Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2020

Argentina

Free
71
100
A Obstacles to Access 19 25
B Limits on Content 27 35
C Violations of User Rights 25 40
Last Year's Score & Status
72 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the research methodology and report acknowledgements.

header1 Overview

Argentina’s internet environment remained free during the coverage period, as users generally experienced unfettered access to online content and were able to engage freely on social media. While concerns about online manipulation surfaced ahead of the presidential election in October 2019, it did not prove to be disruptive to the polls themselves. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, however, several users were fined for or accused of spreading “false information.” Security agents’ practice of “cyberpatrolling” impacted users’ privacy rights during the coverage period, and remains a significant concern.

Argentina is a representative democracy with lively media and civil society sectors. After four years under Mauricio Macri’s administration, Alberto Fernández assumed the presidency in December 2019, and the country saw the return of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as his vice president. Economic instability, corruption in the government and judiciary, and drug-related violence are among the country’s most serious challenges.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2019 - May 31, 2020

  • In addition to creating concerns about high internet traffic, the COVID-19 pandemic further exposed the country’s digital divide. Many of those with limited or no internet access experienced difficulty obtaining information about the virus, with reports indicating that some groups did not know about the pandemic until weeks after COVID-19 was present in Argentina. In response, the government passed several temporary measures that aimed to mitigate some barriers to access (see A1 and A2).
  • Social movements and organizers of demonstrations continued to use the internet as a tool to amplify and bring new voices to campaigns in support of issues such as women’s rights (see B8).
  • Several problematic investigations were launched during the coverage period, including one against a cybersecurity expert who had shared information about a hacking, and at least two users who were charged with spreading false information about the COVID-19 pandemic in response to speculation about public figures’ possible exposure (see C3).
  • Though the Ministry of Security introduced a new protocol with clearer instructions on the use of “cyberpatrolling,” civil society continued to criticize the practice, saying it resulted in the infringement of the right to privacy (see C5).
  • The fact-checking organization Chequeado announced in October that it had been the victim of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack before and during an electoral debate (see C8).

A Obstacles to Access

Access to the internet has increased consistently in Argentina over the past decade, though a series of recent price increases above the inflation rate have made fixed and mobile internet plans more expensive. During the coverage period, the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to creating concerns about high network traffic, revealed new consequences of the country’s digital divide including a lack of access to information about the virus for some populations. In response, the government passed several temporary measures that would mitigate some barriers to access.

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Argentina’s internet penetration rate is among the highest in Latin America, at above 75 percent according to 2017 data from the International Telecommunications Union, the most recent available.1 In the first quarter of 2020, there were 7.47 million fixed internet subscriptions, a 0.3 percent increase compared to the previous year.2

According to 2020 data from the Argentine Internet Chamber (CABASE), fiber-optic connections represent only 11.9 percent of the total fixed internet connections in the country. The chamber has promoted investment in Fiber Optic Home (FTTH) networks, which grew by 61 percent in the first quarter of 2020, compared to the previous year.3

The number of mobile internet users are also on the rise, counting more than 31.7 million subscriptions by the first quarter of 2020, a 2.1 percent increase compared to the first quarter of 2019.4 However, figures show a decrease in the national mobile penetration rate between the first quarter of 2019 and 2020, from 131 to 124 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.5

Measurements of internet speed in Argentina vary, but a range of sources show that the country lags behind global averages and that speeds are slower than in several other Latin American countries.6 In July 2020, CABASE reported an increase in internet speeds above 6 MB, representing 69.11 percent of total connections as of March 2020. Of this total, 47.97 percent of connections were above 20 Mbps, 9.24 percent between 10 and 20 Mbps, and 11.9 percent between 6 and 10 Mbps. Connections below 6 Mbps fell to 31.2 percent.7

Although power outages are not uncommon throughout the country, particularly during the summer months, a rare event took place in June 2019, when a failure in the power grid’s system led to a blackout affecting nearly the entire country, together with its neighbors Uruguay and Paraguay.8 The outage, which impacted fixed internet connections, lasted for up to 14 hours in some areas, leaving users dependent on mobile data plans and the cell tower infrastructure, which remained operational.9

Other access issues emerged amid the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, as the government instructed people to stay home,10 concerns about the network’s health and resilience in the wake of high demand became a topic of public discussion. During the first two days after the government’s announcement, CABASE registered an average increase in internet traffic of between 22 and 25 percent.11 Internet service providers implemented measures to increase their technicians’ operations in order to keep the networks up and running.12 CABASE also affirmed that there was no need to worry about the increase in traffic; given the resilience of the infrastructure, they stated that the national backbone was not at risk.13

In addition, following international trends, the telecommunications regulator, the National Authority for Communications (ENACOM) urged companies to implement measures to mitigate stress on the network, particularly regarding video streaming. Netflix14 and YouTube15 were among the first companies to announce such measures, which included reducing video quality. As part of ENACOM’s campaign, the regulator also called for responsible use of the internet, such as by alleviating video traffic, and provided advice on how to do so.16 In April 2020, ENACOM, the state-owned satellite and communications infrastructure operator ARSAT, and private telecommunications companies Personal, Claro, Movistar, and Datco, announced an agreement to strengthen collaboration to guarantee connectivity throughout the country during the lockdown period.17

In October 2018, former president Mauricio Macri had announced a National Plan of Telecommunications and Connectivity, with a new schedule to deploy 4G in 2,790 municipalities by the end of 2019. The government also announced financing for internet development in small and medium-sized cities, and price cuts for wholesale internet services marketed by the ARSAT.18 No official updates on the plan appeared to have been provided as of June 2020.

