Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Singapore

Partly Free
54
100
A Obstacles to Access 19 25
B Limits on Content 17 35
C Violations of User Rights 18 40
Last Year's Score & Status
54 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Singapore remained under threat during the coverage period, as the government continued to exercise control over the digital environment. Lawmakers established new rules regulating online behavior, passing the Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act in November 2022 and the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) in July 2023, just after the coverage period. Combined with the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) of 2021 and the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) of 2019, the new measures further empower authorities with broad latitude to restrict online activity. At times, internet users were intimidated and investigated by police, and some faced criminal charges for sharing political and social content on digital platforms. Free expression and free assembly online have been diminished under these conditions.

The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) and the family of current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong have dominated Singapore’s parliamentary political system since 1959. The electoral and legal framework constructed by the party allows for some political pluralism, but it constrains the growth of opposition parties and limits freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 – May 31, 2023

  • In November 2022, Parliament adopted the Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, under which the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) can direct social media platforms to block access to so-called “egregious content” and other vaguely defined categories of online material that are deemed problematic by the government (see B3).
  • OCHA was introduced in Parliament in May 2023 and passed in July, giving authorities new powers to block online content, services, and applications (see B3).
  • Government officials repeatedly invoked POFMA to force independent news websites, opposition politicians, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social media users, and social media platforms to publish correction notices pertaining to their online content (see B2 and B3).
  • After being forced to shut down during the last coverage period, The Online Citizen (TOC) resumed its publication of news and commentary, with editor Terry Xu operating the site from Taiwan (see B2 and B6).
  • Authorities repeatedly issued “conditional warnings”—notices that can serve to intimidate and censor critics of the government—to activists and journalists, and some online commentators were convicted after violating the terms of these warnings (see B6 and C3).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

Singapore’s internet penetration rate is high, as is the general quality of service. As of 2023, 93.1 percent of resident households had broadband internet access,1 and there were more than 9.7 million wireless broadband subscriptions on the island.2 In May 2023, the tally of mobile subscriptions using third-generation (3G), fourth-generation (4G), and fifth-generation (5G) network technology stood at 9,785,500.3

Mobile data usage reached 79.75 petabytes (PB) in the first quarter of 2023.4 Singapore is the first country in the world to achieve nationwide 5G coverage.5 As of July 2022, the 5G network operated by Singapore Telecommunications (Singtel) covered over 95 percent of the country.6 The company had launched the network in 2021.7

The fiber-optic Nationwide Broadband Network (NBN) currently provides internet service at a speed of 1 gigabit per second (Gbps), and the government plans to further increase speeds to enhance digital connectivity.8 By February 2023, broadband providers StarHub, Singtel, and ViewQwest all offered service plans with 10 Gbps upload and download speeds.9 In March 2023, Singtel, Ericsson, and Qualcomm Technologies had achieved 5G upload speeds of up to 1.6 Gbps.10 Also that month, the government announced a new Digital Connectivity Blueprint to increase home broadband speeds to 10 Gbps nationwide over the next five years, while also developing a sixth-generation (6G) mobile network.11

The national wireless network, Wireless@SG, offers free public access via hotspots, with speeds of 5 megabits per second (Mbps). As of December 2022, a list compiled by the IMDA showed 5,962 Wireless@SG hotspots across the island.12 In June 2023, just after the coverage period, Singapore’s median fixed-line broadband download speed reached 247.29 Mbps, while the median mobile download speed reached 77.95 Mbps.13 During the same period, Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index ranked Singapore first among 180 countries in fixed-line broadband performance and 25th out of 140 countries in mobile performance.14

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 3.003 3.003

The internet is largely available to all users in Singapore, and the government is undertaking projects to limit any residual disparities in access, such as those between different age and income groups.1

On average, broadband service costs about US$33.27 per month,2 while the average cost of 1 GB of mobile data is about US$0.61.3 According to the Ministry of Manpower, the country’s gross median monthly income is about S$5,070 (US$3,700) per month, although this number only refers to full-time employed citizens and permanent residents.4

Eight percent of households in Singapore do not have access to a computer, and 2 percent do not have broadband service. To address this gap, the Ministry for Communications and Information (MCI) launched a S$80 million (US$58 million) DigitalAccess@Home scheme to provide 60,000 low-income Singaporean families with subsidized broadband service and laptop or tablet computers. Announced in February 2023, the initiative will replace the NEU PC Plus and Home Access programs, which had connected 46,000 households between 2020 and 2022.5

The disparity in internet access is partly generational. A 2022 survey by the IMDA found that 99 and 98 percent of residents between 18 and 39 years old, and between 40 and 59 years old, respectively, reported using the internet within the last three months. The rate was just 78 percent for those aged 60 and older.6

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

No known restrictions have been placed on connectivity to information and communication technologies (ICTs), either permanently or during specific events. The Singapore Internet Exchange (SGIX), a nonprofit entity established by the government in 2009, provides an open, neutral, and self-regulated central point for service providers to exchange traffic with one another directly, instead of routing it through international carriers.1

Singapore’s “Next Generation” NBN infrastructure was built, and is currently owned and operated, by NetLink Trust, an entity responsible for supplying wholesale-only, open-access, and nondiscriminatory services to all telecommunications carriers and service providers.2 To avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure a competitive broadband market, separate companies manage passive fiber-optic infrastructure, active infrastructure (such as routers and access-network equipment), and retail-level service provision.3

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Service providers do not face onerous obstacles to market entry or ongoing operations within Singapore. However, users’ choices among ISPs and mobile providers remain limited.

