Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2023

Colombia

Partly Free
65
100
A Obstacles to Access 19 25
B Limits on Content 25 35
C Violations of User Rights 21 40
Last Year's Score & Status
64 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Colombia improved slightly, though serious challenges persisted—particularly the ongoing threat of violence against digital journalists. Continuing a trend from recent years, the judiciary issued several rulings that favored free expression and access to information, including a decision that defended women digital journalists’ efforts to investigate allegations of sexual harassment. Unlike in previous years, no reports emerged that the government had blocked political, religious, or social content online, and most websites remained freely accessible. Despite these improvements, digital journalists in Colombia continued to face worsening deadly violence. At least five journalists were killed in possible retaliation for their online reporting during the coverage period.

Colombia is among the longest-standing democracies in Latin America, but one with a history of widespread violence and serious human rights abuses. Public institutions have demonstrated the capacity to check executive power, and the country’s main left-wing guerrilla group signed a peace accord with the government in 2016. Nonetheless, Colombia faces enormous challenges in consolidating peace and guaranteeing political rights and civil liberties outside of major urban areas. In June 2022, opposition candidate Gustavo Petro, a former member of a smaller leftist guerrilla group, was elected to the presidency and received the support of a broad left-leaning majority in Congress. Petro formed Colombia’s first leftist government since the reestablishment of competitive democracy in the 1970s.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2022 – May 31, 2023

  • The government did not block political, religious, or social websites during the coverage period, though blocks of unauthorized gambling sites continued (see B1).
  • In November 2022, the Constitutional Court heard a case filed by adult film actress Esperanza Gómez against Meta. Gómez claimed that Meta’s Instagram platform had censored her by closing her account, raising questions about the state’s ability to protect user rights in content moderation policies (see B3).
  • A series of judicial decisions upheld free expression and access to information online during the coverage period, including one that rejected a legal action aimed at stifling reporting on sexual harassment allegations (see B4 and C3).
  • Violence against digital journalists worsened, and at least five journalists were killed in possible retaliation for their online reporting during the coverage period (see C8).

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Internet access has slightly increased in Colombia. According to data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), internet penetration stood at 73.03 percent in 2021.1 Fixed-line internet connections increased slightly, from 16.53 connections per 100 inhabitants at the end of 2021 to 17 connections per 100 inhabitants as of December 2022. Mobile internet connectivity also increased between the final quarters of 2021 and 2022, from 74.4 connections to 77.7 connections per 100 inhabitants.2

Though fixed broadband speeds have improved in recent years, Colombia ranks relatively low in global surveys of mobile broadband speeds. Speedtest recorded a median fixed download speed of 94.40 megabits per second (Mbps) in May 2023, up from 73.04 Mbps in April 2022, placing Colombia 39th out of 181 countries surveyed. Mobile broadband speeds still lag significantly, however; with a median download speed of 12.64 Mbps, Colombia ranked 127th among 140 countries surveyed as of May 2023.3

In June 2020, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies (MinTIC) announced the Plan to Transition to New Technologies, which laid out a national strategy to upgrade second-generation (2G) and third-generation (3G) mobile networks to fourth-generation (4G) networks by 2022.4 The Communications Regulation Commission (CRC) stated that Colombia had reached 32.9 million 4G connections by September 2022, surpassing the government’s goal of achieving 27 million 4G connections by the end of former president Iván Duque’s administration.5

After conducting fifth-generation (5G) network trials in several cities in 2022, the MinTIC announced that the allocation process for 5G-suitable spectrum would commence in 2023, with the aim of implementing 5G in Colombia in 2024.6 As of December 2022, nine providers had expressed interest in using Colombia’s 5G spectrum.7

In July 2021, the government passed an amendment to existing legislation that declared the internet an “essential public service.” It requires providers to guarantee service to their customers and avoid suspending the installation, maintenance, and adaptation of their networks (see A2).8

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Geographic and socioeconomic disparities in internet access are significant, but current and former administrations have made efforts to address them.

According to the Colombian Chamber of Informatics and Telecommunications (CCIT), an information and communication technology (ICT) trade association, 75 percent of higher-income people have internet access, compared with fewer than 50 percent of lower-income people.1 Fixed-line internet speeds vary greatly among lower- and higher-income households.2 There is also a gap between urban and rural areas; as of 2022, more than 70 percent of households in some areas did not have an internet connection.3

Colombia ranks relatively high on indicators of internet affordability, especially when compared with other countries in the region. According to Cable, a British company, the average price for one gigabyte (GB) of mobile data in Colombia was 2,169 Colombian pesos ($0.45) as of 2022, the second cheapest cost in South America.4 Colombia’s average monthly broadband cost of 69,057 pesos ($14.31) was the lowest in the region as of 2023.5

In recent years, Colombia has ranked highly in the Affordability Drivers Index (ADI) report, which measures policy and regulatory factors that enable more affordable broadband. The latest report, released in 2021, ranked Colombia in second place out of 72 countries, citing sound regulatory decisions to improve affordability and access in the country.6

Under the July 2021 law establishing the internet as an essential public service, the MinTIC must adopt regulatory measures aimed at ensuring that providers extend access to rural areas (see A1).7 To improve access in underserved communities, the law includes incentives for service providers with fewer than 30,000 users, such as temporary tax exemptions.8

In recent years, the government has taken steps to address digital disparities. In March 2023, the MinTIC announced the Connect ICT 360 plan, which aims to provide connectivity to 85 percent of Colombians by 2026, with a focus on implementing emerging technologies and encouraging new service providers in regions affected by the digital divide.9 The plan was incorporated into the Digital Colombia Agenda 2022-26, which the government presented for public comments in April 2023.10 In June 2019, Congress approved the ICT Modernization Law, which aims to close the digital gap, largely through cooperation between the public and private sectors (see A4 and A5).

The MinTIC also aims to install over 10,000 internet access points that provide free service to remote and rural areas in all 32 departments through 2030. Three percent of the access points, known as Digital Centers, will be set in Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. The MinTIC has heralded the project as the “largest rural connectivity project in the history of the country.”11 According to the ministry, by February 2023, 5,207 Digital Centers were operating in schools, Indigenous communities, parks, and health centers, among other areas; more than 3,000 of the centers had started operating that year.12

Colombian law allows service providers to engage in zero-rating, which has the potential to limit the content that certain people can access. Article 56 of Law 1450 of 2011 states that internet service providers (ISPs) "may make offers according to the needs of market segments or their users according to their usage and consumption profiles, which shall not be understood as discrimination.”13 Recently, concerns have been raised regarding how ISPs utilize the personal data of users to create these internet packages (see C6).

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The government does not limit bandwidth or deliberately restrict internet connections, nor does it impose centralized control over infrastructure, except in emergency situations when ISPs are required to make their infrastructure available for official responses.1

Previously, Netblocks reported that fixed-line and mobile services were disrupted in Cali amid widespread protests in May 2021 (see B8). Movistar, a service provider, reported that vandalism had disrupted service around this time.2 There was no evidence that the government intentionally restricted connectivity in Cali. In October 2021, two United Nations special rapporteurs sent a letter to the Colombian government requesting further information on the disruptions and the measures in place to investigate them.3 In April 2022, the Constitutional Court decided to review a case in which a group of free expression and digital rights organizations called on the government to prepare an independent report clarifying the service disruptions in Cali in 2021 and to develop a protocol for guaranteeing connectivity during social demonstrations.4 The court had not issued a ruling by the end of the coverage period.

Colombia has only one internet exchange point (IXP), NAP Colombia, through which ISPs exchange traffic to improve efficiency and speed. The IXP is located in Bogotá and managed by the CCIT.5

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

There is healthy competition among the country’s more than 800 ISPs, and consumers have multiple options.1 Market entry is straightforward, and it is possible for anyone to set up an ISP by following the general requirements of the 2009 ICT Law, which establishes free competition and prioritizes efficient use of infrastructure and access to ICTs.2 However, approximately 73 percent of the fixed-line market is held by three providers: Claro, with a 38 percent market share, followed by UNE EPM with a 20 percent share, and Movistar with a 15 percent share.3

Registration requirements are neither excessive nor onerous. Business owners must provide personal and tax identification as well as a description of services, but no fee is required. This information is published in an open registry, and the MinTIC has 10 days to verify the data before the business may begin operating. Registration can be denied when information is incomplete or false, or when an ISP does not have the proper commercial status to offer the necessary services.4 ISPs must also apply for licenses to utilize the radioelectric spectrum, although there have been no complaints of difficulties or bias with this process.

The mobile service sector is more concentrated. Although there are 11 providers, 92 percent of the market is in the hands of three companies: Claro (52.23 percent), Movistar (22.38 percent), and Tigo (17.41 percent).5

The 2019 ICT modernization law, which aims to increase connectivity, risks maintaining and augmenting market concentration by favoring larger and more established telecommunications providers (see A2 and A5). The spectrum licensing period, for instance, was extended from 10 years to up to 20.6 While this extension provides more stability for private investments, it could limit competition at the infrastructural level.

Service providers are required to contribute 1.9 percent of their gross annual income to a MinTIC fund, the Single Fund for Information and Communications Technologies, which is devoted to the development of nationwide ICT projects. However, the ICT minister is given the discretion to modify these contributions at any time “according to the variations in the behavior of the market and its correspondence with the needs and investment plans for closing the digital divide.”7 A share of the fund is used to increase connectivity, and service providers that partner with the government to do so are allowed to pay up to 60 percent of their contribution in kind, also at the ICT minister’s discretion.8 In December 2020, the MinTIC published a regulation that outlines requirements and procedures for authorizing and quantifying such contributions.9

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

The regulation of Colombia’s ICT sector changed significantly in 2019, after Congress approved the ICT modernization law (see A2 and A4). It notably eliminated the National Television Authority (ANT) and established a convergent regulator—through a restructured CRC—to oversee the ICT sector, television, and radio. Critics of the law contended that the new regulatory body concentrated too many functions in the government and lacked independence.1

In a move criticized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the law also establishes two decision-making entities within the CRC: the Commission for Audiovisual Content (CCA), covering issues related to pluralism and audiences, and the Communications Commission (CC), dealing with technical and market regulation. The CCA has three members: two chosen through a public contest and one chosen by regional channels. The CC has five: the ICT minister, a commissioner chosen by the president, and three selected by the government through an open application process.2 In May 2020, the Constitutional Court rejected a legal challenge to the law.3

The president appoints the ICT minister, who oversees the telecommunications sector through the ministry; that minister is responsible for leading the CRC.4 The minister also designates the head of the National Spectrum Agency (ANE), which manages Colombia’s radioelectric spectrum. Some have suggested that this executive-driven design prevents objective oversight of the sector and affords the president undue influence over its operations.

The MinTIC has suffered from several controversies in recent years. President Gustavo Petro’s initial nomination for ICT minister, Mery Gutiérrez, was withdrawn, reportedly due to conflict-of-interest concerns stemming from pending legal challenges,5 and Sandra Milena Urrutia was sworn in as the ICT minister in September 2022.6 However, Urrutia resigned from the post in April 2023 and was replaced by Mauricio Lizcano the following month.7 Previously, in September 2021, ICT minister Karen Abudinen Abuchaibe resigned amid a corruption scandal involving the disappearance of millions of dollars intended to provide internet service to rural schools.8

Since 2009, a government-appointed concessionaire has been responsible for administering the .co domain.9 In 2019, the process for awarding a public tender for the administration of the .co domain was mired in public and legal controversy. The selection, managed by the MinTIC, was criticized for irregularities in calculating qualified bidders, leading the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia to request a suspension to the tender process. Former ICT minister Sylvia Constaín resigned in May 2020, reportedly due to the flawed process.10

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 4 to 5 because there were no reports of political, religious, or social content being blocked during the coverage period, and Tumblr remained freely accessible.

Political, religious, and social content is not regularly blocked or filtered in Colombia.1 YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and international blog-hosting services are generally freely available.

Websites are frequently blocked in connection with gambling and illegal activities. In many cases, the exact criteria for blocking such content remains unknown (see B3). In December 2022, the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Interpol (DIJIN) reported that more than 20,000 webpages had been blocked in response to 59,774 cybercrime-related complaints during that year.2 Since 2018, Colombia’s gambling regulator has regularly requested the blocking of unauthorized gambling websites.3 In July 2022, the gambling regulator reported having issued 1,577 blocking orders for websites between November 1, 2021, and June 30, 2022.4 DIJIN previously announced in January 2022 that it had ordered the blocking of 104 websites used for the sale of drugs in Colombia.5

Tumblr was reportedly blocked by at least one provider during the previous coverage period. The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) confirmed that Claro had blocked access to Tumblr.com between December 12, 2021 and January 21, 2022, instead directing users to a government website containing a warning about accessing illegal online sites.6 OONI also confirmed that Tumblr.com showed signs of blocking on Movistar’s network during this period on December 16, 2021.7 OONI reported that the website was accessible on Movistar’s network from January 2022 onward, and signs of blocking did not appear on Claro’s network after January 21, 2022. The reasons behind the block remain unclear.

Transportation apps, like Uber, DiDi, and Cabify, have been the center of much debate. While the companies behind these apps have incurred fines or received orders to suspend operations in recent years, the apps themselves have not been blocked.8 In January 2023, reports emerged that the Superintendence of Transportation intended to introduce legislation that would ban the transportation apps and fine users and drivers.9 However, after criticism of the proposal, the Ministry of Transportation and the Superintendence of Transportation announced that a bill regulating the platforms would not be presented until dialogues were held with drivers.10

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The Colombian government does not regularly order the removal of content, though a 2019 Supreme Court ruling could facilitate content restrictions. Court cases have periodically resulted in judicial orders to remove specific information deemed to violate fundamental rights (see B3). News outlets have also reported receiving legal threats intended to force them to remove content based on the “right to be forgotten” and defamation lawsuits. The Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP) reported five requests to remove or block journalistic online content in 2022.1

In December 2019, the Supreme Court ruled that blog and forum operators would be legally responsible for third-party defamatory user comments if they did not adopt mechanisms to control them. The decision was criticized for incentivizing forum operators to excessively restrict comments or eliminate comment sections.2

Between January and June 2022, the most recently available reporting period, Facebook restricted access to 79 items related to illegal food and drug advertising.3

In July 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez in an acción de tutela—a legal action aimed at protecting fundamental rights outlined in the constitution, such as privacy and reputation—against Daniel Mendoza Leal, creator of the web series Matarife. The court ruled that Mendoza had slandered Uribe in the series and ordered him to rectify, or publicly retract, a Twitter post accusing Uribe of committing genocide, among other criticisms.4 However, the court did not grant Uribe’s request to remove Matarife and prevent its distribution on the internet.5

In the past, the government has requested that platforms restrict content it regards as incitement to violence. In January 2021, the director of the National Police asked Twitter and Facebook to block accounts linked to members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the rebel group that signed a peace treaty with the government in 2016— following the publication of a video that showed a former FARC leader criticizing the government alongside armed individuals. Twitter suspended at least three accounts managed by former FARC leaders and dissidents, and Facebook reportedly removed related content.6

In 2021, FLIP reported that judges had been using judicial channels to unduly restrict content relevant to the public interest at unprecedented levels within the few years prior.7 For example, in October 2020, a judge ordered the magazine Semana to remove from its website a news program that contained recordings of conversations involving witnesses in a high-profile case of witness tampering. The decision was based on the right to personal and family privacy. Local press freedom organizations condemned the ruling as censorship, arguing that it ignored protections constitutionally guaranteed to those disseminating information in the public interest.8

Private reputation-management companies, such as the Spanish firm Eliminalia, offer services that erase the electronic traces of their clients, including individuals in Colombia. The service’s techniques reportedly consist of judicial threats, mainly targeted at the media, and the manipulation of search-engine algorithms.9 Several publications, including La Silla Vacía,10 Colombia Reports,11 and the university newspaper El Uniandino,12 have reported such attempts to remove their content in recent years.

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

Colombian authorities and courts place some restrictions on digital content, and these decisions are sometimes made in an opaque environment and with sparse or no public explanation. This is especially true in cases of images depicting sexual abuse against children and online gambling. Users have limited avenues to appeal blockings or restrictions.

Police and other institutions may limit a wide range of content, from sexual abuse imagery to vaguely defined “inappropriate” material, in order to protect minors. Child sexual abuse images, which are illegal under international law, are subject to blocking.1 Decree 1524 (2002) requires ISPs to undertake technical measures to prevent the online availability of child sexual abuse images.2 Civil or judicial oversight of these restrictions is limited, because information about which websites are blocked is classified.3

Online gambling legislation also allows for the blocking of websites (see B1), but there is no centralized, public reporting system with explanations for why sites are blocked, and the reasons are not always disclosed. Users are sometimes, but not always, redirected to pages displaying the reason a website is blocked. In some cases, entire websites are blocked for having gambling-related advertisements.4

A number of ISPs publish data or transparency reports on government requests to restrict content.5 According to Fundación Karisma’s 2022 “Where is my data?” report, five companies—Claro, Movistar, Tigo, Bogotá Telecommunications Company (ETB), and Partners Telecom Colombia (WOM)—give detailed information about URL takedowns.6

Content takedown cases carried out through judicial channels generally uphold transparency and due process for all parties. While judges sometimes neglect proper consideration of the necessity and proportionality of a case, high courts have upheld these principles in the recent past.7 In November 2021, for instance, the Constitutional Court overturned a civil court ruling that ordered the Movement of Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE) to remove a picture of a street mural from its social networks and webpages.8 The mural depicts high-ranking officials involved in the “false positives” scandal, in which the military extrajudicially killed thousands of innocent civilians and presented the bodies as those of guerrilla fighters.9 The Constitutional Court ruled that, as a criticism of the state and matter of public interest and public debate, the message qualifies as protected speech.10

Often, content takedown requests are brought before judicial authorities through an acción de tutela. Some of these cases have been reviewed by the Constitutional Court. In September 2019, for example, the court issued a ruling establishing that intermediaries are not liable for third-party content but can be called to enforce judgments for deletion of content online when the publisher cannot or is unwilling to comply.11 In November 2022, the Constitutional Court rejected an acción de tutela in which a senator and former mayor sought to edit information about him on Wikipedia. In addition to ruling that the request did not comply with procedural requirements, the court reaffirmed that public officials must tolerate a greater burden of social criticism.12

In November 2022, the Constitutional Court opened a hearing for the acción de tutela of adult-film actress Esperanza Gómez against Meta. The actress claimed that Instagram had censored her by closing her account for allegedly violating community rules against promoting adult content and sexual services.13 Gómez maintained that she did not use the platform for those purposes and that her rights to freedom of expression and ability to work were violated. The case raised questions regarding the barriers to filing a claim against a foreign company for a potential violation of rights in Colombia, as well as the protection of users’ rights in content takedowns. The case was returned to the court of first instance in February 2023 due to procedural irregularities, and a review by the Constitutional Court was still pending at the end of the coverage period.14

In June 2023, after the coverage period, the Congress approved a bill that would address political violence against women.15 Article 29 of the bill includes a broad provision allowing the National Electoral Council (CNE) to remove content, “including that which is disseminated through digital media,” if it is considered violence against women in politics.16 Freedom of expression organizations, such as Fundación Karisma, FLIP, and El Veinte, raised concerns that the bill could disregard international standards of freedom of expression, moderate public debate, and eventually be used to censor protected speech.17 The bill did not immediately become law, as it had yet to be reviewed by the Constitutional Court.

Platforms have restricted political and social content in moments of social unrest. During the previous coverage period, in November 2021, Twitter temporarily suspended the account of Ana Bejarano, a columnist for online portal Los Danieles. Bejarano received a request from Twitter to confirm her phone number and verify her account ownership minutes after she read a column criticizing then minister of national defense Diego Molano while live-streaming on another platform and wearing a shirt with the phrase “Take your rosaries out of our ovaries,” a reference to the national debate on abortion. Twitter was unable to specify the reason for the suspension; while journalists and reproductive rights organizations decried it as clear censorship by the platform, the suspension may also have been triggered by a hacking attempt against Bejarano’s account (see C8).18

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Self-censorship is a notable problem for journalists and likely affects online publications.1 Journalists sometimes practice self-censorship out of fear of violence by armed groups, legal action under libel laws, or the general climate of impunity.2 Online harassment against women remains a serious issue in Colombia and has also led to some self-censorship (see C7).

In February 2023, FLIP reported that in December 2022 Diego Peña, a journalist in Donmatías, in the department of Antioquia, closed his Facebook media outlet and left the town after he experienced judicial harassment by public officials. Peña was reportedly the only journalist investigating corruption in the municipality.3 A December 2022 ruling by the Constitutional Court acknowledged the threat posed by Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP) against journalists and media outlets in Colombia, particularly when they are reporting on gender-based violence and accusations of abuse and harassment on social networks. The ruling, which concerned a report in the outlet Volcánicas alleging sexual harassment by a prominent filmmaker (see C3), recognized that if the legal system imposes particularly severe sanctions or consequences in response to civil or criminal liability procedures, it could create a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of the press or expression and lead to self-censorship.4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

Disinformation and coordinated attempts to amplify political narratives have sometimes influenced online information in Colombia.

Events of high national interest, like presidential elections, frequently prompt heightened levels of manipulated online content. Ahead of the May 2022 presidential election and June runoff election, coordinated and seemingly inauthentic ad campaigns spread disinformation and hateful content about a wide range of candidates and politicians on Facebook and Instagram. The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) reported on the campaigns in August 2022, revealing connections between the Facebook networks and so-called “disinformation for hire” marketing firms that sought to influence the vote by spreading fear and polarization. The campaigns most frequently targeted Gustavo Petro, the election’s eventual winner; one of the most costly campaigns paid $138,500 for ads that linked to fringe media and alternative sites with content attacking Petro and supporting right-wing candidate Federico Gutiérrez and independent candidate Rodolfo Hernández.1

In May 2022, during the previous coverage period, La Silla Vacía and the Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism (CLIP) published a report revealing that 10 coordinated Facebook pages had spent 309 million Colombian pesos ($64,100) to spread 538 ads containing negative and misleading content about Petro and centrist candidate Sergio Fajardo, as well as former heads of state. The investigation outlined connections between some of the Facebook pages and two marketing firms; it also revealed that a senior employee at one of the firms cofounded Únete por Colombia, a think tank whose members include political leaders and influencers aligned with right-wing parties, and which has spread misinformation about Petro on its Facebook page.2

High levels of disinformation, including about economic issues facing the country and candidates from across the political spectrum, were also spread during the electoral period outside of these coordinated ad campaigns.3 Decontextualized and doctored pictures of candidates were shared across social media platforms in high volumes, while unknown actors fabricated posts on Twitter posing as various candidates. Political actors close to candidates were also frequent sources of disinformation.4

During the coverage period, Colombian authorities also used social media platforms in attempts to influence online debate or advance their favored political interests. Both as a candidate and while in office, President Petro has used social media to criticize the press and attack individual outlets for their reporting. In February 2023, FLIP reported that the newly elected president had published at least 34 Twitter posts within the previous month in which he criticized, corrected, or attacked nine media outlets.5 In May 2023, FLIP warned that such attacks were an attempt to undermine the credibility of certain media outlets and influence their reporting.6

In August 2022, it was reported that a Twitter user who had previously created a fake academic persona to defend Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero and attack his opponents had transformed their account into an apparent media outlet. This outlet, under the name Frente al Poder, had received more than 60 million Colombian pesos ($12,000) in public advertising contracts from the city.7 In addition, one media report estimated that approximately half of Quintero’s Twitter followers were fake accounts or automated “bots” used to support and amplify the mayor’s posts.8

Disinformation affects the online media landscape beyond social media platforms. According to a November 2022 report by the Global Disinformation Index (GDI), 44 percent of the online media sites assessed presented a medium risk of disinformation, while 12 percent presented a high risk. The report cited risk factors ranging from a lack of transparency regarding funding and editorial stances to the publication of openly biased content that could manipulate users.9

In 2021, the government launched a campaign to shape online narratives around social unrest that year. In October 2021, FLIP published an investigation into the online #ColombiaEsMiVerdad (#ColombiaIsMyTruth) campaign launched by the Ministry of National Defense and military forces amid nationwide protests in late April and early May 2021 (see B8). As part of the campaign, official accounts belonging to the Ministry of National Defense and the National Police posted screenshots of online content superimposed with a “fake news” label, claiming that the content had been classified as false by independent fact-checking entities like Colombiacheck and La Silla Vacía. Both organizations refuted this claim, reporting that they had not labeled all of the posts in question as false, and that the government had strategically cherrypicked fact-checking publications in its favor.10 Also in the course of the campaign, the government staged a cyberattack on the websites of defense and security entities and the social media accounts of high-ranking officials in May 2021, and launched widely criticized cyberpatrolling and online monitoring efforts (see C5).11

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Many online news outlets are thought to avoid or adjust coverage of certain issues in order to maintain relationships with advertisers.

According to a 2015 survey of journalists by Proyecto Antonio Nariño (PAN), an alliance of organizations focused on freedom of expression and access to information, between 40 and 66 percent of respondents believed that media outlets in their region modify their editorial positions to protect advertising revenue, depending on the region; 64 percent said that the way official advertising is awarded is opaque; and 75 percent agreed that it is necessary to change the way in which official advertising contracts are allocated.1 In May 2021, news outlet El Espectador published leaked audio clips in which members of the ruling party’s leadership discussed how to leverage advertising money to pressure the media into changing their narrative surrounding the government’s role in national strikes.2

In October 2022, the governing coalition, Pacto Histórico, announced legislation that would regulate public advertising in the media and impose taxes on foreign over-the-top (OTT) platforms, such as Netflix or Amazon Prime Video, which provide streaming services through the internet, among other provisions to “strengthen community and alternative media.”3 By the end of the coverage period, the bill had not yet been filed in Congress.

In March 2023, La Silla Vacía published a photo of President Petro's minor daughter in an article referencing the presidential family tree. In response, Petro called the outlet a "scoundrel" on Twitter, and the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC) sent La Silla Vacía a request for information about its publication of the photo.4 In July 2023, after the coverage period, a court ruled that the outlet had adhered to journalistic standards in publishing the photo.5

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Colombia has numerous digital media outlets and online spaces for political debate, and Colombians are able to view and disseminate a wide range of content.

Many professional media enterprises thrive in Colombia’s largest cities, and authorities generally do not interfere with their operations. However, there is a lack of media diversity in many regions. According to FLIP, almost 60 percent of the 1,109 municipalities they mapped had no media that produced local news. Out of the 2,186 media outlets that FLIP identified, 228 were digital.1 Of these digital outlets, 62 percent were concentrated in department capitals, while 1,030 municipalities had no digital news media as of 2019.2

Indigenous voices are underrepresented in the online landscape, which lacks linguistic and cultural diversity.3 False or misleading content has also contributed to offline harms for Indigenous Colombians in recent years. During a national strike in May 2021, false claims spread on social media that members of the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) were entering residential complexes in Cali with the intention of looting them. As a result, residents violently confronted the group; eight Indigenous people were injured, including the CRIC’s leader, Daniela Soto, who was shot in the abdomen.4

The presence of false information online has negatively affected Colombians’ ability to access credible and reliable information on the internet. According to the Reuters Institute’s 2022 Digital News Report on Colombia, 61 percent of survey respondents expressed concern about discerning between real and false information online.5

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 5.005 6.006

Social media has played an important role in organizing and has contributed to offline mobilization in recent years. Though police abuses, including arbitrary detentions, physical violence, and device seizures, were widespread during 2021 protests, they were not reported on a similar scale during the current coverage period.

In February 2023, demonstrations were held both in favor of recent government reforms,1 called by President Petro, and against them,2 called by the opposition. Participants on both sides, including Mendellín mayor Daniel Quintero,3 an ally of Petro, and opposition senator Miguel Uribe Turbey,4 used social media to mobilize support during the demonstrations. None of the demonstrations involved widespread episodes of police brutality.

Ahead of a February 2022 Constitutional Court decision on abortion, activists and ordinary citizens used social media to organize online and voice their support for the legalization of abortion. In the fall of 2021, for instance, reproductive and women’s rights advocates launched a social media campaign entitled “Daughters on the Border”, in which celebrities shared stories of Colombian women and girls who had been denied abortions.5 The Constitutional Court ultimately ruled to decriminalize abortion during the first 24 weeks of pregnancy.6

Several protests have been sparked and sustained by users of digital platforms in recent years. From April to July 2021, nationwide protests that began in opposition to a proposed tax reform quickly escalated into a mass antigovernment movement. Demonstrators were met with severe abuses by police, and Colombians used social media to contribute to the movement’s momentum and share videos documenting and condemning police brutality.7

In November 2022, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) officially launched the "Social Media 4 Peace" project in Colombia. Funded by the European Union, the project aims to strengthen society's capacity to counter online hate speech while promoting freedom of expression and peace through social media.8

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 4.004 6.006

Colombia’s constitution includes protections for free expression, and judges often uphold these rights in practice. Article 20 of the constitution guarantees freedom of information and expression and prohibits prior restraint. Article 73 further provides for the protection of “the liberty and professional independence” of “journalistic activity.” Although there are no specific provisions protecting freedom of expression online, according to the Constitutional Court, online journalists and bloggers have the same liberties and protections as print or broadcast journalists.1

The judiciary consistently exhibits independence. Though judges have sometimes ruled against free expression, as with orders to restrict content based on an acción de tutela, in recent years there have been multiple judicial rulings in favor of online expression and access to information (see B3). In June 2022, for example, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of FLIP in a protective action it filed against Juan Pablo Bieri Lozano, the former manager of the public broadcaster. In 2019, FLIP published a recording that revealed Bieri’s intentions to censor a journalist, leading Bieri to ultimately denounce FLIP in a series of social media posts. Among its considerations, the ruling argued that attacks against rights organizations like FLIP undermine democracy and the rights of journalists, whose credibility is important to maintaining public confidence in their work defending human rights.2

In April 2022 the Constitutional Court overturned an electoral code reform that had been criticized by digital rights organizations for threatening citizens’ political expression over social media (see C2).3 Previously, in January 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the attorney general’s office had violated FLIP's rights to access information and to free expression in its refusal to provide the organization with information on the number of criminal libel and slander complaints filed against journalists by a particular lawyer. The court also ordered the office to provide FLIP with the requested information.4

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Colombia maintains criminal penalties for defamation. According to the Colombian penal code, individuals accused of making “dishonorable accusations” can face up to four and a half years in prison, while individuals accused of libel can face up to six years in prison. Sentences may be heavier when the crime is committed through the use of “social mediums of communication or of other collective divulgence.”1 Whoever “publishes, reproduces, or repeats” dishonorable accusations or libel may also be subject to the same punishment.2 In February 2023, the Ministry of Justice submitted a draft penal code reform to Congress that would, among other things, eliminate the crimes of libel and slander in an effort to reduce prison overcrowding.3 However, in April, officials confirmed that the proposal to eliminate libel and slander from the penal code had been dropped from the reforms, ending the latest effort to decriminalize such speech.4

During the previous coverage period, in April 2022, the Constitutional Court overturned a reform to the electoral code approved by Congress in December 2020. The reform included provisions that had been criticized by digital rights organizations for their disproportionate and ambiguous restrictions on citizens’ political expression over social media.5 The decision by the court hinged on the flawed legal procedure behind the reform, rather than its content.6

In December 2021, the Senate rejected an article in a proposed anticorruption bill that had been criticized by free expression and journalism organizations for violating free expression guarantees by imposing disproportionate criminal penalties. The article provided for prison sentences of up to 10 years and fines of up to 1.36 billion Colombian pesos ($282,000) for those found to have slandered current or former public officials.7

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 4 to 5 because digital journalists and other users faced a less serious threat from penalties—including arbitrary detentions and criminal defamation lawsuits—compared to the previous coverage period.

Prosecution and imprisonment for online activities is quite rare in Colombia. However, criminal defamation suits and other forms of judicial harassment pose an ongoing threat to journalists.

In recent years, criminal defamation suits have sometimes been filed against journalists in retaliation for their online reporting. For instance, in September 2020, the attorney general’s office ordered two freelance journalists for the online news magazine Volcánicas to appear for questioning in connection with a criminal defamation complaint. The complainant, screenwriter and director Ciro Guerra Picón, filed the case in response to an article the journalists published in June 2020, describing at least eight separate cases in which Guerra was accused of sexual harassment.1 In May 2021, a court ordered the journalists to add additional context and details to their published testimonies.2 In December 2022, the Constitutional Court rejected the acción de tutela filed by the director. The ruling held that the journalists did not violate Guerra’s right to honor, reputation, and presumption of innocence. Instead, the decision contended that they published a story of public interest that was necessary to counteract discrimination against women and combat gender-based violence, and acknowledged the potential chilling effect created by such cases (see B4). As the civil and criminal processes in the case remain ongoing in separate courts, the Constitutional Court sent a copy of its judgment to these courts for them to consider in the respective cases.3

In the first four months of 2022, the most recent period for which information was available, the attorney general’s office reported 471 cases of alleged slander related to the dissemination of purportedly false news.4

Digital media journalists covering protests have been arbitrarily detained by authorities in recent years. In March 2022, during the previous coverage period, Jennifer Mejía, a journalist for online outlets Le Cuento and Pacifista!, was detained for one hour on unspecified grounds after identifying herself as press. Mejía had been documenting the arrest of a protester involved in demonstrations for International Women’s Day.5 Previously, in September 2020, four journalists from the digital outlet La Otra Verdad were detained for seven hours while covering protests, despite having identified themselves as press to police.6

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

There are no restrictions on the use of anonymizing tools online, though users must register to obtain telecommunication services. While Colombia maintains vaguely worded legislation on encrypted messages, its applicability to online activities remains unclear.

Telecommunications service providers must maintain a database, to which police have access, that contains user data, such as users’ names, identification numbers, residential addresses, mobile phone numbers, and service activation dates.1 Users must provide accurate information under penalty of perjury, which is punishable by a minimum of six years in prison.2 There are no registration requirements for bloggers or cybercafé owners.

Since 1993, Colombian law has banned the use of “communication devices that use the electromagnetic spectrum” to send “encrypted messages or messages in unintelligible language.”3 In response to an information request, the MinTIC explained that those provisions apply only “to the content of the communications, not the encryption of the medium.” Despite the ambiguous wording of the law, the MinTIC further claimed that these provisions only apply to radio-like devices and not to the internet.4 The Intelligence and Counterintelligence Act stipulates that telecommunications service providers may only offer encrypted voice services to intelligence agencies and “high government” officials.5 In September 2022, it was reported that the Petro government had purchased 50 licenses for encrypted call and text messaging services, to be used by cabinet members and state security officials.6

A 2019 Constitutional Court ruling recognized anonymity as an essential element of freedom of expression and the extension of its protected scope to technologies that enable anonymity, including encryption.7

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Intercepting personal communications in Colombia is authorized only for criminal investigation purposes and requires a judicial order.1 Colombian law allows intelligence agencies to monitor devices that use the electromagnetic spectrum to transmit wireless communication without a judicial order.2

Episodes of extralegal surveillance carried out by intelligence agencies, the army, and the police against journalists, activists, and opposition leaders have constituted an ongoing scandal in Colombia for more than 10 years.3 Some steps have been taken in recent years to punish perpetrators, including the arrests of former heads of illegal wiretapping and interception networks.4 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) confirmed in October 2020, however, that impunity persists for those conducting illegal surveillance.5

In August 2022, Revista Raya published an investigation warning that over the past several years, Colombian military intelligence personnel had conducted surveillance on and intercepted the private communications of diplomats, political leaders, and journalists as part of espionage efforts against Cuba.6 According to FLIP, journalists Joshua Goodman, José Luis Mayorga, and Gerald Bermúdez were surveilled by intelligence services during these efforts; Bermúdez had already been profiled by the Colombian army in 2020.7

Previously, two investigations published by the magazine Semana in January and May 2020 revealed the processes and equipment used in illegal military surveillance. The January report exposed the use of sophisticated technology and open-source intelligence—including International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catcher equipment, a malware system called Invisible Man, and the artificial intelligence tool Voyager—to spy on politicians, magistrates, generals, social leaders, activists, and journalists in 2019. The military redirected technology originally provided by the United States to address drug trafficking and the fight against guerrillas, compiling files on each target that included excerpts of social media conversations, photographs, videos, contacts, and maps tracing their movements.8 The May report noted that military intelligence personnel had targeted 130 people for surveillance in 2019, including 30 journalists from prominent outlets, human rights defenders, and the regional head of Human Rights Watch.9

Social media monitoring is also an issue. In February 2023, FLIP reported that the state, particularly the military and security forces, had acquired and were continuing to purchase technologies to monitor online activity and collect information from social media and the online sphere, especially from journalists and media outlets, in order to protect "national security." The confidential Manual of Military Techniques for Open Source Monitoring documents the use of programs that "analyze social media, monitor posts, verify images, track emails, obtain geolocations, search for people, and extract sensitive information.”10 These practices are only known through leaked documents. According to FLIP, the lack of transparency and legal regulations raises concerns that security forces are not considering human rights standards in the use of these technologies.

As part of the #ColombiaEsMiVerdad campaign launched by the Ministry of National Defense and military forces amid nationwide protests in late April and early May 2021, cyber patrol units invested over 21,000 hours in surveilling online speech in an alleged attempt to identify purportedly false news, for which they did not provide a clear definition. The IACHR condemned the practice in July 2021.11

In August 2020, a national observatory revealed that the mayor of Medellín, Daniel Quintero, had used public resources to hire a firm to monitor the social media profiles of journalists, social leaders, politicians, and ordinary Colombians who were critical of his administration.12

In April 2023, some legislators raised concerns that a provision in the Petro government’s National Development Plan (PND) 2022–26 could be used to surveil the private online communications, such as WhatsApp messages, of Colombian users.13 The proposed article would have expanded the regulatory scope of the CRC to online communications platforms. In response to these concerns, the CRC claimed that it would only have access to aggregated user data, including information about traffic on the platforms, and denied that it had the intention or legal authority to intercept any individual messages.14 The article in question was ultimately removed from the PND that month.15

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

While some constitutional and legal protections regulate the government’s use of data, service providers in Colombia are obliged to share data with the intelligence community with limited judicial review.

Service providers are required to collaborate with intelligence agencies by providing access, when feasible, to the communications history, location data, or technical data of any specific user without a warrant; intelligence agencies conducting an authorized operation only need to request the data. However, Colombian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies are also subject to Statutory Law 1621 of 2013, which compels them to respect “rights to honor, good name, personal and family privacy, and due process.” Article 4 restricts the discriminatory use of intelligence data, including on the basis of gender, race, or origin.1

Service providers are obliged to retain subscriber data for the purposes of criminal investigations and intelligence activities for a period of five years.2 An additional threat to user privacy comes in the form of Article 2 of Decree 1704 (2012), which requires ISPs to create access points that capture communications traffic on their networks for criminal investigation purposes; the systems can be used with authorization from the attorney general. Service providers that do not comply with these obligations face fines and could lose their operating license.3

Recently, concerns have been raised regarding how ISPs use personal data to create and market internet service packages, including zero-rating plans (see A2). In 2022, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) El Veinte challenged regulations that allow zero-rating for violating the right to privacy of users and net neutrality, among other reasons. The Constitutional Court convened a hearing on the matter in November 2022, and a ruling on the case was pending at the end of the coverage period.4

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to an escalation in violence against journalists in potential retaliation for their online reporting, resulting in the deaths of at least five reporters during the coverage period.

Online journalists faced a significant escalation of deadly violence during the coverage period. At least five digital journalists were killed in potential connection with their work.

In August 2022, journalists Leiner Montero and Dilia Contreras were shot and killed in Fundación, Magdalena. Montero was the director of a local radio station and a Facebook news page. Contreras worked for both national and community radio stations and collaborated with Montero to post stories on Facebook. In recent years, Montero had received several threats, leading him to uninstall the transmitters of the station he established.1

Later in the year, in October 2022, online journalist Rafael Emiro Moreno was murdered in Montelíbano, in the department of Córdoba. Moreno, who was the director of digital outlet Voces de Córdoba and published information related to corruption and illegal armed groups, was fatally shot by two men, despite receiving security protection from the state’s National Protection Unit (UNP). The UNP had been warned on multiple occasions about the threats facing Moreno.2

The next month, in La Unión, Nariño, Wilder Alfredo Córdoba was murdered. The journalist was the director of the local digital outlet Unión Televisión and published news about the local administration on the outlet’s Facebook page and his personal Facebook profile.3 Córdoba had denounced insecurity, crime, and corruption in La Unión and had received threatening messages from the profiles of people identified as members of armed groups. Authorities have been slow to investigate the murder.4

Luis Gabriel Pereira, director of the Facebook-based outlet Notiorense, was fatally shot in Ciénaga de Oro, Córdoba, in May 2023. He used Notiorense to publish news about violence and crime in the municipality. After Pereira published multiple accusations related to crime in Ciénaga de Oro and reported on a recent femicide, his colleagues reportedly warned him about the potential risks of his work. Prosecutors have not definitively tied Pereira’s murder to his journalism.5

In February 2023, FLIP denounced the fact that violence against the press increased in 2022, with 218 journalists receiving threats, the highest number in the last 15 years.6

During the previous coverage period, in September 2021, journalist Marcos Efraín Montalvo was fatally shot in Tuluá. Montalvo, who had practiced journalism for more than 40 years, had been reporting on local organized crime and corruption on his personal Facebook page, for which he had received death threats in 2021. Though it is uncertain whether Montalvo was killed in retaliation for his reporting, the country’s minister of national defense stated that his murder could be related to his commentary on political corruption.7 The investigation into Montalvo’s murder remained ongoing as of September 2022.8

Online journalists are subject to other forms of violence and intimidation. In June 2021, during the previous coverage period, eight men demanded that Pincen Mora, an editor for independent Facebook-based local news outlet Extrema Noticias, come out of his home and speak with them. When he refused to do so, they opened fire on his house. Mora had previously received death threats over Facebook Messenger for his outlet’s reporting on a neighborhood gang.9 In September 2021, Josué Nieves, director of the digital media outlet N Noticias Saravena, was detained by FARC dissidents and forced to record and publish a video on his outlet to prove that a hostage they had kidnapped was still alive.10

Online journalists covering protests frequently face violence and harassment by state and nonstate actors. FLIP reported that seven journalists, at least three of whom were affiliated with digital media, were victims of physical aggressions and obstructions by demonstrators during the February 2023 protests (see B8).11 In June 2021, journalists José Alberto Tejada and Jhonatan Buitrago of community media outlet Canal2 received threats of deadly violence from security forces while using Facebook to live-stream coverage of national strike protests.12

Journalists and politicians also sometimes face sexist and racist abuse online. In May 2022, during an electoral period, FLIP and the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) voiced concern regarding racist content about certain candidates that was being spread online.13 In a decision the same month, the Administrative Court of Cundinamarca recognized “a marked pattern of online violence, exercised [through] social networks, against women journalists,” especially “in the exercise of political activity.” The case involved an acción de tutela filed by FLIP in October 2020 on behalf of nine women journalists who had faced online violence by political actors; they argued that the abuse was facilitated by the failure of political parties and the CNE to effectively penalize such aggression. The court further established that the CNE and political parties’ ethics committees must adopt a more proactive role in preventing and penalizing online violence related to political activity.14

In March 2023, the Constitutional Court confirmed the Cundinamarca court’s decision, recognizing "that there is a marked pattern of online violence perpetrated by third parties against women journalists” and urging political parties to punish online violence and support its victims.15 The ruling acknowledges that online violence can facilitate serious offline harms, such as physical attacks, undermining the security of women journalists.16

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Online outlets and journalists continue to be targeted by cyberattacks. In 2022, FLIP recorded 12 cyberattacks against media outlets, seven more than in 2021.1 Smaller, Facebook-based outlets remain particularly vulnerable to hacking.2

Media outlets have been directly targeted by cyberattacks in recent years. In April 2023, the Caracol Radio media group was the victim of a “devastating” cyberattack that disrupted normal operations, including radio broadcasting, for several days.3 During the previous coverage period, in August 2021, one media outlet reported to FLIP that its website ceased to work for two and a half hours following a denial of service (DoS) attack.4

Individual journalists have been victims of recent hacking attempts. In April 2021, Diana Calderón announced that her WhatsApp account had been hacked and become part of a hacking chain, in which her contacts would receive requests for a code from her account that, if provided, would grant the hackers full access to their own accounts. Calderón is the director of a radio show and regularly writes articles for El Pais that are published online. The same hacking campaign also targeted high-level politicians and two other Colombian journalists.5

Government institutions have faced several cyberattacks in recent years. Beginning in late 2022, reports emerged that the Colombian army and the Office of the Attorney General of Colombia had been hacked by "Guacamaya," a hacktivist collective that has targeted institutions in several Latin American countries.6 The cyberattack exposed thousands of law enforcement emails in which judicial processes and detailed military operations were discussed.7

In April 2021, the hacking group Anonymous claimed to have used distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks—which aim to crash websites by bombarding their host servers with information requests—to take down the official pages of the presidency and the Senate. The group also claimed to have leaked the personal information of members of the army through cyberattacks.8

On Colombia

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    70 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    65 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No