Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Serbia

Free
71
100
A Obstacles to Access 22 25
B Limits on Content 24 35
C Violations of User Rights 25 40
Last Year's Score & Status
72 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Serbia registered a slight decline in internet freedom during the coverage period. The country features high levels of internet access, limited website blocking, and strong constitutional protections for journalists. However, progovernment news sites, some of which are connected to the ruling party, engage in disinformation campaigns. The government has reportedly employed trolls on social media to advance its narrative and denigrate critics. The surveillance infrastructure poses concerns as well, with research showing that government agencies have used spyware surveillance tools, including Predator. Journalists continue to face strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) concerning “insults” or “slander” against public officials, though detentions and prison sentences in these cases are rare.

Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with competitive multiparty elections. In recent years the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • Government officials and individuals linked to the government continued to use strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) to intimidate and pressure independent media, particularly the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (see B4 and C3).
  • In the fourth quarter of 2022, Meta removed more than 5,000 accounts on multiple platforms connected to the ruling SNS party due to the spread of coordinated inauthentic behavior (see B5).
  • Fewer individuals were detained for alleged offenses concerning online speech than in the previous coverage period (see C3).
  • Following the May 2023 mass shootings in and around Belgrade, people mobilized online to protest the government’s response, but critics of the government have also faced significant online harassment (see B8 and C7).
  • In April 2023, the National Assembly passed the Law on Electronic Communications, which compels the government to register the purchase of all SIM cards (see C4).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

Serbia’s internet penetration rate has increased in recent years. According to 2022 data from the Statistical Office of Serbia, 77 percent of households have a computer, while 95 percent have a mobile phone. In 2022, 83.2 percent of Serbian households had an internet connection, with 90.9 percent using fixed-line broadband service and 74.4 percent using mobile broadband.1 Based on 2022 data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 83.5 percent of Serbians have access to the internet. According to 2022 data from the ITU, Serbia has a mobile broadband penetration rate of 103.6 percent and a fixed broadband penetration rate of 26.2 percent.2 Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index from May 2023 registered median download speeds in Serbia at 47.37 megabits per second (Mbps) for mobile connection and 66.24 Mbps for fixed broadband connection.3

In general, internet service in Serbia is reliable. Most users have some form of digital subscriber line (DSL) connection, and fourth-generation (4G) mobile internet technology is also widely available. Telekom Serbia, the state-owned telecommunications firm, has dramatically accelerated the development of its fiber-optic network in the last few years. Cable companies, which have long been a major factor in the development of high-speed internet in the country, also continue to invest in fiber-optic technology. In 2020, the state launched a program to build fiber-optic infrastructure in previously neglected areas.4

Serbia has cultivated a strategic partnership in telecommunications with Chinese companies since 2017, when the government and the Chinese firm Huawei signed two nonbinding agreements concerning “smart cities” (see C5) and the development of broadband internet service. The relationship forms part of Beijing’s plan for a Chinese-led “digital silk road,” for which Serbia would be a European hub.5

Although Serbia is not formally part of the “Clean Network,” a US-led fifth-generation (5G) mobile network security initiative that identifies the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE as “untrusted” technology vendors, in 2020 the president of Serbia and the prime minister of Kosovo signed a cooperation agreement in Washington, DC, pledging to refrain from using 5G equipment from any companies designated as untrusted. However, the Washington agreement did not directly mention either China or specific vendors like Huawei.6

Originally planned to launch in 2021, the 5G network rollout in Serbia has been postponed.7 Tatjana Matić, the former minister of trade, tourism, and telecommunications, announced auctions for 5G licenses, which were supposed to be held in the first half of 2022.8 However, there were no updates as of the end of the coverage period.

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Internet service in Serbia is relatively affordable, although access to fixed-line broadband connections is more expensive than mobile access. According to 2022 data from the ITU, a 5 gigabyte (GB) fixed broadband subscription costs 2.31 percent of monthly gross national income (GNI) per capita, and 2 GB of mobile data costs .82 percent of monthly GNI per capita.1 The Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development has stated that “entry level broadband services” should cost less than 2 percent of monthly GNI per capita.

There is a digital divide between urban and less populous areas. Per 2022 annual data from the Statistical Office of Serbia, there are significant differences in terms of internet connectivity between urban centers, where 87.6 percent of households have access to the internet, and smaller settlements and villages, where 75.8 percent of households have access to the internet. The highest penetration rate is in Belgrade (93 percent), the capital and most populous city in Serbia, while the northern province of Vojvodina (81.9 percent), central and western Serbia (80.7 percent), and southern and eastern Serbia (76.6 percent) all have lower penetration rates.2 The regions with higher levels of internet access are mostly in the central and northern parts of the country.3

Levels of internet access among households also depend on socioeconomic conditions. Internet connections are present in 99.6 percent of households with a monthly income of more than €760 ($817), while households with a monthly income between €255 ($272) and €426 ($454) lag at 71.1 percent.4

Although the Law on Electronic Communications prescribes that universal services be provided on a technologically neutral basis, with prescribed quality and at affordable prices for people with disabilities and socially disadvantaged,5 in recent years there has been little progress in the implementation of universal service at more favorable prices for socially disadvantaged users.6

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The government did not disrupt or restrict access to the internet during the coverage period, and it has no past record of imposing internet shutdowns amid elections or other national events.

The infrastructure of internet service providers (ISPs) is not centralized, even though the state holds a majority stake in Telekom Serbia,1 one of the largest providers. Serbian Open eXchange (SOX),2 the country’s internet exchange point, is a private entity with a decentralized network.3

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

The telecommunications sector is relatively diverse, though state-owned Telekom Serbia holds the largest shares of both the mobile and fixed-line broadband markets. Telekom Serbia was already the most-used and widely distributed ISP, and following continued acquisition of smaller telecommunications companies it controlled over 50 percent of the country’s broadband-internet market as of 2021.1 A May 2023 European Parliament report urged the European Investment Bank (EIB) to review its €70 million loan ($72.5 million) to Telekom Serbia because of the company’s dominant market position (see B6).2

There are no significant barriers to market entry. According to the Law on Electronic Communications,3 any company can provide telecommunications services if it fulfills general requirements and applies to the Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services (RATEL).4 Individual licenses are only issued for limited resources such as radio frequencies. The Law on Electronic Communications mostly aligns with European Union (EU) rules.5

Based on RATEL’s electronic communications-market report for the fourth quarter of 2022, Telekom Serbia covered 43.8 percent of the estimated 8.6 million mobile telephone subscribers,6 while Yettel, which was originally Telenor before being acquired by Czech investment firm PPF Group in 2018 and renamed Yettel in 2022,7 and A1 Serbia cover 31.7 and 23.7 percent, respectively. Telekom Serbia and Serbia Broadband (SBB) tightly control the fixed-broadband market. Of the 1.92 million fixed-broadband subscribers, Telekom Serbia holds 56.8 percent, with SBB servicing 30.2 percent of the market.8

In July 2022, after the coverage period, Telekom Serbia acquired Globaltel, a telecommunications company, for an undisclosed price.9

In January 2021, Telekom Serbia confirmed that it had signed an agreement to rent out fiber-optic cables to Yettel.10

In April 2021, United Media and SBB, which are both part of Netherlands-based United Group,11 filed a criminal complaint against Telekom and Telenor for allegedly concluding a restrictive agreement, which they believed could set a precedent that makes it more difficult for competitors to enter the market.12 After almost two years, the prosecutor of the Belgrade Higher Public Prosecutor's Office that was initially assigned to the case was removed from her post, which an opposition MP alleged was linked to her investigation into a state-owned electric company,13 and the case was given to another prosecutor that promptly dismissed it.14 In response to the complaint, Telekom filed an almost $90 million compensation suit alleging that N1 and Nova.rs media, which are owned by the United Group, were reporting critically on the state operator in a way which could constitute an act of unfair competition. The suit was dismissed by the Commercial Court in May 2022.15

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 4.004 4.004

The Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services (RATEL), which is responsible for regulating the telecommunications and fixed-line broadband sectors, operates transparently.1 The Ministry for Information and Telecommunications (MIT), formerly the Ministry for Trade, Tourism, and Telecommunications, is responsible for oversight of the agency, which is mandated by the Law on Electronic Communications as well as RATEL’s 2016 statute.2 There is no single state body or authority tasked with overseeing or regulating internet content in Serbia.

RATEL has two main operating entities—the Managing Board and the agency director. Members of the Managing Board are chosen by the National Assembly, based on a public competition administered by the MIT. The board’s members are not formally appointed based on political affiliation, though the assembly’s majority coalition can vote for its preferred candidates. The board in turn chooses the agency director from among candidates who are also selected based on a public competition. In August 2020, Dragan Pejović, who had previously worked on issues related to Serbia’s postal service, was unanimously elected to a five-year term as the director of RATEL, replacing Vladica Tintor.3

RATEL is financially independent from the executive branch, as its funding comes from various fees (for example, those for the use of frequencies) paid by service providers. However, any excess funds must be transferred to the state budget.4

RATEL’s Managing Board appointment process is formally transparent; the competitions are announced publicly, the list of selected candidates is also publicized, and the National Assembly sessions at which lawmakers discuss the appointments are streamed live on the internet. Different stakeholders, including industry associations, cannot officially propose candidates, since that could negatively affect RATEL’s commitment to impartiality. Previous boards have lacked impartial members in practice.5 Decisions made by RATEL’s director and Managing Board are available on the agency website, along with records of board meetings and the permits the agency has granted.6 RATEL regularly holds public consultations on acts under its jurisdiction, as it and the MIT are obliged to do under Articles 34 to 36 of the Law on Electronic Communications.7

The Serbian National Internet Domain Registry (RNIDS), a privately owned and operated entity, manages the registry of Serbia’s top-level country code domains (.rs and .срб) and critical internet infrastructure.8

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

In general, content is widely accessible, and no political, cultural, or social content has been blocked.

During the coverage period, there were no reported instances of the government ordering website blocking or filtering. However, the government did block a number of gambling sites in late 2020 when users of certain ISPs were unable to access an array of online gambling websites, which previously operated freely.1 When asked about the issue, the ISPs replied that they were complying with the new Gambling Law, which was enacted in April 2020.2 The websites remained blocked as of the end of the coverage period.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

The government rarely removes online content that is protected under international human rights standards from the internet.

In April 2023, Serbian daily newspaper Večernje Novosti released a profile on United States Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill, in which they criticized his alleged negative attitudes towards Serbia. The article was promptly removed from the outlet’s website, but the title is still visible through search engines and news aggregators.1

Exclusion of intermediary liability for third-party content is established in the Law on Electronic Commerce,2 which is based on the principles of the EU E-Commerce Directive. The law contains a chapter titled “Intermediary Liability” (Articles 16–20), which establishes the criteria for exclusion of intermediary liability for different types of service provision, including hosting and caching, as well as the notice-and-takedown procedure.

However, amendments to Serbia’s Trademark Law adopted in March 2020 allow claims to be filed not only against those who have infringed upon the rights holder, but also against the intermediaries whose services were being used in the infringement.3 According to the amendments, a breach of license agreement is therefore considered trademark infringement, and violators can be subject to criminal liability. In this instance, the licensee may be obliged to reveal documents related to the breach, as well as the channels and persons who have participated in the infringement.4

In its transparency reports covering the period from January to June 2022, Meta disclosed that it removed no content on requests from the Serbian government.5 Google did not receive removal requests from the Serbian government in 2022.6 Additionally, Twitter did not produce a transparency report covering any part of 2022.7

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

Restrictions on the internet are minimal. Serbia does not have a specific law regulating online content, and general media laws, such as the Law on Public Information and Media and the Law on Electronic Media,1 are not currently used to stifle or restrict online speech.

When mobile service provider A1 Serbia blocked access to certain online gambling websites at the request of the Games of Chance Administration of the Ministry of Finance in October 2020 (see B1), SHARE Foundation, a nonprofit group that advocates for human rights online, sent two freedom of information requests to the government, asking for the notice sent to ISPs and the list of banned URLs, but the Games of Chance Administration refused them.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Self-censorship does occur in Serbia, particularly among government-aligned media outlets. As one journalist described it, “when the risks are assessed, the boundaries become pretty self-explanatory.”1 At some media outlets, journalists are implicitly aware of which topics they can and cannot discuss freely.2 According to the International Research and Exchanges Board’s (IREX) 2022 Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) report, “self-censorship is very present” in the country.3 Additionally, SLAPPs filed against independent media outlets raise concerns about self-censorship (see C3).

  • 1Interview with an online journalist who requested anonymity on April 9, 2021,
  • 2Interview with Željko Bodrožić, president of the Independent Journalist Association of Serbia (NUNS) on April 12, 2021.
  • 3IREX, “Vibrant Information Barometer 2022: Serbia,” 2022, https://www.irex.org/VIBE_2022_Serbia.
B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because a Meta report revealed that Serbian state employees and employees of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) operated a network of fake accounts that promoted the party’s preferred narratives.

The state continues to play an active role in influencing sources of information. Several news outlets have close ties to the government, and the political polarization of media is exacerbated by the administration's preferential treatment of tabloids that cover it in a positive light.

A package of media laws passed in 2014 empowered state bodies to cofinance media in an effort to serve the public interest. In practice, though, the law gave the government a mechanism to support private media outlets owned by members or sympathizers of the ruling party through direct advertising contracts and less-transparent subsidies.1 The internet portals of tabloids that are close to the government—which consistently manipulate facts and slander independent media outlets—have continued to receive significant public funding at both the state and local levels (see B6).2

In Meta’s Adversarial Threat Report for the last quarter of 2022, the company detailed the removal of a widespread network in Serbia consisting of over 5,000 accounts and a dozen groups on Facebook and Instagram that engaged in “coordinated inauthentic behavior” to support President Aleksandar Vučić and criticize the political opposition.3 Meta found these networks were linked to a group of employees of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), known as the Internet Team, and some state employees.4 In addition to Facebook and Instagram, the network also operated on Twitter, YouTube, and local media sites. In contrast to “traditional” troll farms Meta has documented that operate out of a single central office, this network was run by individuals and small groups from locations across the country.

Earlier, in August 2021, Twitter began labeling various progovernment media as either “operated by a government representative or “a state-affiliated media entity,” sparking major controversy in the country.5 The action has been linked to the platform’s removal of 8,500 progovernment accounts in March 2020.6 According to Twitter, these clusters of removed accounts served to promote the interests of President Vučić and the SNS by amplifying coverage favorable to the administration. President Vučić denounced the move to label accounts as censorship.7

In July 2021, the press freedom organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF) documented the rise of “Ugly Twins” websites, which are designed to confuse readers by mimicking existing independent media outlets and plagiarizing their work, while also publishing news directly from the ruling party and smearing employees of the actual independent media outlets. In December 2021, a court ruled in favor of the media outlet Južne Vesti, which had been targeted by an “Ugly Twin” website, ordering that the “mimic” portal be temporarily removed.8 Media outlets Ozonpress, and Kolubarske, which were also targeted by these sites, had been unsuccessful in their previous attempts to challenge them for copyright infringement in court.9

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Online media outlets in Serbia face some regulatory and economic obstacles, primarily due to the importance of government funding in the media market.

The state is active in influencing the media sector through public cofinancing (see B5). The 2014 package of media laws gives the government sizable influence over several outlets, though these outlets also generate revenue through other means. Additionally, a European Parliament report published in 2023 has raised concerns over “allegations that the ruling party is using [Telekom Serbia] to increase its influence over the media market in Serbia.”1

The Law on Electronic Communications does not explicitly mention “net neutrality,” but it enshrines a principle of “providing opportunities for end users to freely access and distribute information when using public communications networks and services, as well as to use applications and services of their choice.”2 There have been no recorded attempts to dismantle net neutrality in practice.

However, mobile operators in Serbia do engage in zero-rating, the provision of access to certain sites and services at no cost. As of 2023, all mobile service providers, including Yettel,3 A1 Serbia,4 and Telekom Serbia,5 continued to offer packages that included data for certain apps, such as Facebook, Viber, and WhatsApp.

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Serbia’s media landscape is diverse, though hybrid news websites and troll farms that amplify misinformation are becoming more prevalent.

SHARE Foundation has compiled a database of more than 1,400 online media platforms as well as print media that also operate as websites.1 The data was obtained from the national Business Registers Agency, which maintains the country’s Media Register.2

The Law on Public Information and Media (Article 30, Paragraph 2) states that online platforms—such as internet forums, social networks, and other services that allow the free exchange of information, ideas, and opinions among their users, or any other independent electronic publication, such as blogs, web presentations, and similar formats—are not legally considered “media” unless they willingly choose to enroll with the Media Register.3

In February 2023, Serbian daily Danas published an interview with Daniel Smith, an alleged British expert on foreign relations and specifically the Balkan region. In the interview Smith discussed the situation in Kosovo and rising tensions, criticizing Serbia and President Vučić’s official position on Kosovo and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A few days later, a Twitter user seemingly debunked the existence of Daniel Smith, pointing to a number of inconsistencies in his credentials.4 This was soon followed by more information revealing that the account used a deep fake profile picture.5 Danas promptly removed the interview and published an article detailing how its journalist was tricked by the troll account.6 This was not the first instance of Daniel Smith giving interviews for regional media.

Social media platforms have played a role in amplifying the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation, particularly regarding migration. 7

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 5.005 6.006

Social media is regularly used to organize social movements and protests.1

In the wake of two mass shootings in and around Belgrade in early May that killed 17 people and injured 21, including one that took place at a school, citizens mobilized both online and offline over the lax response by the government and the continued promotion of violence in the media. The protests dubbed “Serbia against violence” began on May 8 when thousands of people silently marched through the city center and they continued through the end of the coverage period, with their size fluctuating between anywhere from thousands to tens of thousands of participants through the end of the coverage period.2

Local and general elections took place in April 2022 and several organizations launched the “Three Liberties Platform” to monitor the election campaign as well as to help citizens and voters express their freedom to access information, associate, and assemble.3

In December 2021, sexual abuse survivors took to Twitter and launched a social media campaign resembling the #MeToo campaign, using the hashtag #nisamprijavila (#ididntreportit).4 The campaign quickly spread on social media, with thousands of survivors sharing their stories and offering support to each other (see C7).

Several other social movements routinely organize online to address issues concerning the environment, online labor, and local politics.5

  • 1“Srbija, životna sredina i Rio Tinto: Eko protest u Beogradu – do Božića obelodaniti ugovore ili slede nove blokade [Serbia, the environment and Rio Tinto: Environmental Protests in Belgrade - Contracts to Be Revealed by Christmas or New Blockades to Follow]”, BBC in Serbian, December 18, 2021. https://www.danas.rs/bbc-news-serbian/srbija-zivotna-sredina-i-rio-tint….
  • 2“Thousands rally in Belgrade against government and culture of violence,” The Guardian, June 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/03/thousands-rally-in-belgra….
  • 3Civic Initiatives, “Platforma Tri Slobode za očuvanje prostora za civilno društvo u Republici Srbiji [Three Liberties Platform for the Preservation of Space for Civil Society in the Republic of Serbia]” 2022. https://www.gradjanske.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Platforma-Tri-slo….
  • 4Katarina Stevanović and Tijana Dušej Ristev, “Žene, seksualno zlostavljanje i kampanja #nisamprijavila u Srbiji: „Da nijedna devojčica ne doživi bol kao one koju su podelile iskustva" [Women, sexual harassment and #ididntreport in Serbia: “So no girl has to experience the same pain as those that shared their experiences”],” BBC in Serbian, December 27, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-59803726.
  • 5Jovana Georgievski, “’Oterali smo strah’: Kako su borci za reke sa Stare planine postali heroji ekološkog bunta u Srbiji [‘We drove away the fear:’ How the fighters for the rivers of Stara Planina became the heroes of the ecological revolt in Serbia],” BBC in Serbian, August 15, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-53773502.

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 4.004 6.006

Article 46 of the constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression, as well as the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through speech, writing, art, or in any other manner. Article 50 stipulates that everyone has the freedom to establish newspapers and other forms of media without prior permission and in a manner established by law. The article declares that censorship is not practiced in the Republic of Serbia. Article 51 guarantees the right to be informed accurately, fully, and in a timely manner about issues of public importance. Access to information kept by state bodies and organizations with delegated public powers, in accordance with the law, is also guaranteed by Article 51 of the constitution.1

Article 52 of the Law on Public Information and Media defines “journalistic privilege” and establishes that journalists are not obliged to disclose their sources of information, unless the information they hold relates to a criminal offense punishable by a prison sentence of at least five years and cannot be obtained by authorities in any other manner.2

The criminal code also provides protections to journalists, stating that “persons performing work of importance to public information” should be free from threats to their safety and the safety of persons close to them (Article 138, Paragraph 3). The sentence for threatening journalists in connection with their work ranges from six months to five years in prison—the same as that for threatening the highest-ranking state officials.3 However, these rights are not robustly guaranteed in practice. In late 2021, amendments to the criminal code were proposed with the intention of providing more protections to journalists, but the proposal also contained articles that could criminalize alleged insults, which threatens real freedom of speech (see C2).4

While the judiciary is nominally independent, it often comes under the influence of government officials who publicly comment on the work of the judicial branch and, in some cases, openly antagonize judges. Moreover, successive reports from the European Commission (EC) have noted that judicial reforms intended to bolster judicial independence have stalled.5

Constitutional amendments drafted to improve judicial independence were put to a referendum in January 2022. Most citizens who voted in the referendum were in favor of the amendments, and Parliament subsequently passed the necessary law to amend the constitution in February.6 The impact of the constitutional changes on the judiciary’s independence are yet to be seen.7

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

Some laws and constitutional provisions leave room for abusive enforcement designed to penalize legitimate online activities. In 2012, amendments to the criminal code decriminalized defamation; while Article 170 still regards insult as a criminal act, it is not punishable by prison time. However, draft amendments to the criminal code introduced in late 2021 would punish “rude insults or maltreatment, insolence or ruthlessness” with up to one year in prison (see C1).1 In recent years, insult charges have rarely been used to suppress online speech.

The constitution’s general restrictions on speech and expression are in line with international standards, though they could be interpreted to justify repressive actions. Article 46, paragraph 2, for example, states that free expression may be legally restricted if necessary to protect “the rights and reputation of others,” the authority and impartiality of the courts, public health, “morals of a democratic society,” and national security. Article 50, which guarantees freedom of the media, states that a competent court may prevent “the dissemination of information and ideas” only if it prevents calls for “the violent destruction of the constitutional order”; the violation of Serbia’s territorial integrity; the propagation or incitement of war or direct violence; or racial, national, or religious discrimination, which could incite hostility or violence.2

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 4 to 5 because there were no reported arrests concerning online speech protected under international human rights standards, as there had been in the previous coverage periods.

Users have been sued or detained for their online speech and private lawsuits are filed against the media.1

In December 2021, when environmental protests against Rio Tinto’s lithium mining project erupted across Serbia, citizens, journalists and local community activists were visited by the police.2 In seven cases, police came to the homes of activists who had posted about the protests on Facebook and discouraged them from attending.3 Journalists and activists who were branded as organizers of the environmental protests and roadblocks received misdemeanor charges, which can carry prison time, simply for sharing information on social media or reporting from these events. 4

Libel and insult lawsuits are used to intimidate journalists.5 The Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK), a nonprofit investigative journalism outlet, had been sued 12 times in a two-year period between May 2021 and May 2023.6 Most recently, in May 2023, a first instance court in Belgrade convicted KRIK for publishing the names of all the public figures including controversial businessmen and politicians that filed strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP) lawsuits against the media outlet.7 However, on May 30, the guilty verdict against KRIK regarding a suit filed by then director of the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) Bratislav Gašić was overturned.8

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 due to the passage of a new law mandating the registration of SIM Cards.

There are no legal repercussions for using encrypted services in Serbia.

There is no requirement for individuals to register with the government to use online services, However, in April 2023 the National Assembly adopted a new draft Law on Electronic Communications that, among other provisions, requires that all SIM cards be registered with the authorities starting in 2024. Proponents of the law, which will require disclosure of an individual’s first and last name and an identification number in order to obtain a SIM card, said it was needed to increase security.1 As soon as the law goes into effect, the Ministry of Information and Telecommunications will have a six-month window to create rules on the registration of prepaid mobile phone services, and service providers and operators will have to start registering users a year after the rules are released. Users’ ability to remain anonymous will be stripped away under the law, potentially allowing authorities greater ability to monitor online activity.

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

The constitution does not explicitly mention privacy, but it offers clear guarantees for the inviolability of dwellings (Article 40), the confidentiality of letters and other forms of communication (Article 41), and personal data protection (Article 42). Regarding confidentiality of communications, Article 41 states that exemptions are only allowed within a specific time frame and with a court order if they are necessary for the investigation of criminal activities or the protection of Serbia’s national security.

In May 2022, Google’s Threat Analysis Group reported that “government-backed actors” in Serbia likely deployed Predator, a spyware tool with advanced capabilities used to target and extract information from mobile phones, to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in Android devices.1 This report followed a December 2021 investigation by Citizen Lab, a research center at the University of Toronto, which identified customers in Serbia that were likely operating Predator. The tool is developed by Cytrox, a member of Intellexa, which bills itself as the “Star Alliance” of spyware.2 Previously, a December 2020 Citizen Lab report mentioned Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) as a possible customer of Circles, a spyware tool that allows customers to monitor calls, texts, and mobile phone geolocation by exploiting weaknesses in mobile telecommunications infrastructure.3

Telecommunications companies in Serbia are forced to retain communications metadata, and the authorities have accessed this information through dubious legal means (see C6).

In more than one instance, SNS members have made comments about unreleased articles and correspondence between journalists and their sources. The leaks have also found their way onto the front pages of government-affiliated tabloids.4 Stevan Dojčinović, editor of KRIK, has had his personal correspondence repeatedly intercepted by state agencies and published in Informer, one of the government’s staunchest tabloid supporters.5

KRIK and other media outlets and civil society organizations have previously been accused of cooperating with criminal organizations and working “against the state,” with high-ranking officials publicly threatening journalists by using knowledge of their personal information and openly admitting to wiretapping.6

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

The Law on Personal Data Protection,1 adopted in November 2018, aligned Serbia’s data protection regime with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its 2016 law enforcement directive.2 The Serbian law came into effect in August 2019, giving public and private entities adequate time to adapt to the new standards.

Serbia’s independent data protection authority is the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, which acts as a body for both freedom of information issues and personal data protection.3 Since its inception, the Office of the Commissioner has defended citizens’ data rights. According to its annual report for 2022, the Commissioner’s Office resolved proceedings in more than 18,701 cases, with about 4,116 of them concerning personal data-protection issues.4

The Law on Electronic Communications requires ISPs and operators of mobile-phone and fixed-line networks to retain all metadata pertaining to communications on their systems for 12 months.5 The competent authorities, including the police and security agencies, can then request access to the metadata for the purposes of investigating crime and protecting national security. In 2013, the Constitutional Court, one of the two most important judicial institutions in the country, declared that access to communications metadata retained by network operators requires a court order, as they are an integral part of communication and as such have constitutional protections.6

However, SHARE Foundation’s research on data retention practices in Serbia has shown that state authorities access the metadata stored by telecommunications firms directly through “applications for independent access,” which are of dubious legality. Data from 2020, obtained by SHARE Foundation from the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, demonstrates that Telekom Serbia received 1,417 official access requests from the authorities, followed by Telenor (now known as Yettel) and A1 Serbia with 422 and 122 respectively.7

Telenor’s databases were accessed directly by the police more than 270,000 times between March 2011 and March 2012, according to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection.8 Additional SHARE research confirmed that direct access to Telenor’s retained metadata continued from 2014 to 2017,9 and it is possible that other telecommunications companies allowed access but did not provide a report to the commissioner.

All network operators and state bodies authorized to access retained data are supposed to submit an annual record to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. In accordance with Article 130a of the Law on Electronic Communications, the annual records must contain the number of requests for access to retained data, the number of granted requests, and the number of days between the initial data retention and the time of requested access.10 The parliament’s Committee for the Control of Security Services also theoretically has oversight powers,11 but the majority of the committee’s members belong to the ruling party or its coalition partners.12 Serbia does not have a data localization requirement.

According to the Law on Electronic Commerce,13 which regulates matters including intermediary liability, ISPs are obliged to store data on the users of their services, including the internet protocol (IP) address from which a user gains access, both during use and a minimum of 30 days after termination of service (Article 16, Paragraph 3). The law does not explain the purpose of this collection, who can access the data, and how the rule is to be enforced, which leaves room for broad interpretation by the authorities.

Some major international tech companies, including Meta and Amazon, had not yet named a local representative for data protection issues in Serbia at the end of the coverage period, a step that is required under the Law on Personal Data Protection.14

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 3.003 5.005

Journalists often face physical assaults and threats in connection with both online and offline reporting.

The Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS) documented 137 attacks in 2022 and 90 attacks between January and June 2023 on journalists, both online and offline.1 Of the total 227 cases, 15 were physical assaults. The other attacks included verbal assaults, pressure and threats, and attacks on journalists’ property. When such cases make it to court, judicial procedures are lengthy and frequently feature obstruction.

In December 2022, Jelena Obućina, a journalist at Nova S TV, received violent threats on X, formerly known as Twitter, after a tabloid magazine incorrectly accused her of “threatening” President Vučić. In the same month, two journalists working for the daily newspaper Danas were sent death threats, after progovernment tabloids had criticized one of them for his coverage of a World Cup match on TV Nova S.2

Writer and podcast host Marko Vidojković received death threats on social media after airing an episode in January 2023 that discussed the genocide in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and convicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Ratko Mladić, who led the genocidal execution in 1995 of more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys.3 Because Mladić is hailed as a hero by part of the Serbian population,4 the episode caused an uproar. Prior to the podcast episode, Vidojković had received more than 40 death threats in 2022 related to his writing and podcasts, with only two resulting in court cases and sentences.5 Ultimately, Vidojković and his family had to leave the country following the episode and resettle at a secret location because of the threats and legal pressure they faced, including multiple SLAPP from then vice president of SNS and current mayor of Belgrade Aleksandar Šapić.6 Šapić also said he would “rip [Vidojković’s] heart out of his chest with his bare hands” if he ever saw him.7 Vidojković filed a criminal complaint against Šapić over the threat, which the prosecutor’s office encouraged him to drop. Soon after, prosecutors dismissed the case on grounds that Šapić’s threat was expressed in the conditional tense.8

After the May 2023 mass shootings in and around Belgrade, both praise and criticism of the emerging protests against the government's reaction emerged on social media (see B8). Public figures, including actors and actresses, who showed support for the protests were smeared online,9 and some individuals experienced threats of physical violence against themselves and their family members.

In December 2018, the home of Milan Jovanović, an investigative journalist for Zig.info, was set on fire when a Molotov cocktail was thrown at it in the middle of the night. The attack was quickly connected to the local mayor, the high-ranking SNS member Dragoljub Simonović, whose business dealings Jovanović had covered for years. The ensuing trial was plagued by obstructions from the defense and interference by progovernment tabloids, with the judiciary itself coming under pressure. Simonović was ultimately sentenced in February 2021 to four years and three months in prison for inciting the arson of Jovanović’s house.10 Jovanović has been under police protection since the incident. In December 2021, the Appeals Court in Belgrade overturned the initial ruling and ordered a retrial, based on a technicality and a procedural error.11 In the retrial, which concluded in March 2023, the Second Basic Court sentenced Simonović to five years’ imprisonment, and other collaborators and perpetrators to between three-and-a-half and five years.12 Months after the conclusion of the trial, the verdict has still not been formally submitted and the sentences have not started.13

Gender-based attacks on women journalists persist. In a report compiled from the results of research conducted in 2020 as part of the international Media4Women campaign,14 71 percent of women journalists working in Serbia said they had received misogynistic and gender-based harassment online in the past five years, and 54 percent said they experienced some form of online sexual harassment.15 Prior to the December 2021 #nisamprijavila (#ididntreportit) campaign,16 in which sexual abuse survivors shared their experiences on Twitter (see B8), there had been reporting on the existence of Telegram groups in which members shared nonconsensual intimate images of former partners as a form of retaliation, as well as nonconsensual screenshots of women’s Instagram profiles and photos of women taken on the street.17 The group members solicited information about the women in the images and shared their personal details, including names, addresses, and social media profiles. The largest group consisted of more than 30,000 members, while the smaller groups were organized around individual cities in Serbia.18

The migrant population in Serbia has been subject to online smears (see B7).19

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Cyberattacks are relatively common in Serbia, and civil society and media outlets are often targeted. From June 2022 through May 2023, SHARE Foundation recorded 24 information security breaches that were publicly disclosed. Five of the breaches involved technical restrictions of content, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. SHARE also recorded 15 instances of computer fraud, and 2 cases of destruction and theft of data.1

In January 2023, websites of multiple state institutions,2 allegedly including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, and the Serbian army, suffered cyberattacks. Social media accounts linked to the hacker group Anonymous claimed responsibility for the attacks and noted they had accessed a number of government officials’ emails, and also criticized President Vučić’s relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin.

The Republic Geodetic Authority (RGZ) suffered a major ransomware attack in June 2022, which left the real estate market in Serbia paralyzed as the RGZ controls crucial data, including real estate and land ownership records, and information systems used by outside parties, such as public notaries.3 After several weeks, operation of all the RGZ services and information systems was restored.4 In the investigation following the attack, the Office of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection concluded that no personal data was compromised in the attack.5

Independent media and civil society groups regularly experience technical attacks. In May 2023, JUGpress, an online news outlet primarily covering the southern part of the country, was targeted with a cyber-attack that limited its operation for two days. JUGpress’ website has been under attack frequently in recent years.6 In early April 2022, the website of the Beta news agency was targeted with a DDoS attack, rendering it inaccessible.7 Also in April, Danas daily newspaper experienced a “flood” attack, which is a type of DDoS attack, for more than 10 days, but public access to the site was not jeopardized.8

Serbia signed and ratified the Budapest Cybercrime Convention and has adapted its criminal laws to conform with the standards of the convention.9 The criminal code of Serbia contains a chapter focused on “crimes against security of computer data” (Articles 298–304a).10 There is a special Prosecution Office for Cybercrime in Belgrade,11 but given the sheer number of incidents and the fact that it is the only prosecution authority tasked with handling such cases in the country, it has struggled to keep up with a growing backlog.

On Serbia

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    60 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    71 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    No