The dominant ISPs are also the main mobile service providers: Singtel, StarHub, and M1. A fourth service provider, TPG Telecom, launched commercial services in 2020;1 it then rebranded as SIMBA Telecom in 2022.2 Singtel, formerly a state telecommunications monopoly, is majority owned by Temasek Holdings, the government’s investment arm.3 Temasek Holdings is similarly the parent company of ST Telemedia, an investment portfolio company that owns the majority of shares in StarHub.4 Through Temasek Holdings, the Singaporean government also owns the largest number of shares in M1’s parent company, Keppel Corporation.5 As of March 2023, Singtel reported holding 45.6 percent of the mobile market and 43.1 percent of the fixed-line broadband market.6

Twelve mobile virtual network operators lease network infrastructure from Singtel, StarHub, or M1 and sell mobile plans to users.7 MyRepublic, which launched a broadband service in 2014, began offering mobile services in 2018.8 In March 2022, the IMDA approved StarHub’s bid to buy a 50.1 percent stake in MyRepublic’s residential and enterprise broadband business.9

The government awarded 5G licenses to Singtel, StarHub, and M1 in April 2020.10 Starlink, a broadband internet provider owned by the US company SpaceX, reportedly had plans to begin operating in Singapore by the second quarter of 2023.11

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 1.001 4.004

The hallmark of the regulatory framework in Singapore is close government oversight of service providers and digital technology. Under the Telecommunications Act, licenses for telecommunications systems and services can be issued either unconditionally or with conditions specified by the authorities.1 The IMDA is responsible for both the development and regulation of the converging communications and media sectors.2 It is not an independent public agency, but a statutory body of the MCI.

Following the passage of POFMA in 2019, the POFMA Office was set up to convey orders issued by ministers to service providers, publications, and users. The POFMA Office is situated within the IMDA and enforces compliance with directions and codes of practice stipulated by the law (see B3).

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 4.004 6.006

Long-term blocks are imposed on certain websites, and the government directed ISPs to restrict access to one website just after the current coverage period.

In June 2023, after the coverage period, the minister for communications and information directed ISPs to block access to Asia Sentinel for users in Singapore under Section 11 of POFMA.1 The news site was restricted on the grounds that it had failed to adequately comply with a government-issued “correction instruction” concerning an article published on May 24.2

The government blocked a number of fraudulent news websites in March 2023. The sites, which mimicked popular news outlets like the Straits Times, Lianhe Zaobao, and CNA, were designed to trick users into submitting their financial and personal information.3 According to Minister of State for Home Affairs Sun Xueling, analytic tools had assisted in the blocking of roughly 20,000 scam websites of this kind.4 In February 2022, Minister for Communications and Information Josephine Teo said that 12,000 scam websites had been blocked in 2021, a sharp increase from 500 in 2020.5

In September 2022, 99 domains associated with 30 websites that stream sports and South Korean drama content were blocked under a copyright-related court order.6 Since the order allowed for “dynamic site blocking,” copyright holders were able to alert ISPs to block other domains linking to the offending websites.

Singaporean authorities have previously blocked media and civil society websites, including those of the Malaysian NGO Lawyers for Liberty, the news site Singapore Herald, and the States Times Review. In addition, the Canada-based extramarital dating website Ashley Madison has been blocked since the 2013 announcement of its plan to launch in Singapore.7

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

The state regularly employs legal, administrative, and other means to remove content.

Between the implementation of POFMA in October 2019 and the end of the coverage period in May 2023, POFMA directions were issued a total of 114 times to a range of targets including news websites, NGOs, opposition parties and politicians, social media users, and social media platforms.1 According to the IMDA’s POFMA Office, as of March 2023, the government had opened 42 POFMA cases, constituting 98 different directions.2 Fifty percent of these orders were described as being “COVID-19 related.”

In May 2023, the Minister for Home Affairs ordered three correction directions under POFMA. The first pertained to an April 2023 Facebook post and news article published by journalist Terry Xu about a 2021 POFMA order (see below).3 The second direction targeted activist and journalist Kirsten Han, the advocacy group Transformative Justice Collective, the media outlet TOC, and two individuals for April 2023 social media posts and online news articles related to a capital punishment case.4 The government's third direction required news outlet Asia Sentinel to add a correction notice to an article posted that month (see B1).5

TOC—also known as The Online Citizen Asia, one of Singapore’s longest-running and most well-known alternative news media sites—has been subjected to multiple POFMA orders in recent years. In May 2021, the government issued a correction direction to TOC, the news site Singapore Uncensored, and an Instagram user for sharing claims that the police had mistreated an elderly woman for not wearing a mask.6 TOC appealed to the minister to withdraw the POFMA order, but the appeal was rejected.7 An appeal to the High Court was dismissed in July 2022.8 The minister for home affairs later issued POFMA orders to TOC again over this incident, accusing the outlet of continuing to publish falsehoods regarding the matter.9

In October and November 2022, POFMA correction directions were issued to TOC and Yeoh Lam Keong, a former chief economist at one of Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds, in relation to Yeoh’s comments about government deficits and public housing. The Independent Singapore (TISG) website also received POFMA directions for covering Yeoh’s comments.10

In September 2022, the government issued a POFMA correction direction against the Facebook page “The Alternative View” for a post claiming that the government profited from a new public housing estate.11 When “The Alternative View” did not comply with the order, Facebook’s parent company, Meta, was instructed to publish a correction notice on its behalf.12 In August 2022, the government issued a correction order against another Facebook page that was accused of publishing misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines.13

In September 2021, the IMDA had ordered TOC to close its websites and social media accounts after the regulator suspended the outlet’s license, which was fully revoked the following month (see B6).14 However, in September 2022, TOC editor Terry Xu announced that he had left Singapore and would resume running the outlet from Taiwan.15

Individual government officials are known to demand retractions or apologies for comments posted to social media. Although government ministers did not order content to be removed under POFMA during the coverage period, ministers issued 11 POFMA correction directions, affecting at least 32 pieces of content across social media platforms and websites.16 Recipients of correction directions are required to publish notices drafted by the government stating that their content contains “falsehoods.”

Streaming platforms have also complied with requests to remove content. According to Netflix’s Environmental Social Governance Report, in 2022 the company satisfied a government request to remove the series How to Change Your Mind from the platform. The company had also removed a film and two episodes of an animated series in February and September 2021, respectively, at the request of the IMDA.17

According to Google, the government made 27 removal requests related to 301 items between July and December 2022 across YouTube, Gmail, Google Docs, Google Images, Google Play Apps, and other locations.18 In response, Google removed 38 pieces of content. Between January and June 2022, Google received 40 content removal requests related to 265 items. The company removed 155 items pursuant to these requests.19 Meta reported that 562 pieces of content (pages, groups, accounts, and posts) were restricted in Singapore during the same period, and 14 more were subject to externally imposed global restrictions. According to Meta, the government claimed that this content was linked to money-laundering scams and the sale of unsafe health products.20 Twitter disclosed that it had received five legal demands to remove content between July and December 2021 and complied with three of them.21

At least 11 news sites have been licensed under a notice-and-takedown framework, which requires them to comply with government orders to remove content within 24 hours (see B3). Nine are run by either Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) or MediaCorp, which, as newspaper and broadcasting companies, are already subject to discretionary individual licensing and traditionally have cooperated with the government (see B6).

Since the Class License system was introduced in 1996 (see B3), it has been used to restrict access to sensitive websites.

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

There is a lack of transparency in the process for restricting online and digital content. New laws that are ostensibly aimed at addressing online falsehoods, foreign influence operations, and criminal activity online also lack independent appeals mechanisms.

The Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act was adopted by Parliament in November 2022 and came into effect in February 2023. The law empowers the IMDA to direct social media platforms to disable access to “egregious content.” This includes content that encourages self-harm or violence and material involving child sexual abuse, but also a more ambiguous category of content “dealing with matters of race or religion in a way that is likely to cause feelings” of ill will and hostility between groups. Platforms that fail to comply face fines of up to S$1 million (US$730,000) or outright blocking in Singapore. ISPs may be subject to fines of up to S$500,000 (US$370,000) if they fail to block noncompliant social media platforms.1

In May 2023, the government introduced OCHA, a draft law that would enable authorities to issue directions when there is “reasonable suspicion” that activities are being conducted online to commit crimes.2 Specifically, OCHA requires service providers, app stores, and individuals to comply with directions that may include disabling access to content, account blocking, domain-level blocking of websites, and removal of applications from app stores. OCHA also lowers thresholds for issuing takedown orders related to scams and other malicious online activities. Offenses under the bill include those “relating to harmony between different races, religion, or classes of the population” and those “relating to incitement of violence or counselling disobedience to the law.” OCHA was adopted by Parliament in July 2023, just after the coverage period ended. Some groups have expressed concerns about the act’s negative impact on freedom of expression.3

Also in July 2023, IMDA enacted its Code of Practice for Online Safety, or Online Safety Code, which specifies additional measures that social media services must adopt to limit the spread of harmful content and to protect children.4 Among other obligations, the code requires that the services maintain “a set of community guidelines appropriate for children, content moderation, and online safety information that children can easily understand,” and prevent children on the service from receiving advertisements.5 The code further specifies that designated platforms must produce annual transparency reports related to their online safety initiatives. The IMDA will publish these reports on its website.

The government is developing a complementary code of practice for app stores related to harmful online content.6 According to the government, the code “will clarify the age appropriateness of games and help parents exercise better supervision over their children’s online gaming,” in addition to limiting “risks of exposure to harmful content through [app store] games.”7 More details about the code had not been released by the end of the coverage period.

FICA was passed by Parliament in October 2021. The law grants the minister for home affairs power to issue censorship orders—including content removals, website blocks, social media account restrictions, app store restrictions, and the publication of government notices—if the minister suspects that the content in question is linked to foreign interference and believes it is in the public interest to act. The law defines foreign interference expansively, encompassing a range of conduct undertaken by foreign citizens, foreign entities, and their collaborators in Singapore.

FICA also allows authorities to designate individuals and organizations as “politically significant persons” who are required to submit regular reports to the government on their foreign affiliations and donations from foreign citizens.8 The law lacks an independent appeals process. Appeals of FICA decisions can only be directed to the minister for home affairs, or to a reviewing tribunal made up of political appointees. Judicial reviews are limited to procedural matters.9

Provisions of FICA that permit authorities to order social media platforms to investigate purported foreign interference in Singaporean politics took effect in July 2022. Other provisions of the law have not taken effect as of the end of the coverage period.10

POFMA, which came into effect in October 2019, provides any government minister with the power to order correction notices and to remove or restrict access to content if they find that it contains false statements and are of the opinion that it would be in the public interest to take action (see C1 and C2). Ministers do not need a court order to enforce a directive; instead, the directives must first be complied with, even if the recipient of a notice intends to file an appeal with the High Court.11 Beyond content publishers, internet intermediaries can be held liable if they do not comply with correction or removal orders. There is a lack of transparency regarding how and when the government decides to invoke POFMA against online content.12 Only a handful of POFMA correction orders have been challenged in the High Court,13 and the cases were dismissed.14

The Broadcasting Act has included explicit internet regulations since 1996. Internet content providers and ISPs are licensed as a class and must comply with the act’s Class License Conditions and the Internet Code of Practice. Under this regime, ISPs are required to take “all reasonable steps” to filter any content that the regulator deems “undesirable, harmful, or obscene.”15 The law also empowers the minister for communications and information to prohibit disclosure of any orders to censor content.16 Together with the fact that most ISPs and large online media companies have close ties to the government, the law has created a lack of transparency and public accountability surrounding online content regulation. The Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act amended the Broadcasting Act.

Introduced in 2013, the notice-and-takedown framework removes the identified sites from the class license and subjects them to individual licensing, under which they are required to comply with any takedown notice within 24 hours. The sites are obliged to put up a “performance bond” of S$50,000 (US$37,000) as an incentive to remain in compliance.17 The bond is in line with the requirement for niche television broadcasters.18 Because takedown orders are not public and major media organizations generally do not reveal removal requests, it is difficult to gauge how often this mechanism is used.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Self-censorship is common among journalists, commentators, and ordinary users, who are generally aware that there could be repercussions, including civil and criminal penalties, for certain types of speech or expression (see C3).1 Matters of race and religion, as well as any comment on the independence of the judiciary or alleged government malfeasance, are considered particularly sensitive, given Singapore’s laws relating to religious harmony, contempt of court, and defamation (see C2).2

The communication practices of online journalists are significantly impacted by the dominance of state-owned media groups (see B5). According to Reporters Without Boarders, this dynamic engenders widespread self-censorship in the print, radio, television, and digital media sectors.3 The 2018 Digital News Report by the Reuters Institute found that 63 percent of Singaporeans were concerned that publicly expressing political views could get them in trouble with the authorities.4

A 2021 survey on academic freedom in Singapore, conducted by Academia.sg, found that academics researching “politically sensitive” topics were more likely to “feel constrained” in their work than colleagues with different research agendas. As many as 93 percent of these academics reported interference and self-censorship.5

Authorities have a practice of issuing conditional warnings, which may indirectly lead people, particularly journalists and human rights activists, to regulate their behavior (see B6).

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

The dominance of the ruling PAP generally leads mainstream online sources of information to toe the government line, though these outlets occasionally publish critical content. The government exerts influence over online information through formal ownership or executive oversight of mainstream outlets. While mainstream newspaper and broadcast outlets owned by SPH and MediaCorp are among the most popular online news sources, commercial outlets like Mothership.sg and Yahoo News are also widely viewed.1

MediaCorp is state owned.2 In May 2021, SPH, citing falling revenues, announced a restructuring plan that would transition its media business into a nonprofit organization, the SPH Media Trust (SMT).3 The trust launched in December 2021.4 Khaw Boon Wan, a former PAP official with deep connections to the ruling party’s elite, currently serves as its chairman.5 In February 2022, Minister for Communications and Information Josephine Teo said that the government would fund SPH Media Trust with up to S$180 million (US$132 million) a year for the next five years; about 40 percent of this funding would be allocated for technology investments and digital talent.6 The creation of SMT meant that major local news outlets in all of the country’s official languages would be directly funded by the government.7

Since the 1980s, every SPH chairperson has been a former cabinet minister. The government is known to have a say in the appointment of SPH’s chief executives and chief editors.8 In May 2023, an article published by the Reuters Institute noted that journalists at SPH had concerns about “a culture of deference to authority in the newsrooms” and “increasing control from government communication teams.”9 Also in May, an article on the Israeli spyware firm QuaDream in the SMT-owned outlet Straits Times excluded the fact that Singapore’s government was a known client of the company (see C5).10 Government ministries are known to complain about, and seek corrections from, the media. This downward pressure on newsrooms has at times involved requests for specific word usage.11

In addition to influencing the online media environment, the government uses informal means to advance progovernment commentary. Individual ministers and government agencies have ramped up and professionalized their social media capacity, in part by publishing press releases on social media platforms like Facebook. The organizers of major government campaigns regularly and openly commission bloggers and creative professionals.12

Certain pro-PAP websites and Facebook pages that attack the opposition have been described as engaging in “guerrilla-type activism,” with supporters responding quickly to antiestablishment comments online.13 Bloggers have pointed out that some (largely progovernment) online commentators hide behind anonymous profiles; these accounts are often referred to as the “Internet Brigades.”14 However, there is no concrete evidence indicating large-scale covert deployment of paid online commentators.

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Online-only news outlets struggle to remain financially viable, due in part to restrictions on foreign funding and registration rules. FICA may have an adverse impact on local civil society and independent media (see B3); in comments related to the potential introduction of such a law in 2019, the minister for home affairs made references to TOC and another outlet, New Naratif.1

Both POFMA and FICA can undermine an outlet’s financial stability by allowing the government to demonetize websites (see B3 and C1). Under these laws, government ministers can designate any website or page as a “declared online location” (DOL), or a “proscribed online location,” if it has repeatedly published allegedly false information or is suspected of being involved in foreign interference activities. Websites with this designation are not allowed to accept donations or sell advertising or subscriptions.2 In July 2023, just after the coverage period, government officials declared that TOC’s website, as well as its Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn pages, were DOLs.3 TOC was the first website to receive this designation.

Special IMDA registration rules require sites to provide details about their funding sources and prohibit foreign funding, an essential form of revenue for most independent political sites in the region.4 TOC and the Independent, two independent sites known for critical commentary, fall under these registration rules. In effect, the regulations eliminate the possibility that these outlets can generate enough revenue to produce original daily news or regular investigative features.5 In October 2021, the IMDA canceled TOC’s license after a month-long suspension.6 TOC was effectively shut down as a result of the September suspension; a year later, editor Terry Xu announced that he had relocated to Taiwan and began operating the outlet from there (see B3).7

In December 2019, Google said it would not accept any advertising that is regulated under Singapore’s Code of Practice for Transparency of Online Political Advertisements,8 which was established under POFMA. The code requires hosts, platforms, or other intermediaries to develop due-diligence measures that include disclosure notices indicating who requested or paid for the advertisement, providing the government with a record of all online political advertisements, and implementing government reporting channels.9 The Singapore Democratic Party argued that Google’s ban on political advertising could disproportionately affect opposition parties, which receive less coverage in the mainstream media.

The government practice of issuing “conditional warnings” to citizens based on comments posted online raises concerns about freedom of speech and due process. While conditional warnings do not amount to official criminal charges, have no legal effect, and are not subject to formal judicial oversight,10 they do demand a recipient’s adherence to certain behavioral expectations (for example, remaining crime free for a year) to avoid future prosecution. Conditional warnings are neither transparent nor contestable. They risk being abused for the purposes of silencing or intimidating government critics (see C3).

Some online outlets have found ways to sustain themselves financially. Media start-up Mothership.sg appears to be financially stable, with advertising partners including multiple government ministries and agencies such as the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Finance, and the Economic Development Board.11 This relationship has contributed to what analysts call a “normalization” of online space, with the PAP’s ideological dominance of the offline world increasingly reflected online.12 Rice Media, a niche digital outlet that launched in 2016, has so far managed to sustain itself through branded content, advertising, and seed funding from venture-capital investors.13

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

While the online information landscape is significantly more diverse than offline media, most independent and opposition-oriented online news outlets are too small and financially weak to counterbalance the media domination of the PAP establishment. Working with limited resources, independent online news outlets are unable to challenge the newsgathering, production, and dissemination capabilities of mainstream media.

The consolidation of SMT in 2021 further inhibited the diversity of online content (see B5). Yahoo Singapore’s news site and Mothership.sg are the only two licensed outlets that do not belong to national mainstream media firms. After Yahoo was licensed, its reporters were granted the official press accreditation they had sought for several years. The country’s press accreditation system designates approved journalists as “bona fide media personnel reporting in Singapore” and confers certain government benefits.1 According to a Yahoo Singapore editor writing in 2020, this “caste system of press accreditation” contributes to a media landscape of “unequal access.”2 In October 2022, seven Singapore-based journalists for Yahoo Southeast Asia were reportedly laid off due to restructuring efforts.3

In 2015, Mothership.sg became the first individually licensed site that was not part of a major corporation, after it crossed the regulatory threshold of 50,000 visitors a month.4 Although it is popular for its irreverent commentary, Mothership.sg is not considered an antiestablishment outlet. Other commercial outlets, such as Rice Media,5 have gained traction online, but remain subject to the same governmental pressures and legal obligations that encourage self-censorship among other media platforms. In February 2022, Mothership.sg’s press accreditation was suspended for six months after it broke an embargo on information from the national budget.6

YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and international blog-hosting services are freely available. All major opposition parties and many NGOs are active online. Activists and other civil society groups are able to air their views on a variety of issues via social media platforms.

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 3.003 6.006

Groups from across the political spectrum regularly use the internet for popular mobilization, and organizing tools are unrestricted. The success of these efforts is significantly constrained, however, by police investigations and arrests for those participating in online activism, as well as by offline restrictions on fundraising and public assembly. There is only one location—a small downtown park area known as Speakers’ Corner—where Singaporeans can gather without a police permit. The country’s restrictive laws generally limit public demonstrations, including individual protests (see C2 and C3).

In September 2022, activist Jolovan Wham served a 15-day jail term after he was found guilty of participating in an illegal assembly under the Public Order Act (see C3).

In late 2021 and early 2022, Singaporean activists used social media to rally support for the campaign against the death penalty, particularly in relation to the case of Nagaenthran K. Dharmalingam, a Malaysian man who had been sentenced to death on drug-trafficking charges and reportedly had intellectual and other mental disabilities. A petition calling on the president of Singapore to pardon him garnered over 100,000 signatures.1 This online organizing moved offline with protests against the death penalty at Speakers’ Corner that drew hundreds of people, an unusually large public turnout for Singapore.2 However, Nagaenthran was executed in April 2022.

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 1.001 6.006

The constitution enshrines freedom of expression, but it also grants Parliament the authority to impose limits on that freedom.1 There is no legislation guaranteeing freedom of information in the country. Journalists and citizens face great difficulties obtaining data that are not voluntarily disclosed by the government.

A suite of recent legislation grants the government the power to issue “directions” that do not require initial authorization by the courts. POFMA enables such directions in order to combat “false statements of fact,” while FICA allows the home affairs minister to issue directions against individuals, publications, and platforms suspected of being involved in foreign interference. OCHA, adopted after the coverage period in July 2023, functions similarly (see B3).

Contempt of court charges have been lodged to stifle public debate in Singapore, including cases against bloggers for their writing about issues such as discrimination against LGBT+ people and the treatment of opposition politicians in the courts.2 A contempt of court law was passed by Parliament in 2016, and it came into force a year later (see C2).3 Activists, opposition politicians, and critics of the government have been investigated or charged under this law.

The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act and the Broadcasting Act, which also covers the internet, grant sweeping powers to ministers, as well as significant scope for administrative officials, to apply vaguely articulated subsidiary regulations as they see fit, including website licensing and registration rules (see B6). Other laws that have been used to restrict online communication are open to broad interpretation by the authorities (see C2).

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Several laws apply criminal and civil penalties to online activities.

The 2018 Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act gives the authorities the power to ban communications—including videos, images, text, or audio messages—in the event of a “serious incident.” The definition of a “serious incident” encompasses terrorist attacks as well as peaceful protests such as large sit-down demonstrations.1 Those found guilty of violating the law could receive sentences of up to two years in prison and a fine of S$20,000 (US$15,000).2 The measure effectively allows heavy restrictions on online journalism and information sharing surrounding major public events.

In 2016, Parliament passed the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act, which codified the offense of contempt of court.3 The statute, which came into force in 2017, criminalizes the publication of material that interferes with ongoing judicial proceedings or “scandalizes” the court because it “imputes improper motives to or impugns the integrity, propriety, or impartiality of any court” or “poses a risk that public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined.” The law lowered the threshold for what constitutes a “risk” of harm to the administration of justice. It also allows the attorney general to “direct the publisher of any matter to refrain from or cease publishing” content that might be in contempt of court. The maximum penalty under the law is three years in prison and a fine of S$100,000 (US$73,000), a harsher punishment than judges had previously imposed.4

The Sedition Act, which dated to the colonial era, was repealed in October 2021.5 At the same time, provisions in both the penal code and the criminal procedure code were amended to cover some aspects of the repealed law.6 Section 298 of the penal code provides for prison terms of up to three years for offenders who act through any medium with the “deliberate intention of wounding the religious or racial feelings of any person.”7 Section 298A of the penal code provides similar penalties for expression that “is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different racial groups and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity.” Police appear to regularly investigate such complaints.

Defamation is criminalized in the penal code (see C3).8 In addition to criminal charges, civil defamation suits remain a powerful deterrent. PAP leaders have been awarded damages ranging from S$100,000 (US$73,000) to S$300,000 (US$220,000) in defamation suits brought against opposition politicians and foreign media corporations.9

Under the 2014 Protection from Harassment Act, a person who uses “threatening, abusive, or insulting” language likely to cause “harassment, alarm, or distress” can be fined up to S$5,000 (US$3,700).10 Victims can also apply to the court for a protection order, which could include a ban on continued publication of the offending communication. Another provision in the law provides civil remedies for the publication of “false statements of fact” about a person. The affected party can seek a court order requiring that the publication of the falsehood cease, unless a notice is inserted to correct the record. The law was amended in 2019 to outlaw doxing with intent to either harass or provoke the use of violence. The amendments also allow victims of harassment to seek protection for family members or prevent similar material from being circulated.11

Singapore’s broad public assembly laws, such as the Public Order Act, have been used in prosecutions that cite people’s online activity (see C3).12 Those convicted of organizing public assemblies without a permit can be fined up to S$5,000 (US$3,700); repeat offenders can be fined up to S$10,000 (US$7,300) and imprisoned for up to six months.

POFMA includes harsh penalties for online activities. For example, the malicious communication of statements that are “false or misleading” can lead to fines of up to S$50,000 (US$37,000), or up to five years’ imprisonment. Failure to comply with orders to correct or remove content can draw fines of up to S$20,000 (US$15,000), or up to one year of imprisonment (see B3).

FICA includes criminal penalties for covert electronic communications activity on behalf of a foreign principal. Penalties range up to a fine of S$100,000 (US$73,000) and 14 years’ imprisonment (see B3). Even preparing or planning for such an offense is criminalized, with a penalty of up to S$60,000 (US$44,000) in fines and prison terms of up to nine years (see B3).13

OCHA, adopted by Parliament in July 2023, imposes a range of financial and legal penalties (see B3). These penalties vary based on the direction violated and whether the offender is an individual or a company. For example, individuals found to be noncompliant with a stop-communication direction may face a S$20,000 (US$15,000) fine and imprisonment of up to two years, while companies risk S$500,000 (US$370,000) in fines.14

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Police opened investigations into individuals for their online activities during the coverage period, and cases initiated prior to the coverage period continued to be adjudicated.

In April 2023, police interrogated a member of the Transformative Justice Collective about a post published on the group’s social media platforms that questioned the disproportionate number of ethnic Malay people in Singapore’s prisons.1

In October 2022, journalist and activist Kirsten Han was issued a conditional warning by the police, on instructions from the Attorney-General’s Chambers, claiming that a Facebook post published in May of that year was in contempt of court. Under the warning, Han was expected to maintain a “crime-free period” of 12 months or risk prosecution for both the offense committed during that period and contempt of court.2 Han’s challenge of the warning was dismissed in court after the judge ruled that the warning had no legal effect and thus could not be subjected to judicial review.3

Individuals have been prosecuted for online activities that the government claimed disrupted racial harmony. In July 2023, rapper Subhas Nair was convicted on four counts of attempting to promote ill will among racial and religious groups in Singapore.4 Police had previously issued conditional warnings to Nair and his sister, social media influencer Preeti Nair, for publishing a parody rap video on YouTube.5

In February 2022, Roy Ngerng—who had previously been sued for defamation by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong—was investigated by police over a 2020 Facebook post that allegedly violated Section 298 of the penal code (see C2). Although police indicated that they would confiscate his passport and prevent him from leaving Singapore, Ngerng ultimately received only a stern warning and was allowed to leave the country.6

In October 2022, content creator Titus Low was sentenced to three weeks’ imprisonment for accessing the subscription service OnlyFans—known for its pornographic material—despite a police order not to. He was also fined S$3,000 (US$2,200) for distributing obscene content.7 Low is believed to be the first OnlyFans creator charged for his content in Singapore. His case sparked discussions in the country about whether adult content behind a paywall—requiring people to actively choose to view the posted material—should be criminalized.8

In January 2022, lawyer and opposition politician Charles Yeo was charged with three counts under the Protection from Harassment Act for directing harassing posts at a police officer, and one count under the penal code for wounding the religious feelings of Christians.9 Yeo had made comments on his Facebook and Instagram accounts that criticized anti-LGBT+ Christians. In July 2022, Yeo announced that he was seeking political asylum in the United Kingdom.10

Users have been investigated and arrested for their use of the internet for political mobilization (see B8). In February 2022, the court fined activist Jolovan Wham S$3,000 (US$2,200) under the Public Order Act for a 2018 incident in which he held up a sign in support of Terry Xu and another TOC journalist outside a courthouse, then posted the image on social media (see B8).11 The High Court dismissed the appeals against his sentence and conviction in September 2022.12 Although the Public Order Act relates to offline activities, the prosecution referred to the fact that Wham had posted the photo on social media, describing this as his “modus operandi” and arguing that online outreach was relevant to sentencing.13

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

While many people attempt to communicate anonymously online in Singapore, their ability to conceal their identities from the government is limited.

Registration is required for some forms of digital interaction. Government-issued identity cards or passports must be produced when buying SIM cards, including prepaid cards, and buyers’ personal details must be electronically recorded by vendors. Registration for the Wireless@SG public Wi-Fi network also requires identity details.

The government does not restrict the use of encryption tools. However, the criminal procedure code allows authorities to require access to decryption information or technology if it is available.1 With authorization from the public prosecutor, police can require individuals to hand over decryption codes. Failure to provide decryption information can result in fines of up to S$10,000 (US$7,300), jail terms of up to three months, or both.2

FICA criminalizes electronic communications activity designated as foreign interference if it is “covert or involves deception.” The term “covert” is “intended to cover any conduct that is hidden or secret, or lacking transparency,” and the law mentions use of encrypted communication platforms as an example of covert behavior.3

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Singapore has no constitutionally recognized right to privacy, and law enforcement authorities have broad powers to search electronic devices without judicial authorization, including while people are in custody (see C3).1 The full extent of the government’s surveillance capabilities and practices is unknown.

In April 2023, Citizen Lab published a report on the Israeli surveillance firm QuaDream, concluding that Singapore was an “operator location” for the company.2 In February 2022, reporting revealed that QuaDream had the ability to exploit a flaw in Apple’s software and that the Singapore government was a QuaDream client.3 Desmond Tan, the minister of state for home affairs and for sustainability and the environment, has said that state agencies “rely on a range of intelligence capabilities, including harnessing technology” to safeguard Singapore, and that the government cannot discuss specifics for national security reasons.4

In December 2021, multiple Singaporeans—including TOC chief editor Terry Xu and journalist Kirsten Han—said they had received security notices from Facebook warning that their accounts had been targeted by surveillance companies.5 These notifications were among the 50,000 sent by Facebook to users around the world to warn of activity by such firms.6

Privacy International notes that Singapore’s law enforcement agencies have sophisticated technological capabilities to monitor telephone and other digital communications. According to the group, surveillance is facilitated by the fact that “the legal framework regulating interception of communication falls short of applicable international human rights standards, and judicial authorization is sidelined and democratic oversight inexistent.”7

A number of laws provide the government with access to users’ personal information. For example, some members of Parliament have expressed privacy concerns about the 2018 Cybersecurity Act, which allows authorized officers to take or make copies of hard disks as part of investigations or assessments of cybersecurity threats (see C8).8

Under the criminal procedure code, police officers investigating arrestable offenses may, at any time, access and search the data of a computer they suspect has been used in connection with the offense.9 No warrant or special authorization is needed. For example, while being questioned for alleged offenses under the Public Order Act in June 2022, activists Rocky Howe and Kirsten Han had their mobile phones confiscated by police. Han, who is also a journalist, was asked to hand over her social media passwords. After she refused, the police suggested that the offense of obstructing the police in the exercise of their powers could “come into play.”10 Penalties for noncompliance can include a fine of up to S$5,000 (US$3,700), six months in jail, or both.

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

In the absence of a constitutional right to privacy, service providers and technology companies can be required to hand information over to the government.

Website registration requirements, though imposed on only a small number of platforms, have raised concerns about unwarranted official intrusion into the sites’ operations and the personal information of subscribers (see B6).

Under laws like FICA, the government can demand a wide range of information from individuals, whether they are in or outside of Singapore. This information could include any relations with foreigners, the provision of voluntary labor by noncitizens, or financial data used “for the administration and management of activities undertaken by the person which are directed towards a political end in Singapore.”1

Government authorities have said they can request metadata and content from international social media platforms and other technology companies when required for the investigation of offenses.2 The Personal Data Protection Act exempts public agencies and organizations acting on their behalf from compliance with its privacy safeguards.3 Recent transparency reports from various social media and technology companies indicate the extent to which the government seeks access to Singaporean users’ data. From July to December 2022, Facebook reported receiving 1,687 requests from the Singapore government for the details of 2,940 accounts. Facebook provided the data in almost 85 percent of the cases.4 During the same period, Google received 1,250 user data disclosure requests related to 2,097 Google accounts. Some data were provided in roughly 79 percent of the cases.5 Twitter has not updated its data on government requests for information since December 2021.6

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 3.003 5.005

Internet users did not experience violence in retaliation for their online activities during the coverage period. However, due to the lack of protections for the expression of unpopular or dissenting views, Singaporeans do not operate in an online environment free of intimidation or harassment.

In March 2023, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security Teo Chee Hean singled out and criticized an e-book written by Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh about an ongoing dispute between the prime minister and his siblings regarding the will of their late father, founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew. Teo asserted that the book was “calculated to mislead.”1

In October 2021, during the previous coverage period, Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam identified three Singaporeans—TOC chief editor Terry Xu, New Naratif managing director Thum Ping Tjin, and independent journalist and activist Kirsten Han—as possible agents of foreign interference.2 The remarks came amid the parliamentary debate over FICA. The minister described Thum and Han, who had campaigned online against the passage of FICA, as “chief” among those spreading misinformation about the bill, and noted that they had received funding from the Open Society Foundations, a grant-giving body founded by US philanthropist George Soros.

In June 2021, Shanmugam criticized TOC for sharing video content and publishing articles in which police were accused of bullying an elderly woman for not wearing a mask (see B2). He alleged that the outlet had manipulated the woman, whom he said had dementia, into making claims about the incident in a video interview.3 The minister’s comments sparked an online backlash against the independent news website, which received a POFMA order regarding this coverage.

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Cyberattacks against government entities, media outlets, and civil society organizations have historically not been a widespread problem in Singapore. Private companies were subjected to technical attacks and other privacy breaches during the coverage period.

In October 2022, the hotel chain Shangri-La Group reported that it had experienced a data breach between May and July of that year, potentially exposing guest data. During the affected period, the chain’s hotel in Singapore hosted an intergovernmental Asia-Pacific security conference.1

Consumer data breaches are common and affect thousands of Singaporeans. In August 2021, for example, telecommunications company StarHub revealed that the identity card numbers, addresses, and email addresses of over 57,000 customers had been leaked.2

The 2018 Cybersecurity Act requires owners of computer systems that deal with essential services pertaining to national security, public safety, or the economy to report cybersecurity incidents and conduct audits and risk assessments, among other obligations.

On Singapore

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    47 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    54 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes