Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Malawi

Partly Free
60
100
A Obstacles to Access 11 25
B Limits on Content 25 35
C Violations of User Rights 24 40
Last Year's Score & Status
57 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Malawi improved during the coverage period. The government repealed a law that had criminalized insulting the president, fewer journalists were arrested in retaliation for their coverage of political leaders, and the country’s Anti-Corruption Bureau blocked the acquisition of a new system that could give the government greater access to data from telecommunications providers. Online news outlets have been subject to government manipulation through unofficial directives in recent years, though there were no reported cases of forced removal of content during the coverage period.

Malawi holds regular elections and has undergone multiple transfers of power between political parties. Political rights and civil liberties are largely respected by the state. However, corruption is endemic, police brutality is common, and Malawians are in severe economic distress. Discrimination and violence toward women, members of minority groups, and people with albinism remain problems.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 - May 31, 2023

  • Amendments to the Protected Flag, Emblems and Names Act removed the president from the list of protected names, repealing criminal penalties for those who “insult” the president (see C1).
  • Two individuals were detained in connection with online content that criticized the National Intelligence Service, though neither was convicted (see C3).
  • An attempt by the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) to purchase a new software system to replace the Consolidated ICT Regulatory Management System (CIRMS), which enabled the agency to access data from telecommunications providers, was blocked by Malawi’s Anti-Corruption Bureau (see C5).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 1.001 6.006

Landlocked Malawi—with a population of more than 19.9 million people—has one of the lowest rates of internet access in the world.1 According to the latest data from the Malawian government’s National Statistics Office (NSO), internet penetration stood at 14.6 percent in 2019.2 DataReportal reported an internet penetration rate of 24.4 percent as of February 2023.3

According to International Telecommunications Union (ITU) statistics from 2021, fixed broadband subscriptions are extremely rare, at less than one per one hundred people. Mobile phone penetration is also low, at 39.3 percent as of 2021.4 Data from the NSO indicate that that 37 percent of households owned a mobile phone and 2.8 percent of individuals owned a computer as of 2019.5

The few users who have internet access experience slow internet speeds. According to the Inclusive Internet Index 2022 report, the average mobile broadband upload speed in Malawi is 14.58 megabits per second (Mbps) and the average download speed is 30.63 Mbps.6 This reflects rising costs of internet service provision due to poor infrastructure management and a lack of investment. Malawi’s economy has flagged over the past few years, reinforcing its status as a least developed country, with soaring inflation negatively impacting the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector.

Unreliable electricity and the high cost of fuel-generated power strain ICT use. According to the World Bank, just 14.9 percent of the country had access to electricity as of 2020, giving Malawi one of the lowest electrification rates in the world.7 Frequent electricity blackouts remain one of the country’s biggest problems, with slight improvements seen during the rainy season as increased water levels enhance hydroelectric generation. Inconsistent rainfall and droughts, which are expected to become increasingly frequent because of climate change, have a negative effect on power production.8 During the 2021–22 rainy season, for example, Malawi’s only energy supplier lost a third of its power-generating capacity during a tropical storm.9 Power blackouts returned during the 2022–23 rainy season.10 Malawi’s sporadic and infrequent power supply adversely affects the delivery of internet and mobile services in the country.11 Half of Malawi’s private-sector enterprises rely on backup generators, which were also affected by fuel shortages during the coverage period.12

Because Malawi is landlocked, it is connected to the international fiber-optic network in Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa, and Tanzania through the SEACOM and EASSy (Eastern African Submarine Cable System) networks. The fiber-optic network SimbaNET was launched in May 2016, establishing a connection between Tanzania and Lilongwe, Malawi’s capital.13 In April 2018, the Malawi National Optic Fibre Backbone Project was completed by the Chinese company Huawei, with the promise of faster internet service.14 Internet speeds in Malawi have experienced modest gains since 2018.15

The country’s ICT backbone is entirely national in nature, with no regional integration yet in place. The scarcity of regional internet exchange points forces telecom companies to rely on upstream service providers that are usually based outside the country, in Europe or North America. Data that could be exchanged locally within Malawi or regionally must pass outside Africa, resulting in an unnecessary and expensive use of upstream bandwidth.

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

High data tariffs and expensive devices make accessing the internet prohibitively expensive for the majority of people in Malawi.

In April 2021, MACRA called on mobile service providers to lower the cost of data, specifically the cost of one gigabyte (GB) bundles.1 In March 2022, the country’s two dominant mobile internet providers, Telekom Networks Malawi (TNM) and Airtel Malawi, introduced promotional internet bundles that are cheaper than existing options.2 In January 2023, TNM announced the end of its unlimited monthly subscription bundle, effectively increasing the costs of connectivity for individuals who now need to purchase additional data subscriptions if they deplete their plan’s allotted data within a month.3

As of April 2023, a monthly 10 GB data bundle from Airtel Malawi cost 17,050 kwacha ($16.47),4 and a bundle from TNM cost 18,600 kwacha ($17.97).5 Malawi’s regulator requires internet service providers to pay annual license and spectrum fees, a tax of 3.5 percent of annual sales and turnover, and a 0.5 percent tax on all ICT equipment entering the country.6 Subscribers are also charged a 17.5 percent value-added tax (VAT) on mobile phones and services, a 16.5 percent VAT on internet services,7 and an additional 10 percent excise duty on mobile phone text messages and internet data transfers.8 These taxes and fees increase the cost of accessing the internet. The country’s minimum monthly wage remains 50,000 kwacha ($48.18), and most Malawians are employed outside of the formal sector.9

In November 2020, MACRA indicated it would introduce regulations removing expiration dates for internet bundles.10 No such regulation had been issued as of March 2023, though Airtel Malawi voluntarily released a no-expiration bundle in April 2021.11

Internet costs impact the country’s poor the most. Those without internet access are effectively shut out of an increasingly digital world of essential communication platforms and important services, such as mobile banking and money services, which could help lift them out of poverty. In July 2020, Malawians mobilized online to ask the government to address concerns about the high cost of internet data (see B8).12 A coalition of civil society organizations also appealed to the government to make the internet more affordable.13

In October 2022, Malawi licensed Starlink to provide high-speed, low-latency satellite broadband internet in the country. The new service is expected to expand service to rural areas and to drive down the cost of internet data.14 SpaceX currently expects to roll out Starlink in Malawi by the end of 2023.15 In September 2022, the government began providing free Wi-Fi in 32 public locations in the country, including schools, markets, hospitals, airports, and libraries.16

There are geographic divides in internet access. The high cost of infrastructure development in rural areas makes companies unwilling to invest in the Malawi’s remote regions. According to an August 2020 NSO report, 40.7 percent of people in urban areas had access to the internet, as opposed to 9.3 percent of those in rural areas.17 The Universal Service Fund (USF), which aims to increase infrastructure in rural and hard-to-reach areas of the country, remains inoperable, although MACRA outlined a five-year strategic plan for the fund in May 2022.18 The electric grid is concentrated in urban centers, giving 62 percent of urban households access to electricity, compared with a mere 5 percent of rural households.19 A low literacy rate of 62 percent also remains a barrier to accessing ICTs.20

There is a significant digital divide along gender lines.21 According to the NSO, 15.4 percent of Malawian men use the internet, compared with only 12.4 percent of women.22

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

There were no connectivity restrictions imposed during the coverage period, though outages during political events such as elections have been reported in the past. The government of Malawi does not have centralized control over the international gateway.1

Shortly after polling stations for Malawi’s 2019 tripartite elections had closed, Malawi experienced a disruption in nationwide connectivity for several hours, raising concerns that connectivity was intentionally disrupted.2 Connectivity through privately owned internet providers remained available.3 According to a report by the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), the government denied that there was a network disruption and said that vandals had damaged infrastructure, causing a temporary shutdown. However, the report also noted that MACRA resisted government attempts to shut down the internet and alleged that the government applied direct pressure on internet service providers (ISPs) to shut down their networks.4

Malawi has a total of six fiber-optic gateways to the SEACOM and EASSy cable landings, three each through Malawi Telecommunications Limited (MTL) and the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi Limited (ESCOM). The state-owned Malawi Sustainable Development Network Programme (SDNP), a licensed ISP, oversees the local traffic hub that connects the country’s ISPs, but it does not have the capacity to block content or restrict connectivity.5

Article 24(2)(e) of the 2016 Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act provides that online public communication may be restricted in order to “protect order and national security,” while article 24(2)(f) provides that online public communication may be restricted in order to “facilitate technical restriction to conditional access to online communication.”6 These provisions are vulnerable to state abuse and could be used by the government to implement full or partial internet shutdowns.

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 3.003 6.006

There are no legal or regulatory barriers that restrict the diversity of service providers. However, there is a lack of diversity among mobile service providers in the country.

Mobile phone services are offered by three providers—Airtel Malawi, TNM, and Access Communications.1 The industry is dominated by the de facto duopoly of Airtel Malawi and TNM, whose internet prices are very similar. Access Communications, a fixed-line broadband provider that also offers mobile services, presents no serious competition to the two main operators.2 In August 2020, President Lazarus Chakwera indicated his support for the licensing of a third mobile phone operator to promote competition.3 According to a May 2022 report, Nyasa Mobile Limited was set to become the third mobile phone operator in Malawi.4 As of April 2023 Nyasa Mobile Limited was not yet active. However, the licensing of Starlink during the coverage period is expected to diversify the mobile operator market, and the service is expected to drive down prices once it is operational (See A2).5

As of 2021, TNM had a market share of 56 percent, Airtel Malawi had 43 percent, and Access Communications Limited had less than 1 percent.6

Malawi’s ICT market is reasonably competitive, with 50 licensed ISPs. The majority of ISPs are privately owned, with the exception of SDNP.7 Political connections are often necessary to obtain licenses from MACRA (see A5).

MTL operates the country’s telecommunications backbone and leases its infrastructure to most ISPs and mobile providers in the country.8 Previously a government-owned entity, MTL was privatized in 2005; at present, the government retains 20 percent of MTL’s shares while Telecomm Holdings Limited holds the other 80 percent.

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 1.001 4.004

The telecommunications regulator, MACRA, lacks political independence and is generally considered corrupt. MACRA’s board is appointed by the president and the regulator has strong links to the Ministry of Information and Digitalization.

MACRA remains the country’s sole telecommunications regulator, although there are reports that the government may seek to establish a regulatory authority focused on the ICT sector.1 MACRA was established under the 1998 Communications Act to regulate the entire telecommunications sector and issue operating licenses for mobile and fixed-line phone service providers, ISPs, and cybercafés.

The institutional structure of MACRA is subject to political interference, with its board composed of a chair and six other members appointed by the president, and two ex-officio members—the secretary to the Office of the President and Cabinet, and the secretary of the Ministry of Information.2 The director general of MACRA, whose appointment is also overseen by the president, heads the authority’s management and supports the board of directors in the execution of its mandate. Article 5(1) of the Communications Act stipulates that MACRA may seek direction from the Ministry of Information on its duties.3

Former MACRA board members and officials have faced corruption charges.4 In April 2022, MACRA suspended five senior managers without an apparent reason.5 In May 2021, a government watchdog found widespread misconduct in MACRA’s recruitment practices.6 In its 2015–20 Strategic Plan, the regulator states that one of its weaknesses is a perceived bias in regulation by operators.7

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

While past regimes have censored internet content,1 the current government does not block or filter content aside from child sexual abuse images. Social media platforms are widely available.

  • 1During violent anti-government protests in July 2011, MACRA reportedly ordered ISPs to block certain news websites and social media networks, including Facebook and Twitter, in a supposed effort to quell the spread of violence. See Michael Malakata, “Malawi blocks social media networks to quell protests,” Computer World, July 22, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20110726185847/http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cf….
B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

There were no publicly reported cases of content removal in Malawi during the coverage period. However, according to Moses Michael-Phiri—a news editor with Nation Publications Limited (NPL), which publishes a daily print and online newspaper—forced content removal was common in past years. According to Phiri, these removals are ordered by top government and ruling party officials. Previously, such officials, including a government minister, ordered NPL to remove content on at least three occasions.1

  • 1Author interview with Moses Michael Phiri, news editor at Nation Publications Limited, on February 26, 2020.
B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

While there were no cases of restrictions on internet usage during the coverage period, the 2016 Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act contains vague provisions that could be used by the government to restrict online content. Article 24 allows for restrictions on online public communications to “protect public order and national security,” a broad provision that is open to abuse.1 The same article would also “facilitate technical restriction to conditional access to online communication,” an unclear statement that could be interpreted to enable network shutdowns or blocks of social media platforms.

Without central control over infrastructure, the most direct way for the government to restrict content would be through an agreement with private telecommunications operators.2 Malawi has no laws prohibiting the government from doing so, and recent government suggestions that it could partner with telecommunications providers on monitoring programs (see C6) indicate that it could also restrict content through similar agreements.

Instances of content removal via unofficial directive are public and cannot be appealed.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

There are no restrictions preventing internet users and commentators from discussing controversial topics. However, arrests of individuals for social media posts about high-profile figures (see C3) increasingly add to a climate of intimidation that prompts a degree of self-censorship, particularly among media professionals and social media users.1 In April 2021, the International Press Institute condemned recent detentions of journalists, claiming that they “threaten[ed] to create a climate of fear” in Malawi.2 Online journalists usually also exhibit caution when handling news associated with ethnic, racial, or religious minorities.

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

Online news is subject to government manipulation via government directives to media organizations and individual journalists. Discussions with journalists revealed that in the past their articles were sometimes not published online or in print because their editors received directives from officials to refrain from publishing about certain topics (see B2). Newspaper journalists have indicated that they have received demands from politicians in both opposition and ruling parties to prioritize positive news articles and reports about them;1 this remains the case during the current coverage period. Previously, politicians have verbally threatened and abused journalists for their journalistic work (see C7).2

In the aftermath of the May 2019 tripartite elections, progovernment and ruling party groups manipulated images of newspaper front pages to suit their interests, then circulated them online, misleading the public for political aims.3 (News organizations in Malawi routinely post pictures of the front and back pages of newspapers on social media as a way of advertising.) This trend was most pronounced during the disputed elections but has continued afterwards.4

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

The high cost of registering a domain is an obstacle to publishing locally produced content online, while a complicated online payment system limits content hosted on foreign domains. The SDNP administers the .mw domain on behalf of the Malawian government.1 As of March 2023, the cost of registering a new .mw domain was $40, with a $40 annual fee for the renewal of the domain.2

During the coverage period, MACRA’s new administration revoked the broadcast licenses of some radio and television stations for late or nonpayment of license fees, which led to the closure of a number of broadcasters, some of which also livestreamed their programs online. While some were able to reapply for licenses, some of the impacted stations perceived the decision as silencing media institutions that were critical of government policies and initiatives.3

Malawians also face limitations when trying to access foreign domains because of the country’s limited options for online payments and restrictions on international payments due to insufficient foreign currency reserves in the country.4 The online payment system requires users to have a foreign currency account, Mastercard, or Visa card in order to complete a transaction; the majority of Malawians do not have such accounts.5 Despite efforts by TNM to introduce more accessible Mastercard services, complications related to online payment systems persist.6 Furthermore, the rate of online advertising is low because of a limited understanding of the internet among businesses, which are hesitant to advertise with independent media outlets. It is also difficult for online publications to attract large amounts of advertising because of high internet costs, which makes it accessible by few, often urban-based Malawians (see A1 and A2).

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 2.002 4.004

Even though the online landscape in Malawi is generally open and relatively free, it does not reflect a wide diversity of viewpoints, primarily due to the low level of internet use (see A1 and A2). Economic conditions make it difficult for local journalists and media groups to launch online outlets (see B6), and the few local publications available online provide limited coverage because of a lack of editorial staff.

The dominant local news organizations posting original content are traditional media outlets that have also established online platforms. Many of the discussions on online platforms are in English, which is the official language of the country but is spoken by only a minority of the population.1

Malawi’s information space has struggled with reliability. Misinformation about the 2023 cholera outbreak,2 the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 presidential elections, and political figures has spread online in recent years.3

Malawi’s blogosphere has stagnated as Malawians have shifted to social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp groups, where they engage in political discussions and express themselves freely. Prominent bloggers tend to be employed as full-time journalists; they often publish content on their blogs that they know their media employers are unlikely to publish because of editorial pressure or concerns about reprisals from criticized individuals or bodies.4 Some cultural topics remain taboo (see B4).

Foreign news and other websites are readily available and contribute to the diversity of content that Malawians have access to—though much of what is published by these websites does not address local issues.

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 5.005 6.006

Online mobilization tools are available to users in Malawi, and digital activism for political or social causes occurs occasionally. For example, Malawians mobilized on social media to protest high internet data prices using the #DataMustFall hashtag starting in July 2020 (see A2).1

Messaging apps like WhatsApp and social media platforms like Twitter are regularly used to organize campaigns and demonstrations, garner political support, and conduct opinion polls. In the lead-up to the 2019 tripartite elections, news organizations and outlets such as the Zodiak Broadcasting Station (ZBS) and the Times Group used livestreams on Facebook to cover events such as political rallies, the presentation of presidential nomination papers, and presidential debates. Twitter Spaces and similar new platforms are also increasingly being used to discuss political and social issues in the country.

In late 2018, Malawians successfully used an online petition to force the government to backtrack on its decision to erect a statue of Mahatma Gandhi in the country’s commercial capital, Blantyre.2

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 3.003 6.006

Malawi has strong constitutional guarantees for freedoms of the press and expression, and the constitution is the supreme law of the land—meaning that any law that contradicts it should be invalidated. However, there are a number of laws that restrict freedom of expression and press freedom in practice (see C2).

During the coverage period, the 1967 Protected Flag, Emblems, and Names Act, which had previously limited critical reporting on the president, was amended.1 Although demonstrating “ridicule” or “disrespect” to the national flag, armorial ensigns, and public seal is still criminalized, “insulting” the president is no longer a criminal offense under the act.2 The 1947 Printed Publications Act, however, remains in place, and could also restrict the media from reporting on the president.3

While judicial appointment processes lack transparency, the judiciary is generally regarded as independent.4 The Constitutional Court’s annulment of the controversial May 2019 presidential election in February 2020 strengthened the perception of judicial independence.5

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Several provisions of Malawi’s legal framework assign criminal penalties to online speech.

Libel is punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment if prosecuted as a criminal charge, although most libel cases are processed as civil offenses or settled out of court. Section 60 of the penal code penalizes “publication of false news likely to cause fear and alarm to the public” with prison sentences of up to two years, a fine, or both, which has been used to prosecute people for online activities (see C3). The Malawi chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) has urged the government to remove this provision from the penal code, as it hinders freedom of expression.1

In an effort to provide a regulatory framework for ICTs and address cybercrime, in July 2016 the parliament passed the controversial Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act; the law came into force in June 2017.2 Article 24 allows for restrictions on online public communications deemed necessary to “protect public order and national security.”3 The same article would also “facilitate technical restriction to conditional access to online communication,” another unclear provision that could be interpreted to enable network shutdowns or blocks of social media platforms.4 Article 87 penalizes “offensive” electronic communication that disturbs the privacy rights of any person with fines or a prison sentence of up to a year, a provision that that has been used to punish critical speech by online journalists and internet users through arrests (see C3).5 Article 52 of the law also places vague restrictions on encryption (see C4).

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 4.004 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 3 to 4 because two individuals were detained for their online activity during the coverage period, but neither case led to a conviction.

Internet users continue to be penalized for online activities in Malawi, especially when their online expression is aimed at powerful individuals. A lack of transparency around which officials are responsible for ordering arrests for online expression has contributed to concerns that these penalties are applied disproportionately to those who criticize authorities.

In February 2023, police arrested Dorica Mtenje, a journalist working for the online publication Maravi Post, over a story she did not write or publish. The police stated that the detention followed a complaint from the director of the National Intelligence Service. Mtenje was detained for 12 hours and charged with offensive communication under the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act, and defamation under the penal code.1

In January 2023, police arrested a former civil servant, Gracian Lungu, for criticizing the National Intelligence Bureau, the country’s security agency, in a Facebook post.2 The arrest followed a complaint from the director of the National Intelligence Service.

In April 2022, local police detained freelance journalist Watipaso Mzungu and questioned him for two hours in connection to a story in which he quoted a local organization that criticized the president.3

In March 2022, local police in Lilongwe arrested a man for claiming on Facebook that a member of parliament siphoned maize meant for his constituency.4 The man was charged with cyberstalking under the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act before being released at the request of the member of parliament he had accused.5

In January 2022, political activist Joshua Chisa Mbele was arrested after he shared a list of government officials who allegedly had offshore bank accounts on Facebook. Before he was arrested, Mbele deleted the post, claiming that he had fallen for misinformation.6 Mbele was charged with criminal libel under the penal code and publication of offensive communication under Article 87 of the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act, which prohibits “offensive communication.” He was later released on bail.7

In June 2021, Ignatius Kamwanje was sentenced to either 18 months imprisonment or a fine of 200,000 kwacha ($193) after pleading guilty to a spamming charge under the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act; he chose to pay the fine.8 Kamwanje was arrested in April 2021 for a Facebook post in which he alleged that money was being stolen from customers at the National Bank of Malawi, one of the largest banks in the country. Bank employees filed a complaint with police, contesting the allegation.9

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

SIM card registration is mandatory in Malawi, as stipulated by the 2016 Communications Act,1 and requires proof of identity, limiting anonymous communication. Accepted documents include national identity cards, driver’s licenses, and passports.2

MACRA announced that SIM cards that were not registered by September 2018 would not be able to access phone services.3 As a way of enforcing the SIM registration, the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee stated that those who used unregistered SIM cards after the deadline would be fined 5 million kwacha ($4,800) and face five years’ imprisonment.4 This punishment, which section 93 of the 2016 Communications Act proscribes to people who sell SIM cards in violation of the law,5 was not enforced. SIM cards that were not registered by the deadline were deactivated.6

Similarly, article 31(1)(a) of the 2016 Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act mandates that online content providers must display the full name, domicile, telephone number, and email address of their editor on their website. While the government does not actively enforce this provision, its presence in legislation undermines citizens’ rights to privacy and anonymity and may encourage self-censorship.7

The Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act requires providers of cryptography services or products to register with MACRA and provide the regulator with “the technical characteristics of the encryption means as well as the source code of the software used.”8 This provision potentially affects services with end-to-end encryption, such as WhatsApp. Violations can carry a penalty of up to seven years in prison, a fine of 5 million kwacha ($4,800), or both.9

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

Government surveillance of ICT activities is strongly suspected in Malawi, although the infamous CIRMS, which is known locally as the “spy machine” (see C6) is not currently in use, and attempts by MACRA to procure another communications surveillance system were blocked by the Anti-Corruption Bureau in August 2022.1 The right to privacy, including protection from interference with private telecommunications, is protected under the constitution.2

Malawi requires all citizens aged 16 and older to register for a national identity card under the National Registration Act of 2010. Registration involves providing personal information and biometrics, including fingerprints and a photograph of the individual’s face, which are stored in a centralized database. Following a mass registration exercise in 2017, the national identity card has become the only acceptable form of identification in certain transactions, including accessing state services,3 banking services,4 healthcare services,5 taxpayer registration,6 and voter registration.7 Commentators have raised concerns that mass personal data collection has increased the likelihood of state surveillance, especially in the absence of a data protection law.8

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Service providers do not necessarily monitor the communications of users, but they can be legally compelled by courts to hand over user information. Legal safeguards have failed to prevent such abuse in the past, particularly under past presidents. However, there are no examples of such cases from the coverage period.

In January 2019, the then-minister of information hinted that the government was considering establishing programs to monitor people who abuse social media and had engaged one of the country’s major telecommunications providers, TNM, to that end.1 No clear program has emerged from the consultations. In June 2019, the minister warned those who post “fake news” and obscene posts online that the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Law would “catch up with them.”2 Since then, several individuals have been charged under the law (see C3).

In January 2018, MACRA implanted the CIRMS system,3 known locally as the “spy machine” (see C5). MACRA described the system as a tool for monitoring the performance of mobile phone companies and improving the quality of service. However, news reports said that the system would also allow MACRA—without judicial oversight—to obtain data from telephone operators, including the time, duration, and location of calls; short-message service (SMS) messages sent and received; the type of handset used; and other subscriber details.4 However, there have been no reported cases indicating that MACRA has ever implemented or attempted to implement any of these types of information requests.

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 4.004 5.005

Periodic assaults, extralegal detentions, and harassment of opposition activists, journalists, and bloggers have contributed to a climate of intimidation for media professionals.1

In April 2022, Gregory Gondwe, the chief executive of the Platform for Investigative Journalism, was interrogated by the police, who demanded he reveal his sources for a story that exposed high-level corruption within the government (see C8). During the investigation, the police confiscated Gondwe’s phone and computer.2

Physical assaults of journalists—whose work in the print media is often cross-posted to online platforms, livestreamed, or tweeted—take place occasionally.3 In September 2019, Golden Matonga, a blogger and NPL journalist, and Gladys Nthenda, a reporter with Kulinji.com, were physically attacked while covering a public demonstration against the electoral commission’s role in the mismanagement of the May 2019 elections.4 Attacks against journalists are sometimes perpetrated by state security forces, who act with impunity. In March 2019, a ZBS journalist, John Paul Kayuni, was reportedly assaulted by police officers for photographing a protest.

There have been numerous reports in past years of threats against political commentators and journalists who are critical of the government and the ruling party.5 Threats tend to come through phone calls and text messages and are not usually prosecuted.

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 3.003 3.003

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 3 because there were no reported cyberattacks against media or civil society organizations during the coverage period.

Technical attacks against independent news websites or activists are uncommon in Malawi; however, one such attack was reported during the previous coverage period.

In April 2022, the Platform for Investigative Journalism reported that its website had been hacked and compromised. Prior to the attack, the online investigative news site had published a series of stories exposing high profile corruption cases in Malawi. Shortly before the hacking, local police had interrogated the platform’s chief executive, Gregory Gondwe, and seized his phone and computer (see C3). MISA Malawi claimed that the hacking was intentional and was committed by state authorities.1

On Malawi

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    66 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    60 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes