Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

South Africa

Free
73
100
A Obstacles to Access 17 25
B Limits on Content 29 35
C Violations of User Rights 27 40
Last Year's Score & Status
73 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

South Africans did not see any significant changes to the environment for internet freedoms during the coverage period. The government continues to prioritize improving internet infrastructure, but severe electricity constraints pose challenges to internet access. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) political party mobilized national shutdown protests on social media in March 2023, though some of their content is under investigation by the authorities for potentially inciting violence. Members of Parliament expressed concerns around the exemption granted to the South African Police Service (SAPS) to procure and use mass surveillance technologies, and the threat of disinformation and content manipulation is rising as the country prepares for general elections in 2024.

South Africa is a constitutional democracy. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, it has been regarded globally as a proponent of human rights and a leader on the African continent. However, reports of corruption among government officials often emerge, and in recent years, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has been accused of undermining state institutions to protect corrupt officials and preserve its power as its support base has begun to wane. Gender-based violence is a severe challenge.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • Severe electrical constraints continue to limit access to the internet (see A1).
  • The Film and Publications Board (FPB) opened police cases and issued takedown requests to Twitter in response to videos of EFF members that were related to the party’s planned national shutdown protest in March 2023, alleging that they incited violence and threatened children (see B2 and C3).
  • In May 2023, the minister of justice and constitutional development granted the SAPS an exemption in terms of Section 46 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA) of 2002, allowing the SAPS to procure and use interception technologies including international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catchers (see C5).
  • Cyberattacks caused fewer disruptions in the operations of government organizations this year, although cyber incidents targeting public institutions continued. In April 2023, hackers targeted the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development’s Guardian’s Fund, which led to the suspension of payments to many of the fund’s beneficiaries (see C8).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 4.004 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 5 to 4 due to frequent disruptions to access caused by the country’s ongoing electricity crisis, including frequent vandalism of critical infrastructure.

Internet penetration has expanded rapidly in South Africa. DataReportal’s Digital 2023 report found that the internet penetration rate was 72.3 percent as of January 2023.1 According to the 2021 General Household Survey conducted by Statistics South Africa, the national statistics agency, 77.5 percent of South African households have at least one member who can access the internet at home, work, school, public hotspots, or internet cafés.2

The government has prioritized universal internet access since the adoption of its broadband policy, the SA Connect program, in 2013.3 Phase one of the project involved rolling out broadband to schools, clinics, police stations, and other government facilities in underserved communities.4 Despite challenges with the rollout of the project’s first phase, the cabinet approved the rollout of the second phase.5 In the 2023–24 budget, the second phase of the SA Connect program was allocated 3 billion rands ($176.2 million) for capital equipment and new fiber infrastructure, or to lease existing fiber in order to expand information communications networks to underserviced areas.6 In 2023, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)—the country’s communications and broadcasting regulator—announced that companies obtaining spectrum licenses would be required to contribute to the SA Connect program by connecting public schools, hospitals, clinics, and tribal authorities, and by providing zero-rated access to government websites.7 In February 2023, the former minister of communications and digital technologies announced that the department plans to roll out 14,024 community Wi-Fi hotspots across 16 districts in the 2023-24 financial year.8

Several other initiatives have enjoyed modest success in rolling out public Wi-Fi in metropolitan areas, including Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Tshwane,9 and the Ekurhuleni municipality.10 Similar projects have been rolled out in other provinces and towns across the country.11

In March 2022, the minister of public works and infrastructure published the National Infrastructure Plan 2050, which laid out the government’s plans to provide 10 gigabytes (GB) of free mobile data every month to South African households by 2024 and 50 GB by 2026.12

The fiber-optic network in South Africa has grown at an exponential rate. Most suburban areas of the major urban centers are already covered with fiber-optic cables, and new “last mile” providers of fiber-optic cables have begun to wire homes by connecting to competitive internet backbones run by larger operators. At least 12 companies provide fiber-optic network infrastructure,13 with partially state-owned Telkom providing 157,400 kilometers (97,800 miles) of cables, the largest share as of 2018, connecting more than 2.5 million premises; other companies provide fiber-optic connections to a considerably smaller share of buildings.14

The majority of users (69.4 percent) access the internet through their mobile devices.15 According to DataReportal’s Digital 2023 report, at the start of 2023, the median mobile internet connection speed in South Africa was 36.70 megabits per second (Mbps), while the median speed for a fixed-line connection was 40.12 Mbps, an increase from the previous year.16 The United Kingdom–based telecommunications company Cable reported that the average download speed in South Africa was 28.62 Mbps as of September 2022.17

The availability of the internet has been significantly limited by power cuts introduced in 2019 by the national power company, Eskom, to stave off years of mismanagement.18 Since 2019, Eskom has conducted load-shedding—planned blackouts—on a regular basis due to reduced power-generating capacity that is caused by a lack of maintenance at power stations, as well as operational, structural, and financial problems.19 According to a forecast by Eskom, load-shedding is projected to continue until 2027.20

On February 10, 2023, President Cyril Ramaphosa declared a national state of disaster due to the electricity crisis and announced the appointment of a minister of electricity.21 Mobile operators continue to struggle with the adverse effects of the power outages, which severely affect network quality.22 The operators have had to implement tighter security and surveillance measures to protect cell phone towers during power outages due to a wave of thefts and vandalism of tower batteries and generators.23 The state of disaster ended on April 5, 2023.24 Following the termination of the state of disaster, ICASA established a council committee to ascertain the impact of load-shedding on the communications industry and work with industry stakeholders to find solutions that minimize the effects of load-shedding on the information and communications technology (ICT) sector.25 The committee will also be guided by the policy directions published by the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT), which identify critical electronic communications and broadcasting infrastructure, in order to grant exemptions from future load-shedding.26

In April 2020, ICASA announced a “temporary release of high demand spectrum” during the COVID-19-related state of disaster that had been declared by the government that March to ease network congestion, maintain quality broadband services, and allow service providers to lower costs.27 In September 2021, ICASA announced it would reconsider plans to permanently allocate the additional spectrum.28 Service provider Telkom and television station eTV sued the government over the plan, arguing that further allocation would entrench the dominance of providers MTN and Vodafone (see A4).29 In February 2022, ICASA announced that Cell C, Liquid Telecoms, MTN, Rain Networks, Telkom, and Vodacom would take part in the first South African spectrum auction in March 2022.30 The auction was concluded towards the end of March and amassed more than 14.4 billion rands ($897 million).31

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

High costs remain a primary obstacle to access in South Africa, with digital inequality increasing as more South Africans connect to the internet.1

In 2021, the average cost of 1 GB of mobile data was 1.41 percent of the average annual income in South Africa, according to the Alliance for Affordable Internet.2 Though mobile service providers are gradually providing more low-cost data packages to lower-income customers,3 the vast majority of South Africans without internet access are those earning less than 7,200 rands ($450) per month (representing 42 percent of the population). Those without internet access have pinpointed the high costs as the main reason for their lack of connectivity.4

ICASA has taken steps to address the high cost of data. The introduction of the End-User and Subscriber Service Charter (EUSSC) Regulation Amendment of 2018, which came into force in April 2019, requires service providers to give users the option to roll over their data bundles from month to month for a maximum period of three years; to transfer their data to another user within the same network; and to provide opt-in and opt-out choices for out-of-bundle data charges, which are considerably more expensive, upon exhaustion of their data.5 In December 2019, ICASA announced a regulatory impact assessment of the new regulations’ effects.6 As of March 2023, ICASA deferred planned amendments to the EUSSC related to data rollover plans, and announced it would continue stakeholder consultations.7 A spectrum auction completed in March 2022 (see A1) was also expected to lower the costs of mobile data. However, the impacts are yet to be widely felt by consumers.8

An investigation launched in 2017 by the Competition Commission of South Africa found that the average price of data had not declined as significantly over time as the prices in other countries.9 During the previous coverage period, ICASA reported that all leading mobile network operators lowered their prices for prepaid 1 GB bundles.10 Vodacom and MTN, which together control 80 percent of the market, reached agreements with the Competition Commission that include several concessions aimed at making internet access more affordable. The concessions, effective as of April 2020, included reducing prices for data bundles, expanding the range of zero-rated websites (websites individuals can access at no cost), and providing a daily amount of free data.11

Currently, zero-rated offerings by mobile operators essentially offer free internet access to a few over-the-top (OTT) media services such as free basics on Facebook, Twitter, and educational services including D6 Communicator for schools and Vodacom e-school learning apps.12 Some other services are partially zero-rated in that users receive them as part of a paid package. Network operators in South Africa also offer zero-rated services for various government, education, health, and public organizations’ websites.13 As part of its Open Time Initiative, MTN zero-rates over 350 education, health, and employment websites.14 Vodacom zero-rates a number of government websites, schools, and universities through its ConnectU Platform.15 Furthermore, ICASA announced that as part of the social obligations imposed by the regulator on the licensees that obtained spectrum during the auction, those licensees will be required to provide zero-rated access to a range of public benefit websites, including government websites.16 Zero-rated services are often used by South Africans who are already connected to reduce their costs of access, and not necessarily as their exclusive means of accessing the internet.17

Though the country has achieved nearly 100 percent third-generation (3G) network coverage, there are disparities in internet access between urban and rural dwellers, in part due to cost.18 According to the 2021 General Household Survey, only 1.2 percent of people in rural areas had access to the internet at home, compared to 8.8 percent of those in urban areas and 17.2 percent of those in metropolitan areas.19 Similarly, mobile internet access in rural areas lags behind access in urban and metropolitan areas; only 59.2 percent of rural dwellers had access to the internet on mobile devices, compared to 73.7 percent of urban dwellers and 73.4 percent of people in metropolitan areas.20

The Alliance for Affordable Internet reported that as of February 2022, 16.4 percent of men and 12.1 percent of women had “meaningful internet connectivity,” which they define as fourth-generation (4G) network speeds, smartphone ownership, daily use, and unlimited access at a location relevant to them.21 There is also an urban-rural digital divide; 15.9 percent of users living in urban regions have meaningful connectivity compared to only 5.7 of individuals in rural areas.22 Access to the internet among youth is relatively high, at 70 percent, compared to 53 percent of the general population.23

Importantly, proof of residence requirements for SIM card registration (see C4) present an obstacle to mobile phone usage for many South Africans who live in informal settlements.

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

There is no evidence that the government exercises control over internet infrastructure to censor content or to restrict connectivity.

The government does not have direct control over the country’s internet backbone or its connection to the international internet, and there have been no intentional disruptions to connectivity. International internet connectivity is facilitated via nine undersea cables—SAT-3, WACS, the South Africa Far East (SAFE) cable, EASSy, 2Africa, ACE, Equiano, METISS, and SEACOM.1 Each cable is owned and operated by a consortium of private companies, with the exception of Equiano, which is fully owned by Google.2 Several operators oversee South Africa’s national fiber-optic cable networks, including Telkom and the privately owned MTN, Vodacom, Cell C, Neotel-Liquid, and Broadband Infraco. Internet traffic between different networks is exchanged at internet exchange points (IXPs) located in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban, which are operated by South Africa’s nonprofit Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA) and NapAfrica.3 The three IXPs are hosted in vendor-neutral data centers owned by the South African firm Teraco.4

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

South Africa has a competitive internet service provider (ISP) market. The ISPA currently has over 220 members in South Africa, which are mostly private enterprises.1 However, the fixed-line connectivity market is dominated by Telkom, of which the government has a 40 percent share.2 There are four major mobile carriers in South Africa’s fixed and mobile telecommunications market—Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, and Telkom Mobile—the first three of which are privately owned. Vodacom dominates the South African mobile telecoms market with a 43 percent share of revenue, followed by MTN with 26 percent, Telkom with 23 percent, and Cell C with 8 percent.3 In addition to the major players, there is also a data-only mobile network operator, Rain, which is a relatively new entrant to the market.

In March 2021, ICASA released the findings of a 2018 inquiry on competition in the mobile broadband services market,4 which claimed that Vodacom and MTN dominate the field. The regulations proposed alongside the findings, which aim to regulate the two providers more stringently, with particular focus on exclusionary pricing schemes, were published and came into force on March 31, 2022.5 In September 2022, MTN brought an application in the High Court challenging their status as a significant market power.6

The current coverage period saw several developments that could decrease the diversity of the market. In July 2022, MTN entered talks to acquire Telkom.7 In August, data-only mobile operator Rain announced that it planned to approach Telkom with a merger proposition.8 The press release was retracted after South Africa’s Takeover Regulation Panel (TRP) censured Rain for not seeking prior approval, but in September, Rain submitted a new proposal offering its network to Telkom for acquisition.9 Acquisition talks between Rain and Telkom failed in January 2023, months after MTN walked away from a deal with Telkom in October 2022.10 Analysts expect that the failed Rain-Telkom deal will bring MTN back to the table.11 After the end of the coverage period, Telkom confirmed it had received an unsolicited bid for a controlling stake in the company from a consortium.12 An acquisition of Telkom by MTN would consolidate the ISP market and make MTN the largest mobile operator in South Africa.

The licensing processes for fixed and mobile phones, as well as internet services, are overseen by ICASA and are clear and easily accessible on ICASA’s website.13 The licensing fees imposed by ICASA are reasonable and do not impose an undue barrier to the diversity of service providers.

While no informal connection between licensees or prospective licensees and government officials is required for service providers, ICASA is seen by some as a “fractured and weak” institution, which affects its capacity to execute its mandate, which includes licensing.14

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

The Information Regulator is the data protection authority in South Africa. According to the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI) Act, the Information Regulator is independent, subject only to the constitution, and accountable to the National Assembly.1 However, the Information Regulator has been dependent on the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD). In February 2023, members of Parliament demanded action from the National Treasury to ensure the financial independence of the Information Regulator.2 Once the process is finalized, the Information Regulator will account directly to Parliament through the National Assembly.3

The autonomy of the regulator, ICASA, is protected by the constitution. A transparent and participatory appointment process involving parliamentary oversight is guaranteed by the law that established the body.4 There is, however, a perception that in practice, political interference is a problem in the agency, and that membership on the ICASA board is open only to supporters of the ruling party.5

ICASA’s independence has also been compromised by encroachments on its mandate by other government entities. In addition to ICASA, the .za Domain Name Authority (.ZADNA), the Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA), and the DCDT—formed in June 2019 as a result of the merger of the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services and the Department of Communications6 —have regulatory power over ICTs. The proliferation of regulatory bodies has led to redundancy and poor coordination and contributes to the perception that the country lacks a comprehensive approach to ICT regulation.

In 2016, the cabinet approved the National Integrated ICT Policy White Paper,7 which outlines the overarching policy framework aimed at transforming South Africa into an inclusive and innovative digital and knowledge society.8 One of the bills proposed in the white paper is the ICT Sector Commission and Tribunal Bill. The bill would consolidate regulation of the ICT sector through the introduction of an ICT sector commission and tribunal.9 The legislation had not yet been passed by May 2022, but the DCDT has indicated that it still intends to proceed with the bill as part of its phased approach to implementing the National Integrated ICT Policy White Paper.10

Another key actor in the regulation of ICTs is the Film and Publication Board (FPB), which traditionally regulates the distribution of films, games, and other publications. The Films and Publications Act of 1996 was amended in 2019 and enacted in March 2022 to extend the authority of the FPB to regulate such content on the internet (see B3).11 12 In 2016, the FPB signed a memorandum of understanding with ICASA to address regulatory overlaps created by the proposed amendments, which will effectively create cojurisdiction over online content.13 These amendments further complicate the regulation of online content, and it remains unclear how the two bodies will implement the agreement.

Access providers and other internet-related groups are active in lobbying for a better legislative and policy environment for the sector. In 2009, the ISPA was recognized as a self-regulatory body by the Department of Communications, and it exercises authority over its members through transparent processes (see B3).14

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

Neither the state nor other actors block or filter internet and other ICT content, and there is no evidence of blocking or content filtering on mobile phones.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

State and nonstate actors do not frequently force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete legitimate content. Decisions on takedowns for online content are made not by the state but by the self-regulatory body, the ISPA.1

The Electronic Communications and Transaction Act (ECTA) requires ISPs to respond to takedown notices regarding illegal content such as child sexual abuse images, defamatory material, or copyright violations. Members of the ISPA—the industry’s representative body—are not held liable for third-party content that they do not create or select, though they can lose their protection from liability if they do not respond to takedown requests.2

After two videos related to the EFF’s national shutdown (see C3) circulated on social media, the FPB issued takedown requests to Twitter, stating that the videos violated the Film and Publications Act because they contained incitement to violence and harm and threatened children. The FPB also stated that individuals who shared, reposted, or otherwise distributed the videos online could be held liable3 and receive up to five years in jail.4

In October 2022, the FPB issued a notice giving internet access and service providers 90 days within which they are required to update the board on a number of items, including how they have moderated their child-oriented services; prominently displayed reasonable safety messages in a language that will be clearly understood by children; provided mechanisms to enable children to report suspicious behavior to the service provider; and where feasible, provided children and parents with information concerning software that can be used to block or filter content considered unsuitable for children.5 Those who fail to comply with the regulations can receive a fine of up to 50,000 rands ($2,937), a prison term of six months, or both upon conviction.

Google reported that it received five requests for the removal of content from the South African government between January and June 2022, relating to trademark infringement, bullying and harassment, and defamation. The company removed one piece of content pursuant to one defamation request; the other four requests did not result in removals.6

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

Restrictions on the internet are generally transparent and proportional, with a few exceptions. The ISPA takes a self-regulatory approach to restricting access to unlawful internet and digital content hosted by its members. This process is in accordance with the takedown procedures provided in the ECTA1 and is guided by the ISPA’s complaints procedures.2 ISPs often err on the side of caution by taking down content upon receipt of a notice to avoid litigation (see B2), and there is no incentive for providers to defend the rights of the original content creator if they believe the takedown notice was requested in bad faith.

The ISPA code of conduct requires members to respect freedoms of speech and expression as guaranteed by the constitution, and to act lawfully and cooperate with law enforcement agencies, though no specific reference is made to a proportionality test as a consideration in restricting access.3 There is an internal appeal process available to those who may be aggrieved by the ISPA’s actions, as well as an avenue for appeal in the courts.4

The ISPA reports annually on activities related to restrictions on content. The reports indicate that most takedown notifications do not result in content removal: In 2022, less than half of the more than 600 takedown notices lodged with the ISPA were accepted. The most common basis for content being removed is copyright and trademark infringement. Other reasons for removal include fraud, malware or phishing, defamation, hate speech, harassment, and invasion of privacy.5

The Films and Publications Amendment Act, which was implemented in March 2022,6 empowers the FPB to issue takedown orders for content judged to be prohibited (see A5). The amendment has been criticized by the ISPA for, among other things, exceeding the FPB’s mandate and opening online content to state censorship, given the quasi-government nature of the FPB and its limited capacity compared to the courts in adjudicating justifiable limitations to freedom of expression (see C1).7

Regulations to implement the act were published in September 2022.8 Parts 5 and 6 of the regulations deal with online content classification. Online content distributors who are registered with the FPB can either submit online content to the FPB for classification or apply for a self-classification permit.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Although the government does not limit or manipulate online discussions, online self-censorship is a growing concern in South Africa. The severity of online attacks against journalists increased sharply in the run-up to the 2019 national and provincial elections (see C7), leading to greater self-censorship online. In particular, the leader of the EFF, Julius Malema, has on several occasions attacked and encouraged attacks against journalists online. Analysts contend that these attacks form part of a well-orchestrated cyberbullying strategy intended to deter other journalists and commentators from issuing reports or utterances critical of the EFF.1

Despite the perception that online self-censorship by journalists has increased, ordinary citizens and journalists, including those who have been subjected to online abuse, continue to report on politically sensitive issues.2

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 3.003 4.004

Manipulation of the online space by political actors—including through bogus social media profiles, targeted commenting on social media posts, and bots—is a growing problem in South Africa. Mis- and disinformation was especially apparent during the 2019 elections, and there are concerns that doctored news stories, trolls, bots, and digital disinformation campaigns have the power to undermine the legitimacy of the upcoming 2024 elections.1

The political disinformation that plagued the May 2019 elections declined in the aftermath of the vote. In the run-up to the elections, the online space was weaponized not only by the EFF but also by other major political parties and their supporters to discredit critics and spread disinformation.2

The government and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) have not attempted to overtly influence the editorial lines of media outlets. However, in March 2019, the ANC’s head of elections, Fikile Mbalula, reportedly attempted to coerce the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the public broadcaster, to increase its coverage of the ANC’s election campaigns; Mbalula accused the SABC of a “clampdown” and “blackout” of the party’s campaign activities.3

The 2013 purchase of the Independent Group, a large media conglomerate, by ANC ally Iqbal Survé, and persistent interference with the SABC have taken a toll on fair and balanced media content in South Africa.4

The state capture inquiry that examined the influence of the Gupta family and other powerful interests on the government revealed in January 2019 that several journalists received monthly bribes from the contracting firm Bosasa (now known as African Global Operations) to inform the company of potential negative stories about it, as well as to write articles that presented it in a flattering light.5 In January 2020, disclosures revealed that security forces had paid 20 million rands ($1.2 million) to the African News Agency, a newswire company operated by the Independent Group, to carry positive stories about former president Jacob Zuma. The company has denied any wrongdoing.6

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

For the most part, there are no economic or regulatory constraints that significantly affect users’ ability to publish content online. The online environment in South Africa is net neutral, although net neutrality has not been expressly provided for in law or policy.1 The ISPA is at the forefront of promoting net neutrality and believes that it is essential for the transparent management of networks and the prevention of anticompetitive behavior.2

The Film and Publications Amendment Act, which came into effect in March 2022, requires commercial distributors to classify all online content by submitting it to the FPB prior to its publication or by self-classifying it.3 Noncommercial distributors—those who publish content for personal use—are not required to classify their content. The act penalizes failing to register with the FPB as a distributor with a fine of 150,000 rands ($9,300) and failing to classify content with a fine of 500,000 rands ($31,000).4

Politicized advertising may impact the economic viability of online outlets. In the past, the Gupta-owned progovernment ANN7 news channel and New Age newspaper, both of which ceased operations in 2018, routinely received a massive share of government advertising, extending up to hundreds of millions of rands.5 According to the final report of a yearslong inquiry into high-level corruption and state capture, which was released in June 2022, former president Jacob Zuma played a key role in helping members of the Gupta family launch their media channels by funneling lucrative contracts to the companies, helping them become financially viable.6

Some online platforms are required to pay licensing fees. In November 2020, the FPB finalized revisions to the tariff structure that would require online streaming services to pay a licensing fee per film and per series season that they offer, as opposed to the current structure, which involves payment of a flat fee.7 The revised fees benefit content distributors with fewer titles, while those with more content pay significantly more than the previous license fee of 795,000 rands ($49,500).8

Content published by journalists online is overseen by a self-regulatory body, the Press Ombudsman, which is an independent body set up by the media industry to adjudicate public complaints. Membership in the Press Ombudsman is voluntary.9

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Online media in South Africa is vibrant, representing a wide range of international and national viewpoints and perspectives.

In January 2023, the SABC announced the launch of a 24-hour news television channel that will broadcast current news in African languages.1 The channel will be available on the SABC+ streaming service and on digital terrestrial television. The channel will carry news bulletins and current affairs programming in Indigenous languages and will also cover parliamentary proceedings.2 The channel is mainly meant to serve communities underserved by mainstream commercial media.

Web-only news platforms, such as the Daily Maverick and News24, have become particularly popular in recent years, with key news stories often broken online before in print or broadcast outlets. While content in both English and Afrikaans is well-represented online, the other 9 of South Africa’s 11 official languages are underrepresented on the internet, including on government websites. Additionally, the perspectives of women, rural dwellers, persons with disabilities, LGBT+ people, and ethnic and religious minorities are underrepresented and marginalized in the media, including online media.3

In February 2022, an expert panel appointed by the president revealed that false information that spread on social media contributed to the violence that occurred during the civil unrest in July 2021, which was largely fueled by economic inequality.4

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Neither the government nor nonstate actors restrict the use of digital tools for mobilization and campaigning. South Africa has a robust online community that addresses contemporary social, economic, and political issues. For instance, in March 2023, members of the EFF were able to mobilize under the hashtag #NationalShutdown on Twitter. The movement was intended to mobilize citizens to shut down South Africa over growing frustration with socioeconomic issues such unemployment and load-shedding.1

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 5.005 6.006

There are no specific legislative provisions to protect online modes of expression. However, the constitution provides for freedom of the press and freedom of expression, among other guarantees. It includes constraints on “propaganda for war; incitement of imminent violence; or advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”1 The right of access to information held by the state, and in limited circumstances by private bodies, is also guaranteed by the constitution.2 These rights apply to all members of the public and to journalists equally, whether they operate online or offline.

The judiciary is generally regarded as independent, and in recent years has been seen as the branch of government that has been most dedicated to upholding the rule of law by constraining the executive and legislative branches from arbitrary actions.3 In May 2022, the Western Cape High Court ruled that journalists had the right to access information held by private bodies in order to report on matters of public interest in its Tiso Blackstar Group & Other v Steinhoff Int. Holdings NV decision.4

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Several laws are vulnerable to being misused to prosecute online journalists and activists. The offense of crimen injuria, or insulting the dignity of a person, has been invoked to prosecute online harassment.1

Observers have expressed concern that the Films and Publications Amendment Act, which was operationalized in March 2022, will make online content vulnerable to censorship (see B3).

Defamation is a criminal offense, though prosecutions are rare, and until recently, defamation charges were not brought against people for online activity. The ANC committed to scrapping criminal defamation in September 2015, but there have been no moves to introduce legislation to fulfill this promise.2

In May 2021, the government passed the Cybercrimes Act, 2020, which contains some provisions regulating online speech. For instance, the law bars electronic content that incites or threatens violence to people or damage to property, and it criminalizes the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images. In December 2021, following a presidential proclamation, certain sections of the law relating to intercepting data and unlawfully accessing computer systems were enacted (see C8).3 Violators of those provisions face a penalty of up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. These prohibitions do not directly criminalize online activities protected under international human rights standards; however, some commentators suggested the provision barring incitement to violence might be used to prosecute people for social media posts supporting the July 2021 unrest (see C3).4

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

In March 2023, ahead of a national shutdown planned by the EFF, the National Joint Operational Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) announced that it would be closely monitoring social media mobilization.1 This includes monitoring social media for the criminal offenses of incitement to violence and sharing of inflammatory messages, for which social media users can be charged with intimidation and incitement of violence. The FPB opened a case with the police against a member of the EFF who warned students not to attend school on the day of the party’s national shutdown in a video that was posted on social media one day after the EFF told the government to close schools during the national shutdown. The FPB stated that the video incited violence and threatened schoolchildren.2 The FPB opened another EFF shutdown–related case against a man who appeared in a viral video telling shop owners to close their stores and join protest marches if they wanted to avoid their shops being looted during the shutdown, which the FPB called inciting violence and threatening to children.3 The current status of these cases is unknown. The FPB stated that people who repost or share the videos online could also face charges.

When former president Zuma was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment for contempt of court in relation to an ongoing corruption investigation in early July 2021, fatally violent riots broke out in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces in support of Zuma. South African authorities committed to prosecuting people who supported the unrest on social media.4 In August 2021, Zamaswazi Majozi and Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla were arrested for social media posts they made during the riots: Majozi posted with the Twitter account @__AfricanSoil, which was a leading voice in the Radical Economic Transformation political faction;5 Zuma-Sambudla is Zuma’s daughter and made posts supporting him. Both were charged under the 1956 Riotous Assemblies Act, and one was released on bail in late August; neither were charged for any specific posts on social media.6 Research from the DFRLab did not find evidence that any of Zuma-Sambudla's posts directly incited violence.7 Majozi also used Twitter to defend former president Zuma and attack his critics. In March 2022, Majozi’s case was struck from the court roll following numerous requests from the state prosecuting authority to postpone the hearing.8

Also in August 2021, South African police released a statement that authorities had identified people spreading “inflammatory messages on various social media platforms advocating for violence” and “warned” them that doing so is a criminal offense.9 A February 2022 report on the riots revealed that the minister of police had identified 12 individuals who made incendiary social media posts, but only charged a few for incitement to violence.10

In August 2022, 65 people were arrested for allegedly instigating riots in July 2021 by using a WhatsApp group to communicate with groups that caused destruction.11 The trial was ongoing as of July 2023, after the end of the coverage period.

In May 2023, a man was arrested for allegedly sharing pornographic images—on which the faces of the president, the police minister, and the police minister’s wife were superimposed—on social media.12

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

South Africa has few restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption. There are no laws requiring internet users, website owners, or bloggers to register with the government or any of its agencies. Users are also not required to use their real names when posting comments on the internet, including on social media platforms.

The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA) of 2002, however, compromises users’ rights to anonymous communication by requiring mobile subscribers to provide national identification numbers, copies of national identification documents, and proof of physical address to service providers.1 An identification number is legally required for any SIM card purchase, and registration requires proof of residence and an identity document.2 In March 2022, ICASA published the Draft Numbering Plan Regulations, which, if passed, will require users to provide biometric data when purchasing or registering a SIM card.3

Users are not explicitly prohibited from using encryption to safeguard their communications. However, RICA empowers a judge to force the disclosure of decryption keys or to require assistance in decryption in specified circumstances, upon approval of a request made by the police, military, intelligence, or other law enforcement agencies.4 Similarly, the Cybercrimes Act, which was passed in May 2021, includes provisions obligating companies to decrypt data to facilitate the search and seizure of stored data under the provisions of that law (see C6).5

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Strong concerns about potentially unchecked government surveillance powers over online activity remain, but some legal safeguards related to surveillance do exist. RICA does not permit the blanket collection of telecommunications metadata but provides for a stringent process for the targeted collection of metadata, the interception of communications, and the decryption of private communications, all of which require a court order.1

In September 2019, a high court ruled that numerous provisions of RICA were unconstitutional;2 the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism had filed a case in 2017 challenging its constitutionality on several fronts. The presiding judges found that bulk surveillance conducted by the National Communication Centre (NCC) was unlawful because there is no legislation that authorizes the state to conduct such interception of private communications. The ruling postponed the resulting invalidation of RICA for two years to permit Parliament to pass legislation amending the unconstitutional provisions while imposing interim changes to the law. The interim changes included requiring the NCC to notify individuals who have their communications intercepted within 90 days after the surveillance is terminated and to disclose in its application when the target of surveillance is a journalist or lawyer. The high court ruling was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in February 2021, which also extended the period before RICA’s invalidation to three years, or until February 2024.3 In September 2021, the designated RICA judge, Justice Bess Nkabinde, expressed concerns that unlawful interception of communications of private and public officials continued despite the law being declared unconstitutional.4

Under RICA, the threshold for granting a court order is low, oversight is insufficient, and in the past, users did not have to be informed that their communications had been intercepted.5 A loophole allows communications to be intercepted under the Criminal Procedure Act, which lacks certain safeguards and has been abused by law enforcement agencies.6 Up to 95 percent of court orders involving the interception of communications are not approved by a RICA judge, and most of the court orders outside of RICA are for metadata; metadata from 70,000 to 195,000 mobile users is collected every year.7 Telecommunications service providers are also required to store the metadata of all customers for three to five years, a provision that concerns privacy advocates.8

The South African government has the technical capacity to undertake bulk and targeted surveillance, and it has been acknowledged that bulk surveillance is undertaken by various government agencies.9 The NCC is responsible for intercepting foreign signal intelligence and does so without oversight; the agency has disclosed that the content it intercepts includes domestic communications as well.10

The South African police possess international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)–catcher technology, also known by the product name Stingrays, which permit the bulk interception of mobile phone traffic, although the extent of its use is uncertain.11 The Ministry of State Security does not believe that IMSI catchers are governed by RICA, and their use is therefore unregulated.12 The government has claimed that the technology is used only for national security matters.13 Nonetheless, consistent weaknesses in oversight mechanisms within the state security departments leave surveillance open to abuse; in addition, the interception of communications that originate outside South Africa are essentially unregulated.14

The court rulings on RICA rendered the state’s use of IMSI catchers illegal unless new legislation is passed to regulate such use for bulk surveillance. In May 2023, the minister of justice and constitutional development granted the SAPS a certificate of exemption in terms of Section 46(3) of RICA.15 The exemption allows the SAPS to procure and use interception technologies including “IMSI catchers, equipment reasonably necessary to be used with IMSI catchers, and software to be installed on such IMSI catchers.”16 The exemption was granted after receiving parliamentary approval, despite opposition parties expressing concern that Parliament has been misled about the purchase of the interception communication technologies.17 Some opposition members of Parliament cited the lack of trust in the SAPS as a reason for opposing the exemption.18

South Africa's intelligence services have been reported to use a social media analytics and monitoring tool called Media Sonar, which allows for the searching and analyzing of social media content of users within a defined geolocation and using keyword searches.19

In March 2023, the SAPS put out a request for bids to procure open-source intelligence and social media investigation and monitoring technologies.20 This tool will be used to collect and mine data including hashtags, authors, date and time, and individuals of interest from social media sources, searches in public domain data, and the dark web. According to the SAPS bid documentation, the tool must also be able to assist in the identification of trends for certain types of searches.21

Journalists have been frequently targeted for surveillance by the state, usually as a means of identifying confidential sources.22 For example, in March 2021, the online outlet News24 disclosed that officers with the police intelligence division had targeted its journalists with location tracking and communications interception tools, apparently in response to the outlet’s investigation into unrest within the division.23

In a 2018 report by Citizen Lab, a Canadian internet watchdog, South Africa was listed as one of 45 countries worldwide using Pegasus, a targeted spyware software developed by the Israeli technology firm NSO. Pegasus is known to be used by governments to spy on journalists, human rights defenders, and the opposition.24

Beyond RICA, the Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act serves as South Africa’s legal framework protecting the constitutional right to privacy. It includes provisions to protect users’ online security, privacy, and data, and allows an individual to bring civil claims against those who contravene the law (see C6).25

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

RICA provides for a legal process for the interception of communications, and service providers are, under certain circumstances, required to aid the government in surveillance (see C5).

The POPI Act of 2013, part of South Africa’s data protection framework, entered fully into force on July 1, 2020.1 The law establishes safeguards for the processing of personal data, including requirements for consent, retention limitations, and notice and limitations on automated processing and cross-border data transfers. POPI defines personal data broadly, covering information about individuals, their beliefs, and their legal identity, and it establishes more extensive safeguards for particularly sensitive personal data. It includes a standard set of exceptions, including national security and criminal matters. Penalties for contravening the law are stiff, including prison terms and fines of up to 10 million rands ($620,000).2

In May 2021, the government passed the Cybercrimes Act, 2020, which establishes broad authority for officials to access data stored by service providers and other companies when those data relate to cybercrimes that the law defines. Along with several provisions that relate to online activities (see C2), the act establishes a broad range of violations relating to computer use. Seizure of data generally requires a warrant, though the law establishes a broad range of exceptions.

In February 2023, South Africa’s Information Regulator referred the National Department of Health to its Enforcement Committee regarding personal information that was collected during the pandemic.3 This followed numerous unsuccessful requests for information made by the regulator to the Department of Health to ascertain whether the department had destroyed or de-identified the database that contained information such as the names, identity or passport numbers, and residential addresses of people who might have contracted COVID-19. The information was collected pursuant to the Disaster Management Regulations, which also directed that the databases must be destroyed or de-identified within six weeks of the end of the state of disaster, which occurred in April 2022. If the Enforcement Committee issues an enforcement notice, it will have the same effect as a court order.

According to RICA, service providers, including ISPs, are required to use systems with the technical capacity for communications to be intercepted; they are also required to retain customer metadata for three to five years.4 RICA specifically requires service providers to intercept and provide the communications of their customers upon a judge’s directive.5 The Cybercrimes Act also expands the scope of real-time communications interception under RICA.6 In practice, however, the bulk of requests for information are not made through RICA and are thus not transparent or subject to appeal (see C5).

Neither RICA nor POPI impose data localization requirements. In April 2021, the DCDT published the Draft National Policy on Data and Cloud for comment.7 An updated version of the policy is expected to be published by March 2024.8 If the draft policy is passed, data generated in South Africa would become property of the government regardless of where the company is located. The government would be the trustee for all “government data”—an ambiguous term that authorities have failed to clarify—generated within the borders of South Africa.

While the ECTA does not require ISPs to actively monitor content or to seek information on unlawful activity, the minister of communications may, under certain circumstances, require ISPs to provide information on the illegal activities of their users or information that facilitates the identification of users.9

Under the Film and Publications Amendment Act, enacted in March 2022, internet access providers who have knowledge that their services are being used to host or distribute child sexual abuse images, war propaganda, or content that incites violence and hatred of an identifiable group, are required to report to the police details on the person maintaining, hosting, distributing, or in any way contributing to the circulation of this content.10

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 4.004 5.005

Cases of extralegal intimidation or violence reported against bloggers, journalists, and online users in South Africa declined sharply after the May 2019 elections, but women and LGBT+ people continue to routinely experience online harassment.

In August 2022, social media user Zamaswazi Majozi, also known as “Sphithiphithi Evaluator,” filed a lawsuit claiming that she was held in a dark room without food or water for two days after being unlawfully arrested the previous year. The police had searched her home and confiscated her electronic devices, as well as electronic devices belonging to her family members, and arrested her in August 2021 on charges of allegedly inciting violence during the July 2021 riots (see C3). Her case was thrown out in March 2022 after prosecutors failed to produce enough evidence.1

In November 2021, during local elections, Fikile Mbalula, the minister of transport and the head of elections for the ANC, blamed SABC’s coverage of the local elections for the ANC’s poor performance and accused SABC’s chief editor of bias. The South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) called on Mbalula to immediately cease making such statements, as similar behavior has in other instances encouraged cyberbullying by ANC party members and supporters on social media.2

Online harassment based on gender and sexuality is rampant in South Africa, and racist language is common. In June 2022, the South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) denounced Afrikaans musician, Steve Hofmeyer, for social media posts he made that the organization claims were intentionally discriminatory toward LGBT+ people.3 In the wake of this incident, the SAHRC launched the Social Media Charter.4 The charter provides guidelines for individuals and organizations to promote responsible and ethical behavior on social media, and includes sections on accountability, freedom of expression, privacy, and the protection of vulnerable groups.5

Almost 25 percent of the 536 South African women surveyed in August 2020 by the civic technology organization Pollicy reported experiencing online gender-based violence.6 In a 2018 report by Gender Links, 30 percent of women journalists surveyed reported experiencing some form of online violence.7 A survey of LGBT+ youth released in April 2020 found that 82 percent reported experiencing harassment online because of their identity.8 A report from PeaceTech Lab and Media Monitoring Africa found a sharp increase in racist and racially discriminatory language online during the May 2019 elections.9

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 3.003 3.003

Score Change: The score improved from 2 to 3 because South Africa did not experience as many cyberattacks that disabled the operations of government agencies during the coverage period.

Independent news outlets and opposition voices have not been subject to technical attacks in several years. However, South Africa is vulnerable to cybersecurity threats on many fronts.

In April 2023, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD) suffered a cyberattack for the third time in three years.1 Criminals targeted the Guardian’s Fund, which sits within the DOJ&CD and was created to manage money on behalf of persons who are legally incapable of doing so themselves. The hackers managed to steal 18 million rands ($1.06 million), which led to the suspension all payments by the fund, in turn causing financial trouble for many of its beneficiaries.2

In 2021, South Africa suffered a significant number of cyberattacks, especially those targeting critical infrastructure. According to Interpol’s October 2021 African Cyberthreat Assessment report, South Africa has the highest number of targeted ransomware and business email compromise attacks on the continent.3

In July 2021, Transnet, a state-owned company that is the custodian of South Africa ports, railways, and pipelines, suffered a major ransomware attack that forced the company to rely on manual operations.4 Hackers gained access to personal data, financial reports, and other documents.5

In December 2021, following a presidential proclamation, Chapter 2 of the Cybercrimes Act became operational,6 criminalizing the unlawful interference with computer systems, and the illegal access, interception, and possession of data, including passwords. This provision replaced parts of the ECTA that protected against cyberattacks by criminalizing access, interception, or interference of an individual’s data without permission; the unlawful production, sale, procurement, design, distribution, or possession of a device used to overcome security measures or the protection of data; the use of such a device to unlawfully overcome security measures for the protection of data; and interference with an information system that protects data.7

On South Africa

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    79 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    73 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No