Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Uzbekistan

Not Free
25
100
A Obstacles to Access 8 25
B Limits on Content 11 35
C Violations of User Rights 6 40
Last Year's Score & Status
27 100 Not Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Uzbekistan worsened during the coverage period, largely due to measures the government took in response to summer 2022 protests in the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan against proposed constitutional amendments that would infringe on the region’s sovereignty. Ahead of and during the protests, the government restricted access to the internet, arrested journalists and activists for sharing information about the protests, and reportedly tortured bloggers in Karakalpakstan. In the wake of the protests, the government convicted at least 61 people for their involvement in the protests, some of which related to online activities. More positively, the government unblocked social media platforms, which were initially blocked for violating data localization requirements introduced in April 2021.

While reforms adopted since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016 have led to improvements on some issues, Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state with few signs of democratization. No opposition parties operate legally. The legislature and judiciary effectively serve as instruments of the executive branch, which initiates reforms by decree, and the media are still tightly controlled by the authorities. Reports of torture and other ill-treatment persist, although highly publicized cases of abuse have resulted in dismissals and prosecutions for some officials, and small-scale corruption has been meaningfully reduced.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • The government reportedly restricted access to mobile and fixed-line internet in Karakalpakstan in June and July 2022 as residents protested proposed constitutional changes that would have limited the region’s autonomy (see A3 and B8).
  • In August 2022, the Information and Mass Media Agency (AIMK) announced the unblocking of Skype, Twitter, and VKontakte, which had originally been blocked for failing to store Uzbek users’ data in-country in 2021 (see A3 and B1).
  • In January and March 2023, at least 61 individuals were convicted for their roles in the 2022 Karakalpakstan protests, including for online activities. Sentences ranged from probation to 16 years in prison (see B8 and C3).
  • In June 2022, law enforcement officers reportedly detained Karakalpakstan-based blogger Kural Rametov, tortured him, and dumped him on the street after his detention (see C3 and C7).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 4.004 6.006

Internet penetration rates have improved in Uzbekistan in recent years. Internet access is still based primarily on asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) technology. According to Economist Impact’s Inclusive Internet Index 2022, 93.6 percent of households have internet access.1 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reports an overall internet penetration rate of 76.6 percent as of 2021.2 In 2022, the country’s fixed-line internet subscription rate was 26 percent, while its active mobile broadband penetration rate was 104 percent,3 according to the most recent ITU data.

Internet connection speeds remain relatively slow. Subscribers experience poor connection quality and frequent disconnections. According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, as of May 2023, the median fixed-line broadband download speed was 49.69 Megabits per second (Mbps), while the median mobile broadband download speed was 19.61.4 Uztelecom, the state-run telecommunications monopoly, upgraded the bandwidth of Uzbekistan’s international internet channels to 3.2 Terabits per second (Tbps) in 2022.5 However, users regularly experience slower speeds than reported, or even disruptions.6

Mobile service providers deliver second-generation (2G), 3G, and 4G services, with most of the population covered by 2G (99 percent), 3G (90 percent), and 4G (66 percent) networks.7 In September 2022, state-owned mobile service provider UMS (Mobiuz) launched 5G services available only in business districts of Tashkent, the capital, after another state-owned provider, Ucell, launched a “limited-area 5G user zone” in the city in April 2021.8

State-owned Uztelecom and several mobile service providers offer public Wi-Fi hotspots in limited locations. In February 2018, Mirziyoyev signed a decree that introduced tax relief and advertisement rights for businesses investing in Wi-Fi hotspots.9 In June 2022, the government reported that it set up 702 hotspots in tourist sites during the year, with a total of 3,450 hotspots across the country.10

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

The cost of internet access relative to household income continues to decrease in Uzbekistan. However, there are significant geographic and gender divides.

In 2022, the ITU reported that a 5 gigabyte (GB) fixed-line broadband connection costs 1.71 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, while a 2 GB mobile broadband subscription costs .85 percent of GNI per capita.1 According to the World Bank, Uzbekistan’s GNI per capita was $1,960 in 2021.2

In November 2019, the government began to obligate consumers to pay a fee to register their mobile devices’ international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) codes (see C4), introducing another cost to getting online. In December 2020, the government changed the IMEI registration procedure, obliging retail sellers to take responsibility for registering IMEI devices.3

Internet penetration rates are significantly lower outside Tashkent. The capital has the highest rate of internet penetration and fiber-to-the-building (FTTB) broadband connectivity in Uzbekistan, significantly higher than the country’s 12 administrative regions and the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan.4 Furthermore, the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure depends on a stable electricity supply, which is lacking in some rural areas.5

Residential areas outside Tashkent still have far fewer high-speed FTTB connections, as shown by national internet service providers’ (ISPs) coverage maps.6 In April 2020, Mirziyoyev issued a decree stating that all settlements would have high-speed internet by 2021,7 but this had not come into fruition at the end of the coverage period.

According to Economist Impact’s Inclusive Internet Index 2022, men access the internet at a higher rate than women, with a 13.3 percent difference between their respective internet penetration rates. The difference in mobile connection is relatively lower, at 9.6 percent.8

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 2.002 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because the government restricted internet access in the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan during protests in June and July 2022.

The government continues to exercise significant control over ICT infrastructure.

In June and July 2022, the government restricted internet access ahead of and during protests in Karakalpakstan, claiming it would prevent the spread of “fake news.”1 The protests, which started in the region’s capital, Nukus, at the beginning of July, concerned a constitutional change that would prevent the autonomous region from seceding from Uzbekistan. On June 26, ahead of the protests, the government began limiting mobile internet access. Authorities reportedly later restricted fixed-line access, which persisted into late July.2 While internet access was disrupted, the authorities violently attacked protesters. Although officials claimed that 18 people died in the crackdown, rights groups estimated that over 100 people were killed or went missing after law enforcement officers used live ammunition and deployed grenade launchers against protesters.3 Mirziyoyev announced that he would withdraw the proposed constitutional changes on July 2.4

In July 2021, the State Inspectorate for Control in the Sphere of Informatization and Telecommunications in Uzbekistan (Uzkomnazorat) restricted access to Skype, Twitter, TikTok, VKontakte, and WeChat for violating new amendments to the personal data law (see B1 and C6).5 On November 3, 2021, additional social media platforms and messaging applications including Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Odnoklassniki, Telegram, and YouTube were blocked, though access was restored on the same day (see B1). In August 2022, the Information and Mass Media Agency (AIMK) announced that Twitter, VKontakte, and WeChat were unblocked and the government was in ongoing discussions with TikTok about unblocking the application.6 Though TikTok has remained blocked since 2021, users have been able to briefly access the application at various different times since the initial blocking order.7

The Open Observatory on Network Interference (OONI) reported that Signal, a popular encrypted and open-source messaging application, was blocked in Uzbekistan between April and September 2021 (see B1).8

Uztelecom runs the International Packet Switching Center, which aggregates international internet traffic at a single point within its infrastructure. By centralizing international connections into one “choke point” (and concentrating the ICT sector in a state-owned company), the government can more easily restrict internet access and engage in surveillance. Uztelecom also functions as an upstream ISP, selling internet traffic to domestic ISPs at wholesale prices. Private ISPs are prohibited by law from bypassing Uztelecom’s infrastructure to connect to the international internet, and from installing and maintaining their own satellite stations to establish internet connectivity. The government had planned to permit private ISPs to establish their own connections to the international internet in 2020.9 This goal had not been realized by the end of the coverage period.10

The TAS-IX peering center and content delivery network, established in 2004, interconnects the networks of private ISPs to enable traffic conveyance and exchange at no mutual charge, and without the need to establish international internet connections via Uztelecom.11 Private ISPs provide no traffic limitations to websites hosted within the TAS-IX networks, but filter and block other websites to the same extent as Uztelecom.12

The authorities also have ordered mobile service providers to halt internet and text message services around educational institutions to prevent cheating during university entrance exams held every August.13

Certain services are sometimes unavailable via fixed-line or mobile internet connections.14 The web browser Opera has been persistently blocked,15 although Uztelecom insists that there are “no restrictions on equipment to which the company’s specialists have access.”16

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 1.001 6.006

There are numerous legal, regulatory, and economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of Uzbekistan’s ICT sector. Officially, hundreds of companies provide telecommunications services,1 and as of April 2020, there were some 8,200 telecommunications businesses.2

However, the state dominates the ICT sector. State-owned Uztelecom is the only fixed-line broadband provider that is allowed to connect to the international internet (see A3). Five mobile service providers operate in the mobile market, including three state-owned firms: Ucell, Mobiuz, and UzMobile, as well as two privately owned operators: Perfectum Mobile (owned by Uzbek company Rubicon Wireless Communication) and Beeline (Unitel), which is owned by Netherlands-based VEON. Ucell, the second-largest mobile service provider after Beeline,3 was acquired by the government in November 2018 after its former owner, Sweden’s Telia Company, announced in 2015 that it would exit Uzbekistan.4

Service providers must possess licenses to operate, and in 2005, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted Resolution No. 155, which stipulates that providers must register as a legal entity before being issued a license.5 Licensing is often encumbered by political interests and has historically been marred by bribery.6

Other factors impeding telecommunications companies’ operations include an unstable regulatory environment and complicated customs procedures for the import of ICT equipment.

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 0.000 4.004

The Ministry for Development of Information Technologies and Communications (MiTC) regulates telecommunications services related to the internet, while Uzkomnazorat monitors compliance with ICT-related legislation. The MiTC takes on the role of policymaker, regulator, and content provider, and thus is responsible for, inter alia, licensing ISPs and mobile service providers (see A4), promoting technical standards for telecommunications technologies, and providing e-governance services. The MiTC is not independent and operates opaquely.

The state-owned Uzinfocom administers the “.uz” top-level domain. As of March 2023, 19 ISPs and 8 private companies were authorized to provide registry services in the “.uz” domain zone.1

In November 2018, the president signed a decree reorganizing the country’s internet governance apparatus, creating Uzkomanazorat to oversee compliance with ICT-related legislation; the Technical Assistance Center to collect, retain, and analyze data from ISPs and law enforcement bodies on “threats to information security”; and a third entity to help implement the government’s Safe City surveillance system (see C5).2

  • 1Computerization and Information Technologies Developing Center, "РЕГИСТРАТОРЫ [Administrators],” http://cctld.uz/reg/.
  • 2"О мерах по совершенствованию системы контроля за внедрением информационных технологий и коммуникаций, организации их защиты [On measures to improve the control system for the implementation of information technologies and communications, the organization of their protection],” National News Agency of Uzbekistan, November 22, 2018, http://uza.uz/ru/documents/o-merakh-po-sovershenstvovaniyu-sistemy-kont….

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 2 to 3 to reflect the government’s decision to restore access to social media platforms and messaging applications, which were blocked during the last coverage period.

Significant blocking and filtering limit access to online content related to political and social topics, particularly to sites and platforms that discuss human rights abuses in Uzbekistan. During the coverage period, the government blocked access to major social media platforms and messaging applications.

In August 2022, the government restored access to Twitter, VKontakte, Skype, and WeChat,1 which had initially been blocked in July 2021 for failing to store data on local servers in violation of the April 2021 Law on Personal Data (see A3 and C6).2 TikTok, which was blocked for the same reason in July 2021, remained inaccessible through the end of the coverage period.3 In November 2021, Uzkomnazorat briefly restricted access to Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Odnoklassniki, Telegram, and YouTube for the same reason. Later the same day, the president fired Golubsher Ziyayev, the head of Uzkomnazorat, and reinstated access to these networks.

In a study conducted from April to September 2021, OONI found signs that access to the Signal app was blocked in Uzbekistan (See A3).4

Between June and August 2020, users had trouble accessing Meta products,5 including Messenger6 and Instagram.7 The government repeatedly denied playing a role in blocking the platforms and encouraged users to voice their complaints to ISPs.8

In July 2020, the MiTC blocked the satirical website Durakchi (“Fool”),9 run by journalist Vasily Markov, because it allegedly violated Resolution No. 707 (see B3).10

In December 2019, journalist Katy Putz and human rights researcher Steve Swerdlow reported that they could not access the websites of the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, the International Partnership for Human Rights, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights (since renamed the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights) while in Uzbekistan.11 Shortly thereafter, the Agency for Information and Mass Communications (AIMK), which serves as a media regulator, announced that the websites were not, in fact, blocked.12 Commentators speculated that the decision to unblock these websites was related to the December 2019 parliamentary elections, which attracted global attention.13 That same month, domestic news outlet Spot.uz reported that several websites hosting user-generated content, including BuzzFeed, Lurkmore, the Internet Archive, SoundCloud, and WordPress, were unblocked, as was independent Russian news service TV Rain.14

In September 2019, users complained that several virtual private network (VPN) services, including CyberGhost VPN, Express VPN, and NordVPN, were blocked by Uztelecom.15 Similarly, the Opera web browser reportedly remained blocked (see A3) as of October 2021 because it features a built-in proxy service.16 These services allow users to access web resources that remain censored in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Uztelecom provides its own VPN.17

In May 2019, Komil Allamjonov, a former AIMK director, announced in a social media post that access to certain online media outlets and human rights organizations, including Eurasianet and Human Rights Watch, would be restored,18 following a statement from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).19 The websites of many independent online media outlets had been largely inaccessible since 2005,20 after a violent government crackdown on peaceful antigovernment protests in Andijan.21 Allamjonov did not say that the government had blocked these websites, blaming “certain technical problems” for their long-term unavailability.22

Other websites hosting political, social, and religious content, including the Uzbek news service Eltuz;23 the religious freedom organization Forum 18;24 Radio Ozodlik, the Uzbek-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL); the Open Society Foundations; and public opinion platforms Avaaz and Change.org25 remained inaccessible during the coverage period.”26

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

There is extensive nontechnical censorship of online content in Uzbekistan, including amongst the country’s most popular news sites, although it is not always widely reported.

In June 2022, during the protests in Karakalpakstan, news site Gazeta.uz removed an article detailing the change in the status of the autonomous republic and other proposed amendments to the constitution. The article now available only in the internet cache.1

In April 2022, Anora Sadikova, editor in chief of online media outlet Uzbek Rost24, was threatened and eventually forced to remove a report on a corruption scandal involving Jahangir Usmanov; Usmanov was mentioned in the Pandora Papers, an investigation that revealed the improper financial behavior and connections of rich and powerful actors around the world.2 Sadikova later published a video detailing the investigation on her Facebook page.3

After the Russian military invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Tashkent issued directives to media outlets requesting that they cover the invasion in a “neutral” fashion (see B4 and B5). In some cases, outlets deleted articles covering the conflict. Umid Shermuhammedov, a founder of online outlet Kun.uz, deleted a Facebook post detailing the attempts of the State Security Service (DXX) to summon him and other Kun.uz correspondents about the outlet’s coverage.4

Between January and June 2022, Facebook did not remove any content based on requests from the government.5 Twitter did not produce a transparency report covering the reporting period.6 In 2022, the government submitted 11 removal requests to Google covering 44 items, primarily concerning criticism of the government, but Google did not comply with any of them.7

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 0.000 4.004

The AIMK and the MiTC are responsible for regulating online content, particularly content deemed harmful to the government. Decisions to block or remove content are nontransparent.

In December 2022, the AIMK released a draft Information Code, which poses threats to freedom of expression.1 The draft code aims to amend eight existing pieces of legislation covering the media and the online environment. It broadly defines a blogger as a journalist or “a person who posts socio-political, socio-economic, and other information on his website and/or web page in the global information network.” The law would hold bloggers liable for posting “unverified information,” which it does not clearly define. Media experts in Uzbekistan noted the law contains several other vague definitions; for example, posting about “mass protests” can be interpreted as “calling to mass riots.”2 The draft law also has measures that would penalize bloggers for posting “insulting” content, including content that denigrates “society, the state, and state symbols.” Additionally, it would prevent the promotion of “same sex-relations,” according to analysis from Human Rights Watch.3 The draft law remained a proposal as of the end of the coverage period.

In April 2021, the government amended the Law on Personal Data to require website owners to store their data in Uzbekistan and ensure that their servers are registered with Uzkomnazorat (see C6). The law gives the regulator the authority to block websites that do not comply with the amendments, which it employed in July and November 2021 (see A3 and B1).4

In December 2020, the government amended Resolution No. 707 on “measures to improve information security in the global information network,” which was originally passed in 2018. The new amendment gives AIMK’s Center of Mass Communications the authority to order bloggers, website owners, social media companies, and messaging applications to remove “prohibited” content within 24 hours. If the prohibited content—which can include comments on social media posts—is not removed, the Center of Mass Communications can take the website owner or company to court.5

In September 2019, Mirziyoyev signed a decree requiring the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court to publish an up-to-date list of “organizations, websites, social networks and mobile messengers recognized… as extremist or terrorist and banned in the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan.”6

In September 2018, the government introduced guidelines on blocking websites. These guidelines marked the government’s first attempt to legitimize blocking, a practice it had long engaged in informally. According to the guidelines, the Center for Mass Communications now tracks the publication of illegal information online, forwarding any illegal content to two state bodies, the Public Monitoring Center and the Expert Commission on Information and Mass Communications. These two administrative bodies then place any flagged content on a confidential blacklist that the MiTC uses as the basis for imposing restrictions.7 The expansive category of “prohibited” information, which is defined under the Law on Informatization, includes “calls for a forced change of the existing constitutional order” and material that threatens the territorial integrity of Uzbekistan; “propaganda of war, violence, and terrorism,” as well as sites that promote religious extremism, separatism, and fundamentalism; state secrets; incitement to “national, racial, ethnic, or religious hatred”; defamation; material that violates the right to privacy; content pertaining to illegal drugs; and pornography.8

Under these guidelines, owners of blocked websites have the right to issue a complaint in court. Further, the authorities have pledged to unblock any blocked sites that voluntarily remove illegal content.9

Amendments from 2014 to the Law on Informatization brought bloggers and other online news providers, including citizen journalists, under state regulation and subjected them to content removal requirements. The law’s broad definition could qualify any person who disseminated information “of sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and other character” to the public through a website as a blogger.10 The law requires bloggers to substantiate the credibility of “generally accessible information” prior to publishing or even reposting content and obliges them to “immediately remove” information if it is not considered credible.

This law entitles the Center for Mass Communications to limit access to websites that do not comply with its provisions. It also bans, among other things, “information inciting national, racial, ethnic, or religious hatred, as well as denigrating the honor and dignity of citizens.”11

Intermediaries can be held liable for third-party content hosted on their platforms and can be forced to remove such content. Under the 1999 Law on Telecommunications and several subsequent government resolutions, the licenses of downstream ISPs may be withheld or denied for failing to take measures to prevent their computer networks from being used to exchange information deemed to violate national laws. Under Order No. 216 passed in 2004, ISPs and operators “cannot disseminate information that, inter alia, calls for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan, instigates war and violence, contains pornography, or degrades and defames human dignity.”12

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 1.001 4.004

Self-censorship remains pervasive given the government’s tight control over the media (particularly state media). Those commenting or reporting on topics deemed taboo, including criticism of the president or revelations about corruption, can still face harsh punishment. As a result of the government’s history of harassing journalists as well as their families, many online writers are cautious about what they post. Although some domestic news outlets continue to shine a light on abuses of power, other outlets refrain from tackling sensitive issues or are forced to remove content (see B2).

In March 2023, 41 bloggers and journalists appealed to the president through Telegram, asking him to eliminate the practice of censorship, which the group claimed has forced journalists, bloggers, and activists to change “the essence of information.”1

A June 2022 investigation in The Diplomat outlined the DXX’s pervasive role in fostering self-censorship. Journalists and bloggers detailed incidents where they were propositioned with bribes, were threatened, or were forced to delete content. In one instance, a Kun.uz journalist left his job after his editor prohibited him from covering a construction project that involved a deputy minister’s brother. In another case, a journalist reported moving to Tashkent after facing police surveillance in his hometown of Samarkand.2

The Diplomat also noted that the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan and the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to an increase in self-censorship.3 At the outset of invasion of Ukraine, the DXX warned bloggers and journalists to cover the events in a “very neutral” manner. Some journalists were summoned by the DXX because of their coverage (see B2).4

In recent years, officials at varying levels of government have also relied on other tactics to foster self-censorship, including "informal" conversations, 5 threats of prosecution, and, in some cases, physical threats. 6

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

The editorial direction of online versions of state-run news outlets is determined by both official and unofficial directives. This has remained the case under Mirziyoyev.

After the Russian military invaded Ukraine, Tashkent declared its neutral position. The DXX summoned several journalists, including journalists from Kun.uz,1 instructing them to report events “neutrally” (see B4).2

The Union of Youth of Uzbekistan (OYI), a government-affiliated youth organization, has recruited social media trolls from its ranks. These trolls smear government critics and spread disinformation, including false claims about the illegality of VPN usage in Uzbekistan. According to Hook.report, OYI members have been encouraged to create five Facebook profiles per person.3 According to researchers at Oxford University, progovernment commentators are also active on Twitter.4 In April 2020, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (IIV) proposed the creation of a group of bloggers comprised of OYI members, students at the Tashkent University of Information Technologies, and volunteer youth who would counter negative opinions on social media.5

  • 1“Kun.uz строго соблюдает национальное законодательство и объективность при освещении событий в Украине [Kun.uz strictly observes national legislation and objectivity when covering events in Ukraine],” Kun UZ, March 6, 2022, available at: https://kun.uz/ru/news/2022/03/06/obektivnost-i-aktualnost-kak-v-kunuz-….
  • 2“В Узбекистане журналистов вызывают вспецслужбы за «неправильное освещение»войны в Украине [In Uzbekistan, journalists are summoned by special services for "incorrect coverage" of the war in Ukraine],” Radio Azattyq, March 6, 2022, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/31738517.html.
  • 3Rafael Sattorov, “Фабрика троллей Узбекистана: кто стоит за новым инструментом управления массами [Uzbekistan Troll Factory: who is behind the new mass management tool].” Hook.report, September 28, 2018, https://hook.report/2018/09/arrrr-vokrug-trolli/.
  • 4Samantha Bradshaw and Philip Howard, “The Global Disinformation Order 2019: Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation,” Computational Propaganda Research Project: University of Oxford, 2019, https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberT….
  • 5“Постановление Президента Республики Узбекистан Вояга етмаганлар ва ёшлар ўртасида ҳуқуқбузарликлар профилактикаси тизимини янада такомиллаштириш бўйича чора-тадбирлар тўғрисида ID-16692 [Presidential. President of the Republic of Uzbekistan On measures to further improve the system of prevention of juvenile delinquency and juvenile delinquency ID-16692].” regulation.gov.uz, https://regulation.gov.uz/ru/document/16692.
B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 0.000 3.003

The economic and regulatory environment for online publishers is heavily constrained. The financial sustainability of independent online media outlets largely depends on foreign funding that remains subject to vigorous state control. The parliamentary Public Fund for Support and Development of Independent Print Media and News Agencies of Uzbekistan allocates state subsidies,1 which are primarily granted to state-owned and progovernment outlets.

Under 2007 amendments to the Law on Mass Media,2 any website engaged in the dissemination of information at least once every six months is considered “mass media” and is subject to official press registration.3 This registration process can be arbitrary, inhibiting journalists and readers from exercising their rights to free expression and access to information. A December 2019 regulation requires new mass media, including mass media whose work is distributed online, to register—for a fee—with the AIMK.4 The regulation simplifies the registration process, allowing it to be done online and reducing the time by half.5 The draft information code, introduced by the AIMK in December 2022, includes new regulations for bloggers (see B3). However, the code had not passed through parliament as of the end of the coverage period.6

According to remarks made by Mirziyoyev in June 2022, there were 1,962 mass media outlets, including 677 online outlets, in Uzbekistan.7 Journalists who work online are subject to extensive regulation (see B3).8

  • 1“Указ Президента Республики Уузбекистан об образовании общественного фонда поддержки и развития независимых печатных средств массовой информации и информационных агентств Узбекистана [Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Establishing the Public Foundation on Support and Development of Independent Mass Media and News Agencies of Uzbekistan],” Lex.uz, November 16, 2005, https://web.archive.org/web/20190504222402/http://www.lex.uz:80/docs/11….
  • 2Law RU, Осредствахмассовойинформации, [On the Mass Media] No. 541-I, adopted December 26, 1997, as amended on January 15, 2007, SZRU (2007) No. 3, item 20, at art. 4.
  • 3Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers RU, О Дальнейшем Совершенствовании Порядка Государственной регистрации средств массовой информации в Республике Узбекистан, [On the Further Development of the Procedure for State Registration of the Mass Media in the Republic of Uzbekistan], No. 214, October 11, 2006, in SP RU (2007) No. 14, item 141, at art. 8.
  • 4“ОАВ соҳасида давлат хизматлари кўрсатишнинг маъмурий регламенти тасдиқланди [The administrative regulations for the provision of public services in the field of mass media have been approved],” Kun.uz, December 21, 2019, https://kun.uz/news/2019/12/21/oav-sohasida-davlat-xizmatlari-korsatish….
  • 5“Ўзбекистон Республикаси вазирлар маҳкамасининг қарори оммавий ахборот ва коммуникациялар соҳасида давлат хизматлари кўрсатишнинг айрим маъмурий регламентларини тасдиқлаш тўғрисида [The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan Resolution on Approval of Some Administrative Regulations of Government Services in the Sphere of Media and Communications],” lex.uz, https://lex.uz/docs/4655428.
  • 6Yevgeny Sorochin, “Проект Информационного кодекса: Расплывчатые формулировки, ограничения для СМИ и блогеров [Draft Information Code: Vague wording, restrictions for media and bloggers],” Gazeta UZ, December 28, 2022, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2022/12/28/information-code/.
  • 7President Mirziyoyev, “Работникам печати и средств массовой информации [To Press and Media Workers],” President UZ, June 27, 2022, available at: https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/5294.
  • 8IREX,“Media Sustainability Index 2019: Uzbekistan,” 2019, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index….
B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 2.002 4.004

Though the online media environment in Uzbekistan has remained severely restricted under Mirziyoyev, there is evidence that some registered media outlets have begun to cover more politically and socially sensitive topics.1 Relative to previous years, more internet users are reading and engaging with news from independent sites. Historically, these websites had been subject to arbitrary closure or retroactive deregistration.2

According to a May 2023 survey released by the European Neighborhood Council and conducted by Internews, 38 percent of respondents say social media is their main source for “domestic news,” while 24 percent rely on messaging applications for the same purpose.3

Telegram channels are a popular source of relatively unfiltered information and cater to underserved audiences.4

Many people access blocked websites or messaging apps through proxies or VPNs.5

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 2.002 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because access to the internet was restricted during protests in Karakalpakstan in the summer of 2022, and the government prosecuted those who organized or disseminated information about them online.

The government’s stringent policies regarding use of the internet and social media, by youth in particular, discourage online mobilization as a significant form of political engagement, as do technical restrictions on communications platforms and petition websites (see A3 and B1).

The government shut down the internet during protests in Karakalpakstan, which were organized online and via messaging applications, in the summer of 2022 (see A3).1 Journalists covering the protests in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakstan and the epicenter of the protests, disseminated information about the protests on Telegram.2 At least 61 individuals were charged and convicted by courts in the wake of the protests for both online and offline activities (see C3). While several participants were sentenced to shorter terms, activist Daulet Tajimuratov, who was accused of instigating the protests, was sentenced to 16 years. Journalist Lolagul Kallyhanova was sentenced to eight years of suspended imprisonment.3 Additionally, in March 2023, a court in Karakalpakstan charged Amanbay Sagidullayev and Nietbay Urazbayev, activists who posted in support of the protests in Karakalpakstan from abroad, with “attempts to overthrow the constitutional regime” in absentia.4

Political activists and regime critics actively use social media to reach supporters in and outside of Uzbekistan. For example, there are social media pages for political movements like Erkin O’zbekiston (Free Uzbekistan)5 which are led by exiles. While the mobilizing potential of social media remains limited, in part due to restrictive laws governing freedom of assembly, the internet has increasingly become a space for activism.

Facebook and Telegram users can follow daily discussions about political, economic, and social issues in groups like “Reforms in the Republic of Uzbekistan: Problems with No Solutions.”6 In some cases, online activism can lead to real-world change. For example, in February 2021, the mayor of Tashkent promised not to cut down any trees in a central park7 after residents took to Facebook to campaign for its preservation.8

Citizens continue to utilize the government’s “virtual office” initiative to speak directly with government representatives, as well as Mening Fikrim (My Opinion), the government’s official petition platform.

  • 1Uzbekistan region in information vacuum, authorities must #KeepItOn, Access Now, January 26, 2023, https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/uzbekistan-information-vacuum-k….
  • 2Aziz Yakubov, “Пожизненный срок, бесправный Каракалпакстан и призрак ГУЛАГа. Зачем Шавкат Мирзиеев затеял обновление Конституции Узбекистана [“Пожизненный срок, бесправный Каракалпакстан и призрак ГУЛАГа. Зачем Шавкат Мирзиеев затеял обновление Конституции Узбекистана]” Mediazona Central Asia, June 28, 2022, https://mediazona.ca/article/2022/06/28/uzchanges.
  • 3Sania Toiken, “Верховный суд Узбекистана оставил без изменений приговор каракалпакскому журналисту Даулетмурату Тажимуратову [The Supreme Court of Uzbekistan upheld the sentence of Karakalpak journalist Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov],” Azattyq Radio, June 5, 2023, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/32445681.html.
  • 4Aziz Obidov, @azizobidov, Supreme Court, Official Information, March 25, 2023, https://t.me/AzizAbidov/3638.
  • 5“Free Uzbekistan [Erkin O'zbekiston],” accessed on May 31, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/groups/ErkinOzbekiston/.
  • 6“Реформы в Республике Узбекистан проблемы без решения [Reforms in the Republic of Uzbekistan - Problems With No Solution,]” accessed on May, 31, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1702403539857772/?ref=timeline.
  • 7“Артыкходжаев пообещал, что если хоть одно дерево в парке возле ЦУМа будет вырублено, то он уйдет с поста хокима” [“Artykhodzhaev promised that if at least one tree in the park near the Central Department Store is cut down, he will leave his post of khokim],” Podrobno.uz, February 13, 2021, https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/artykkhodzhaev-poobeshchal-chto-esli-….
  • 8“Первая часть подписей в защиту парка возле ЦУМа была сдана в Народную приемную президента [The first part of the signatures in defense of the park near the Central Department Store was handed over to the President's People's Reception],” Podrobno.uz, February 9, 2021, https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/pervaya-chast-podpisey-v-zashchitu-pa….

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 0.000 6.006

Uzbekistan’s constitution protects expression and mass-media rights and prohibits censorship. Article 29 of the constitution guarantees the right to gather and disseminate information.1 However, in practice, these rights are not respected, as evidenced by blocking of websites critical of the government and the subjection of media workers to political persecution. Courts in Uzbekistan are not independent and have largely failed to protect individuals, including journalists, against government retaliation for exercising freedom of expression. Courts also operate without transparency, depriving the public of access to legal decisions, although recent changes have clarified the media’s right to attend and report on legal proceedings.2 Rampant corruption, particularly within law enforcement agencies, as well as weak legislative and judicial bodies, continue to have a deleterious impact on these rights, online and offline.

Media workers are nominally provided strong protections under the Law on the Protection of Professional Activity of Journalists. However, these protections are not fully respected in practice.3

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

The criminal code contains several provisions that have been used extensively to prosecute reporters and ordinary internet users, including prohibitions on threatening the constitutional order (Article 159); inciting ethnic, national, racial, or religious hatred (Article 156); producing and disseminating of materials that contain threats to public security and order (Article 244.1); slander (Article 139); insult (Article 140); and insult of the president (Article 158).1 These offenses are variously punishable by fines, community service, and imprisonment. Further prohibitions typically placed on both journalists who work online and ordinary internet users are based on vague information security rules.2

In late 2020 and early 2021, the government enacted amendments to the administrative and criminal codes that enforce harsh penalties for online speech, including up to five years’ imprisonment for insulting the president. In December 2020, amendments to both codes introduced fines and prison time for a range of offenses. Publishing information that contains allegations deemed false or that threatens public order or security is now punishable with two years’ imprisonment in ordinary cases. Violators can face up to three years’ imprisonment in cases where the offense is “repeated,” “causes major damage,” occurs “during mass events or in case of emergency,” inflicts “especially large damage,” or results “in other grave consequences.” Violators can also face up to three years’ imprisonment if the offense is committed by “an organized group or in its interests.”3

The March 2021 amendments to the administrative and criminal codes stipulate that insulting or slandering the president online or in the press is punishable with up to five years’ imprisonment. 4 Additionally, “public calls for riots and violence against citizens” are punishable by five years' imprisonment, or up to 10 years in cases where the offense is made online or as part of a conspiracy with a large group.5

While the December 2020 amendments included harsh penalties for insult and slander in certain instances, they also reduced the penalties for defamation and insult generally. In December 2020, the government amended Articles 139 and 140 of the criminal code, which still criminalize defamation and insult, but with reduced maximum penalties. In defamation cases, violators now face up to three years of “restrained liberty,” which could include house arrest, or two to three years of correctional labor, instead of a three-year prison term. Likewise, those who are guilty of insult now face up to one year of probation, two to three years of correctional labor, or one year of “restrained liberty.”6

In March 2020,7 Mirziyoyev enacted amendments to Article 244.5 of the criminal code which penalize the dissemination of “false information” regarding the spread of infectious diseases or quarantine via mass media or the internet with up to three years’ imprisonment.8

In 2016, amendments to the criminal code increased the penalty (under Article 244.1) for the dissemination through “mass media or telecommunications networks” of “information or materials” that threaten public security and order (including by containing “ideas of religious extremism, separatism, or fundamentalism”) to up to eight years’ imprisonment.9

  • 1“Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Art. 139 and 140,“ https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Legal_documents/nationa….
  • 2Zhanna Kozhamberdiyeva, “Freedom of Expression on the Internet: A Case Study of Uzbekistan,” Review of Central and East European Law, January 2008, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233562177_Freedom_of_Expressio….
  • 3“Закон республики Узбекистан о внесении изменений и дополнений в уголовный, уголовно-процессуальный кодексы Республики Узбекистан и кодекс республики Узбекистан об административной ответственности” [“Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Amendments and Supplements to the Criminal, Criminal Procedural Codes of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Administrative Responsibility Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan],” December 26, 2020, https://www.lex.uz/acts/5186089?ONDATE=26.12.2020%2000#5189654.
  • 4“Uzbekistan establishes criminal liability for insulting the President on the Internet,” Kun.uz, March 31, 2021, https://kun.uz/en/news/2021/03/31/uzbekistan-establishes-criminal-liabi….
  • 5“О внесении изменений и дополнений в некоторые законодательные акты Республики Узбекистан [On amendments and additions to some legislative acts of the Republic of Uzbekistan],” xs.uz, March 31, 2021, https://xs.uz/ru/post/o-vnesenii-izmenenij-i-dopolnenij-v-nekotorye-zak….
  • 6Lex.uz, “Уголовный Кодекс Республики Узбекистан [Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan],” December 25, 2020, https://lex.uz/docs/111457.
  • 7“Информационное сообщение о третьем пленарном заседании Сената Олий Мажлиса Республики Узбекистан [Information Statement about the Third Session of the Senate of Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan],” Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, March 24, 2020, www.senat.uz/ru/lists/view/1262.
  • 8“Закон Республики Узбекистан о внесении изменений и дополнений в уголовный, уголовно-процессуальный кодексы Республики Узбекистан и кодекс Республики Узбекистан об административной ответственности [On Amendments and Additions to the Criminal, Criminal Procedure Codes of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Administrative Responsibility],” Lex.uz, March 24, 2020, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4774974.
  • 9Mushfig Bayram, "Uzbekistan: Harshened Criminal And Administrative Code punishments," Forum 18, June 15, 2016, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2189
C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 6.006

Despite Mirziyoyev's public statements about liberal reform, the government remains hostile toward its critics, including journalists who work online, human rights activists, and ordinary internet users.1 Numerous individuals have been arrested and convicted for their online activities, including in relation to the protests in Karakalpakstan in the summer of 2022. During these arrests, authorities often violate detainees’ fundamental rights by searching their phones without permission, accusing them of crimes they have not been charged of, and denying them access to legal assistance.

In January 2023, a Karakalpakstan court convicted 22 people who were arrested in connection with the summer 2022 protests, including for online activities related to the protests. Seventeen of them were sentenced to prison and five of were released or placed on house arrest. Most of the sentences ranged from three-and-a-half to eight years, except for activist Daulet Tajimuratov, who was sentenced to 16 years for allegedly attempting to seize power, embezzlement, and organizing mass riots. Of the five journalists who were released, two of them were initially handed suspended sentences.2 Among these was journalist Lolagul Kallyhanova, who was sentenced to eight years of suspended imprisonment with three years of probation under articles 159 (“conspiracy against the constitutional regime”) and 244 (“organization of mass riots” and “dissemination of materials threatening the public security”) of the criminal code (see B8).3 Following her release, she expressed remorse about her political activism during the protests in Karakalpakstan on her Telegram channel, which boasts 60,000 readers.4 Kallyhanova was initially detained for several days during the protest.5

In June 2023, after the coverage period, the Supreme Court issued a ruling after 16 defendants who were convicted in January 2023 appealed their sentences. The court reduced the sentences of six people and converted an additional eight sentences to house arrest. However, the court did not shorten Tajimuratov’s 16-year sentence.6

In a second trial related to the protests in March 2023, a Bukhara court found 39 people guilty for both online and offline activities. Sentences ranged from probation to 11 years in prison, with seven people charged with “distributing materials inciting social discord.”7 The court sentenced Oralbai Dosnasarov, a Nukus-based lawyer, to 11 years in prison for allegedly organizing meetings with other lawyers, inciting the protests, and sharing videos about the protests.8

Also in connection to the protests, in June 2022 Kural Rametov, a blogger in Karakalpalstan, was detained after he criticized the proposed constitutional amendments on social media. He was allegedly tortured and subsequently dumped naked in the streets of Nukus by police officers (see C7).9

In July 2022, police in Nukus briefly detained Joanna Lillis, who writes for the online outlet Eurasianet, after she traveled to Karakalpalstan to cover the story. Police also threatened to confiscate her phone (see C7).10

The government also continued to arrest and charge individuals throughout the country who criticized the government or exposed corruption online.

In March 2023, the Tashkent Province police arrested blogger Lemara Mirzaahmedova, who writes under the pseudonym Emine Karamanova and covers local corruption.11 The police claimed the criminal proceedings were associated with “fraud” and “public money embezzlement” related to Mirzaahmedova’s commercial interests connected to her company Tex Kredo. She faces a maximum sentence of up to 10 years and the case was ongoing as of the end of the coverage period.12

In February 2023, police in Tashkent arrested popular blogger Abdukodir Muminov (see C7), who has regularly criticized Mirziyoyev, for allegedly committing fraud and extortion felonies in 2021, under articles 165 and 168 of the criminal code.13 His mother claimed she was able to see her son only once, by video connection, and that Muminov has no access to lawyer.14 In August 2023, the Mirabad District Court of Tashkent sentenced Muminov to seven years and three months of imprisonment, banned him from working in journalism for three years, and ordered him to pay more than 900 million som ($80,000) to those he allegedly extorted.15

In February 2023, the Tashkent Mirabad District Criminal Court declared that blogger Shohida Salomova had mental health issues and detained her at a psychiatric facility.16 Salomova was arrested in December 2022 after she publicly criticized Mirziyoyev and his family, accusing them of nepotism. Shortly after her arrest, her Telegram channel and its archive were deleted; her house was also searched.17

In December 2022, Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court ordered a retrial for Hayot Norboev, a blogger who was handed a seven-year sentence by a lower court in Samarkand in July 2022. Norboev was initially convicted on charges of extorting local authorities. The case remained ongoing as of the end of the coverage period.18

In November 2022, social media influencer Sevinch Sadullayeva was arrested following a complaint from the deputy mayor of Tashkent. After she was arrested, she was compelled to go through “psychological counselling” because of photographs on her social media accounts, most of which depicted her and her boyfriend.19

The same month, Tashkent’s Yunusabad District Criminal Court issued a 108 million som ($10,000) fine to Aleksei Garshin, an independent journalist who criticized president Mirziyoyev on YouTube. The fine was for allegedly insulting a woman on Telegram.20

In April 2022, the Supreme Court upheld a six-and-a-half-year sentence against Otabek Sattoriy, who appealed a decision handed down by a Surxondaryo Province court.21 Sattoriy was detained by police, who accused him of threatening to publish an article on unfair prices in a bazaar unless he received a gift, in January 2021. That February, the prosecutor general’s office claimed seven complaints had been reported against Sattoriy, stating that he was “guilty of administrative offenses of slander, insult, and disseminating false information.”22 Sattoriy originally received his prison term for money extortion and aggravated slander in May 2021.23 In March 2022, cassation proceedings in response to a December 2021 complaint began at the Supreme Court, but Sattoriy was not allowed to attend.24

In February 2022, a district court in Xorazm Province sentenced blogger Sobirjon Babaniyazov to three years in prison for insulting Mirziyoyev and his daughter, as well as former president Islam Karimov, in a Facebook group.25 According to the official charge, the blogger “committed acts under aggravated circumstances” and “alcoholic intoxication.”26 The blogger posted two short videos and two audio messages via Telegram, explaining his acts were a result of “gas supply” issues and unemployment.27 Babaniyazov’s sentence marked the first time the March 2021 amendments to the criminal code, which criminalized insults against the president, were enforced (see C2).

In January 2022, the Almazar District Court of Tashkent sentenced Fozilhoja Arifhojayev, a religious blogger who regularly criticized the country’s clerical authorities, to a seven-and-a-half-year prison term for possessing “materials threatening public safety and public order” on his mobile phone.28 The charges stemmed from a Facebook post where he commented on whether Muslims should congratulate non-Muslims during their holidays.29 Arifhojayev was initially charged with petty hooliganism, but authorities later charged him with violating public order as well as extremism under Article 244 of the criminal code.30 The prison term was upheld in a March 2022 court ruling.31

In December 2021, anticorruption activist and blogger Ruslan Khairnurov, who exposed a multimillion-euro corruption scandal concerning an uncompleted recycling plant, was detained for sharing information regarding corruption in the health-care system on Facebook.32 Khairnurov was accused of libel and placed under house arrest during the criminal investigation, which was still ongoing at the end of the coverage period.33

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 1.001 4.004

There is limited space for anonymous digital communication, and the government strictly regulates the use of encryption.1 Proxy servers and anonymizers are important tools for protecting privacy and accessing blocked content.

There are few options for posting anonymous comments online. Individuals are increasingly encouraged to register with their real names to participate in discussion forums such as the state-run Uforum.2 Individuals must also provide their internal passport information to buy a SIM card.3 In addition, as of September 2019, individuals must register their mobile devices’ IMEI codes with the state.4 Service providers must block unregistered devices.

Additionally, certain VPN services have apparently been blocked (see B1).

  • 1Resolution of the President RU “О мерах по организации криптографической защиты информации в Rеспублике Узбекистан [On Organizational Measures for Cryptographic Protection of Information in the Republic of Uzbekistan],” No. ПП-614, No 14, Item 140, at Art. 1., April 3, 2007, SZ RU, 2007.
  • 2"Правила форума [Terms of Use],” UZ Forum, http://uforum.uz/misc.php?do=cfrules.
  • 3“Timeline of SIM Card Registration Laws,” Privacy International, June 11, 2019, https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3018/timeline-sim-card-regis….
  • 4“Регистрация мобильных устройств: что нужно знать [Mobile device registration: what you need to know,]” Gazeta.uz, September 18, 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/09/18/imei/.
C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 1.001 6.006

Government surveillance of ICTs is extensive. Although Article 27 of the constitution guarantees the privacy of “written communications and telephone conversations,” there is no data protection legislation in Uzbekistan.1 Article 27 also guarantees respect for human rights and the rule of law, though these rights are frequently violated during surveillance operations.

In November 2020, Mirziyoyev signed amendments to the Law on Guarantees for Legal Advocacy and Social Protection of Lawyers, the Law on Operational-Search Activities, and the criminal code.2 The changes expand law enforcement agencies’ ability to wiretap lawyers and enhance the surveillance powers of the National Guard, a body that has grown to prominence under Mirziyoyev.3

In July 2019, Mirziyoyev enacted the Law on Personal Data,4 unifying several regulations concerning the collection and processing of personal data, including by ISPs and mobile service providers. The law enumerates several privacy rights but carves out several exceptions “in order to ensure state security” and does not apply to personal data obtained by law enforcement authorities.5

Police frequently confiscate computers, phones, and other internet-enabled devices when conducting arrests (see C3).6

Since 2006, the National Security Service (MXX) has conducted electronic surveillance of the national telecommunications network by employing the Russia-designed System for Operational Investigative Measures (SORM), ostensibly to prevent terrorism and extremism.7 ’

In April 2023, the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab and Microsoft reported that QuaDream, an Israeli spyware company, had servers operating in Uzbekistan. The company developed spyware that used a zero-click exploit in iOS 14, which sent victims “invisible iCloud calendar invitations,” enabling operators to remotely take advantage of targets’ devices.8

The Israeli branch of US company Verint and the Israeli company NICE both supply Uzbekistan’s security services with monitoring centers, allowing them direct access to residents’ telephone calls and internet activity, according to UK-based Privacy International. Privacy International reported that Verint also carried out tests on behalf of the MXX to gain access to SSL-encrypted communications, such as those now offered by default by Gmail, Facebook, and other service providers, by replacing security certificates with false ones using technology supplied by US company Netronome.9 Researchers from Kaspersky, a Russian-based cybersecurity firm, claimed that the security services have used software from the German company FinFisher, which has exported spyware to authoritarian countries around the world.10

In addition to purchasing spyware from foreign technology companies, the government has developed its own interception tools. Kaspersky identified one protocol for phone and computer hacking, called “Sharpa,” in October 2018.11 The protocol was reportedly created by an MXX-linked entity known as “Military Unit 02616.”

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 0.000 6.006

ISPs and mobile service providers must install SORM-compliant surveillance equipment on their networks in order to obtain an operating license.1 Telecommunications providers are prohibited by law from disclosing details on surveillance methods and face possible financial sanctions in addition to license revocation if they fail to design their networks to accommodate electronic interception.2

In April 2021, amendments to the Law on Personal Data requiring companies to store the personal data of Uzbek citizens on servers in Uzbekistan came into effect; these servers must also be registered with Uzkomnazorat.3 Violators can be fined and can receive up to three years’ imprisonment. The law also allows Uzkomnazorat to block access to websites that do not comply with the new regulations.4 In July and November 2021, the law was used as a justification to block several social media platforms, including Facebook, LinkedIn, Odnoklassniki, Skype, Telegram, TikTok, Twitter, VKontakte, WeChat, and YouTube. By August 2022, all platforms except TikTok were unblocked (see A3 and B1).

ISPs and mobile service providers are required to store user data for three months.5 Since 2004, operators of public internet access points have been required to monitor their users and cooperate with state bodies. Under regulatory amendments introduced in 2014, those operators must also install surveillance cameras on their premises to “ensure [the] safety of visitors.” Additionally, they are required to retain a “registry of internet web resources” used by customers for three months.6

The law requires a prosecutor’s warrant for the interception of internet traffic by law enforcement bodies. However, in cases deemed urgent, the authorities may initiate surveillance and subsequently inform the prosecutor’s office within 24 hours.7

  • 1Resolution of the President RU, “О мерахпоповышениюэффективностиорганизацииоперативно-розыскныхмероприятийнасетяхтелекоммуникацийРеспубликиУзбекистан [On Measures for Increasing the Effectiveness of Operational andInvestigative Actions on the Telecommunications Networks of the Republic of Uzbekistan],” No. ПП-513, November 21, 2006, at art. 5.8. Infra., Note 110. Also, tax and custom exemptions apply for import of the SORM equipment by domestic ISPs, see Tax Code of RU, Art. 208, 211, 230 Part 2, and 269.
  • 2“Ўзбекистон Республикасининг қонунителекоммуникациялар тўғрисида [Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, On Telecommunications],” Lex.uz, http://lex.uz/acts/33150
  • 3“Разбор: персональные данные узбекистанцев обязали хранить в Узбекистане. Что изменится [Analysis: personal data of Uzbekistanis ordered to keep in Uzbekistan. What will change],” Spot UZ, January 29, 2021, https://www.spot.uz/ru/2021/01/29/database/.
  • 4Library of Congress, “Uzbekistan: New Requirements for Uzbek Citizens' Personal Data Localization Enter into Force,” May 7, 2021, https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-05-07/uzbekistan-new…
  • 5“Приказ генерального директора узбекского агентства связи и информатизации об утверждении положения о порядке предоставления доступа к сети интернет в общественных пунктах пользования [Order - Director General Of The Uzbek Communication And Information Agency: On Approval Of The Regulation On The Procedure Of Giving Internet Access To Public Use Items],” lex.uz, July 30, 2004, http://www.lex.uz/acts/771468
  • 6See Resolution of the SCCITT RU, "О внесенииизменений и дополнений в Положение о порядкепредоставлениядоступа к сетиИнтернет в общественныхпунктахпользования [On making amendments and additions to the Regulations on the procedure for providing access to the Internet in the public areas of use]," No. 79-мх, SZRU (2014) NO. 13, item 150. Lex.uz, March 28, 2014, https://lex.uz/docs/2362804
  • 7Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, "On the National Security Service of the Republic of Uzbekistan," No. 278, at Part IV (3), November 2, 1991.
C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because of severe attacks against bloggers and journalists, and reports of torture.

Activists, journalists, and ordinary internet users continued to face extralegal intimidation and violence in retribution for their online activities.

In May 2023, a well-known online activist leading a feminist social media group called Nemolchi UZ stated that she was forced to leave Uzbekistan temporarily after a death threat online,1 though she returned to the country a month later.2

In December 2022, five unknown assailants attacked blogger Abdukodir Muminov, injuring him and smashing his car windows.3 The police investigated the case, but did not apprehend a suspect.4 Muminov was later arrested (see C3).

In June 2022, Karakalpakstan-based blogger Rametov was allegedly tortured after he was detained for criticizing the constitutional amendments (see C3). After his detention, law enforcement allegedly left him without any clothes on a road in Nukus.5 Other journalists in Karakalpakstan, including Bakhtiyar Kadirbergenov and Mustafa Tursinbaev, were reportedly beaten earlier in the month. Tursinbaev had a large following on Telegram.6 Individuals who were convicted because of their actions during the summer 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan, including Tajimuratov, were also reportedly tortured.7

In July 2022, law enforcement threatened to confiscate the phone of Eurasianet journalist Lillis when she was detained in Nukus (see C3).8

In November 2019, journalist Davlatnazar Ruzmetov, also known as Davlat Nazar, was killed in a hit-and-run incident in Xorazm Province.9 Ruzmetov had been a contributor to Radio Ozodlik, where he reported on forced labor in the cotton industry. He actively commented on political and social affairs on Facebook. The authorities denied any foul play in Ruzmetov’s death,10 but human rights defenders (HRDs) say he had been under state surveillance. The man who struck and killed Ruzmetov was released after just three months of detention.11

LGBT+ individuals who are active online brave hate speech, intimidation, and offline violence.12

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

HRDs, bloggers, and online journalists regularly report attempts to compromise their online accounts.

In November 2022, the Senate’s website was hacked for a day, and it displayed a message reading “Hello to the cybersecurity center.”1

In June 2022, AsiaTerra, a news website, faced distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that temporarily left the website inaccessible. The website’s Facebook page was also compromised.2

In April 2021, the Telegram account of a Kun.uz employee was breached via IP addresses based in Uzbekistan and Sweden. Although the reporter had enabled two-step verification, they did not receive a short-message service (SMS) text prior to the hack. The extent of damage remained unknown, but Kun.uz asked law enforcement to find the cyberattack’s perpetrators.3

In April 2022, the parliament passed the Law on Cybersecurity, which came into effect in July. The law requires operators of “critical facilities,” including in transportation, defense, law enforcement, public health, and other areas, to implement the government’s cybersecurity guidelines, retain data for at least three months, and give the DXX the right to access cybersecurity systems.4

  • 1“Hackers hacked the official website of the Senate,” UzDaily, November 11, 2022, https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/76793.
  • 2Tweet from @UzbekForum, “Attacks on #MediaFreedom in #Uzbekistan continue: Asiaterra, one of the last independent media outlets paralysed by DDoS attacks and inaccessible. #Facebook page of Asiaterra also blocked. We wish brave editor and journalist Aleksey Volosevich a speedy resumption of his work,” Twitter, June 24, 2022, https://twitter.com/UzbekForum/status/1540298929375412226.
  • 3“Telegram-аккаунт ответственного сотрудника Kun.uz был взломан неизвестными [Telegram-аккаунт ответственного сотрудника Kun.uz был взломан неизвестными],” Kun UZ, April 24, 2021, available at: https://kun.uz/ru/38626080.
  • 4Ulugbek Abdullaev and Eldor Mannopov, Uzbekistan adopts cybersecurity law, JDSupra, April 25, 2022, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/uzbekistan-adopts-cybersecurity-law-1….

On Uzbekistan

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    12 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    25 100 not free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free

  • Networks Restricted

    Yes

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes