Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Rwanda

Not Free
37
100
A Obstacles to Access 13 25
B Limits on Content 11 35
C Violations of User Rights 13 40
Last Year's Score & Status
37 100 Not Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedoms remained highly restricted in Rwanda during the coverage period: the government continued imprisoning and intimidating online journalists and critics, as well as subjecting them to harassment and violence while in detention. Self-censorship online remains common as the government increasingly tightens its control of the online media environment. Over the past several years, evidence has implicated Rwandan authorities in the widespread use of commercial surveillance tools against journalists, activists, and opposition leaders.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by President Paul Kagame, has ruled the country since 1994, when it ousted forces responsible for that year’s genocide and ended a civil war. While the regime has been lauded for maintaining stability and economic growth, it has also suppressed political dissent through pervasive surveillance, intimidation, torture, and renditions or suspected assassinations of exiled dissidents and journalists critical of the regime.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • In February 2023, the Rwanda Utilities and Regulatory Authority (RURA) announced plans to modify Korea Telecom Rwanda Networks (KTRN)’s license, which would allow other companies to deploy their own mobile networks using fourth-generation (4G) technology, increasing competition in the sector (see A4).
  • Three journalists for a YouTube-based news outlet who had been imprisoned since 2018 on charges of spreading false information, publishing unoriginal statements, and inciting insurrection were acquitted and released in October 2022 (see C3).
  • In July 2022, Citizen Lab published new evidence that found that Jean Paul Nsonzerumpa, nephew of jailed government critic Paul Rusesabagina, was targeted with Israeli company NSO Group’s Pegasus surveillance technology multiple times throughout 2020 (see C5).
  • John Ntwali, a prominent investigative online journalist and critic of the Rwandan government’s human rights record, was killed in an automobile accident in January 2023 under circumstances that have raised suspicions of state involvement in his death (see C7).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 3.003 6.006

Access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in Rwanda has improved notably in recent years. The government has invested in building internet and other ICT infrastructure in order to develop a robust information economy.

The Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA), the sector regulator, reported a decrease in internet usage by Rwandans, from 66.0 percent in December 2021 to 60.6 percent in June 2022.1 DataReportal’s Digital 2023 Rwanda report measures the country’s internet penetration rate at 30.5 percent.2

Most Rwandans access the internet using smartphones. The percentage of the population that uses fixed-line broadband internet remains marginal, at less than one percent as of 2021.3

According to the joint partnership between the government and the Korea Telecom Rwanda Network (KTRN), 98 percent of Rwanda’s population lives in areas covered by fourth-generation (4G) broadband technology networks.4 However, 75 percent of the population in areas covered by a mobile broadband network do not yet use internet services.5

In December 2021, the Rwandan government received $100 million from the World Bank Group to increase access to broadband and select digital public services and to strengthen the digital innovation ecosystem in the country. In October 2022, the Rwandan government launched a plan to invest in the development of a fifth-generation (5G) mobile network, which is expected to improve wireless connectivity.6

Internet speeds have improved since the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns, when mobile broadband subscribers experienced drastic internet slowdowns. Subscribers of service providers MTN Rwanda and Airtel reported service disruptions and speeds as low as 55 kilobits per second (Kbps) in April 2020.7 According to the internet speeds aggregator Ookla Speedtest Global Index, Rwandans experienced a median mobile download speed of 38.37 megabits per second (Mbps) in January 2023, an increase from 16.9 Mbps in 2020. Upload speeds have also increased, from 6 Mbps in November 2020 to 10.17 Mbps in January 2023.8 Median fixed-line broadband download speeds increased from 23.49 to 29.88 Mbps and upload speeds decreased from 19.13 to 10.18 Mbps between June 2021 and March 2023.9

Limited fixed-line internet infrastructure continues to negatively impact internet access. Nevertheless, developments in the fixed-network market have improved connectivity and reliability. Operators have rolled out national fiber-optic backbone networks to connect to the international submarine fiber-optic cables on the east coast of Africa. These cables have provided the entire region with fiber-based international bandwidth for the first time, ending its dependency on satellites. As of October 2022, internet service provider (ISP) Liquid Telecom continued to expand fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) services and wireless solutions in the capital city of Kigali and some small towns by launching Liquid Home, a new brand for its residential fixed-line broadband services.10

In 2013, the government of Rwanda and Korea Telecom (KT) signed a 25-year deal to launch 4G across the entire country. Through the partnership KT committed to investing a total of $140 million to improvement internet infrastructure in Rwanda.11 National Long-Term Evolution (LTE) 4G coverage was achieved in 2018.12 In December 2019, KT announced a $10 million project aimed at improving connectivity across the country.13

Improved access to electricity due to hydropower and solar energy projects has helped increase internet connection speeds and decrease costs. However, only 46.6 percent of the population had access to the national electricity grid as of August 2022,14 which falls far short of the government’s ambitious plan to achieve 100-percent electrification by 2024.

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

Internet access is primarily concentrated in Kigali and remains beyond the reach of many citizens, particularly those in rural areas who are limited by low incomes and low levels of ICT awareness.1 However, there have been efforts to reduce costs and expand service to underserved communities. Poverty continues to be the primary barrier to internet access.2

Rwanda ranked 32nd out of 72 countries in the Alliance for Affordable Internet’s 2021 Affordability Drivers Index.3 According to the Economist’s Inclusive Internet Index, in 2022 prepaid mobile data plans with one gigabyte (GB) of data cost about 3.5 percent of monthly gross national income (GNI) per capita; postpaid data plans, in contrast, cost 34.6 percent of monthly GNI per capita.4 These costs remain prohibitively expensive for the majority of residents.5 The 2022 Global Connectivity Report from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) found that the price of mobile broadband was equivalent to more than 15 percent of monthly income for the lowest-earning 40 percent of Rwandans.6

In February 2023, Starlink, a satellite broadband service offered by the company SpaceX, was issued a license to operate in Rwanda and began providing service (see A4).7 Although the price of Starlink far exceeds what most residents can afford, the Ministry of ICT & Innovation (MINICT) announced a pilot plan to provide Starlink satellite internet connectivity in 500 schools.8

While Liquid Telecom, one of the leading broadband internet providers, launched fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) mobile broadband services in October 2022, the cost of different internet packages continues to keep majority of Rwandan residents from accessing them. Prices for Liquid’s FTTH begin at 27,999 Rwandan francs ($25.60).9 10 In comparison, MTN Rwanda, another ISP, offers a home fiber-optic service beginning at 20,000 francs ($18.30) for 15 Mbps.11

Fewer than 10 percent of Rwandans were digitally literate as of 2019,12 but the country has ambitious plans to achieve 60 percent adult digital literacy by 2024.13

Multiple projects in recent years have sought to improve access to the internet in underserved rural areas. In 2019, the Government of Rwanda, the ITU, and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) collaborated on a pilot program that enhanced broadband coverage for 63 rural schools in Rwanda that lacked internet access despite being located within 30 kilometers of broadband coverage.14

A joint ITU and RURA broadband expansion project aims to increase connectivity in rural areas and improve access to government services and information. According to the ITU, the project also aims to provide free or low-cost internet access to schools, hospitals, and underserved populations.15 In November 2022, OneWeb, a British company, signed a partnership with Airtel Africa to deliver high speed, low-latency low earth orbit (LEO) satellite connectivity services to government and private-sector customers across the African continent, including in Rwanda.16

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

There were no restrictions on connectivity reported in Rwanda during the coverage period, though Article 52 of the 2001 Law Governing Telecommunications gives the government excessive powers over telecommunications networks in the name of preserving “national integrity.” These powers include the ability to “suspend a telecommunications service for an indeterminate period, either generally or for certain communications.”1

The local internet exchange point (IXP), the Rwanda Internet Exchange (RINEX),2 is managed by the Rwanda Internet Community and Technology Alliance, a nonprofit organization comprised of ICT institutions and professionals.3

Since 2013, IHS Towers, Africa’s largest operator of telecommunications towers, has managed most of these assets in Rwanda, acquiring hundreds of towers from other providers in 2014.4 Internet activists believe the consolidation of telecommunications infrastructure under one company’s ownership may permit the government to exercise greater control over these assets, and that the government collects massive intelligence data with the company’s help (see C6).5

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 3.003 6.006

RURA is not transparent in its oversight of Internet Service Providers (ISPs). However, recent developments in the ISP market have improved competition between providers.

Following the announcement of Rwanda’s National Broadband Policy and Strategy in October 2022 (see A1), the government has sought to increase competition in the broadband market. To this end, in February 2023, the Rwanda Utilities and Regulatory Authority (RURA) announced plans to modify the license for Korea Telecom Rwanda Networks (KTRN), which had previously held a monopoly on 4G infrastructure in the country, to allow other companies to deploy 4G networks. This policy change will allow other providers such as MTN and Airtel to launch their own mobile networks in Rwanda.1

Starlink satellite internet services are licensed in Rwanda and began operating in February 2023 (see A2). Although the costs for satellite internet remain high, the establishment of another internet service provider could further decrease the market dominance of KTRN.2

As of June 2022, Rwanda had 21 licensed ISPs.3 The fixed-line internet service market is fairly diverse, with the largest market shares held by GVA Rwanda with 40 percent and Liquid Telecom with 31 percent, respectively. However, MTN and Airtel dominate the mobile service market. In June 2022, RURA reported that MTN Rwanda held over 66 percent of the country’s mobile internet subscriptions, while Airtel Rwanda held another 32 percent.4 In 2019, an anonymous source from within RURA’s legal department said that many ISPs were no longer operational due to the dominance of MTN Rwanda and Airtel. According to the source, the state has interest in maintaining the dominance of these two companies because they allow RURA to more easily monitor users.5 According to local sources, government officials and agencies have shares in some telecommunications companies, which may enable the state to interfere in their operations.

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 1.001 4.004

There are no legal guarantees for the autonomy of RURA. RURA reports directly to the office of the prime minister. The government audits RURA’s budget, while the president nominates its seven board members, supervisory board, and director general, limiting its autonomy in practice.1 Emile Patrick Baganizi, previously a deputy director general of Rwanda Transport Development Agency (RTDA), was appointed acting director general of RURA in October 2022 after three former executives were dismissed for mismanagement.2

Appointments to RURA have raised concerns about the influence of the military and intelligence services over the regulation of the ICT sector.3 Former assistant police commissioner Anthony Kulamba, who also served as the Rwanda National Police (RNP) commissioner for Interpol,4 currently serves as RURA’s General Manager for transport regulation.5

There are no mechanisms for ISPs or other companies regulated by RURA to appeal its decisions.6 Furthermore, no self-regulatory mechanism is available for ISPs.7

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

The government restricts the types of online content that users can access, particularly material that strays from the government’s official narrative.

As of June 2023, 15 online radio stations and websites owned by Rwandan critics living in exile were inaccessible.1 The Rwandan Senate previously accused these and 11 other online radio stations and websites of genocide denial (see C7).2 As of June 2023, numerous independent news outlets and opposition blogs that have been blocked for years reportedly remained inaccessible,3 including the website of the newspaper The Rwandan, as well as online publication Le Prophete.4 The websites for independent regional news outlets and websites associated with the Rwandan diaspora, such as Rugali, are also blocked.5

In 2019, RURA blocked several Ugandan news sites, including the websites of the Daily Monitor, the Observer, and the Independent, reciprocating the Uganda Communications Commission’s (UCC) blocking of two Rwandan news sites, the New Times and Igihe.6 As of June 2023, the Daily Monitor, Independent, and two other Ugandan news sites—ChimpReports and Nile Post—were still reported inaccessible in Rwanda, despite the rapprochement the two countries reached in 2022.7 The website of SoftPower News, a Ugandan digital media company that had previously been blocked in 2018, also reportedly remained inaccessible at the end of the coverage period.8

Most international news sources, some of which are critical of the Rwandan government, are available online. However, the website of Agence France-Presse, a news agency, showed signs of blocking in Rwanda during the coverage period.9

Social networking sites and communications apps such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp are generally accessible.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The extent to which the government forces websites or digital platforms to delete content is unknown, though anecdotal evidence in recent years suggests the practice is common. According to journalists who have spoken on condition of anonymity, authorities often pressure editors of news sites to delete content that is critical of the government or avoid publishing such content altogether, threatening to block sites that do not comply.1 Local journalists refer to the practice as kunyonga (meaning “shutting down anonymously”).

Credible sources claim that the Office of the Government Spokesperson (OGS), an official propaganda entity, has administrative access to the websites of some nominally independent newspapers. Designated government employees from the OGS reportedly remove stories deemed critical of the Kagame administration on a routine basis.

  • 1Interview with journalists for Igihe and Kigali Today.
B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

RURA generally does not provide explanations when local and international news sites are blocked. Website owners have no avenue of appeal when their sites are blocked.

According to a 2010 law relating to electronic messages, signatures, and transactions, intermediaries and service providers are not held liable for content transmitted through their networks.1 Nonetheless, service providers are required to remove content when handed a takedown notice, and there are no mechanisms for appeal.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 0.000 4.004

While Rwandans are active on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, in recent years self-censorship has become ubiquitous among both online journalists and ordinary users due to increasing repression, social pressure to support the government, and fear of reprisals for those who criticize the authorities.1 The hostile environment for journalists, who risk prosecution and imprisonment for critical, independent reporting (see C3), contributes to self-censorship. The disappearance and murder of numerous opposition members, similarly, reinforces self-censorship (see C7).2 Internet users typically avoid topics that can be construed as critical of the government or disruptive to national unity and reconciliation.3

President Kagame has frequently threatened his critics and accused them of destabilizing the country, further entrenching self-censorship. In a 2019 speech, Kagame warned opponents of his government in the diaspora that, “those making noise on the internet do so because they're far from the fire. If they dare get close to it, they’ll face its heat.”4 Observers argued that Kagame’s threats were genuine, as a number of Rwandan dissidents abroad have been killed, disappeared, or kidnapped and brought back to Rwanda.5

Financial challenges in Rwanda’s media sector have driven many media houses and journalists to YouTube channels for monetization. In March 2020, one editor reported that their outlet is “exercising extreme caution” because of government restrictions on online speech (see C2). They stated that “the government started cracking down on YouTubers—especially those who go against the official narrative."6

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

The government uses editorial influence and coordinated social media campaigns to manipulate online information.

Security officials and other government authorities frequently interfere with editors at online outlets to prevent the publication of stories on certain topics and alter content that criticizes the government.1 Journalists say that editorial decisions are heavily influenced by government forces—including police and army officers and powerful political leaders—whose demands are colloquially known as “I say this.” For example, two anonymous sources confirmed that during the 2017 presidential campaign, editors of Igihe, an online news outlet, were not allowed to publish articles on candidates challenging President Kagame. According to journalists who were interviewed anonymously, security officials often review journalists’ stories and photographs before they are published. One respondent said that authorities have tightened their control of the media by ensuring that each news organization employs a government representative to monitor editorial content.2 A wide range of institutions are required to employ government agents, especially those that the government deems to handle potentially sensitive information.

Social media accounts with government affiliations regularly debate and harass individuals who post online comments considered critical of the government.3 In July 2020, Edouard Bamporiki, culture and youth minister, targeted Aimable Karasira, then a University of Rwanda lecturer and YouTube commentator, with social media attacks and called for his dismissal (see C7).4 Karasira was dismissed a month later and arrested on genocide denial charges in 2021 (see C3).5

President Kagame regularly encourages supporters to represent the government’s interests online. In April 2021, for instance, he chastised party cadres for not attacking those who criticize the government on social media.6

Progovernment accounts also mobilize to share and post positive comments in response to President Kagame’s Twitter posts in order to project an image of widespread support. Through Itorero, a state-run school that teaches traditional values, and Intore, the graduates of this school, the government has mobilized social media users to counter the views of individuals deemed to be “enemies of the state.” This so-called “Twitter Army” has systematically attacked and discredited individuals and media outlets that criticize the government. Journalists outside Rwanda who publish work critical of the regime are also targeted with harassment and intimidation on social media.7

According to local sources, members of the “Twitter Army” are rewarded for their attacks with appointments or nominations to jobs at government institutions and private companies with ties to the ruling party. One source said that intelligence services monitor and report social media users who engage constructively with government critics.

In October 2019, the Rwandan Senate accused 26 online radio stations and websites owned by Rwandan critics in exile of denying the 1994 genocide (see C7); the report was followed by a February 2020 campaign to share the results of its research.8 The accusations limited the reach of the websites named in the report, contributing to greater government control of the online media environment.

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Compared to their state-run counterparts, which receive income from government advertisements and direct subsidies, independent media outlets often struggle financially.1 Large businesses generally only advertise with state-owned or progovernment media outlets, based on an unspoken rule.

An increasing proportion of media houses and journalists rely on YouTube channels to finance their content. In December 2020, the Rwanda Media Commission (RMC) suspended plans to require YouTube channels to register with the RMC, which had originally been announced earlier that month.2 Registration reportedly would have required proof of press credentials and a fee of 50,000 francs ($46).3 Human rights groups argued that the proposed plans would give the government another avenue to target critics and censor online expression.4

In April 2020, the RMC had released a statement saying that individuals running personal YouTube channels did not qualify as journalists.5 One editor said disqualifying YouTube channels as professional media sources could limit the already sparse safeguards for online journalists, potentially causing the collapse of online journalism in the country.6

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 1.001 4.004

Government repression of the media greatly limits the diversity and reliability of the information landscape, both online and offline.

Critical and independent online journalism produced by opposition supporters overseas—mainly in Europe, the United States, and South Africa—is blocked in Rwanda. Proxy servers can be used to access blocked content, but few Rwandans are aware of the extent of blocking or the means to circumvent it.1

Currently, over 70 percent of the population speaks only Kinyarwanda, making internet content in English inaccessible to most Rwandans.2

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 2.002 6.006

Digital activism on political and social issues is uncommon, despite the widespread availability of mobilization tools; no social media campaigns that criticize the government have been noted in recent years. Rampant surveillance and SIM card registration requirements have made users fearful of using digital tools for political activism that challenges the government (see C4 and C5).

Government-aligned accounts sometimes organize social media campaigns to spread progovernment narratives. For instance, the ndi Umunyarwanda (“I am Rwandan”) program purports to build national unity and counter the spread of “genocide ideology”—a criminal act in Rwandan law that bars incitement to genocide and ethnic divisionism but is often applied to silence any dissenting views of the government’s preferred narrative about the 1994 genocide (see C2).

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 1.001 6.006

Freedom of press, of expression, and of access to information are recognized and guaranteed by the state in Article 38 of the Rwandan Constitution.1 However, Rwanda’s legal framework is used to restrict fundamental rights, including online. The Rwandan judiciary is not independent, and many journalists who publish material online view the threat of imprisonment as a significant constraint on their work.

In April 2019, the Supreme Court repealed a law that banned the publication of political cartoons but upheld criminal defamation against the president (see C2). The decision draws an explicit distinction between the head of state and other public officials,2 and was viewed as evidence of the judiciary’s deference to the executive.

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Rwandan law restricts free expression and imposes criminal and civil penalties for legitimate online activities, sometimes with high fines and maximum sentences.

A cybersecurity law passed in 2018 imposes up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of between one million francs ($910) and three million francs ($2,700) for publishing “rumors that may incite fear, insurrection, or violence or that may make a person lose their credibility.”1 Additionally, anyone who “establishes, publishes, or uses a site of a terrorist group” faces imprisonment of 15 to 20 years and a fine of between 20 million francs ($18,000) and 50 million francs ($46,000).2 The government considers many exiled opposition organizations “terrorist groups,” which has contributed to concerns that the law will be used to further crack down on opposition activities.3

Defamation of the president is a criminal offense in Rwanda, for which 2018 revisions to the penal code impose penalties of five to seven years’ imprisonment.4 Many other often vaguely worded penal code provisions contain undue restrictions on freedom of expression that can be applied to online activities. Notably, the spread of “false information or harmful propaganda with intent to cause a hostile international opinion against [the] Rwanda government” carries penalties of between 7 and 10 years’ imprisonment in peacetime, and life imprisonment during wartime.5

Defamation against private individuals was decriminalized under the revised code. A provision in the code that criminalized the “humiliation of national authorities,” including through cartoons, was overturned by the Supreme Court in April 2019 (see C1).6

An ICT law enacted in 2016 created a new legal and regulatory framework for the ICT sector and codified specific restrictions on internet activities that are antithetical to internet freedom.7 Most notably, provisions in the law prohibit the dissemination of “grossly offensive” or “indecent” messages as well as the use of ICTs to cause “annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety.”8

The law against “genocide ideology”—amended in 2013—also threatens freedom of expression both online and off, prescribing heavy prison sentences of up to nine years and fines for any offender “who disseminates genocide ideology in public through documents, speeches, pictures, media, or any other means.”9

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because of the acquittal of three online journalists who had been detained since 2018 on charges of spreading false information and inciting insurrection.

Citizens and journalists are periodically arrested for online activities in Rwanda, though the high degree of self-censorship practiced by online journalists and ordinary users alike has resulted in fewer arrests in recent years. Cases may be underreported, given the government’s strict control of the media.

In September 2022, the trial of Christopher Kayumba began. Kayumba is the former editor of The Chronicles, an online newspaper, and was arrested in September 2021 on allegations of rape and attempted rape. Critics said the allegations were politically motivated because of his critical coverage of corruption and human rights abuses in Rwanda.1 His trial was initially conducted at Mageragere prison, though Kayumba requested that it be transferred to an open court.2 Kayumba was subsequently acquitted in February 2023.3

In November 2021, a court sentenced Dieudonné Niyonsenga to a seven-year prison sentence and a fine of five million francs ($4,600) on charges of humiliating state officials.4 Niyonsenga operated a YouTube channel, Ishema TV, where he discussed human rights abuses perpetrated by Rwandan authorities.

In October 2021, Théoneste Nsengimana, a journalist, was arrested ahead of a planned discussion on his YouTube channel with Victoria Ingabire, the leader of DALFA-Umurinzi, an unregistered opposition party.5 The Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB) later announced that Nsengimana and five others had been arrested and detained for “publication of rumors intended to cause uprising or unrest among the population.” As of January 2023, Nsengimana was still jailed in Kigali.6

In October 2018, three journalists were arrested on charges of publishing unoriginal statements or pictures, inciting insurrection, and spreading false information with the intention of creating a hostile international opinion of Rwanda.7 The three journalists, Damascene Mutuyimana, Jean Baptiste Nshimiyimana, and Shadrack Niyonsenga, worked for Iwacu TV, a Kinyarwanda-language news broadcaster on YouTube.8 After the Rwandan high court postponed their trial in June 2021, a legal expert noted their pretrial detention had exceeded the potential punishment associated with the charges against them.9 In October 2022 they were acquitted and released.10

In May 2021, police arrested Aimable Karasira, a YouTube commentator and former university professor, and charged him with genocide denial for his social media activity.11 He later received additional charges for “illicit enrichment” over funds that authorities allege he possessed with no adequate explanation.12 In a May 2022 court appearance, Karasira told a judge that he had been subjected to torture in detention and denied medical treatment.13 He further said that the prison authorities were inflicting the same treatment on the Dieudonné Niyonsenga and Christopher Kayumba (see C7). Karasira remained in prison as of May 2023, after the court called for him to undergo psychiatric evaluation before his trial continued.14

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

The ability to communicate anonymously is compromised by mandatory SIM card registration requirements that have been in place since 2013.1 Under the law, RURA has unfettered access to SIM card databases managed by operators, while other “authorized” individuals or institutions may also be granted access.2

In recent years, RURA has sought to revise regulations on SIM card registration, ostensibly to tackle fraud, including identity theft, phishing, and SIM boxing (a process that disguises an international call as a local one). In January 2019, RURA announced that mobile phone users could not use more than three SIM cards on each network. The new regulations required users to register each SIM card with their national identification by the end of the month. Foreigners, meanwhile, can use only one SIM card. RURA justified the regulations on security grounds, arguing that the proliferation of SIM cards made it more difficult to track criminal activity.3 Critics argued that the regulations were meant to collect users’ data, since many people have evaded state monitoring by buying and registering SIM cards with false identities. The various legal provisions that enable surveillance and limit anonymity are particularly troubling in the absence of a comprehensive data protection law (see C6).4

Article 123 of Rwanda’s ICT Law mandates the installation of interception tools to compromise encryption and requires operators to install “backdoors” that allow for circumvention of encryption measures.5

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 1.001 6.006

The full extent of the authorities’ surveillance capabilities is unknown, though the government is known to use commercial spyware tools and there is a strong sense among observers that surveillance is pervasive. The government closely monitors social media discussions, as evidenced by the prevalence of progovernment commenters that frequently appear on social media platforms (see B5). Exiled dissidents have been attacked and murdered, despite their efforts to protect their identities, following threats from individuals inside or associated with the government.1

The Rwandan government is known to use Pegasus, a surveillance software developed by Israeli technology firm NSO Group, against opposition figures, journalists, and human rights defenders. In September 2021 Belgium’s military intelligence service assessed that a Belgian journalist and his wife’s devices were likely targeted by Pegasus software, and that the attack was probably initiated by Rwandan authorities.2 In July 2021, Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories (a nonprofit organization that supports the publication of stories by journalists facing physical threats, including imprisonment and murder) identified more than 3,500 phone numbers linked to Rwandan activists, journalists, and politicians in a leaked dataset.3 Investigators describe the dataset as a list of people of interest to NSO Group clients; the investigation identified the Rwandan government as likely client, though the government denied this accusation.4

In October 2019, WhatsApp disclosed that a vulnerability in the application was exploited to target Rwandan dissidents through Pegasus. At least 1,400 people were identified as having been targeted by the vulnerability, of which a “considerable number” were Rwandan.5

Dissidents and other targets of the Rwandan government report credible fears that their devices have been compromised by Pegasus. These include David Batenga, nephew of assassinated Kagame critic and former intelligence chief Patrick Karegeya, and members of the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) and the United Democratic Forces–Inkingi, opposition parties the government has accused of terrorism.6 Members of opposition groups in exile suspect that devices belonging to Paul Rusesabagina, a prominent critic of Kagame who was abducted while traveling through the United Arab Emirates, were compromised, possibly by Pegasus.7

A July 2021 investigation found that Carine Kanimba, Rusesabagina’s daughter and an advocate for his freedom, was targeted by attempted Pegasus attacks throughout 2021, and identified several Pegasus infections on Kanimba’s phone.8 In July 2022, Citizen Lab investigations found that the mobile phone of a Belgian citizen, who is a nephew of Paul Rusesabagina, was hacked nearly a dozen times in 2020 using Israeli-made surveillance technology.9

In July 2018, the government passed a law that extended surveillance powers to a civilian institution, the Office of the Ombudsman, to investigate corruption-related crimes.10 The law came into effect as part of the new penal code in September 2018.11 Previously, interception powers were only held by security agencies, such as the police, military, intelligence services, and the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB). The legislation was vague about whose communications could be intercepted. Press freedom advocates believe that the law could further threaten independent journalism. Communications can still be legally intercepted without prior authorization from a judge.

The 2013 Law Relating to the Interception of Communications expanded the government’s surveillance powers, authorizing high-ranking security officials to tap the communications, including online activity, of individuals considered potential threats to “public security.”12 While the law requires government officials to apply for an interception warrant, warrants are issued by the national prosecutor, who is appointed by the justice minister. The national prosecutor can also issue warrants verbally in urgent security investigations, to be followed by a written warrant within 24 hours. The law also provides for the appointment of “inspectors” to ensure that authorized interceptions are carried out in accordance with the law, though the inspectors are appointed by the president and lack independence.13 There is no requirement to justify surveillance as necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim.14

Government authorities have used private conversations on mobile chat apps as evidence in the prosecutions of dissidents, heightening concerns about the government’s ability to intercept communications on social media platforms.

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Rwandan authorities are presumed to compel service providers to assist in monitoring and surveillance.

In October 2021, the Chamber of Deputies enacted the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy law,1 which includes provisions on users’ data rights, general rules for data collection and processing, and a requirement to store personal data in Rwanda.2 ARTICLE 19 East Africa, a freedom of expression organization, noted that the bill would harm digital and traditional media outlets, which are not granted a public-interest exception under the law and would thus risk criminal and civil sanctions for their reporting. The organization’s analysis also raised concerns that the bill designates Rwanda’s cybersecurity authority, which is not independent from government influence, as the data protection authority.3

Under the 2013 Law Relating to the Interception of Communications (see C5), communications service providers are required to ensure that their systems have the technical capability to intercept communications on demand. Security officials also have the power to “intercept communications using equipment that is not facilitated by communication service providers,” which effectively allows the authorities to hack into a telecommunications network without a provider’s knowledge or assistance.4

In 2018, interviews with anonymous local sources confirmed that government representatives are systematically embedded within the operations of telecommunications companies for the purposes of surveillance. Telecommunications technicians also routinely intercept communications on behalf of the military.

The consolidation of telecommunications towers under one company, IHS Towers, in 2014 (see A3), raised fears among internet activists that the company has assisted the government in collecting intelligence.

According to a staff member of a major telecommunications company active in Rwanda interviewed in 2015, security agents routinely provide the company with phone numbers to target for monitoring. In most cases, these are phone numbers of journalists, opposition politicians, or government officials suspected to have ties to the opposition in exile.5

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to suspicions of authorities’ involvement in the death of an investigative online journalist in January 2023.

Opposition politicians and independent journalists face violence, harassment, and forced disappearance when attempting to cover news stories. As a result, many journalists have fled the country.1 Progovernment trolls regularly harass journalists and ordinary users on social media for posts that are critical of the authorities. An environment of intimidation has instilled fear and muzzled opposition to the government.

Human rights organizations allege that Rwandan security forces perpetrate human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, ill-treatment of detained people, torture, and forced disappearances.2 Government officials regularly question, threaten, and arrest journalists and bloggers who express critical views on sensitive topics online.3

John Ntwali, an investigative journalist who published videos on YouTube, was killed on January 18, 2023, in what police reported as a motorbike accident. However, authorities failed to produce a police report, photo or video evidence, or other details related to the accident, prompting international human rights organizations to call for an independent investigation into his death.4 The driver of the car that allegedly killed Ntwali was convicted in a trial without independent observers present.5 The circumstances of the accident raised suspicions that security authorities were involved in the killing.

In June 2022, Dieudonné Niyonsenga, a YouTube commentator for the channel Ishema TV, reportedly showed his sister injuries he received from beatings and claimed he had been subjected to sexual torture while in prison. He received a seven-year prison sentence in November 2021 for comments he made on his YouTube channel (see C3).6 In May 2022, Agnes Uwimana Nkusi, the owner of the Umurabyo newspaper and its online channel, claimed she was stripped and searched when she went to visit Niyonsenga in prison.7

Aimable Karasira, a commentator on the YouTube channel Ukuri Mbona who was arrested in May 2021 (see C3), accused prison authorities of torturing him through sleep deprivation and beatings during his May 2022 court hearing. He also claimed he was denied medical treatment for his diabetes and mental health issues.8

YouTube journalists and commentators increasingly face online harassment for posting videos that discuss the 1994 genocide or crimes committed by the ruling RPF in its aftermath. In May 2021, Aimable Karasira and Etienne Gatanazi, a commentator on the Real Talk YouTube channel, were subject to online harassment campaigns accusing them of working for dissident groups in exile after they posted YouTube videos expressing views critical of the government.9 Gatanazi reported that he was threatened with prosecution for genocide denial.10 Karasira was dismissed from his position as a lecturer at the University of Rwanda over the allegations shortly thereafter, prior to his imprisonment (see C3).11

Extralegal violence against dissidents, including journalists and other government critics, creates an atmosphere of intimidation. Innocent Bahati, a poet and singer who published poems on YouTube that are critical of the government, went missing in February 2021. His location was still unknown as of June 2023. In February 2022, authorities claimed that Bahati had crossed the border into Uganda and joined an opposition group fighting the Rwandan government.12

In October 2019, the Rwandan Senate released a report on genocide denial in foreign countries, creating a definition of genocide denial that includes claims of a second genocide against the Hutu ethnic group. The report listed the social media accounts and websites of 26 groups and individuals that it claims deny the genocide. The list includes prominent opposition politicians and parties in exile, online radio stations, and online news sites. The report called for government agencies to monitor genocide denialism in newspapers and online, and for young people to use social media to protest genocide deniers.13 The report prompted a wave of online harassment that targeted the websites named by the Senate. The media websites are no longer accessible in Rwanda (see B1).

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Incidents of hacking and cyberattacks occur frequently in Rwanda, though there were no reported hacking attempts or cyberattacks against online news outlets or government websites during the coverage period.

In July 2022, the RIB reported that the country had experienced a total of 254 cybercrime cases in the 2020-2021 fiscal year.1 According to the authorities, hackers most commonly target financial institutions.

In February 2020, news site Taarifa reported a cyberattack against a Rwandan government data center that hosts sensitive servers. The attack reportedly brought down government websites, including those of the president and the ministry of defense.2

The cybersecurity law passed in 2018 includes provisions that address hacking and other threats to online security (see C2).

The last reported technical attack against an online news outlet occurred in April 2014, when investigative news site Ireme faced a seemingly targeted cyberattack from an unknown source.

On Rwanda

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    23 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    37 100 not free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes