Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Saudi Arabia

Not Free
25
100
A Obstacles to Access 13 25
B Limits on Content 7 35
C Violations of User Rights 5 40
Last Year's Score & Status
24 100 Not Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet users in Saudi Arabia face extensive censorship and surveillance, which limits their ability to access diverse content or speak freely online. While internet access is widespread and most social media and communications platforms are available, authorities routinely block websites, remove content, and deliberately manipulate online information to positively portray the government and its policies. Criticism of the government is not tolerated and the threat of harassment or prosecution under broadly worded laws forces many Saudi social media users to self-censor. During the coverage period, local courts handed down multiple multidecade prison sentences for peaceful online expression or activism.

Saudi Arabia’s absolute monarchy restricts almost all political rights and civil liberties. No officials at the national level are elected. The regime relies on extensive surveillance, the criminalization of dissent, appeals to sectarianism and ethnicity, and public spending supported by oil revenues to maintain power. Women and religious minorities face extensive discrimination in law and in practice. Working conditions for the large expatriate labor force are often exploitative.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • Saudi authorities requested that platforms such as Netflix and YouTube remove online content deemed “inappropriate,” and threatened legal action should the platforms not comply with the requests (see B2).
  • A January 2023 report by rights groups DAWN and the Social Media Exchange (SMEX) found that authorities recruited Saudi-based Wikipedia administrators to deliberately manipulate information on pages related to the country (see B5).
  • Authorities intensified a crackdown on political and religious speech. In early 2023, Awad al-Qarni, a prominent cleric who has been incarcerated since 2019 on charges of using Twitter to share information “hostile” to the government, was sentenced to death (see B8 and C3).
  • Online users received multidecade prison sentences for their social media content, including Salma al-Shehab, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for following activists and retweeting their posts on her Twitter account (see C3).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

Rapid growth in internet and communications technologies (ICTs) has produced robust infrastructure and widespread internet access throughout the country. At the start of 2023, there were 36.3 million internet users in Saudi Arabia, with an internet penetration rate of 99 percent.1 Mobile usage is widespread, and there were over 42.5 million mobile connections as of February 2023, according to the data aggregator DataReportal.2 Approximately 98 percent of the population is covered by at least fourth-generation (4G) mobile networks, according to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG).3

The Saudi government continues to invest heavily in the ICT sector as part of its Vision 2030 reform program. The country ranked second for 5G availability in the Middle East according to OpenSignal’s Global 5G Benchmark published in June 2022. According to the report, Saudi Arabia has achieved 28.5 percent 5G availability across the country.4 In August 2022, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology signed a memorandum of understanding with the US Department of Commerce to further the rollout of 5G networks in Saudi Arabia. As part of this agreement, the Saudi government will invest in American firms planning to deploy open radio access network (O-RAN) technology.5

Mobile service providers Saudi Telecom Company (STC), Zain, and Mobily also continued 5G expansion programs during the coverage period. In February 2023, Zain and San Diego–based technology company Qualcomm announced they would jointly expand cloud-native, virtualized, and O-RAN-compliant 5G infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, with plans to increase the cost efficiency and competitiveness of 5G infrastructure.6 Also in February, Microsoft announced it would invest in a cloud data center to provide enterprise cloud services in Saudi Arabia.7

Internet speeds are fast and reliable.8 As of December 2022, Saudi Arabia ranked fifth out of 130 countries for median mobile internet connection speed, according to a joint report by BCG and Meta.9 However, a large number of Saudi internet users report experiencing far lower mobile broadband speeds than what is quoted to them by their providers—including STC and Mobily. Many customers have conducted independent internet speed checks to find that the speed does not match that which they are paying for as part of their internet packages.10 According to Ookla’s speed tests in May 2023, the median mobile download and upload speeds stood at 97.54 megabits per second (Mbps) and 14.79 Mbps, respectively. The median fixed-broadband download and upload speeds stood at 93.75 Mbps and 37.31 Mbps, respectively.11

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

While the cost of internet and mobile services is relatively expensive by global standards, it is affordable for a majority of people living in Saudi Arabia.

According to UK-based firm Cable, the average monthly cost of consumer-broadband services in 2023 was $88.32, down from $95.96 per month in 2022.1 In 2022, the average cost of 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data was $1.52.2 The average annual salary in Saudi Arabia is around 101,300 riyals ($27,000), which is equivalent to a monthly salary of 8,400 riyals ($2,200).3 A significant wage gaps exist between men and women, governmental and private sector employees, as well as between nationals and foreigners working in Saudi Arabia.4 This income gap presents obstacles to access for lower socioeconomic groups.5

Rural villages and provinces—home to about 15 percent of the population in 2021, according to the World Bank6 —have historically had poorer internet connectivity compared to urban metropolitan areas, due in part to the country’s inhospitable desert terrain.7 However, the government has continued efforts to improve connectivity in these regions alongside major service providers. As of February 2022, 60 out of the country’s 136 governorates had access to 5G coverage.8

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 4.004 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 3 to 4 because several Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services have been made accessible in recent years, although WhatsApp calls are still blocked on several ISPs.

The Saudi government exercises technical control over internet infrastructure for the purpose of restricting connectivity.

Regulators and telecommunication companies have historically taken an aggressive stance against free or low-cost VoIP services that potentially reduce the amount of standard mobile calls, circumvent the regulatory environment, and sometimes bypass the country’s surveillance apparatus. ISPs and the industry regulator, the Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC), have previously blocked VoIP apps including Viber,1 WhatsApp,2 and FaceTime,3 as well as integrated chat systems on social media websites such as Facebook Messenger.4 A study released in April 2020 found that nearly all messaging services were accessible in the country, except for WhatsApp, though some user accounts differ.5 As of June 2023, most VoIP services—apart from WhatsApp—were available.6

While the reasons behind the historical blocking of VoIP services have never been formally disclosed either by Saudi authorities or providers, local observers are of the opinion that this is a combination of protectionary measures on behalf of service providers, financial and security concerns, and an attempt to limit encrypted communications (see C4).7

Saudi Arabia is connected to the internet through two country-level data service providers, Integrated Telecom and Bayanat al-Oula for Network Services. The servers they utilize are split between the state-owned internet backbone and global servers. All user requests that arrive via Saudi ISPs travel through these servers, making them subject to censorship at a centralized point.8

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 1.001 6.006

The two country-level service providers offer services to licensed ISPs (see A3). Most fixed-line broadband and mobile services are provided by three long-established providers: STC, Mobily, and Zain, though smaller groups, including ones headquartered abroad such as Virgin Mobile, also operate. As part of its overall economic and social reform strategy, the government has streamlined laws to attract foreign companies, including cloud-computing and technology-service providers, and has eased foreign-ownership rules and other regulatory hurdles.

A new Telecommunications and Information Technology Act (TITA) enacted by royal decree came into force in December 2022 (see A5). The TITA aims to encourage competition between ICT service providers including by requiring controlling service providers—those with over 40 percent of the relevant market share—to meet interconnection and accessibility requests on “fair” terms and prices and according to CITC-approved costs. Language in the TITA also aims prohibit dominant providers from abusing their position.1 The decree came after a series of complaints against major service providers for engaging in unfair trade practices.2

Certain barriers to market entry exist. For example, new entrants are required to have a prelicensed local operator to operate under.3 According to the TITA, the CITC board may require a license or registration for providing specific ICT services or creating special telecommunications networks.4

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 0.000 4.004

The CITC is responsible for regulating the internet.1 Its board of directors is headed by the communications minister, who, like all cabinet members, is appointed by the monarch.2 There are no explicit guarantees protecting the CITC from political or commercial interference.

Among its provisions, the TITA, which came into force in December 2022, states that the CITC must approve any material change of ownership of a licensee or registered telecom provider (see A4). It also widens the scope of the CITC’s jurisdiction over telecommunications activities, requiring the authority’s approval for any use of telecoms networks, which could include regulation of “over-the-top” telecommunications services.3

The CITC regularly imposes fines on service providers. However, specific information on the nature of infractions is rarely provided, making it difficult to judge the merit of any penalties.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 6.006

Authorities block a wide range of websites under rules prohibiting content deemed harmful, illegal, anti-Islamic, or offensive. Criticism of the Saudi government, its policies, or its regional allies is not tolerated, online or otherwise.

News websites that publish content critical of the government are blocked. These include, for instance, the London-based online news outlet Middle East Eye as well as the website of London-based Al-Araby al-Jadeed and its English-language New Arab, which has been blocked since January 2016.1 Some Qatari, Iranian, and Turkish news sites have been blocked amid continued political tensions between those countries and Saudi Arabia.2 Turkish broadcasters, such as the state-run Anadolu Agency, were finally unblocked May 2022 when the two countries resumed diplomatic relations.3 News sites with opposing views to the Saudi government or its geopolitical and strategic aims are also blocked, including the website of Beirut-based broadcaster al-Manar, which is owned by Hezbollah; and websites run by the Yemeni Houthi movement, which Saudi Arabia has been warring with since 2015.4 The websites of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), a US-based nonprofit advocating for greater rights in the Middle East, as well as Al-Estiklal, an Arab dissident news platform, are also blocked in Saudi Arabia.5

The government routinely blocks websites disseminating violent extremist content, as well as those related to pornography, gambling, drugs, and websites used to distribute copyrighted materials.6 In March 2023, intellectual property authorities blocked 4,000 websites over copyright breaches.7

Websites and social media pages belonging to human rights or political organizations, such as Avaaz and the National Assembly Party, a prodemocracy political party founded by Saudi dissidents abroad, are blocked.8 LGBT+ content is also widely blocked. A 2021 report by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) found that Saudi Arabia has the highest percentage of LGBT+ “website blocking consistency” globally. According to the report, Saudi ISPs have used WireFilter censorship technology to block specifical webpages. WireFilter, which is manufactured by Riyadh-based IT company Sewar Technologies, is a network-filtering device made for service providers and other commercial entities.9

Popular social media and communication apps are not consistently blocked, although several platforms’ VoIP services have been intermittently blocked by authorities in the past (see A3).

Saudi internet users regularly use circumvention tools such as Hotspot Shield, which allows users to access a virtual private network (VPN) to bypass censorship.10 However, the websites of many circumvention tools, such as Tor and major VPN providers, are blocked by the government.11

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Blocking and filtering by authorities is complemented by state and nonstate censorship and forced content removal. Outlets frequently delete user-generated content that could be deemed inappropriate or inconsistent with societal norms for fear it could prompt legal penalties, as they can be held liable for content posted on their platforms (see B3).1 As a result, it is unusual to find antigovernment comments on the websites of major Saudi newspapers, which do not reflect the diversity of political views seen on social networks.

Saudi dissidents and political activists who post content critical of the Saudi government from outside the country have reported incidents where platforms like Facebook and Twitter have removed content or blocked access to their accounts.2 In February 2021, New Lines Magazine reported that women who published content recounting their experiences in the Dar al-Reaya prison for women in need of “social correction” had their videos taken down.3

In July 2022, the CITC and the General Commission for Audiovisual Media (GCAM) requested that YouTube remove “inappropriate ads” it said contradicted Islamic values and broke Saudi media laws, and threatened legal action should the platform not comply with their request.4 No action by either party appeared to have been taken as of June 2023.5

In November 2021, the CITC launched a public consultation on its draft Digital Content Platform Regulations, a proposed regulatory framework for digital content.6 A new version, which was updated in March 2022, includes provisions requiring video-sharing platforms, e-sports platforms, and social media platforms to obtain a registration certificate from the CITC in order to operate.7 The draft version includes requirements for online audio- and video- streaming platforms as well as social media companies to comply with requests to remove content in line with the “applicable law in the Kingdom.”8 The proposed regulations have further financial and regulatory implications for online service providers and content hosts (see B6). The regulatory framework has yet to be finalized as of June 2023.9

In September 2022, Saudi Arabia was one of six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries that issued a joint statement demanding Netflix to remove content they claimed, “violates Islamic and societal values and principles.” The countries reportedly threatened legal action if Netflix failed to comply.10 Though the content in question was not specified, local media and officials in the six countries have criticized Netflix for content showing same-sex relationships or that which they said portrayed children in a sexualized manner.

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

No comprehensive list of sites banned by Saudi authorities is publicly available. In certain cases, users who attempt to access a banned site are redirected to a page displaying the message, “Access to the requested URL is not allowed!” A green background is displayed on CITC-blocked sites, whereas sites blocked by the Culture Ministry for licensing violations or copyright infringement have a blue background. However, several blocked sites also return a generic “this site can’t be reached” error.1 A digital-filtering study found that most filtering is based on Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) filtering, augmented with transport layer security–level filtering for Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) connections.2

The government receives blocking requests from members of the public, who can use a web-based form to submit a complaint regarding “undesirable” material.3 Once an individual submits the form, a team of CITC employees determines whether the request is justified.4

Data-service providers must block all sites banned by the CITC,5 and failure to abide by these bans may result in a fine of up to 25 million riyals ($6.7 million) according to Article 38 of the Telecommunication Act.6

The Communications, Space and Technology Commission, a government agency under the CITC, provides “filtering lists to data-service providers to apply on internet gateways.”7 The authority does not provide further details on these lists.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 0.000 4.004

Online self-censorship is pervasive. Social media users are extremely cautious about what they post, share, or “like” online due to the threat of harassment or prosecution under broadly worded antiterrorism and other laws. Users who express support for liberal ideals, minority rights, or political reform, in addition to those who expose human rights violations or otherwise scrutinize government policy, are closely monitored, and are often targeted by the government (see C5).

Repression of free speech in Saudi Arabia has worsened in recent years, with greater self-censorship within even private communications on topics like the actions and policies of those within the crown prince’s inner circle.1 According to the executive director of DAWN, the level of fear that Saudi citizens are currently experiencing is “unprecedented” given the consequences for voicing any criticism or “objection to anything that Mohammed bin Salman is doing” (see C3).2

The threat of imprisonment, coupled with the risk of being labelled a traitor by loyalist media outlets,3 has also led journalists and activists to self-censor (see C3).4 Several Saudi journalists stopped writing for local media outlets for fear of falling afoul of government redlines, per interviews conducted in 2020.5 Some of these journalists described parameters of acceptable public discourse that constantly fluctuate, as well as feeling direct and indirect to publish content praising the government’s policies.6

Foreign correspondents have cited difficulties in obtaining quotes or information from Saudi industry professionals, including economists, on issues like unemployment. On several occasions, journalists for international news outlets have had interview requests denied on the basis of their outlets being “too negative” about Saudi Arabia.7 Saudi-based journalists and online commentators continue to feel increasing pressure to censor their content, or avoid particular topics entirely, out of fear of provoking the government.8

Questioning religious doctrine is strictly taboo, particularly content related to the prophet Mohammed. Saudi women have often been pressured to refrain from posting photos of their faces online and many continue to be discouraged by their families from disclosing their names online, with many using pseudonyms. Some have faced repercussions from family members, including physical assault, for flouting these moral codes.9

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 0.000 4.004

The Saudi government controls news outlets across all mediums, including in the digital sphere. Moreover, officials use a variety of online tactics to create an illusion of popular support for government policies at home and abroad.

Critics suspect that the government employs an “electronic army” to promote progovernment views, particularly on social media. Progovernment trolls have taken to “hashtag poisoning,” a method of spamming a popular hashtag to disrupt criticism or other unwanted conversations through a flood of unrelated or opposing posts, particularly on Twitter.1 The University of Oxford’s Computational Propaganda Research Project concluded in 2019 that government actors employ permanent staff to spread disinformation and propaganda. The same report notes that Saudi Arabia was named by Facebook and Twitter as one of seven countries that used their platforms to “influence global audiences.”2 Activists and journalists have identified “entire Saudi-based marketing firms” dedicated solely to running inauthentic accounts for the Saudi government.3

In January 2023, rights groups DAWN and the Social Media Exchange (SMEX) published a joint statement claiming that the Saudi government had recruited Saudi-based Wikipedia administrators in an effort to control online information about the country. In September 2020, Saudi authorities imprisoned two well-known Wikipedia administrators, Osama Khaled and Ziad al-Sufyani, for reasons that were unclear.4

The Saudi government has also invested in online outlets that help promote its preferred narratives in foreign news organizations. This includes partnerships between the Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG), the country’s largest publisher that is linked to the Saudi royal family, and news corporations such as Bloomberg and the UK-based Independent news group. After concerns emerged over the SRMG’s level of editorial control within Bloomberg, the outlet reduced the scope of the partnership.5

Saudi Arabia regularly invites online influencers to visit the country on all-expenses-paid trips, in the apparent hopes that they will depict an idealized vision of the country.6 Separately, digital rights advocates say there is a need for greater scrutiny of the Saudi government’s online human rights violations, disinformation campaigns, and influence operations in light of Saudi Arabis’s position as Twitter’s second-largest investor.7

Automated social media accounts have sought to manipulate the online narrative around several regional events, often pushing progovernment positions. In July 2021, Al-Jazeera reported that a surge of social media propaganda from Saudi Arabia was attempting to portray Tunisian President Kais Saied’s undemocratic decision to suspend parliament and dismiss the prime minister as a popular revolt against the Muslim Brotherhood.8 The article, citing years of analysis of propaganda hashtags, found that Saudi influencers were often retweeted by progovernment trolls and bots that had a history of spreading disinformation. Following the Russian regime’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, a group of online trolls originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) spread Russian disinformation about the war. Specifically, these accounts—many of which have Saudi or Emirati flags in their profile pictures, attempted to draw attention and sympathy away from Ukraine by promoting narratives that portrayed the supposed excesses and aggression of the United States and European democracies.9

Progovernment commentators frequently smear government critics online. For example, Hussain al-Ghawi, a progovernment online commentator, has played a key role in multiple online attacks that are circulated or amplified by a network of progovernment nationalists, bots, and inauthentic accounts, including the campaign against Khashoggi in the months preceding his death.10

The government frequently issues warnings and directives to reporters, internet users, and others. Hefty fines and prison sentences are used to discourage internet users from publishing information deemed by authorities as contrary to the “public order” (see C2). According to the Economist, clerics and preachers, for example, have been banned from “tweeting anything but praise” for the actions and achievements of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.11

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 0.000 3.003

Online and print outlets cannot operate without explicit approval from the highest levels of government.1 The Media Ministry stipulates licensing requirements for those seeking to publish online. Article 7 of the Regulations for Electronic Publishing Activity requires applicants to be Saudi nationals, at least 25 years old, a university graduate, of “good conduct,” and not employed by the government. Article 15 prohibits publishing anything that contravenes Islamic law, violates public order, or serves “foreign interests,” as well as material inciting a “spirit of discord” within society.2

In September 2022, the General Commission for Audiovisual Media (GCAM), the media regulator, introduced “Mawthooq,” a new protocol requiring individuals to obtain an official license to advertise on social media.3 This applies to any content creator who earns revenue through online marketing, such as social media influencers.4 As part of these new regulations, the GCAM announced that non-Saudi residents or visitors to the country would be prohibited from posting advertisements on social media unless they held a license authorizing them to do so and worked within an established commercial entity. Those in violation of this ruling face a five-year prison sentence and fines up to $1.3 million. The relevant license comes at an annual cost of roughly $4,000.5 The government can also request advertisers to cancel ads on a particular website to pressure it to close.

Under the draft Digital Content Platform Regulations, the new regulatory framework proposed by the CITC in November 2021, audio- and video- service providers and social media platforms could potentially be required to “pay annual fees of between 0.2 percent and 0.5 percent” of their yearly earnings.6 Earlier provisions that would have required foreign companies to have a physical presence in the country have been rewritten, now stating that foreign service providers who lack formal registration can contact the CITC to “further clarify” licensing requirements (see B2 and C6).7

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 1.001 4.004

The government blocks a wide range of websites and can order the removal of content, limiting diversity in the online information landscape (see B1 and B2). Existing news sources in Saudi Arabia largely offer the same narrative and views—in line with that of the government—given that dissenting voices are frequently censored.1 Independent media, both offline and online, are nonexistent in Saudi Arabia.2

While opposition blogs and online forums were once the main venues for discussing political and social matters, such discussions now take place on social media, as the use of platforms like Twitter3 and Snapchat4 continues to grow.5 Opposition figures abroad use YouTube to distribute content since their websites are blocked within the country.6 However, pressure on users to self-censor remains high, and the fear of arbitrary arrest has increased as speech interpreted as critical of the authorities is increasingly persecuted (see B4).7 Consequently, journalists and online commentators can only safely present a progovernment narrative.

Some Saudi dissidents have warned that the government’s monitoring of Twitter has limited the platform’s use for open discussion (see B5).8 Within the country, scholars note that Twitter previously served as a popular platform for debate, but has since fallen under effective government control,9 which has resulted in significantly muted debate among users, and the outright abandonment of the platform by others.10 Local commentators have noted a similar trend with the audio-chat app Clubhouse, which gained popularity among Saudi users in 2021. Citizens have cited reluctance to join conversations hosted by Saudi dissidents for fear of monitoring by state intelligence services (see C5).11

English-language websites of most international news agencies are available. Arabic content is widely available, as are Arabic versions of commonly used social media sites and mobile apps. Online spaces for certain minority groups, such as LGBT+ individuals, are largely unavailable.

Saudi internet users regularly employ VPNs to access websites, including blocked foreign media outlets.12

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 3.003 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because the increasing crackdown on online speech, particularly political and social speech, has hindered users’ ability to mobilize or form online communities.

In the past, Saudis had taken to digital activism to express popular concerns and grievances. These online campaigns, most widely proliferating on Twitter, have mobilized diverse groups of constituents, though the most active participants have been young people. However, during the coverage period the government intensified repression of political and social speech, which has led to increased self-censorship and fewer opportunities for online mobilization (see B4 and C3).1

During the coverage period, authorities imprisoned prominent social media users for their political, social, or religious online activism. In January 2023, reformist cleric Awadh al-Qarni, who used social media platforms to express religious views to his large following, was sentenced to death for using social media to spread material “hostile” to the country.2 Such harsh sentences serve as a reminder to Saudi nationals and residents alike of the risks involved when using social media to mobilize, campaign, or voice dissent (see C3).3

Saudi Arabia’s restrictive laws and the risk of incurring severe penalties under them can reduce participation in mobilization efforts. In February 2022, an online campaign emerged to oppose a government plan to demolish slums and informal neighborhoods in Jeddah in order to create new tourist attractions—reportedly affecting some 500,000 people, most of them migrants.4 Exiled Saudi opposition members as well as Saudi-based social media users using pseudonyms published photos, videos, and commentary opposing the demolitions on Twitter, TikTok, and Instagram using the hashtags “#destructionofJeddah” and “#slumclearance.” As the online campaign gained followers, several local activists stated that they were reluctant to join in the online campaign for fear of retribution from the government (see B4).5

In the past, Saudi authorities have arrested Saudi women’s rights activists who used social media to protest the country’s male guardianship system or to call for the right for women to drive.6 While a number of activists have been released in recent years, some remain subject to travel bans and other restrictions.7

Freedom of assembly is not respected, and the government has imposed harsh punishments on those who call for public protests, both online and offline (see C2).8

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 0.000 6.006

Saudi Arabia has no constitution. The 1992 Basic Law, which is based on the Quran and the life and teachings of the prophet Muhammad, serves as a constitutional framework.

The Basic Law contains language that calls for freedom of speech and of the press, but only within certain boundaries. The Law of Print and Publication largely consists of restrictions on speech rather than protections.1 Online journalists employed at newspapers and other formal news outlets maintain the same rights and protections as print and broadcast journalists and are similarly subject to close government supervision (see B7).2

The Personal Status Law, which was published in March 2022, does not include provisions specific to freedom of expression. Rights groups have criticized the law for its potential to further women’s ability to speak freely about challenges during divorce proceedings or the country’s guardianship rules (see B8).3

Judges have significant discretion in how they interpret Sharia (Islamic law), which forms the basis of Saudi law.4 However, the judiciary is also largely subordinate to the executive branch, as judges are appointed by the king.5 Additionally, judges from Saudi Arabia’s Specialized Criminal Court (SCC), which is routinely used to prosecute peaceful activists, have been subject to arbitrary arrest by Saudi authorities if their rules didn’t align with government preferences (see C3).6

A considerable increase in the length of prison sentences handed down by the SCC accompanied the appointment of judge Awadh al-Ahmari as the new president of the court in June 2022 (see C3). Previously, Judge al-Ahmari was reportedly part of the delegation sent by Saudi authorities to Istanbul in October 2018 to allegedly conceal evidence of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate.7

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0.000 4.004

Laws designed to protect users from cybercrime contain clauses that limit freedom of expression. The 2007 Anti-Cyber Crime Law criminalizes “producing something that harms public order, religious values, public morals, the sanctity of private life, or authoring, sending, or storing it via an information network,” and imposes penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 3 million riyals ($800,000).1

Saudi authorities and state-run media outlets regularly remind citizens of the penalties applicable for breaching the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, the scope of which includes spreading rumors or “fabrications” on social media.2 In March 2022, the government stated that those found guilty for spreading rumors pertaining to COVID-19 would face a potential five-year prison term and a fine of up to 1 million riyals ($270,000), warning that the fine would be doubled for repeat offenders.3

An antiterrorism law introduced in November 2017 provided broad definitions of terrorist acts. The legislation includes criminal penalties of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for portraying the king or crown prince, directly or indirectly, “in a manner that brings religion or justice into disrepute,” and a 15-year sentence for those using their “social status or media influence to promote terrorism.”4 International rights groups have condemned the antiterrorism law as unacceptably vague and inconsistent with international rights standards.5

The SCC was initially founded in 2008 to try terrorism cases but has since been used to imprison human rights defenders and activists (see C3).6

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0.000 6.006

Restrictive laws are rigorously applied to silence critical voices and human rights defenders—many of whom operate primarily online due to bans on traditional political organizing.

Authorities frequently arrest and prosecute activists and ordinary citizens for their social media content. In August 2022, the SCC sentenced Salma al-Shehab, a university student, to 34 years in prison for following activists and retweeting their posts. The charges handed to al-Shehab include “assisting those who seek to cause public unrest and destabilize civil and national security” via social media.1 In April 2023, al-Shehab was resentenced to 27 years in prison followed by a 27-year travel ban.2 In August 2022, Nourah bint Saeed al-Qahtani was sentenced to 45 years in prison by the SCC. Al-Qahtani, a mother of five whose biography otherwise was unclear, was charged with “using the internet to tear [Saudi Arabia’s] social fabric.”3 This represented the country’s longest prison sentence for peaceful activism, on par with penalties for crimes like supplying explosives or hijacking an aircraft.4

In September 2022, the SCC increased the prison sentence of Mahdia al-Marzougui, a 51-year-old Tunisian nurse who had resided in Saudi Arabia since 2008, from three-and-a-half to 15 years. Al-Marzougui was initially arrested in July 2020 after she shared a video on social media of Hezbollah demonstrations in Tunis.5 She was reportedly held in solitary confinement prior to her sentencing.6 Also in September 2022, Saudi-focused human rights organization ALQST reported that Osama Khaled, a computer programmer and internet freedom advocate, was sentenced to 32 years in prison.7 Little has been disclosed about the charges against him. Khaled and Ziad al-Sufyani, another Saudi individual known for his online activism, were both arrested in 2020, with the latter being sentenced to 8 years in prison.8 Both were reportedly known for updating Wikipedia pages about Saudi women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul (B5).9

In October 2022, a 72-year-old Saudi American dual national, Saad Ibrahim al-Madi, was sentenced to 16 years in prison while visiting family in Saudi Arabia. His charges include “harboring a terrorist ideology” and “supporting and funding terrorism” due to 14 tweets that were critical of the kingdom, which he had posted from his home in Florida prior to the trip.10

In November 2022, the SCC handed a 10-year prison sentence and a subsequent 10-year travel ban to Abdullah Jelan. Jelan was forcibly disappeared in early 2021 following a series of anonymous tweets he posted about unemployment in Saudi Arabia.11 He was the first of at least 14 detainees to be disappeared between May and June 2021 because of their anonymous online activism. Others include 20-year-old Rina Abdulaziz and 26-year-old Yasmine Al-Ghafaili. Some were reportedly members of “the Bees,” an online network of Saudi activists combating misinformation and proregime social media trolls (see B5).12

In August 2023, after the reporting period, Muhammad al-Ghamdi was sentenced to death by the SCC because of his Twitter and YouTube activity. He was originally arrested in June 2022 and was convicted of terrorism related charges a year later stemming from his commentary on social media, including his retweets of prominent government critics.13

Others continue to serve unprecedentedly long sentences over their online activity. Notably, Abdulrahman al-Sadhan, a 37-year-old former Red Crescent aid worker, remains imprisoned after receiving a 20-year sentence in 2021 over a satirical Twitter account that mocked conservative religious and government figures. Al-Sadhan’s case is reportedly connected to the infiltration of Twitter in 2014 and 2015 by government agents who obtained jobs at the company (see C5).14

Authorities have in the past targeted high-profile individuals for their online dissent amid a widespread crackdown on intellectuals, academics, clerics, and critics of the ruling family. These included Salman al-Awdah, Awad al-Qarni, and Ali al-Omari, all prominent clerics who have large online followings; al-Awdah was potentially targeted for a Twitter post encouraging reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.15 In May 2019, Middle East Eye reported that all three clerics would be sentenced to death and executed after Ramadan.16 The verdict in al-Awdah’s trial has been repeatedly postponed.17 In January 2023, Saudi prosecutors sentenced al-Qarni to death on charges of using Twitter, WhatsApp, and other social media platforms to share “hostile” information about the government (see B8).18

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 1.001 4.004

Encrypted communications are banned in Saudi Arabia, though this is not effectively enforced.1 Authorities frequently attempt to identify and detain anonymous or pseudonymous users and writers who make critical or controversial remarks. Individuals are required to use their legal names when signing mobile-service contracts and must provide a national identification card or residence permit.2 They also must have their fingerprints processed.3 This information is then saved in a database maintained by the Interior Ministry. In January 2016, the CITC required mobile service providers to register the fingerprints of new SIM card subscribers within 90 days, or those users would face permanent suspension.4

It is common for Saudi social media users to employ pseudonyms or communicate via anonymous channels or apps, such as the anonymous messaging app Jodel. However, some individuals who posted anonymously were nonetheless identified and prosecuted during the coverage period (see C3).5

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 0.000 6.006

Surveillance is rampant in Saudi Arabia and the country increasingly relies on high-tech spyware to monitor Saudi journalists and internet users, both domestically and abroad.1

Saudi authorities regularly monitor websites, blogs, chat rooms, social media sites, emails, and text messages. The government justifies the pervasive monitoring of nonviolent political, social, and religious activists by claiming they are protecting national security and maintaining social order. After the government announced that it would lift its ban on online voice and video call services in September 2017, authorities claimed that all calls would be monitored and censored by the CITC.2 Saudi surveillance activities prompted the European Parliament to approve a resolution calling for an embargo on sales of surveillance equipment to the country in October 2018.3

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has continued to invest in sophisticated mass surveillance systems. According to Citizen Lab, a Canadian watchdog, spyware developed and sold by Israeli firm NSO Group has been used to target activists and dissidents in Saudi Arabia. However, Citizen Lab reported in December 2021 that the Saudi authorities had likely switched from Pegasus spyware, created by NSO, to Predator spyware, distributed by North Macedonia–based “mercenary spyware developer” Cytrox.4 A report by Meta likewise stated that Cytrox customers likely include Saudi entities.5

Even members of the royal family have been targeted by surveillance. In August 2022, Abdullah bin Faisal Al Saud, a minor member of the Saudi royal family, was sentenced to 30 years in prison in part due to phone calls he had made over Signal during which he discussed a family member who had previously been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia.6 It is unclear what specific methods were used by the Saudi government to monitor his private conversations.7

In February 2022, Reuters reported that an “unusual error” in NSO’s spyware—discovered on Saudi activist Loujain al-Hathloul’s iPhone—provided direct evidence that the group had built an espionage tool that penetrates devices without interaction from the user. Al-Hathoul was targeted with NSO spyware in the past on behalf of the Saudi government, as have other Saudi activists like Omar Abdulaziz.8

In October 2021, reports emerged that New York Times journalist Ben Hubbard had been subjected to several phone hacking attempts, likely by Saudi authorities.9 Research by Citizen Lab found that he was targeted with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware between June 2018 and June 2021 while he was reporting on Saudi Arabia and writing a book on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.10 In December 2020, Al-Jazeera and Amnesty International staff were reportedly targeted with NSO Group spyware.11

According to a report by the New York Times in July 2021, Israeli authorities “secretly authorized” and encouraged at least four Israeli cybersurveillance companies to work for the Saudi government, including Verint, Candiru, and Quadream.12 Israeli firm Cellebrite has also provided phone-hacking services to the Saudi government. 13

Saudi Arabia has a track record of recruiting agents to infiltrate technology platforms and online resources. In December 2022, a US court in California found that Ahmad Abouammo, a Saudi national and former Twitter employee, had taken bribes from the Saudi government in exchange for sharing the private data of Saudi dissident Twitter users.14 In the same month, Wikimedia banned 16 Wikipedia content editors following an internal investigation that determined “conflict-of-interest editing” and coordination with “external parties” on the part of these users. The content editors, at least nine of which were based in Saudi Arabia, had primarily edited content relating to that country (see B5 and C3).15

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 1.001 6.006

Given Saudi Arabia’s highly restrictive regime and known surveillance efforts, telecommunications companies likely retain and intercept customer data for use by law enforcement agencies and state authorities.

In September 2021, the Saudi government published the Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL), which regulates the collection, processing, storing, and transfer of data. The law contains many safeguards typical of robust-data protection laws around the world, including mandating user consent for disclosure of most information and penalties for unauthorized transfers of data, but these are undermined by provisions that allow the government to access data collected.1 According to the law, the Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA), a government agency, will be the industry regulator for at least two years. In November 2022, the SDAIA published an amended version of the PDPL which includes business-friendly changes such as a relaxation of strict data localization conditions.2 The amendment is expected to enter into force in September 2023.3

In March 2020, the Guardian reported on data revealed by a whistleblower which showed millions of alleged secret location-tracking requests originating via STC, Mobily, and Zain between November 2019 and February 2020. According to experts, the efforts to establish the US location of Saudi-registered mobile phones suggested a systematic spying campaign orchestrated by the Saudi government, though it was unclear if the mobile service providers were knowingly complicit. 4

In November 2021, the CITC launched a public consultation on its draft Digital Content Platform Regulations, a proposed regulatory framework for digital content platforms that included provisions to establish a local branch in the country and comply with the CITC’s data protection laws (see B2).5 The draft was updated in March 2022, and the new version eases the language around foreign service providers establishing a physical presence in Saudi Arabia (see B6). It is unclear if language around data-protection law compliance has been updated.6

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005

The Saudi government reportedly maintains a secret campaign to monitor, detain, kidnap, and torture dissidents. While these practices existed before Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman came to power, they have worsened under his rule.1 Many individuals detained over their online activism have reported physical abuse including torture while in custody,2 and deaths have been reported.3 The government also targets dissidents’ relatives, and dissidents have reported threats and violence even after fleeing Saudi Arabia.

Those detained and imprisoned for their online activities have experienced torture in custody, according to reports (see C3).4 Abdulah Jelan, who is currently serving a 10-year prison sentence over tweets discussing unemployment in Saudi Arabia, has been subject to torture, ill-treatment, and has been denied medical care.5 The son of Saad Ibrahim al-Madi, a 72-year-old Saudi-American dual national who is currently incarcerated over his online criticism of the Saudi government, has claimed his father has been tortured in jail.6 Likewise, members of the Huwaitat tribe of northwest Saudi Arabia who published videos online protesting their forced eviction have been tortured in Saudi prisons (see B2). One member, Shadli al-Huwaiti, reportedly went on hunger strike to protest his ill treatment in prison.7 Abdulrahman al-Sadhan, who is serving a 20-year prison sentence over a satirical Twitter account, has reportedly been subjected to severe torture and prolonged periods of solitary confinement.8

In July 2021, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published reports from an individual identifying himself as a Saudi prison guard detailing “brutal torture” of high-profile political detainees at a prison in Dhahban as well as at another “secret prison.” According to HRW, Saudi authorities failed to independently investigate allegations of torture, which included electric shocks, whippings, and sexual assault.9

Forcible disappearances of online activists, journalists, or government critics have occurred in the past. Turki al-Jasser, a Saudi writer currently in his fifth year of enforced disappearance in the Saudi prison system due to running a Twitter account critical of the Saudi government, has reportedly been subjected to severe torture.10 His current whereabouts and condition are unknown, with rumors previously circulating that he had died under torture.11 Lina al-Sharif, a Saudi physician, was reportedly forcibly disappeared in July 2021. She was arrested two months earlier for her social media activism, according to the London-based rights group ALQST.12 Her whereabouts are unknown as of May 2023.13

In February 2021, the Washington Post reported on the disappearance of Ahmed Abdullah al-Harbi, a Canada-based Saudi dissident who visited the Saudi embassy in Ottawa in January and later reappeared in Saudi Arabia. Al-Harbi’s fellow activists claimed his return was coerced by Saudi authorities, citing fears that he had been pressured to reveal identifying information that would endanger the activists and their families.14 Al-Harbi had reportedly been granted asylum in Canada in 2019 and was later active in an opposition talk show on YouTube. Al-Harbi’s whereabouts remained unknown at the end of the coverage period.

Private actors have been encouraged by authorities to harass government critics online.15 Royal adviser Saud al-Qahtani, who reportedly manages the so-called electronic army (see B5), managed online campaigns that harassed bloggers and activists, and reportedly kept a blacklist of government enemies, urging citizens to add the names of those allegedly engaging in treachery or showing a lack of patriotism.16 Subsequent evidence suggests that citizens have adopted those tactics, contributing to a climate of fear.17

The government sought to silence journalist Jamal Khashoggi for years before his 2018 murder. In 2017, Khashoggi chose exile in the United States after writing a Washington Post op-ed discussing government intimidation; he reportedly told friends that he feared arrest for his safety in Saudi Arabia.18 Credible reports conclude that Khashoggi was tortured and murdered at the hands of state security agents in October 2018 (see B5).19

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because there have been fewer reports of cyberattacks against bloggers, social media users, and activists in recent years.

While activists and government critics have experienced cyberattacks in the past, such as the malicious installation of malware on their phones, fewer cases were reported during this report’s June 2022–May 2023 coverage period, and more generally over recent years. Given the rise in government-led censorship and the increasing limits on freedom of expression, authorities may depend less on technical attacks to silence independent journalists or human rights activists and organizations.

In October 2022, the digital risk management company CloudSEK found that several phishing domains targeting and impersonating Absher, the Saudi government’s service portal, were giving fake services to citizens while stealing their credentials.1

Several public and private institutions and projects have faced security breaches in recent years. In July 2021, 1,000 gigabytes of data from the Saudi national oil company, Saudi Aramco, was held by extortionists on a dark webpage. According to the Associated Press, the page offered to delete the data in exchange for $50 million in cryptocurrency. The identity of the individuals behind the ransom attack remains unknown.2 In May 2020, researchers at Bitdefender, a Romanian cybersecurity company, found that Chafer, a hacking group with apparent links to Iran, had targeted Saudi air-transport and government entities as far back as 2018.3

The Saudi government has reportedly been tied to attacks on foreign news outlets and journalists. In June 2019, the Guardian was warned that a Saudi “cybersecurity unit” targeted it, with the aim of hacking into email accounts of journalists investigating the royal court (see C5).4 In December 2020, Al-Jazeera journalist Ghada Oueiss was subject to a hacking operation allegedly led by Saudi and Emirati officials (see C5).5

On Saudi Arabia

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    8 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    25 100 not free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes