Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Australia

Free
76
100
A Obstacles to Access 23 25
B Limits on Content 28 35
C Violations of User Rights 25 40
Last Year's Score & Status
76 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Australia remained relatively robust during the coverage period. The country’s information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure is well-developed, and access is affordable and widely available. The government does not restrict internet or mobile connectivity and does not block political or social content online. Recent legislative efforts have sought to increase online surveillance and limit the security of encrypted communication.

Australia has a strong record of advancing and protecting political rights and civil liberties. Challenges to these freedoms include the threat of foreign political influence, harsh policies toward asylum seekers, discrimination against LGBT+ people, increasingly stringent checks against the press, and ongoing difficulties ensuring the equal rights of First Nations Australians.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 – May 31, 2023

  • In November 2022, the government released its review of the 2021 News Media and Digital Platforms Bargaining Code, which established a mandatory arbitration regime for digital platforms to negotiate with and ultimately pay news outlets for using their content (see B6).
  • Several individuals who were arrested for their climate activism were released under bail conditions that banned them from using encrypted apps and required them to provide the police with password access to their devices (see B8).
  • In June 2023, after the coverage period, a court ruled in favor of three news outlets in a landmark defamation case brought forth by a well-known soldier (see C3).
  • Australia experienced several serious data breaches during the coverage period, though there is no evidence that the cyberattacks that led to these breaches were politically motivated (see C8).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

There are few infrastructural limitations on internet access or speeds. The country has a high internet penetration rate: 93 percent of Australian adults had a home internet connection as of June 2022, according to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA).1 Eighty-two percent of Australians are connected to the internet via the National Broadband Network (NBN), which became operational in late 2020. The availability of the NBN has remained relatively stable, with minor improvements made by the government and service providers during the coverage period.2

The NBN has seen some success in delivering faster connections to more residents at lower costs but has been dogged by complaints and delays. Many Australian homes do not have full fiber-optic cable connection to the NBN, instead dealing with partial connections and a patchwork of other infrastructure technologies and their associated connectivity issues.3 By January 2023, approximately 12.3 million premises were ready to connect to the fiber-optic network, while approximately 8.6 million premises already had activated connections.4

In 2022, the majority of NBN broadband services operated on wholesale speed tiers of 50 megabits per second (Mbps).5 According to Ookla’s Speedtest Global Index, as of May 2023, the median mobile and broadband download speeds stood at 86.43 Mbps and 53.60 Mbps, respectively.6

Most Australians are now covered by third-generation (3G) and fourth-generation (4G) mobile networks. Fifth-generation (5G) technology rollout is underway.7 All three national mobile network operators continued to invest in 5G coverage, according to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) 2022 report, including beyond major cities and into regional areas.8 Telstra has the widest 5G network and claimed to cover 80 percent of the population at the end of 2022.9

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Internet access is affordable for most Australians. The gradual shift to NBN services across the country is resulting in greater competition among internet service providers (ISPs), higher-quality connections, and improved speeds.1 However, the ACCC reported that NBN prices increased in 2021 and 2022.2

According to the Australian Digital Inclusion Index, equity in access to and use of digital technologies generally improved in 2022, as did overall affordability, compared to the year prior.3 Australia ranks 13th out of 100 countries surveyed in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2022 Inclusive Internet Index in terms of the affordability of internet connections.4 According to Cable’s 2023 data, the average price of a monthly broadband package was $53.93, and the average price of 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data was $0.57 in 2022.5 Cost of services remains a point of concern for many; 14 percent of Australians would have to spend over 10 percent of their household income in order to receive a reliable connection.6

A marked digital divide between urban and nonurban areas persists. For example, around 85 percent of people living in metropolitan areas may have connections to the NBN, compared to only 76 percent of people living in regional areas.7 Regional fixed-line NBN download speeds also lag behind urban connections.8 Certain segments of the population, including mobile-only users and people who rent from public housing authorities, continue to face challenges when it comes to access and affordability.9 Other groups have seen increased access, such as Australians over the age of 75, 94 percent of whom are now online, almost double the percentage in 2019.10

First Nations Australians, particularly those living in Australia’s remote communities, are some of the most digitally excluded people in the country.11 In September 2021, the government published an Indigenous Digital Inclusion Plan (IDIP) paper about improving digital inclusion in respect to access, availability, and digital literacy of First Nations communities.12 There is also an extensive study underway as part of the Australian Digital Inclusion Index that seeks to map the inclusion gap for First Nations communities.13

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The government does not impose restrictions on internet connectivity or mobile networks. Australia is connected to the international internet through undersea cables that are not controlled by the government.1 Domestically, internet traffic flows through either commercial or nonprofit internet exchange points (IXPs) located in most major cities.2

Under the iCode, a set of voluntary cybersecurity guidelines for ISPs, internet connectivity may be temporarily restricted for users whose devices have become part of a botnet—an array of computers that have been hijacked for use in coordinated cyberattacks or spam distribution—or are at high risk of being infected with malicious software. Such users may have their internet service temporarily throttled or find themselves in a “walled garden,” or quarantine, until they have communicated with their ISP and restored security.3

The 1997 Telecommunications Act places obligations on providers to assist authorities in certain circumstances, including restricting the provision of services in emergencies.4

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 5.005 6.006

The ISP sector is free of major legal, regulatory, and economic obstacles that might restrict the diversity of service providers. However, Telstra has consistently held the largest share of the mobile and broadband markets.

Australia hosts a competitive market for internet access, with at least 144 NBN providers as of June 2023, although several providers have vacated the market over the last year.1 Telstra commands over 42 percent of the wholesale broadband market, with TPG holding 22 percent, Optus holding 13.1 percent, and Vocus holding 7.5 percent.2 All four leading ISPs sell NBN connections. As of 2022, the top three mobile network operators (Telstra, Optus, and TPG) accounted for 82 percent of Australia’s mobile services.3

There are several smaller ISPs that act as “virtual” providers, maintaining only a retail presence and offering end users access through the network facilities of other companies. These “carriage service providers” do not require a license.4 The ACMA issues operating licenses that larger ISPs that own telecommunications infrastructure, or “carriers,” are required to obtain (see A5). Carriers must go through the independent Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) dispute resolution process to resolve complaints from customers.5

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 4.004 4.004

The ACMA is the primary regulator for the broadcasting, internet, and telecommunications sectors.1 Its oversight is generally viewed as fair and independent. ACMA members are formally appointed by the governor-general of Australia for five-year terms.2

Australian ISPs are coregulated under the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) of 1992, which combines regulation by the ACMA with self-regulation by the telecommunications industry.3 The industry’s involvement entails developing industry standards and codes of practice.4 There are more than 30 self-regulatory codes that govern and regulate the country’s ICT sector. ACMA approves self-regulatory codes produced by the Communications Alliance, Australia’s main telecommunications industry body.5

Small businesses and residential customers may file complaints about internet, telephone, and mobile phone services with the TIO,6 which operates a free and independent dispute resolution mechanism.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Political and social content is rarely subject to blocking, and communications and social media applications are freely available. However, popular websites that frequently host copyright-infringing material are blocked with some regularity.

Owners of copyrighted material periodically obtain orders from the Federal Court of Australia blocking copyright-infringing websites.1 An April 2020 Federal Court decision ordered carriage service providers to block a range of copyright-infringing websites, most of which were pirate torrenting and streaming websites.2 In February 2022, 48 Australian carriers were ordered by the Federal Court to block 34 pirated streaming websites.3

In the wake of the March 2019 terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand—which was perpetrated by an Australian—several major Australian ISPs temporarily restricted access to 43 sites,4 including 4chan, 8chan, LiveLeak, Voat, ZeroHedge, and other smaller websites that were believed to be hosting or sharing recordings of the attacker’s livestreamed video.5 The ISPs initially acted independently, but they later coordinated with the ACMA and other government agencies.6 The restrictions reportedly remained in effect until September 2019, when the Office of the eSafety Commissioner permitted ISPs to unblock all but eight unspecified websites.7

During the previous coverage period, the eSafety commissioner called for over 11,000 URLs to be prohibited or potentially prohibited, 99 percent of which hosted content that met the definition of child sexual abuse imagery.8

In November 2019, the Australian government introduced a website blocking scheme, permitting the ACMA to request that ISPs block illegal gambling websites under Section 313(3) of the 1997 Telecommunications Act.9 The ACMA had requested that ISPs block at least 245 such websites in 2021 and 2022.10

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Online content protected under international human rights standards is generally free from interference by state and nonstate actors. However, the courts at times attempt to inhibit publication of defamatory material on large social media platforms and search engines.

In 2019, the parliament adopted the Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material Act (see B3), which amended the criminal code to enforce the removal of a new category of online content, namely “abhorrent violent material.” The eSafety commissioner's office reported that in 2021 and 2022, it issued 17 notices under this law to content hosts in relation to material published on their platforms.1

In its most recent transparency report, covering January to June 2022, Facebook disclosed that it had restricted access to 191 items of content in Australia, including content flagged for defamation.2 During the same period, Google received content removal requests for 910 items, 658 of which were taken down.3 Twitter received two takedown requests, one of which the company complied with, between July and December 2021, according to the most recent data released by the company.4

The June 2021 passage of the Online Safety Act, which sparked civil society concern about its potentially disproportionate effect on content from marginalized groups, has led to the removal of online content.5 In February 2022, a sex work positive social media platform known as Switter announced that it would shut down due to legal concerns over its ability to protect users and comply effectively and ethically with various online safety bills and defamation laws proposed and passed in Australia.6

Recent court cases involving Google’s search results and autocomplete predictions have sought to clarify how Australia’s defamation laws are applied to online content restrictions. In August 2022, the High Court of Australia ruled that Google is not considered a “publisher” of websites it links to in search results.7 The decision overturned an April 2020 ruling by the Supreme Court of Victoria in favor of lawyer George Defteros in a defamation case that ordered the company pay Defteros AU$40,000 ($28,500) in damages.8 In January 2022, Google filed an appeal to the case, warning that it would be forced to censor search results if the ruling, which would hold the search engine liable for allegedly defamatory content contained in hyperlinks, was not overturned.9 In August 2022, an Australian court ruled in favor of Google, arguing that the company cannot be held liable for defamatory content accessed via its search engine.10

A 2021 High Court decision ruled that Australians who maintain a social media page may be exposed to defamation liability for posts others make on their page, even if they are not aware of the posts.11 In response to this decision, lawmakers attempted to pass the Social Media (Anti-Trolling) Bill 2022 (see C4). A proposal to introduce limited defamation liability protections for internet intermediaries was approved by the Standing Council of Attorneys-General in December 2022 and is scheduled to enter into force in 2024, subject to final agreement in 2023.12

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 2.002 4.004

Australia is home to a limited but increasing number of restrictions on the internet. The legal and technical mechanisms by which ISPs filter illegal material have raised some concerns. In 2018, amendments to the criminal code introduced an expansive new category of online content that social media companies must remove, while an amendment to the 1968 Copyright Act opened more avenues for blocking or removing copyright-infringing material.

The Online Safety Act came into force in January 2022.1 While the act aims to improve online safety by, for example, introducing protections against cyberbullying and child exploitation, it expands the federal government’s ability to block and request the removal of certain online content. Civil society groups, tech companies, and other commentators had raised concerns about the law before its passage, including its speedy takedown requirements and its potentially disproportionate effect on marginalized groups, such as sex workers, sex educators, LGBT+ people, and artists (see B2).2

Content targeted under the Online Safety Act includes cyberbullying material directed at children, intimate images shared without consent, and cyber-abuse material.3 Under the law, users can make formal complaints about online content; the eSafety commissioner would then be empowered to conduct investigations into those complaints and issue removal notices. Providers, which include social media services, “relevant electronic services,” “designated internet services,” hosting services, and any end-user that posted the material, must remove content sanctioned by the commissioner within 24 hours of receiving a takedown notice. Failure to comply can result in a penalty of up to AU$555,000 ($396,000) for companies and AU$111,000 ($79,100) for individuals.4 The law also empowers the commissioner to issue app removal notices, requiring a provider to prohibit users from downloading apps that facilitate the posting of certain material.

The eSafety commissioner can also order ISPs to block access to sites hosting “abhorrent violent material” for a period of up to three months. After the three months have expired, the eSafety commissioner can renew the block indefinitely. The act contains no requirement for the commissioner to give reasons for removal notices and provides no opportunity for users to respond to complaints.5

Protections against “abhorrent violent material” were added to the criminal code in 2019. The amendments required ISPs, content providers, and hosting services to “expeditiously” remove any “abhorrent violent material,” defined as content depicting attempted murder, terrorism, torture, rape, or kidnapping.6 The eSafety commissioner may alert companies to “abhorrent violent material” on their services; if the companies fail to “expeditiously” remove it, they could be fined AU$10.5 million (US$7.48 million) or 10 percent of their annual revenue. Individuals may be fined AU$2.1 million (US$1.5 million) or imprisoned for up to three years. The law also penalizes companies that fail to notify the Australian Federal Police (AFP) of such material occurring in Australia within a reasonable timeframe. These penalties are subject to appeal. Critics have expressed concern that the legislation could unreasonably place responsibility on companies for content posted by users.7

Australia’s copyright laws continue to evolve in response to the proliferation of copyright-infringing material online. In 2018, the Copyright Act was amended to broaden its provisions by, for example, allowing blocking injunctions to be extended from sites hosting the material to search engine providers, which must take reasonable steps to block search results for copyright-infringing content.8 The amendment also allows existing blocking injunctions to be extended to “new domain names associated with the blocked online location” without a new court order.9

Section 313(3) of the 1997 Telecommunications Act allows government agencies to block illegal online services. In 2017, the Department of Communications and the Arts published “good practice measures” on the use of Section 313(3) for agencies to follow, including obtaining approval from the agency head prior to blocking online services, disrupting online services only in instances of serious offenses or national security threats, informing the public about the law’s uses, and ensuring that the agency possesses appropriate technical expertise.10

Copyright holders may apply to the Federal Court to request that copyright-infringing websites and services located overseas be blocked by Australian ISPs under Section 115A of the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Act of 2015.11 The court must take into consideration whether the overseas site has a primary purpose of facilitating copyright infringement, whether the response is proportionate, and whether a block is in the public interest. Additionally, there is no appointed party to represent the public interest in these cases.12

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Fear of defamation lawsuits has driven some self-censorship among both the media and ordinary internet users (see C2).

Legal defenses against defamation, such as the public interest defense, are difficult to claim in practice, effectively inhibiting the publication of public interest journalism given the risk of defamation accusations.1 According to a survey of journalists published in 2022 by the Australian Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, 87 percent of respondents reported that defamation laws made their jobs more difficult, with over a quarter saying that stories they had written were not published due to fears of provoking legal proceedings.2 Recent defamation case rulings targeting anonymity online have further raised concerns around potential self-censorship. In June 2022, a court handed Twitter orders by consent to provide identifying information of a popular, anonymous pro-Labor Party account, “PRGuy17,” as part of a defamation lawsuit.3

Separately, narrowly written orders to suppress coverage of ongoing legal proceedings are often interpreted by the media in an overly broad fashion to avoid contempt of court charges.4 In 2018, a judge in Victoria state imposed a global suppression order on the trial of Cardinal George Pell, who was convicted of sex abuse later that year, to mitigate the risk of a mistrial. Journalists criticized the order, which was lifted in 2019, for impeding reporting on a topic of high public importance. Charges of contempt of court for noncompliance were brought against 19 journalists, 21 publications, and 6 corporations.5 Prosecutors later dropped all charges against the individuals,6 but 12 media outlets were fined a combined AU$1.1 million ($784,000).7

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 3.003 4.004

The government does not control or manipulate online sources of information to advance any particular political interest.

The online portal of the publicly funded Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) is a major source of news for Australians. Some members of the former governing coalition periodically called for the privatization of the ABC or cuts to its funding;1 commentators have characterized these proposals as a response to the outlet’s perceived left-leaning bias. The persistent political pressure on the ABC has raised concerns about its editorial independence.2 The media conglomerate News Corp Australia, which was controlled by Rupert Murdoch until September 2023 and is one of the leading players in the country’s concentrated news media market, is regarded by some as editorially biased in favor of the former governing coalition of the conservative Liberal Party and National Party.3

Electoral periods have featured a proliferation of online disinformation spread by domestic political parties.4 In April 2022, one month before the federal election, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) voiced concern over several minor party candidates who posted alleged advice to their supporters on Facebook that was infused with suggestions that election fraud was likely. Other prominent pieces of disinformation included claims that First Nations people had been silently wiped from the electoral roll.5 Facebook removed some of the misleading content at the request of the AEC.6

Major crises in recent years have led to significant misinformation campaigns online. Misinformation about the cause of bushfires, spread by both real users and bots, was rife on social media in late 2019 and early 2020.7 Manipulated online content also persisted throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.8

To address the increasing amount of online misinformation, the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI), a nonprofit association that advocates for the interests of the tech industry in Australia, published a voluntary Australian Code of Practice on Misinformation and Disinformation in 2021. Developed with the assistance of the ACMA, the code outlines practices to label, demote, or remove certain categories of false information; to prioritize credible content including through fact-checking programs; and to enhance transparency reporting. The code also includes practices for platforms to enhance transparency around political advertising. Twitter, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Redbubble, and TikTok are among the platforms who have adopted the code and have since started removing offending content.9

In January 2023, the Australian government announced that the ACMA will be given new powers to respond to the spread of misinformation and disinformation, including by strengthening and extending the DIGI code to apply to non-signatories.10

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 3.003 3.003

Users are generally free to publish content online without economic or regulatory constraints.

There are no limits on the amount of bandwidth that ISPs can supply, though ISPs are free to adopt internal market practices of traffic shaping, also known as data shaping. Some Australian ISPs and mobile service providers practice traffic shaping under what are known as fair-use policies: if a customer uses peer-to-peer file-sharing software, internet connectivity for those activities will be slowed in order to release bandwidth for other applications.1 The principle of net neutrality is not enshrined in any law or regulation.

In February 2021, the government passed the News Media and Digital Platforms Bargaining Code, which establishes a mandatory arbitration regime for digital platforms—including social media companies, search engines, and content aggregators—to negotiate with and ultimately pay news outlets for using their content.2 The minister of communications has the power to categorize services as digital platforms and, in making such a determination, must ensure there is a “significant bargaining power imbalance” between the news companies and the platforms.3 The country’s Department of the Treasury released a review of the code in November 2022, reporting that Google and Meta reached over 30 agreements with news businesses.4

Critics have said that the News Media Bargaining Code ensures that major news corporations benefit from the “systematic data collection and exploitation models” that digital platforms promote and that this could negatively impact media diversity.5 The threshold of AU$150,000 ($107,000) in annual revenue that a corporation must generate in order to be registered by the ACMA to participate in the code and qualify as a valid “news business” has also been criticized for being potentially prohibitive to smaller and regional outlets.6 Broad nondisclosure provisions have also led some eligible news outlets to be shut out of negotiations with platforms without justification.7 Despite these criticisms, some have noted that the added revenue could present an opportunity for media outlets to invest in their newsrooms, potentially improving the quality and diversity of the journalism landscape in Australia.8 Notably, in the November 2022 review of the code, the government stated that the objective of the code is not to improve competition or media diversity, nor is it designed to redistribute resources across the news sector.9

In early 2023, a coalition of mainstream media corporations, some of which may benefit from data-extractive business models, publicly rejected proposals to reform the Australian Privacy Act.10 The proposed reforms would have made news outlets legally liable for privacy invasion.11

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 4.004 4.004

The online landscape is diverse, and Australians have access to a broad selection of online news sources that convey uncensored political and social viewpoints. However, online news media is influenced by ownership concentration in the print media industry. For example, News Corp Australia accounts for more than half of newspaper circulation in Australia, while Nine (Fairfax Media) also holds a sizeable share.1

Some analysis has suggested that while Australia’s newspaper ownership is among the most concentrated in the world, the Australian online news sector is slightly more diverse.2 News Corp’s News.com.au is, according to some studies, the country’s most-viewed news website, and the digital versions of News Corp newspapers, such as The Australian, are also popular.3 Concerns about ownership concentration have come to prominence in the past; News Corp’s 2019 election coverage was criticized for being excessively one-sided, consistent with the outlet’s historically conservative political orientation.4 News Corp outlets have also been assailed for publishing content that is perceived to be supportive of white nationalism and prejudicial toward ethnic minorities.5

Shortly after the News Media and Bargaining Code passed in February 2021 (see B6), Facebook responded by blocking news content for Australian-based users for a week. Non-news content was also restricted, including content from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, civil society organizations, and public health groups. In May 2022, whistleblower reporting exposed that Facebook intentionally created a broad takedown process that would impact non-news content as a negotiating tactic.6 The social media platform reversed the block only after the Australian government agreed to make amendments to the law, including giving platforms more time to negotiate deals with news outlets and a notice period for designated platforms.7

The June 2021 passage of the Online Safety Act, which sparked civil society concern about its potentially disproportionate effect on marginalized groups, may already be impacting the diversity of online content (see B2).8

Nevertheless, traditional and digital-only news outlets collectively ensure that a substantial diversity of viewpoints is accessible to the public, as do other digital media, such as blogs and social media pages.9 The publicly funded television station SBS features high-quality news programs in multiple languages, available offline and online, to reflect the diversity found in the country’s population.10

Online coronavirus misinformation has had real-world effects in Australia. False claims that testing kits were faulty or contaminated reportedly discouraged some people in Melbourne from getting tested.11 Migrant groups in Australia have been found to be particularly influenced by vaccine misinformation and are less likely to get a vaccine as a result.12

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Australians use social media to petition the government and to mobilize public protests without restrictions. For example, campaigns and online petitions launched by GetUp!, an independent nonprofit advocacy group that campaigns on issues aligned with the political left, garner significant engagement online.1 Australians also regularly use the parliament's e-petition tool to deliver petitions directly to the House of Representatives.2

After Minister of Defense Peter Dutton sued refugee activist Shane Bazzi for defamation over Bazzi's posts on Twitter that labeled Dutton a rape apologist (see C3), Bazzi's supporters set up a crowdfunding campaign in April 2021 to cover the cost of the legal proceedings.3

While the ability to organize and assemble online remains unimpeded, the increasingly regular introduction of legislation targeting anonymity is seen by civil society as a potential threat to people’s willingness to mobilize using digital technology (see C4 and C5).4 Additionally, the combination of increasing state-based anti-protest laws5 and broad surveillance powers awarded to law enforcement and intelligence agencies6 has created sustained concerns regarding the safety of online activism, organizing, and campaign work.

For example, in August 2022, several climate activists were arrested for holding an unauthorized protest. They were released under bail conditions banning them from using encrypted apps (including WhatsApp) and requiring them to provide the police with password access to their devices upon demand.7 In February 2023, counterterrorism police raided the home of another climate activist, seized her mobile phone and laptop, and served her with a data access order to compel her to provide her passcodes.8

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 5.005 6.006

Freedom of expression is not an explicitly protected constitutional or statutory right; Australia does not have a federal bill of rights.1 The High Court has held that there is an implied freedom of political communication in the constitution, but this extends only to the context of communications around the facilitation of representative democracy and communication with public officials.2 Australians’ rights to access online content and freely engage in online discussions are based less in law than on a shared understanding of the prerequisites for a fair and free society. The public benefits greatly from a culture of freedom of expression and freedom of information that is generally protected by an independent judiciary.

Whistleblower laws, laws pertaining to defamation, and suppression orders can inhibit journalists’ ability to report on important public issues (see B4).

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Online activities that are protected under international human rights standards are sometimes subject to criminal penalties in Australia, primarily through the country’s defamation laws. The Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material Act, adopted in April 2019, introduced criminal code provisions that could also be applied to online speech (see B3).

Australia’s defamation law has been interpreted to favor plaintiffs and is governed by uniform state-level legislation as well as common law principles.1 However, there are several legal defenses against defamation claims, including those of truth, fair reporting on proceedings of public concern, and honest opinion. Three states—New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia—implemented reformed defamation laws in July 2021,2 which included the addition of a public interest defense, a single publication rule, and a serious harm threshold;3 they seek to standardize defamation laws across the nation while limiting the types of legitimate defamation claims and introducing new defenses.

A person may bring a defamation case to court based on information posted online by someone in another country, provided that the material is accessible in Australia and that the allegedly defamed person enjoys a reputation in Australia. This allows for the possibility of “libel tourism,” in which noncitizens file defamation cases in Australia against others based outside the country to take advantage of its favorable legal environment for plaintiffs. While the United States and the United Kingdom have enacted laws to restrict libel tourism, Australia is not currently considering any such legislation.

In some cases, the courts may grant a permanent injunction to prevent the publication of defamatory material, though this remedy is limited to cases involving a high risk that the defamation will continue.4

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Several high-profile lawsuits from recent years involved online defamation, with members of the media as well as ordinary social media users as defendants.1 Courts issued several awards of high damages in online defamation cases during the coverage period.2

In a precedent-setting decision, a New South Wales Supreme Court judge ruled in June 2019 that media companies are liable for defamatory comments posted by third parties on their social media pages.3 This finding was preliminary in nature, but it was still treated as significant because it leaves the legal position of publishers, including media outlets and social media companies, unclear.4

In June 2023, after the coverage period, a court ruled in favor of three news outlets in a landmark defamation case brought by decorated soldier Ben Roberts-Smith.5 Roberts-Smith had sued The Age, the Sydney Morning Herald, and The Canberra Times, all of which have online versions, for publishing stories in 2018 that claimed Roberts-Smith had committed war crimes while deployed in Afghanistan. The case was a high stakes deliberation on the role of reporting on matters of public interest, particularly those related to the military.6

High-profile politicians, including senior cabinet members of Australia’s former governing coalition, have been known to sue journalists and activists for publishing unfavorable stories or posting critical commentary online.7 In April 2021, Minister of Defense Peter Dutton launched defamation proceedings against refugee activist Shane Bazzi, after Bazzi called Dutton a rape apologist on Twitter. In his submissions to the Court, Dutton accused Bazzi of “showing malice” and of further demeaning him by claiming the defamation suit suppressed free speech.8 Bazzi lost the case in November 2021 but won an appeal overturning the ruling in May 2022, which concluded that Bazzi’s post did not contain a claim that Dutton excused rape.9

In May 2021, New South Wales Deputy Premier John Barilaro launched defamation proceedings in Federal Court against YouTuber Jordan Shanks, who runs the popular YouTube channel Friendlyjordies, in which Shanks often discusses Australian political issues.10 In his suit, Barilaro also included a claim against Google for failing to remove the videos.11 The case against Shanks was settled in November 2021, with Shanks agreeing to pay Barilaro AU$100,000 ($71,300) in legal costs.12 In June 2022, Google was ordered to pay Barilaro AU$515,000 ($367,000) for the two allegedly defamatory videos.13

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

Individuals do not need to register to use the internet, and there are no restrictions on anonymous communications. However, verified identification information is required to purchase any prepaid mobile service.1 Additional personal information must be submitted to a mobile service provider before a phone can be activated, and it may be accessed by law enforcement and emergency agencies with a valid warrant.2

In 2018, the Australian parliament passed the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act, which allows intelligence and security agencies to send a mandatory notice or a voluntary request to ”communications providers” to change or break their own encryption technology in order to facilitate access to user data (see C6).3 The law prohibits assistance that would undermine encryption or security for users at large, but critics have noted that, in practice, enabling authorities’ access to one user’s data without creating exploitable vulnerabilities that could affect others is difficult (and in some cases impossible).4 The law also undermines the “journalist information warrant” (see C5), which is the limited protection that requires law enforcement to file a warrant when accessing a journalist’s metadata because, under the 2018 law, authorities could feasibly install spyware on a journalist’s phone to access their metadata.

In August 2021, the Australian government passed the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill, which poses a threat to encryption as it allows authorities to take over an individual’s social media accounts (see C5).5

In February 2022, the government introduced the Social Media (Anti-Trolling) Bill in parliament.6 The bill sought to restrict anonymity online by requiring platforms to provide the names, email addresses, and phone numbers of users who were alleged to have defamed someone using an anonymous account. In the event of noncompliance, platforms would be held liable for the allegedly defamatory comments.7 The bill was not passed before the May 2022 federal election and the newly elected government reportedly has no intention of retabling it.8

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

The government has expanded its surveillance and data-gathering capabilities in recent years. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the country’s domestic intelligence service, has also employed powers given to it under the Assistance and Access Act (see C6).

While the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) grants some privacy protections, it does not provide individuals with a judicial remedy for privacy breaches, regardless of whether state or nonstate actors were responsible.1 However, individuals can file a complaint to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), the country’s privacy regulator, who can provide them with compensation in cases where their privacy was violated.2 In 2017, the Federal Court clarified that metadata do not qualify as personal information and are therefore not subject to statutory protections, further narrowing the scope of the Privacy Act.3 A review of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is ongoing, and several amendments have been proposed.4

Law enforcement agencies do not require a warrant to access metadata under the 2015 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act (see C6), except when accessing the metadata of journalists, for which they must file a journalist information warrant.5 During the coverage period, the law underwent a parliamentary review; in February 2023, the government accepted almost all recommendations, including closing a number of significant loopholes, and stated plans to implement the reforms.6

In June 2021, both houses of parliament passed the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020,7 which establishes a new legal framework to access overseas communication data for law enforcement and national security purposes, facilitating access to encrypted communications provided by non-Australian companies.8

The Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill, passed in August 2021, grants the AFP and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) the ability to request new types of warrants to investigate and disrupt “serious” crime (see C4).9 Data disruption warrants, network activity warrants, and takeover warrants would be issued by an eligible judge or nominated Administrative Appeal Tribunal (AAT) member. The OAIC had raised concerns about the law, noting that it lacks important safeguards and grants agencies wide-ranging and coercive powers that may affect individuals not suspected of involvement with criminal activity.10

Takeover warrants would give the AFP and ACIC the power to take control of and lock the warrant’s subject out of an online account for the purpose of gathering evidence. To take over an account, defined as a “an account that an electronic service has for an end user,” law enforcement agencies have the right to use an individual’s account credentials, including passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs), and biometric forms of identification; alter account credentials; and remove two-factor authentication requirements. The law also permits law enforcement to object to the public disclosure of the information gathered if “the information…could reasonably be expected to reveal details of account takeover technologies or methods,” raising concerns about authorities’ ability to access accounts on encrypted messaging services.11

In April 2022, the Data Availability and Transparency Bill came into effect, which significantly broadened the government’s powers to share individuals’ personal data among its agencies and accredited parties to support three limited purposes: the delivery of government services, informing government policy and programs, and research and development.12 While negotiating the bill, the government made some privacy-enhancing amendments, including restricting private access to public data.13 Though it does contain some privacy safeguards, including requiring that consent be obtained before sharing an individual’s personal information unless it is “impractical” or “unreasonable,” the OAIC has warned that the legislation could reduce Australians’ privacy protections and lead to the mishandling of personal information.14

The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Australia’s cyber-intelligence agency, confirmed that it had spied on Australian citizens in 2019. While the ASD typically conducts surveillance of targets outside of Australia, the agency confirmed that it had, in an unspecified number of cases involving “rare circumstances,” obtained ministerial approval to conduct domestic surveillance.15

In 2014, the parliament enacted amendments to national security legislation that increased penalties for whistleblowers and potentially allowed intelligence agents to monitor entire networks of people with a single warrant.16

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Technology companies have become more involved in state surveillance in recent years, thanks largely to the Assistance and Access Act adopted in 2018 that gives Australia’s intelligence and security agencies the power to compel “communications providers” to undermine their own encryption technology to obtain user data (see C4).1

The assistance and access law allows intelligence agencies to issue requests for encrypted data under a broad set of circumstances, including for the purpose of safeguarding the country’s national security, foreign relations, or economic well-being, as well as for the purpose of enforcing criminal law. “Technical assistance requests” are voluntary requests for companies to use existing capabilities to assist agencies with access to user information. The law allows relevant agencies to compel tech companies to comply, including with requests to build capabilities into products to facilitate access.2

Rights groups have criticized the Assistance and Access Act's broad reach, relative lack of oversight, and harsh penalties. Opponents have also raised concerns about its potentially stifling effect on the country’s technology sector, as local companies could be forced to create products that are less secure than those of their foreign competitors.3 Companies that fail to cooperate could face fines of up to AU$10 million ($7.1 million), while individuals could face prison time. All requests for assistance are overseen by various Commonwealth bodies, depending on the requesting agency. Organizations subject to a request for assistance have the right to complain or appeal to the relevant oversight body for the requesting agency, and technical capability notices—which require the recipient to change or break their own encryption technology—must be issued by the attorney general and approved by the minister for communications.4

Law enforcement agencies with a lawful warrant may search and seize computers. They may also compel ISPs to intercept and store data from individuals suspected of committing a crime, as governed by the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIAA). ISPs and similar entities are prohibited from monitoring and disclosing the content of communications without the customer’s consent.5 Unlawful collection of a communication and disclosure of its content can draw both civil and criminal sanctions.6 The TIAA and the Telecommunications Act explicitly authorize a range of disclosures, including to specified law enforcement and tax agencies. ISPs are currently able to monitor their networks without a warrant for “network protection duties,” such as curtailing malicious software and spam.7

The TIAA’s 2015 amendment added extra privacy protections for journalists, requiring security agencies to obtain a warrant before accessing journalists’ metadata. However, incidents of unauthorized access and loopholes in the Assistance and Access Act have undermined faith in these safeguards (see C4).8

Under the Online Safety Act 2021 (see B3), the eSafety commissioner has powers “to obtain information about the identity of an end-user and the contact details of an end-user from a social media service, relevant electronic service or designated internet service.” The commissioner can exercise these powers under broad and vaguely defined conditions, where the information sought is “relevant to the operation of the Act.”9

The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 requires telecommunications companies to store two years' worth of customer metadata.10 This law has been the subject of review, and the current government has indicated its intentions to implement proposed reforms (see C5).

The Department of Home Affairs issues reports of authorizations that are granted to access retained subscriber data, as well as warrants that are issued to law enforcement agencies for stored communications under the TIAA.11

The Commonwealth ombudsman issued a report in March 2023 on the oversight of stored communication and telecommunications data powers under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. The report noted that several Australian agencies have improved their compliance culture in 2022 compared to previous years, but there were still serious issues around the application of data accessing powers. For example, the ombudsman found 451 prospective authorizations made by the Victoria police department for offenses that did not meet the offense thresholds.12

The data collection practices of technology firms have also come under scrutiny.13 The Federal Court of Australia ruled in April 2021 that Google breached Australian consumer laws by misleading Android users about how they can limit the company’s ability to obtain, retain, and use personal location data.14 In August 2022, the court fined Google AU$60 million ($42.8 million).15 In March 2020, the OAIC initiated proceedings against Facebook, alleging that the platform had repeatedly interfered with user privacy. In March 2023, after significant procedural delays, the High Court dismissed Facebook’s objections to the jurisdiction and cleared the way for the case to proceed.16

The Data Availability and Transparency Bill 2020 also provides a mechanism by which the government can share citizens’ data with “accredited” third parties, such as academics and scientists. To become accredited, entities must satisfy certain security, privacy, and governance requirements.17

In April 2022, the government launched a discussion paper on the National Data Security Action Plan to develop clearer guidance and expectations around data security, following the passage of data sharing and cybersecurity laws (see C5).18 The Department of Home Affairs included the possible introduction of an explicit approach to data localization in the paper.19

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 5.005 5.005

Violence against online commentators is rare in Australia. Controversial figures are occasionally subject to intimidation and death threats. In 2019, the AFP obtained warrants and raided the homes of two journalists.1

According to its most recent report (covering the period from 2021 to 2022), the eSafety commissioner's office received complaints from 1,243 adults related to cyber-abuse. Around a third of the complaints related to defamation, while a quarter of the complaints concerned online harassment. The majority of the complainants identified as women.2 In the same period, the eSafety commissioner reported receiving 4,169 reports of image-based abuse, which includes the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period.3

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Cyberattacks and hacking incidents are a common concern, though they have not been widely used to censor online speech or punish government critics.

In June 2022, Chinese-language platform Media Today experienced a cyberattack against its registration system with the presumed objective of obtaining user information and stealing accounts. Media Today reported that no user information was leaked and that the attack, which occurred on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, came from internet protocol (IP) addresses located in the United States, Canada, and Hong Kong.1

Several large Australian public businesses were targeted with cyberattacks during the coverage period. In September 2022, the Optus data breach affected nearly 10 million people (about 40 percent of the population), including current and former Optus customers.2 Shortly thereafter, Medibank, an insurance company, announced a similar data breach affecting their current and former customers.3 These incidents, among others, prompted the government to rush through legislative reforms aimed at increasing the penalties imposed on companies that fall short of cybersecurity standards in ways that jeopardize customer data and privacy.4

On Australia

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    95 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    76 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No