Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Jordan

Partly Free
47
100
A Obstacles to Access 13 25
B Limits on Content 17 35
C Violations of User Rights 17 40
Last Year's Score & Status
47 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Jordan remains restricted. Access to the internet has improved significantly in recent years, although concerns about state surveillance of online activity persist. The government annually blocks access to online communications platforms during high school exams, and TikTok was separately blocked during the coverage period. Online journalists, activists, and social media users can be prosecuted for their criticism of the government, based on several laws that penalize legitimate expression online. Journalists are pressured to remove online content, and authorities frequently issue gag orders to limit media coverage of politically sensitive topics. During the coverage period, a 10-day internet shutdown was issued in the south of Jordan amid protests. In August 2023, after the coverage period, the king approved a new Cybercrime Law, which, among other things, includes criminal penalties for broadly defined online speech and introduces additional punishments for the use of circumvention tools.

Jordan is a monarchy in which the king plays a dominant role in politics and governance. The parliament’s lower house is elected, but the electoral system puts the opposition at a disadvantage, and the chamber wields little power in practice. The media and civil society groups are hampered by restrictive laws and government pressure. The judicial system lacks independence and often fails to ensure due process.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 – May 31, 2023

  • In December 2022, authorities restricted internet access in several cities in the south of Jordan during protests (see A3 and B8).
  • TikTok was blocked in December 2022 and remained inaccessible until the end of the coverage period. Following the blocking order, TikTok announced that it deleted 310,724 videos from different accounts after discussions with the Jordanian authorities (see B1 and B2).
  • In January 2023, the Jordanian government submitted a draft law to the Arab League that outlines methods to protect “Arab interests” from negative social media content, including by removing hate speech and misinformation (see B2 and B6).
  • Several online users were investigated or arrested for their online content, including an activist who shared a social media post that criticized the policy of raising fuel prices (see C3).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Jordan’s internet infrastructure improved significantly after telecommunications providers launched fourth-generation long-term evolution (4G LTE) technology for mobile networks in 2015.

More than 90 percent of Jordan’s population is now covered by 4G LTE infrastructure.1 In September 2022, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) signed agreements to license Jordan’s main mobile service providers—Orange, Umniah, and Zain—to deploy fifth-generation (5G) services (see A4).2 Each company has committed to provide 5G services to no less than 50 percent of the population and to increase the coverage by 5 percent annually, with the goal of reaching 75 percent of the population by 2026.3

The majority of Jordanians access the internet on their phones. There were 8.6 million mobile connections in January 2023, and the mobile penetration rate stood at 76.1 percent.4 The number of fiber-optic subscriptions has also increased in recent years.5 Internet penetration stood at 88 percent as of January 2023.

Investment in telecommunications infrastructure has led to improved internet speeds observed during the coverage period. As of June 2023, the median mobile download and upload speeds were 22.16 megabits per second (Mbps) and 14.88 Mbps, respectively. The median fixed-line broadband download and upload speeds were 93.21 Mbps and 91.16 Mbps, respectively.6

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

Internet access varies based on socioeconomic status, gender, and geography. The taxation of mobile internet service is considered a key barrier to access, particularly for low-income individuals.1

Prices for internet service have dropped in recent years due to increased competition, despite the fact that the sales tax on internet service increased from 8 percent to 16 percent in 2017.2 The most inexpensive fiber-optic plan of 200 Mbps with a major service provider costs 20 Jordanian dinars ($28.17) per month, excluding the 16 percent sales tax.3 Monthly mobile internet prices range from 8 dinars ($11.28) for a 40 gigabyte (GB) plan to 16 dinars ($22.57) for a 275 GB plan as of August 2022.4 The average monthly salary in Jordan is around 543 dinars ($766).5

According to a 2021 survey conducted by the Jordan Department of Statistics, 8.6 percent of households that do not have access to the internet cited “cost of service” as the main barrier. Another 6.2 percent cited “cost of equipment” as the reason for lack of access.6 The price of a fixed-line monthly broadband package is roughly 12 percent of monthly gross national income (GNI) per capita.7

According to 2018 data from the Pew Research Center, 87 percent of adults in Jordan go online, and smartphone usage is widespread. While a majority of adults aged 50 or older use smartphones, older Jordanian adults are far less likely than their younger counterparts to use them. According to the report, gender differences in internet use are “modest”; for example, 85 percent of men reported using at least one social media platform or messaging app, compared to 78 percent of women. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2022 Inclusive Internet Index found that men’s access to the internet slightly exceeds women’s, by 2.3 percent, although the gap has narrowed in recent years.8

Mobile service providers Zain9 and Umniah10 offer access to Facebook’s Free Basics initiative, which provides free access to a limited number of websites under a zero-rating plan known as Facebook Flex.11

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 3.003 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because authorities restricted internet access in several cities amid protests.

The government exercises some control over internet infrastructure. During the coverage period, authorities conducted internet shutdowns amid protests and continued their annual practice of disrupting access to messaging applications during high school exams.

In December 2022, authorities restricted internet access in several cities in the south of the country during protests. The internet shutdowns occurred in Ma’an and Karak amid demonstrations by truck drivers who were protesting the increase in fuel prices.1 Internet users and digital rights groups reported daytime disruptions to internet services for at least 10 days.2 Restrictions to mobile internet services were also reported.3 In addition, users reported issues accessing TikTok during this period, and authorities announced a “temporary” ban on the platform (see B1).4

While internet shutdowns are rare in Jordan, they have occurred in the past. In April 2021, following what the authorities referred to as a "coup attempt," internet and telecommunications services were cut off for at least two days in the Dabouq neighborhood of Amman. The localized shutdown occurred in the same area where royal family members live, including Prince Hamzah bin al-Hussein, who was accused of participating in the coup attempt.5 Some virtual private network (VPN) services were reportedly inaccessible during this time (see B1).6

Authorities have restricted bandwidth on communications platforms in recent years. Following a royal decree to restrict the communications of Prince Hamzah in May 2022, Facebook Live was reportedly inaccessible for two and a half hours.7 Facebook Live was also reportedly disrupted in July and August 2020, amid protests and strikes by members and supporters of the Teachers’ Syndicate, particularly during larger demonstrations. In March 2021, protests took place in several cities after COVID-19 patients died due to oxygen shortages. Authorities responded by throttling access to Facebook Live and blocking the audio-based app Clubhouse.8 While Facebook Live was only temporarily inaccessible, Clubhouse remained blocked by internet service providers (ISPs) at the end of the coverage period (see B1).9 While the government has denied restricting access to Facebook Live, many social media users maintained that the authorities were behind the disruptions (see B3 and B8).10

Authorities frequently order ISPs to disrupt access to messaging and communications applications while students sit their exams (see B1).11 In June and July 2022, the TRC ordered three major ISPs to block access to messaging apps for two to four hours a day during high school exams.12

Orange Jordan remains the landing party for the FLAG FEA submarine cable,13 the only east-west cable that serves Jordan.14 However, several providers, like Damamax and LinkDotNet, have independent international connectivity.15 International connectivity is also provided via terrestrial connections from neighboring countries as an alternative to submarine cables. In 2015, the Regional Cable Network (RCN) was launched to provide a high-capacity terrestrial fiber-optic network from Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Amman,16 an addition to the established JADI (Jeddah-Amman-Damascus-Istanbul) link that has operated since 2010.17

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 3.003 6.006

The TRC regulates the licensing of telecommunications providers and ISPs. Article 20 of the Telecommunications Law requires providers to secure a license to establish, operate, and administer telecommunications networks and provide telecommunications services.1 For an ISP, the initial license fees are $42,300.2

Generally, licenses are awarded “to all qualified applicants,” although this does not always apply in practice. The law lists what it calls “objectively justifiable reasons not to grant licenses,” such as national security restrictions, scarce resources, technical limitations, and cases in which awarding a license “would lead to an anticompetitive environment in the market.”3

Three mobile service providers dominate the market: Umniah, a subsidiary of Batelco Bahrain, Zain, and Orange Jordan.4 Each provider controls more than 30 percent of the market. Fifty-one percent of Orange Jordan is owned by Orange SA of France, with the remaining shares divided between Jordan’s Social Security Corporation, Noor Telecommunications, and others.5 In July 2018, the then Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MoICT) confirmed that the government had no intention to license a fourth mobile service provider.6

In September 2022, the TRC signed agreements to license Jordan’s three main mobile service providers to deploy 5G services (see A1). The agreement aims to boost competition and investment in the telecommunications sector and support the increasing development of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure.7

The market power of the country’s largest telecommunications provider, Orange Jordan, has been diluted in recent years. Orange’s de facto monopoly on the international gateway and local backbone has been eroded by competitive terrestrial international connectivity and new fiber-optic backbones established by other providers.8 In a 2020 market review conducted by the TRC, Orange was found to have a dominant market position in leased lines and wholesale broadband access, subjecting the company to additional regulations.9

In addition, long-awaited regulations to enforce full local loop unbundling (LLU) were issued by the TRC in 201710 in an effort to introduce more fixed-line sector competition by forcing Orange to open its networks to other providers. However, according to a TRC report released in 2019, LLU “has not been implemented effectively,” limiting its competition-encouraging effects.11

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 1.001 4.004

The TRC, the sector regulator, does not always operate in an independent manner. It is governed by the Telecommunications Law and defined as a “financially and administratively independent juridical personality.”1 Nonetheless, it is accountable to the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship (MoDEE),2 historically known as the MoICT and renamed in May 2019. The TRC’s board of commissioners and chairperson are appointed upon nomination by the prime minister based on the MoDEE minister’s recommendation.3 The Telecommunications Law endorses free-market policies and governs licensing and quality assurance.4

In November 2021, the government proposed amendments to the Telecommunications Law that would allow the prime minister to discharge the chairperson and commissioners of the TRC board.5 The amendments have not been approved by the Council of Ministers as of June 2023.

The annual practice of blocking social media during national exams goes directly against some provisions in the country’s constitution, which prohibits stopping any means of communication without a judicial order (see C1). The TRC and the Ministry of Education order the blockings via administrative, not judicial, decisions (see A3 and B1).6

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

The government periodically blocks websites and social media platforms, sometimes without justification. Certain VPNs that enable users to bypass censorship have also been blocked in the past. During the coverage period, hundreds of news websites were blocked for failing to obtain a license.

Some social media and communications platforms are blocked in Jordan. In December 2022, authorities blocked TikTok amid demonstrations by truck drivers who were protesting fuel price increases (see A3). At the time of the blocking, the government said it was a “temporary ban” due to “misuse by some” and the “platform’s failure to address posts inciting violence and chaos." However, the app remained blocked at the end of the coverage period.1 Following the blocking, TikTok pledged to remove over 300,000 videos that violated the platform’s community guidelines (see B2).2

Clubhouse was blocked in March 2021, after protests were held in several cities over an oxygen shortage that led to the deaths of COVID-19 patients. Clubhouse remained inaccessible in Jordan at the end of the coverage period; however, some users reported being able to access it via VPNs.3 Clubhouse was widely used by activists, public figures, and dissidents—including those residing outside Jordan—and attracted a growing user base of Jordanians who used the platform to freely discuss the political situation in the country.4

Widely used VPN apps were reportedly blocked shortly after Clubhouse became inaccessible in March 2021. ExpressVPN, ProtonVPN, NordVPN, and TunnelBear were inaccessible on a number of major service providers.5 Many of these VPNs remained blocked as of June 2023. The 2023 Cybercrime Law, which was passed after the coverage period, further seeks to prohibit the use of VPNs, proxy servers, and other anonymous communication tools such as Tor (see C4).6

Some websites are blocked in Jordan, often for failing to obtain a government-issued license. During the coverage period, Jordanian authorities blocked around 300 websites for various reasons, including requests by the Land Transport Authority to crack down on unlicensed rideshare apps.7 In October 2021, there were reports that the website of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) was temporarily blocked hours before the release of the Pandora Papers, in which Jordan's King Abdullah II was accused of buying luxury properties through shell companies.8 Access to the ICIJ’s website was restored before the investigation’s results were published.9

In June 2021, the Media Commission (MC), previously called the Press and Publications Department, announced that it blocked an unspecified number of websites that violated licensing regulations.10 In 2019, new licensing regulations were enforced by the MC, and 45 news sites were subsequently blocked after failing to obtain licenses (see B6).11 However, many of these sites have since successfully applied for licenses, and their access has been restored.12

In 2017, the MC reissued a 2016 order to block access to the local LGBT+ online magazine My.Kali after an Islamist member of parliament, Dima Tahboub, requested an inquiry into the site.13 It remained inaccessible at the end of the coverage period.

Every year since 2015, the government has been ordering ISPs to block access to messaging apps on the days that secondary school students sit for their national exam (Tawjihi).14 In 2018, the number of blocked apps reached seven, including WhatsApp, Messenger, Twitter, and Instagram. Although the restrictions are confined to locations near examination halls and limited to the exams period,15 they drew criticism again in 2020 from those who consider them excessively restrictive and lacking a legal basis (see A3).16 In 2022, the TRC ordered ISPs to block communications platforms for a few hours daily to avoid cheating attempts by students. The decision faced backlash from citizens and digital rights groups.17

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

State pressure on editors of news sites and online activists to delete content is relatively common.

In January 2023, TikTok announced that it deleted 310,724 videos from different accounts in Jordan after discussions with the Jordanian authorities, seemingly with the goal of getting the blocking order the government imposed on the platform in December 2022 lifted (see B1).1

In January 2023, the Jordanian government submitted a draft law to the Arab League that seeks to address issues related to international social media platforms in the Arab world.2 The proposed law outlines methods for protecting “Arab interests” from negative social media content, including by removing hate speech and misinformation. The draft law also includes advertising regulations for social media platforms (see B6).3 The law had not been passed by the end of the coverage period.

In June 2022, a Jordanian media outlet took down an online article that compared the Israeli prime minister to Hitler, reportedly after being pressured by Israeli authorities to remove the article.4

In October 2021, AmmanNet, the only Jordanian media outlet to report on the Pandora Papers, was pressured by the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) to remove an online story about the investigation. AmmanNet’s director reported receiving a WhatsApp message from the GID’s liaison press relations officer asking him to delete an article covering King Abdullah’s foreign real estate holdings. The news outlet removed the article, fearing retaliation.5

In June 2020, cartoonist Rafat al-Khateeb deleted a caricature he published on his Facebook page after being attacked on social media and threatened with legal prosecution. The cartoon, which was posted shortly after the murder of George Floyd in the United States, depicted former prime minister Omar al-Razzaz kneeling on a citizen’s neck. Ultimately, no legal action was taken against al-Khateeb.6

In August 2020, Prince Ali bin Hussein, the half-brother of King Abdullah, deleted a tweet he published with a link to an article denouncing the UAE-Israel peace deal. The tweet included a picture of posters depicting UAE president Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, who was then Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, with the Arabic word “traitor” written across them.7 According to media sources, the tweet disappeared after King Abdullah ordered Prince Ali to delete it to preserve Jordan’s relationship with the UAE.8

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

Internet and digital-content restrictions sometimes lack transparency and proportionality. The sporadic blocking of Facebook Live (see A3), in addition to Clubhouse’s inaccessibility (see B1), raised concerns about the lack of transparency in blocking procedures. The TikTok ban, which was still in place as of June 2023, lacks proportionality (see B1).

In practice, the TRC is the entity that issues blocking orders to ISPs. Civil society groups have raised concerns that the blockings of TikTok, Clubhouse, and VPN tools were performed extralegally, particularly because authorities failed to provide a legal basis for these restrictions. Unlike most blocking cases, the government provided some justification for the TikTok blocking, but the measures lack proportionality considering the duration of the ban and the large number of users affected.1

There have been a lack of transparency and inconsistencies around who orders the restrictions of certain apps. A joint technical report from the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and the Jordan Open Source Association found that Facebook Live was temporarily interfered with during the 2018–19 protests.2 During another Facebook Live disruption in 2021, sources within the telecommunications sector confirmed that authorities blocked Facebook Live broadcasting for several hours.3

Additionally, in March 2021, the head of the TRC stated that his agency “ha[d] nothing to do” with the blocking of Clubhouse (see B1), while the MoDEE minister stated that Jordanian networks were operating normally.4 Furthermore, the TRC denied that they had issued any orders to block VPN tools and claimed that they had not received any complaints regarding VPNs’ inaccessibility. However, some VPN companies confirmed that they received complaints from users in Jordan who were unable to connect.5

The blocking of news sites is carried out according to the Press and Publications Law (PPL), amended in 2012, which stipulates that news sites need to obtain a Media Commission license or face blocking. Publications subject to this provision are defined as any website “with a specific web address on the internet which provides publishing services, including news, reports, investigations, articles, and comments.”6 Articles 48 and 49 of the law enable the head of the commission to block any website for failing to obtain a license or, more broadly, for violating Jordanian law. The law’s expansive definition of news sites could be interpreted to include almost all Jordanian and international websites, blogs, portals, and social networks.

The 2012 amendments to the PPL increased the liability of intermediaries for content posted on news sites, leaving outlets potentially responsible for readers’ comments. Clause 3 of Article 49 states that both the editors in chief and the owners of online publications are legally responsible for all content posted to their sites.7 Moreover, websites must keep a record of all comments for six months after initial publication and refrain from publishing any “untruthful” or “irrelevant” comments.8

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Many Jordanian journalists continue to self-censor, including on topics related to the armed forces, royal court, religion, and sex-related issues.1

A report published in 2021 shows that many media outlets practice prepublication self-censorship and that self-censorship is widespread among journalists due to the retaliation they face, including lawsuits, intimidation, and detention (see C3 and C7). Specifically, the director of the Community Media Network, an independent media nongovernmental organization (NGO), noted that journalists avoid critical topics and issues in their reporting.2 According to one journalist, the government makes it difficult for journalists to access certain information or write about particular issues, which “pushes journalists to exercise self-censorship.”3

A 2020 report by the Amman-based Center for Defending the Freedom of Journalists about media coverage during the COVID-19 pandemic indicated that self-censorship escalated as a result of the activation of the Defense Law (see C2).4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

The online information landscape continues to be limited by direct bans on reporting on certain topics, particularly during sensitive or tense events. At least four gag orders were issued throughout 2022.1

Occasionally, online disinformation campaigns seek to manipulate content. A report released in July 2021 by the Stanford Internet Observatory revealed the existence of a coordinated disinformation network active on Clubhouse and TikTok that pushed pro-military, pro-monarchy narratives. Some videos shared from the network’s accounts were critical of Prince Hamzah, while others criticized the Islamic State militant group.2 In a separate report, Facebook said that the network targeted domestic audiences and was linked to local individuals associated with the Jordanian military.3

Authorities have issued reporting bans to restrict coverage during politically sensitive moments and during demonstrations and protests in recent years. In April 2021, Public Prosecutor Hassan al-Abdallat banned the publication of any information related to the purported coup attempt involving Prince Hamzah.4 The media ban was issued “to preserve the confidentiality of an ongoing investigation” and prohibited the sharing of videos and audio related to the case on social media.5 The media ban was heavily criticized by journalists and social media users,6 prompting al-Abdallat to clarify that the gag order did not ban the publication of opinions protected under international freedom-of-expression standards and that it was limited to the investigation documents and trial hearings.7

In September 2022, recordings of the former public security director, Hussein Al-Hawatmeh, were leaked. The recordings implicated him in possibly unethical or criminal activity. Soon after the leak, the public prosecutor issued a gag order to prohibit media outlets from publishing anything related to the case.8

Since late 2016, two gag orders limiting independent coverage of the armed forces and the king have been enforced. All media outlets, including those that publish online, are banned from reporting news about the king and the royal family unless it is obtained from official bulletins issued by the Royal Hashemite Court.9 The MC also bans the publication of any reports about the armed forces outside of statements made by the military's media spokesperson.

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Several economic and regulatory constraints present obstacles for digital media in Jordan. For example, the PPL defines news sites as “electronic publications,” which subjects them to the same stringent restrictions imposed on print media by the 1998 PPL (see B3).1

In January 2023, the Jordanian government submitted a draft law to the Arab League that seeks to address issues related to international social media platforms in the Arab world (see B2).2 The proposed law includes advertising regulations for social media platforms.3 The law had not been passed by the end of the coverage period.

Licensing for online publications is regulated through a process similar to that of print media. Specifically, in 2017, the MC issued a bylaw that imposed a $2,100 licensing fee and a $71 annual renewal fee on news sites.4 The amended PPL requires any electronic publication that publishes domestic or international news, press releases, or comments to register with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. One of the requirements for a general news site to obtain a license is to have an editor in chief who has been a member of the state-controlled Jordan Press Association (JPA) for at least four years. Online journalists have been allowed to join the body since 2014. Additional constraints were imposed in a separate bylaw issued in 2017, which requires news sites to hire at least five journalists.5

In late 2018, the MC began enforcing these licensing criteria more vigorously. Beginning in 2019, both online and print publications without a full-time editor who worked exclusively at that outlet would have 10 days to rectify the situation.6

Following the 2012 amendments to the PPL, most news sites hired editors in chief who were already JPA members in order to meet the criteria to obtain a license, a concerning development for independent media given that most JPA members work in government or government-related media outlets.7

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Although users can access a wide range of news sources and information online, including through social media, state censorship of online content reduces the variety of information available on the internet. The narrow definition of a “journalist” under the Jordan Press Association (JPA) Law and the dominance of the JPA as a union are additional barriers to pluralism and diversity in online media.1

Local newspapers and media outlets often refrain from covering sensitive topics, especially if they might be perceived to undermine national security. In recent years, the coverage of stories pertinent to the king’s wealth or the royal family have been limited to official government statements. For instance, no media outlets covered the Pandora Papers investigation exposing King Abdullah’s ownership of luxury homes,2 although some republished the Royal Hashemite Court’s official statement on the issue.3 A majority of media outlets did not report on Prince Hamzah renouncing his title in April 2022.4 Similarly, local newspapers remained silent about the alleged coup attempt in 2021.5

Certain communities are not well covered by traditional media: Specifically, information about members of the political opposition based abroad, the LGBT+ community, and refugees can be challenging to access. However, this information is often accessible through other channels, such as Facebook and Twitter. Additionally, some websites are mirrored via different, unblocked domains.

Although Jordan has the second-highest share of refugees per capita in the world,6 a 2015 study of four news sites found that only 2 percent of sample media coverage focused on refugee issues.7

According to the Jordan Media Institute, 45.6 percent of Jordanians rely on social media as their primary source of news, despite the fact that social media is considered to be the least credible source for reliable news. This preference for getting news from social media creates an environment in which misinformation and disinformation can undermine users’ ability to access accurate information.8

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 4.004 6.006

Social media is frequently used to organize demonstrations and protests as well as to campaign and communicate about political or social issues. However, authorities hindered online mobilization efforts amid protests in December 2022 by restricting internet access and blocking social media platforms (see A3 and B1).

Since mid-December 2022, TikTok has been blocked in Jordan after protesters used the app to share videos of strikes against fuel price increases.1 During the protests, authorities also restricted internet access in several cities in the south of the country.2

Social media platforms were crucial during the longest teachers' strike in the country’s history, in September 2019. When the 87,000 members of the largest Jordanian syndicate, the Jordan Teachers Association (JTA), went on strike,3 teachers used apps like Facebook and WhatsApp to better organize their efforts, spread messages in a consistent way through images, poetry, slogans, and other forms of art, and support the JTA’s leadership.4 The hashtags #مع_المعلم [with the teacher] and #إضراب_المعلم [teacher’s strike] were prominently used on social media by users who supported the protests.5

In the past, many protesters used Facebook Live to broadcast demonstrations. During the 2019 anti-austerity demonstrations, short video reports on these events received tens of thousands of views,6 overshadowing coverage by traditional and official media outlets.7

Facebook Live was disrupted on multiple ISPs when King Abdullah placed Prince Hamzah under house arrest in May 2022; Hamzah was accused of participating in a purported coup plot in April 2021. Soon after those initial accusations surfaced, tens of thousands of Jordanians showed their support for Prince Hamzah online.8 For example, the hashtags #الامير_حمزة_حر_شريف [Prince Hamzah is Free and Honorable] and #كلنا_الأمير_حمزة [We Are All Prince Hamzah] trended that month.9

Social media users organized online campaigns around free speech issues during the coverage period. In December 2022, a campaign to support the detained opposition figure Sufyan Tell was launched under the hashtag #الأردن_مش_بخير [Jordan is not doing well].10 Also in December, another campaign was started to support detained activist Hamad al-Kharshah, after the 100th day of his hunger strike.11

In July 2022, the Jordanian cabinet adopted a controversial draft law, the Child Rights Act, which led to a social media campaign spearheaded by the Salafi conservative preacher Eyad Qunaibi. The hashtag #قانون_الطفل_مسموم [The Child Law is Toxic] was trending in August 2022. According to the campaign’s supporters, the law promotes Western values and contradicts the teachings of Islam. Qunaibi also published a YouTube video opposing the law, which received more than 120,000 views.12 Proponents of the law also launched a similar campaign using the hashtag #مع_قانون_حقوق_الطفل [With the Child Rights Law].13 Ultimately, the parliament passed the law after removing some clauses that were attacked by Islamists and conservatives.14

Online campaigns pushed the government to withdraw several media-related regulations it proposed in September 2021; if approved, they would have required special licenses for streaming live videos online. Several hashtags were shared during these campaigns, including #انقذوا_حريه_التعبير [Save Freedom of Expression], #اسحبوا_انظمه_الاعلام [Withdraw the Media Regulations], and #انظمه_الاعلام_مخالفه_للدستور [The Media Regulations Are Unconstitutional].15

Online users who organize protests are sometimes prosecuted. In March 2022, authorities began a campaign of “preemptive” arrests of political activists, aiming to prevent potential protests. More than 150 individuals were arrested in various cities across Jordan around the anniversary of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings.16 Most of those arrested were charged under of the Crime Prevention Law, which allows governors to unilaterally order the detention of anyone they deem dangerous; most of them were released on the same day (see C2).17

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 2.002 6.006

Although the constitution contains some protections for free speech online, several laws, including the penal code, impose disproportionate or unnecessary restrictions in practice (see C2).

Several constitutional amendments introduced in 2011 directly or indirectly touch on internet freedom. Terms such as “mass media” and “other means of communication,” which likely encompass online media, were added to provisions that protect freedom of expression and concomitantly allow for its limitation during states of emergency, among other provisions (see C5). Despite the passage of the Access to Information Law in 2007, several restrictions on requests for information about sensitive social and religious matters remain in place.1

Judicial independence is limited. The king unilaterally appoints the entire Constitutional Court and the chair of the Judicial Council, which nominates judges for the civil court system and is mostly comprised of senior judiciary members.

  • 1For example, the law bars public requests for information involving religious, racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination (Article 10), and allows officials to withhold all types of classified information, a very broad category (Article 13), see: “Summary of the Study on Access to Information Law in Jordan,” Arab Archives Institute, June 2005, https://arab.org/directory/arab-archives-institute/.
C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 4.004

Several laws impose criminal penalties and civil liability for online speech.

The penal code forbids any insult of the royal family, state institutions, national symbols, or foreign states, as well as “any writing or speech that aims at or results in causing sectarian or racial strife.” Defamation is a criminal offense.1 Authorities have also used lèse-majesté charges to penalize online users.

According to Article 11 of the 2015 Cybercrime Law, internet users face at least three months in jail and a maximum fine of $2,800 if they are found guilty of defamation on social media or in online media outlets. In practical terms, this means that journalists face harsher penalties for defamation online than in print publications, since the PPL prohibits the jailing of journalists for press offenses. In 2015, the Law Interpretation Bureau ruled that Article 11 of the Cybercrime Law supersedes other legislation, rendering journalists’ immunity under the PPL largely irrelevant2 as they can be jailed for any defamatory articles that appear online.3

Under the 2023 Cybercrime Law, which was passed after the coverage period and replaces the 2015 Cybercrime Law, internet users can face up to six months in prison and a fine for any content deemed to promote, instigate, or insight immorality.4

Several other laws continue to threaten access to information and free expression online. These include the 1959 Contempt of Court Law, the 1971 Protection of State Secrets and Classified Documents Law, the 1992 Defense Law, the JPA Law, and the PPL.

The PPL bans the publication of “material that is inconsistent with the principles of freedom, national obligation, human rights, and Arab-Islamic values.”5 Article 38 of the law prohibits any “contempt, slander, or defamation of or abuse of” religions or prophets. The same article prohibits the publication of any material that is defamatory or slanderous of individuals, who are also protected against “rumors” and “anything that hinders their personal freedom.”6 Journalists, website owners, and other internet users face a range of possible fines for violating the law.7

Amendments to an antiterrorism law passed in 2014 expanded the definition of “terrorism” to include a broader range of activities.8 In addition to offenses such as attacking members of the royal court or provoking an “armed rebellion,” the definition of terrorism now includes any acts that “threaten the country’s relations to foreign states or expose the country or its citizens to retaliatory acts on them or their money,” an offense that had already been listed in the penal code.9 The law also explicitly penalizes the use of ICTs to promote, support, or fund terrorist acts, or to subject “Jordanians or their property to danger of hostile acts or acts of revenge.”10

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Several individuals were arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned for their online activities during the reporting period.1

Social media content deemed critical of the government or its policies can result in criminal penalties. Anas al-Jamal, a street vendor and member of the Partnership and Salvation Party (PSP), has been in detention since May 2022 after being prosecuted under Article 118 of the penal code, which criminalizes the disturbance of relations with a friendly country, based on a tweet he published in which he criticized a meeting between Egyptian, Emirati, and Israeli leaders.2 Al-Jamal appears to remain in detention as of June 2023.

In March 2023, the public prosecution summoned activist and journalist Ahmad Hasan al-Zoubi based on an online post that criticized the policy of raising fuel prices.3 Hundreds of lawyers volunteered to defend him, and the case was seen as an attack on civil liberties and constitutional rights.4 As a result of the public pushback, the prosecutor dropped the case after a few days.5

Activist Kamil al-Zoubi was arrested in October 2022 after sharing a Facebook post about an alleged case of torture. He was charged based on several provisions in the 2015 Cybercrime Law and released on bail in November of the same year.6 He was previously detained in October 2021, following a personal complaint from Prime Minister Bisher al-Khasawneh: Al-Khasawneh’s complaint related to al-Zoubi’s claims that his wife received a salary from a government agency, which al-Zoubi published on Facebook.7 The charges were dropped in November 2021 after the prime minister withdrew the complaint.8

In August 2022, journalist Adnan al-Rousan was arrested for two Facebook posts criticizing the king, one of which said, “Jordan isn’t your property, it’s for us Jordanians.”9 The public prosecutor charged al-Rousan under Article 11 of the 2015 Cybercrime Law for inciting conflict, broadcasting false news that undermined the prestige of the state, insulting an official entity, and defamation. He was released on bail a month later.10

In March 2022, Taghreed Risheq, a member of Democracy for the Arab World Now, an American nonprofit organization, was detained in Amman’s airport for her January 2022 social media post in which she criticized an article from a progovernment columnist that mocked the late Saudi-born journalist Jamal Khashoggi.11 The same month, journalist Daoud Kuttab, the director of the Community Media Network, was detained for his 2020 article about a Jordanian-American investor who was jailed for using a check while having insufficient funds, despite an apparent lack of evidence.12

In August 2020, several individuals were detained for their online activities supporting the Teachers’ Syndicate, which was staging regular protests at the time.13 A man from the northern city of Jerash was summoned by the cybercrime unit after voicing his support for the protests on Facebook.14

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

Some restrictions on anonymous communication and encryption exist in Jordan.

In 2021, there were multiple reports of restrictions on VPNs, as several circumvention tools were reportedly blocked by service providers (see B1 and B3). The 2023 Cybercrime Law, which was passed after the coverage period, further seeks to limit only anonymity by introducing additional penalties for the use of proxy servers and other anonymous communication tools such as Tor (see B1).1

SIM card registration is mandatory for all mobile phone users.2 In 2018, the TRC announced that a biometric system for mobile and internet SIM card registration would be established, requiring users to submit their fingerprints.3 . No developments have since been reported regarding the implementation of the biometric system.

Cybercafé customers must supply personal identification information before they use the internet (see C6).

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

State surveillance in Jordan threatens users’ right to privacy. Many Jordanians reportedly have a long-standing belief that “someone is listening in” on their phone calls. This attitude has carried over to the internet, where security services are believed to closely monitor online comments, cataloging them by date, internet protocol (IP) address, and location.1

According to an investigation published in January 2023, Jordanian security services had received digital surveillance trainings from British intelligence agencies. These training sessions were ostensibly meant to bolster Jordan’s counterterrorism efforts by extracting data from digital devices. However, these monitoring efforts could also be used to target dissidents by “discrediting them or planting "negative information" about them online.”2

During the previous coverage period, evidence showing that Jordanians were targeted by surveillance technology has emerged. According to a February 2022 report, more than 200 Jordanian smartphone users were targeted with Pegasus spyware, which is supplied by the Israeli firm NSO Group.3 According to local media, the targets include at least one human rights activist, Hala Ahed Deeb, in addition to officials from the Royal Hashemite Court, parliament members, and members of the Jordanian Olympic Committee.4 Deeb, a member of the legal team supporting the Teachers’ Syndicate—which was dissolved by authorities in 2020—first had her phone infected with Pegasus spyware in March 2021.5

Prominent members of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the largest Islamist party in the country, were also reportedly targeted with Pegasus. Individuals with close ties to the party who outspokenly criticize the government, including journalist Husam Gharibeh and Muslim Brotherhood member Badi Rafayyeh, also had their devices infected.6 While IAF members suspect the Israeli government had orchestrated the use of the spyware,7 other sources referred to a potential collaboration between Jordan and the UAE.8 In April 2022, the Jordanian government, through the National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC), denied “that government agents had targeted the phones of Jordanian citizens” or that it had collaborated with other parties to surveil citizens. The NCSC also stated that the sanctity of private communications could not be violated under Jordanian law.9

In April 2022, Front Line Defenders and Citizen Lab reported that the devices of four human rights defenders were compromised between 2018 and 2020. The targets included Malik Abu Orabi, a member of the Teachers’ Syndicate’s legal team; Ahmed al-Neimat, a Hirak member;10 and investigative journalist Suhair Jaradat.11 Although the investigation was unable to “directly connect these names to any specific Pegasus operator,” the domains used in the attacks likely originated in Jordan.12 Several activists believe that these attacks were carried out by government agents.13 According to Front Line Defenders, at least two Pegasus users are likely government agencies, one of which was been active since late 2018 and the other since late 2020.14

Members of the royal family are not immune from surveillance. In April 2021, US outlet Axios reported that Jordanian authorities were in negotiations with NSO Group to obtain spyware, months before the alleged coup attempt. According to Axios, security agents had also been monitoring Prince Hamzah’s communications for months.15 It is unclear whether authorities purchased spyware during these talks, but the government is suspected to have acquired spyware from the NSO Group in the past.16

Article 18 of the constitution protects the right to privacy but allows for surveillance “by a judicial order in accordance with the provisions of the law.” The antiterrorism law permits the prosecutor general to order surveillance upon receiving “reliable information” that “a person or group of persons is connected to any terrorist activity.”17 Under Article 18 of the 2011 constitutional amendments (see C1), judicial approval was added as a precondition for the confiscation of private communications.18

In 2019, the TRC issued new regulations for telecommunication operators and ISPs that included mandatory data retention requirements (see C6). The regulations include a vague clause that addresses when authorities can request such data. According to Article 9.2 of the regulations, the TRC can provide other entities with user data records in “public interest” cases.19

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Service providers and technology companies are required by law to assist the government in monitoring user communications. The Telecommunications Law requires that telecommunications providers take appropriate measures to enable the retention of user communications upon judicial or administrative order.1

Jordan lacks online privacy legislation. In December 2021, the government approved a draft data protection law that is meant to regulate how personal data is collected, used, and published. The draft was referred to the Parliamentary Committee for Economy and Investment in January 2022. While the current draft has some similarities to privacy laws in other countries,2 Jordan’s privacy law fails to ensure the independence of the proposed Data Protection Authority, which would be comprised of members of the government and the security forces.3 Additionally, the draft’s vague language undermines certain privacy provisions.4 The law has not been passed as of June 2023.

According to a 2019 report published by the London-based ImpACT International for Human Rights Policies and Access Now, some ISPs clearly violate customers’ privacy by collecting user information without prominently disclosing that fact or explaining how the data is used.5 In the absence of a personal data protection law, some tech companies state in their privacy policy that, by using their application, users give permission for the company to share user data with authorities if required to do so.6

In May 2018, the Ministry of Transportation published instructions for licensing rideshare apps, which grant the ministry, as well as judicial and security bodies, access to the companies’ servers and databases without a court order.7 With this data, the government can track the movements and activities of users.

Since 2010, cybercafé owners are required to retain the browsing histories of users for at least six months.8 Authorities claim that these restrictions are necessary for security reasons.

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 3.003 5.005

Journalists and other internet users face harassment in retaliation for their online activities. Female journalists1 and members of the LGBT+ community2 are disproportionately targeted for their online activities. Activists are frequently subjected to online harassment and doxing, often to silence them or discredit their activities.

According to a 2023 Human Rights Watch report, Jordanian security forces have targeted LGBT+ people online by surveilling them on social media and dating apps as well as digitally harassing and outing them.3

According to the 2021 State of Media Freedom Index published by the Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists, surveyed journalists believed that press freedom shrank during the reporting year, while violations increased.4 Some 51.4 percent of respondents also believed that the government or state-affiliated bodies engaged in defamation against them. In June 2021, columnist Oraib al-Rantawi was targeted by a social media campaign after publishing an article in Ad-Dustour about the role of Fatah, the Palestinian group that now leads the Palestinian Authority, in the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Al-Rantawi said he was a victim of a “campaign of incitement and abuse,” but he did not specify who orchestrated the harassment.5

Online harassment campaigns targeted members of the Royal Committee for Modernizing the Political System (RCMPS), which was formed by the king and is mandated to suggest amendments to the legal framework governing elections and political parties. In June 2021, committee member Wafa al-Khadra said she faced “hate speech and bullying” by social media users who reacted to a Facebook post regarding Eid al-Adha–related sacrifice practices. Al-Khadra did not clarify if the campaign was organized by state actors but noted that she was facing charges over her online content (see C3).6 She resigned from the committee after facing harassment.7

In August 2020, journalist Khaleel Qandeel was stopped by a plainclothes police officer while covering a Teachers’ Syndicate protest in Russeifa. After being questioned about his photography, Qandeel, who works for the online edition of the Al-Sabeel newspaper, was accused of taking unauthorized photos of police officers, which is illegal. Qandeel deleted the photos from his mobile phone, but it was later confiscated by the police officer who brought him to the police station. At the station, Qandeel was asked to show to the officer his social media accounts, but he refused to show his Facebook account and WhatsApp messages to the officer.8

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because fewer technical attacks against independent websites, activists, and journalists have been reported in recent years.

Politically motivated cyberattacks against journalists, activists, and bloggers are not common; however politicians’ online accounts have been hacked in recent years, as have government websites.1

According to the National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC), the number of cyberattacks targeting government institutions in 2022 increased by over 65 percent compared to the previous year.2 For example, in September 2022, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack left the land registry system, a government website, inoperable.3 In February 2023, the Facebook page of the Jordanian Ministry of Political Affairs was hacked by an unknown perpetrator.4 The NCSC was established under the 2019 Cybersecurity Law to protect the national infrastructure from cyberthreats.5

The hacking of politicians’ social media accounts is not uncommon. The Facebook profile of the former Islamist parliamentarian Saleh al-Armouti was hacked in July 20196 and again in October 2020.7 The Facebook profile of Naser Nawasreh, the deputy head of the Teachers' Syndicate, was hacked in October 2019.8 The identities of the hackers are unknown.

In previous years, targets of cyberattacks included the royal court, security agencies, the Amman Stock Exchange, and publicly and privately owned companies. According to the NCSC, 13 percent of the cyberattacks’ perpetrators in 2021 were linked to “terrorist” organizations.9

Official institutions are also targeted. In February 2022, the Facebook account of the Royal Medical Services was hacked.10 The official Twitter account of the government’s anti-misinformation platform, Haggak.jo, was also hacked in February 2022.11 The website of the Amman Chamber of Commerce was hacked in March 2021, though its database, which contains a directory of Jordanian firms, was left intact.12 In July 2019, the official website of the Constitutional Court was compromised by an “international hacker.” A picture with phrases insulting the Jordanian state and security forces was put in place of its home page.13

On Jordan

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    33 100 not free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    47 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free

  • Networks Restricted

    Yes

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes