better able to account for HRDs’ specific needs and decisions throughout the process as well as issues around family, community, gender, identity, culture and socioeconomics. In some cases, internal or external relocation support includes the full participation of HRDs in assisting with security and protection, as well as family members who are or would also be affected. This includes participation in the entire process of protection and security, including identifying and assessing the risk as well participating in the decision- making regarding how to avert the risk. If relocation is warranted, it is a decision taken together with the HRD. This strategy and approach were hailed by many interviewed for the assessment as ideal and as a practice worthy of strengthening and multiplying throughout Latin America. As a staff member of an organization that supports temporary relocation put it, “Any temporary relocation initiative must put the defenders at the center, give them contextualized, close, personal, and humane attention, and they must be able to listen.”

Only a handful organizations monitor and provide follow-up after temporary relocation to analyze the context, risks, threats and in-person visits to places in the country, including to the HRD’s home, workplace, and usual routes. Similarly, only some relocation initiatives will have periodic meetings with authorities, or issue reports, fact sheets and alerts. If an HRD with a pending case of assault or attack before the Attorney General or Public Ministry’s Office has to relocate outside the country, not all organizations providing relocation services will continue to accompany those cases, and as a consequence, cases get dropped and impunity ensues. It remains a challenge to provide monitoring and follow up of cases to HRD’s family members or keep pro bono attorneys or legal services organizations informed in the host country. If an HRD is returning to her or his home country after temporary relocation, only a handful of national protection organizations have systems in place to evaluate the current context at home to help ensure a safe return. For example, if an HRD seeks to return to a specific area, not all organizations or institutions have processes that would offer the HRD temporary shelter elsewhere, while conditions in the place of return are assessed or processes to accompany or follow up on that HRD’s safe return.

While often the best solution to mitigate risk to an HRD, temporary relocation poses significant challenges. Prior to fleeing their homes within or outside the country, amidst an environment of threats to their lives and attacks to their physical integrity, HRDs often have to hastily put personal and professional aspects of their lives in order, include leaving behind their careers, gainful employment, their homes and family members.

Internal Relocation as the Best Option for HRDs

Through interviews with international and local organizations, as well as HRDs, this assessment found that internal relocation, when feasible, should be the preferred method to assist HRDs at risk for several reasons. First, HRDs themselves prefer internal relocation. Most HRDs do not want to leave their home countries and seek to avoid abandoning their work or their families completely. This is especially true for indigenous HRDs and land rights defenders, who share communal and spiritual traditions connected to their lands. Internal relocation allows HRDs to remain in their environment, connected to their work and their communities. In addition, internal relocation is consistent with the notion of “collective protection,” highlighted by HRDs as a key component of effective protection strategies. The notion of collective protection focuses on the HRD and his or her work as grounded in a community that offers psychosocial support and infrastructure, including temporary shelter and physical security support. This option also allows for easier relocation of the family unit if needed and allows for more fluid communication between HRDs and their families. Perhaps most importantly for HRDs, internal relocation makes it more feasible for HRDs to continue their human rights work. Internal relocation is usually supported by national or local organizations, leveraging informal networks of support, including the HRD’s own community, which they can quickly activate to protect the HRD, offering psychosocial and psycho-emotional support, medical assistance, digital security installation, support and training, legal assistance, are generally not provided under these circumstances. In addition, local organizations familiar with the HRD and his or her work can closely monitor the relocated HRDs.

In contrast, according to HRDs and CSOs, external relocation can disrupt the social fabric of their communities and families, while weaken leadership within organizations or HRD communities. Moreover, external relocation demands more extensive capacity and resources, which are often unavailable or time-consuming to come by in urgent situations.

Nevertheless, internal relocation of an HRD still requires accompaniment from a CSO or other protection body, significant resources, and a thorough assessment of each HRD’s particular context and the conditions elsewhere in the country. Sometimes these elements are absent of indicate that internal relocation is not feasible. For instance, in some cases, the risk to the HRD is so severe and imminent or is so pervasive throughout the country (see Section IV examples of Venezuela and Nicaragua), that external relocation presents the better option. In other cases, national and local organizations are fully engaged with other pressing commitments or lack sufficient funding to assist with relocation or to ensure the HRD’s internal safety. In those cases, HRDs must turn to resources in other countries to help the relocate externally. HRDs overwhelmingly hope that relocation abroad will be temporary and aspire to return to their home countries when possible.

HRD Shelters

While not extensive in number, there are a few regional shelters for HRDs in Latin America, and all operate at full capacity. Below is a brief description of three examples, please refer to Annex 4 for more detailed information.

Shelter City, Costa Rica: Fundación Acceso coordinates the Shelter City Initiative in Costa Rica. Shelter City provides international relocation to HRDs at risk in any country in Central America. Once an HRD enters a shelter, the program provides integral security (legal, physical, digital and psycho-emotional) trainings for the HRDs to build on their existing capacities so they can continue their work in their respective countries when they return. In some cases, the support includes the HRDs’ dependents. The majority of HRDs that Shelter City supports and accompanies come from low socioeconomic backgrounds. Shelter City does not coordinate relocation with the HRD’s organization, but with the HRD directly; the HRD decides what course of action she or he wants to take. A multidisciplinary team assists and accompanies the HRD throughout their stay. Generally, the HRDs stay at Shelter City for 3 months. Shelter City’s in-country analysts assist HRDs with plans for return to their home country. After the HRD has returned to their home country, Shelter City accompanies the HRD back home for an additional 3 months. On average, Shelter City shelters around 200 HRDs annually, and assists 80 organizations that support HRDs. See section IV (B) information related to Nicaraguans in Costa Rica being supported by Shelter City.

ICORN’s Casa México Citlaltépetl: Casa Mexico Citlaltépetl started as part of the International Cities of Refuge Network (ICORN). ICORN is an independent organization of cities and regions offering shelter to writers and artists at risk, advancing freedom of expression, defending democratic values and promoting international solidarity. ICORN member cities offer long term, but temporary, shelter to those at risk as a direct consequence of their creative activities. ICORN has emergency funds for travel and lodging for writers and authors who are forced to flee. For at least two years, individuals received an apartment, a monthly stipend, health insurance and language classes. In 1999, Mexico City joined ICORN through the Casa Refugio Citlaltépetl, which, between 1999 and 2016 hosted 13 writers and artists, five of whom have permanently resided in Mexico. Initially, Casa Refugio Citlaltépetl received funding from Mexico City, and subsequently from the State of Mexico as well. Casa Refugio also generated its own revenue through projects like a restaurant and a bookstore, which allow Casa Refugio to pay staff salaries. Since 2016, Casa Refugio has had no direct relationship with ICORN, nor has it hosted a writer in exile. In 2017, Mexico City took over operations of the Casa Refugio (Mexico City was always the house owner) and converted the house for Mexican cultural activities.

Protect Defenders.eu: Protect Defenders.eu is a consortium of 12 organizations that protect HRDs around the world, and is based in Brussels, Belgium. The Secretariat of this consortium manages the actions of the 12 member organizations. The Secretariat provides temporary relocation grants, which provides emergency funds for HRDs to relocate. The HRD can apply for the emergency funds directly. One of the requirements of this program is that a host organization receive the HRDs in the host country. The Secretariat also implements the Shelter Initiatives Program, which provides economic support and trainings to organizations that are implementing or seek to implement a temporary relocation program for HRDs at risk on a local or regional level. Protect Defenders.eu assists solely with temporary relocation, not permanent resettlement. As part of the support provided to human rights organizations, ProtectDefenders.eu also coordinates the European Commission’s European Union Temporary Relocation Platform (EUTRP), a network of entities working in the protection of HRDs.

Adequacy and impact of assistance

Protecting and defending HRDs in Latin America is a new enterprise for all actors and stakeholders involved. There has not been a systematic evaluation of programs, assistance and impact, and information on assistance is limited. Nonetheless, this assessment has revealed some initial factors that affected the adequacy and impact of assistance for HRDs in Latin America:

• Short-term assistance is most effective: Temporary relocation initiatives are more effective in the short term than in the long term because they respond to an immediate urgent threat with a limited investment to resources. Relocation initiatives and support are difficult to sustain in the long term, as the number of cases of threats and attacks against HRDs continues to rise sharply, taxing existing services, which must prioritize immediate, short-term responses. Most internal and external relocation initiatives last three to six months. While some include reassessment after 6 months, and some HRDs get protection measures for more than two years, most do not include long-term plans.
• Locally-driven relocation initiatives or those where local CSOs coordinate closely with other temporary relocation initiatives, are the most effective in providing HRDs with emergency funds, resources and relocation support.
• Pre-relocation contextual analyses contribute to more appropriate protection measures that address actual risks, and are viable in each specific context.
• Lack of knowledge among organizations supporting HRDs of State structures (legal system, framework and apparatus), channels and mechanisms for addressing issues facing an HRD at risk can blur or weaken official petitions or complaints filed by or on behalf of HRDs. This has bred a distrust of organizations and their protection systems.
• Civil society participation in assistance: In countries that have a State-run protection mechanism, CSOs report that some governments have failed to include or incorporate the participation of civil society, or lack adequate conditions for CSO participation. This has resulted in lack of communication between CSOs and State authorities.
• Legal assistance and representation to help HRDs counter the State’s criminalization of their work is crucial to allowing them to continue their work either in their home country or from abroad. These legal processes can often take years. Legal support is needed for the HRD who faces false charges or imprisonment.
• CSO capacity building. Larger, more prominent organizations working on protection, often need the support of local organizations that can refer cases or connect smaller, nascent CSOs to assistance. When local CSOs have stronger tools and mechanisms to share information and accompany at-risk HRDs, assistance, including relocation can be more successful.

Did exiled HRDs continue their work, if yes how, if not, why?

Once an HRD is living in exile, whether temporarily or permanently, their ability to continue working in human rights generally wanes due to multiple factors, such as personal stress, lack of resources, and legalization or regularization obstacles. HRDs often find themselves isolated and bored during this period, which can lead to depression when coupled with the stress of having had to flee. These HRDs recommend that support for this element should be incorporated in any temporary relocation initiative. Some HRDs may also need to step away and decompress.

Our assessment found that some HRDs are able to work with host organizations as spokespeople for their home organizations and conditions in their home countries. In other cases, HRDs focus on a key activity such as follow-up and monitor the human rights cases he or she handled in their home country while in exile. Some HRDs interviewed expressed a desire to continue their human rights work from their host country, even in cases of temporary relocation.

HRDs who work with CSOs that have already established relationships or partnerships with similar organizations in the host country or internationally are better able to continue their work from exile. However, in some cases, CSOs cannot continue to employ an exiled HRD, due to funding restrictions by donors that limit aid to a specific country or location. When a CSO can continue to employ an exiled HRD, it can often only provide the same salary or wage provided at home. Depending on where the HRD is relocated, those salaries are often inadequate to new costs of living and other additional expenses exile can entail. Some donors are beginning to open to the idea of supporting CSO personnel living abroad, but this is currently the exception. In lieu of offering direct support to beneficiaries, some exiled HRDs have deployed technology and social media to continue their work from abroad. For example, some HRDs have continued to support their communities by providing advice and accompaniment via WhatsApp, phone calls and email. For HRDs relocated in host countries or under temporary relocation initiatives that do provide additional support in relocation beyond emergency funds, HRDs have provided that support to their home communities at their own expense and of their own volition. Isolation from their home countries has prevented HRDs in relocation from working directly on issues back at home, but relocation has allowed them to present petitions and complaints before international and regional bodies, either on behalf of themselves or their colleagues back home.

• 1A precautionary measure is a protection mechanism of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), through which it requests a State to protect one or more persons who are in a serious and urgent situation from suffering irreparable harm. Any person or organization may submit a request for precautionary measures in favor of an identified or identifiable person, or group of persons who find themselves in a situation of risk. It is important to have the consent of the person in whose favor the request is filed, or failing that, the inability to obtain this consent should be reasonably justified. The precautionary measures mechanism is provided for in Article 25 of the IACHR’s Rules of Procedure. More information, https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/decisions/mc/about-…
• 2For the purposes of the assessment, self-care is the ability to engage in human rights work without sacrificing other important parts of one life. The ability to maintain a positive attitude towards the work despite challenges. Self-care can also be understood as a practitioner’s right to be well, safe, and fulfilled. More information here, https://www.newtactics.org/conversation/self-care-activists-sustaining-…

The Cases of Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Human Rights Defenders 

Within the broader Latin America HRD landscape, a new dynamic is emerging at border locations, as HRDs and CSOs have been forced to flee their home countries. Taking a closer look at the border dynamics between Venezuela and Colombia, and Nicaragua and Costa Rica, specifically help inform protection approaches for activists elsewhere in the region that have been forced to flee their home countries. These two country pairs were selected for several reasons. First, there is a critical mass of activity and cases to draw lessons from. Given the hardening of authoritarian rule in Venezuela and Nicaragua, a large number of HRDs and democracy activists have been forced to flee to Colombia and Costa Rica, and many have set operations to continue their work in exile. Second, in Colombia and Costa Rica there is already some scattered and anecdotal evidence of the challenges HRDs face, and approaches being implemented to support and protect them in exile.

These two cases help to understand the role of key actors and how they interact with each other to support and protect HRDs in exile. The actors are: 1) National and local government institutions in the host countries (Costa Rica and Colombia); 2) Venezuelan and Nicaraguan HRD communities in the host countries; 3) the Colombian and Costa Rican HRDs and CSOs in host countries; and 4) the international governmental and non-governmental organizations in the host country. Moreover, the two cases have helped to identify existing approaches to shelter HRDs and democracy activists, the services they receive, and gaps in services. The analysis and systematization of these two cases will help offer initial inputs to develop and implement effective, sustainable, and comprehensive approaches to respond to HRDs’ needs and help host governments more effectively use resources to meet the needs of HRDs in their host communities. At the same time, the focus on these two cases from the perspective of the HRDs will highlight their needs related to health, livelihoods, psychological, education, security, family links, and advocacy opportunities.

Case Study: Exiled Venezuelan Human Rights Defenders in Colombia

Case Study: Exiled Nicaraguan Human Rights Defenders in Costa Rica