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Given high inflation rates, internet subscriptions are relatively expensive in Argentina and present a barrier for those with lower incomes. According to CABASE’s report covering the first quarter of 2020, broadband prices were a high economic burden for some 27 percent of Argentine households.1

Argentina’s main service providers have raised the cost of mobile plans. In March 2020, the largest mobile providers—Movistar, Claro, and Personal—introduced further price hikes between 14 percent and 17 percent for mobile prepaid and postpaid services.2 According to the Argentine Internet Observatory (OIA), fixed internet prices can vary greatly: the minimum tariff for 1Mbps was 2.70 pesos ($0.04) and the maximum was 1,000 pesos ($14.60).3 In January 2020, the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) revealed that the cost of phone and internet services increased by 63.9 percent in 2019, surpassing the average inflation rate of around 53 percent. Perhaps in response to higher prices, a record 3.57 million users changed their mobile provider around the same time, according to ENACOM.4

Geographic and socioeconomic differences in internet penetration persist: fixed internet subscriptions reach over 60 percent of households in provinces such as La Pampa, Buenos Aires, and Córdoba, whereas others such as San Juan, Santa Cruz, and Formosa are closer to 30 percent.5 Around a third of the provinces in the country are still below 40 percent internet penetration, including Misiones (39.02 percent), Corrientes (38.73), Chaco (37.48), and Mendoza (33.14).6 Many who lack internet access live in rural regions.

Government initiatives have sought to promote digital inclusion and education, although investment in such initiatives dropped in 2018 and 2019. 7 A National Plan for Digital Inclusion provided training in digital literacy and digital skills to some 100,000 people in more than 100 cities by mid-2018,8 and by July 2020, had reached nearly 370,00 people.9 A program established in 2018, Aprender Conectados, also promotes coding laboratories and robotics kits for schoolchildren.10 According to a study carried out by Google and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Argentina is among the countries in the region where children are given their first smartphone at an early age.11

In February 2020, the Civil Association for Equality and Justice (ACIJ) sued Telefónica for failing to comply with a resolution issued by the Access to Information Agency ordering the ICT company to provide information about their business operations in the poorer neighborhoods of the city of Buenos Aires;12 the company has been accused of discriminating against lower-income residents when it comes to offering telecom services.13 Moreover, in June 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic (and beyond the scope of this report’s coverage period), several judicial protections were requested before the courts to compel the government of the city of Buenos Aires to provide children in need with the technological means to continue their studies remotely, as well as guarantee access to the internet.14

In another reflection of the impact of Argentina’s digital divide, a May 2020 investigation by the national daily Clarín found that some of those among the 15 percent of the Argentine population that lacks internet access—mainly those in rural areas—did not learn about the COVID-19 pandemic until a month after it had reached Argentina.15

During the COVID-19 outbreak, the government and private companies announced temporary measures to facilitate better access to certain content and ease financial burdens on consumers. In March 2020, for example, the government announced a partnership with mobile operators to secure zero-rating—the practice of providing free internet access under certain conditions—for the public education platform Seguimos Educando.16 The satellite television company DIRECTV made the education channel Escuela Plus, together with several entertainment channels, available to all its users, as well as their app DirecTV GO.17 The mobile operators Personal and Movistar announced data plans meant to help customers who became stranded abroad.18

In the spring of 2020, ENACOM issued new regulations for telecommunications providers, including those offering internet and mobile services, that placed limits on when users could be cut off from such services due to unpaid bills. The regulation also instructed companies to allow users to pay pending bills in monthly installments, and prohibited telecoms from applying any kind of interest to those debts.19

In May, the national government also suspended all raises in telecommunications service rates, including broadband and mobile internet plans, phone and television, until August 31.20 While the price freeze applied to services offered by the companies Telecom, Telefónica, Claro, DirecTV, and Telecentro, services from cooperatives and SMEs were not covered.21

During the same month, as part of a series of initiatives under the national health emergency, ENACOM announced new projects aiming to guarantee connectivity for marginalized communities. Using a dedicated fund of 100 million pesos ($1.46 million), one of the programs would improve ICT access in underserved neighborhoods.22

While Law 27,078 protects net neutrality,23 practices such as zero-rating are commonplace; for example, major mobile providers do not charge users accessing WhatsApp.24 Following the 2017–18 megamerger between Telecom and Cablevisión,25 zero-rated access offers were available to customers of Personal (mobile phone service) and Cablevisión Flow (over-the-top service) to watch the final match of the Copa Libertadores,26 this service was extended to cover other TV content and rebranded as “Flow Pass”, while making it available to Personal customers.27

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The Argentine government does not exercise control over telecommunications infrastructure. There have been no reported instances of the government cutting off internet connectivity during protests or social unrest.

Argentina has 30 functioning internet exchange points (IXPs) strategically distributed in major cities across the country,1 which help to manage internet traffic efficiently.2 In March 2020, ENACOM’s institutional relations director Luis Lázzaro announced that the body was studying measures to promote access to credit for connectivity projects, particularly those developed by worker cooperatives and small and medium-sized enterprises.3

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Argentina has one of the largest number of internet providers in the region after Brazil.1 However, the Argentine broadband market is dominated by two companies, Grupo Clarín and Telefónica, which together represent 63 percent of the market.2 The mobile sector is similarly concentrated, under market leaders Movistar (Telefónica, 34.4 percent), Claro (América Móvil, 33.9 percent), and Personal (Telecom Argentina, 31.7 percent).3

A megamerger between Telecom Argentina and cable TV provider Cablevisión was completed by mid-2018,4 resulting in the largest telecommunications and media group in Argentina.5 Mobile service provider Personal (part of Cablevisión-Telecom), has seen an increase in its market share since the merger, boosted by an array of promotions, packages, advertising, and the largest fiber-optic network in the country.6 Competitors and experts have raised concerns about this merger’s impact on pluralism, diversity, and competition.7

Under former president Macri’s administration, the government issued a series of decrees and resolutions to significantly reform the telecommunications and media sector with an emphasis on convergence and competition. However, critics have contended that these moves encouraged greater market concentration.8 Decree 267 issued in December 2015 notably released cable providers from obligations in the Broadcasting Law. Decree 1340 issued in December 2016 allowed telecommunications companies to offer cable TV as well as internet and phone services beginning in January 2018.9 In 2018, ENACOM approved rules enabling companies to offer “quadruple play” (covering fixed and mobile telephone service, pay television, and internet).10

Pending legislation referred to as ley corta (“short law”) would allow ICT companies to provide satellite television services, seen as a way to promote more competition in light of the Cablevisión-Telecom merger.11 Meanwhile, a decree issued in January 2019 authorized ENACOM to manage and auction the spectrum held by the state-run company ARSAT. Accordingly, at least 20 percent of the frequencies must go to regional and local operators.12

With a new resolution in 2017, the government has pushed for a more “flexible and objective” ICT licensing regime.13 The process to obtain an internet-service provider (ISP) license can be done online with a payment fee of 20,000 pesos ($307).14

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

The main telecommunications regulator, ENACOM, was created by presidential decree in December 2015,1 and later validated by Congress in April 2016.2

The body’s composition has raised some concerns about possible executive influence. ENACOM operates within the public innovation secretariat, under the chief of cabinet of ministers, and has a board comprised of four directors chosen by the president and three proposed by Congress. ENACOM’s decisions can be approved by a simple majority, and its members may be removed by the president.3 The ICT policymaker is the secretariat of public innovation, after the newly elected government restructured4 the secretariat of modernization in December 2019.5

The executive body NIC Argentina regulates and registers all websites with the “.ar” top-level domain name. Since 2015, registration of any domain ending in “.ar” requires an annual fee between 110 and 270 pesos ($1.61 and $3.94).6

B Limits on Content

Individuals and companies have continued to pursue cases against search engines and online newspapers in order to have content removed. Ahead of October 2019 general elections, concerns arose around the use of bots and trolls by political campaigns, though such activity appeared to have a minimal impact on the vote. Social media was used during the coverage to mobilize protesters in support of decriminalizing abortion.

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content? 5.005 6.006

Users in Argentina have access to a wide array of online content. Nevertheless, courts have the power to order website blocks, and have done so to protect copyright and limit access to unauthorized gambling sites based on different provincial regulations.1 Law 25.690 also requires ISPs to provide software that can allow users to choose to limit their own access to “specific websites.”2

Courts have made controversial decisions in recent years to try to block the transportation mobile app Uber since its arrival in Buenos Aires, finding it was not in compliance with the legal framework for public transportation services.3 As part of a dispute dating back to 2016, in February 2018 a court in Buenos Aires issued an order to block access to the Uber app and website nationwide, though providers stated that blocking the app was technically difficult to implement.4 In June 2018, the Superior Court of Justice of the city of Buenos Aires overturned the decision, arguing that such a measure disproportionately affects freedom of expression and access to information.5 According to the fact-checking organization Chequeado, the block on Uber’s website was implemented and lifted several times, but the app remained available.6 In September 2019, a court in Córdoba issued a provisional order to suspend Uber until the company complied with existing regulations.7

There were concerns that similar restrictions would be attempted when, in April 2019, a local judge in the city of Buenos Aires ordered the delivery apps Rappi, PedidosYa, and Glovo, and others to stop providing their services until they complied with a series of regulations consisting primarily of safety measures for their delivery riders. However, the decision was appealed by the City8 and access to the apps remained available.9

Courts have also blocked websites to protect copyright in the past.10 In November 2018, a court ordered the website Cuevana2 to be blocked, as well as domain names associated with Cuevana, for violating copyright provisions (Law 11.723, art. 79).11 Created in 2011, the popular entertainment site had been embroiled in judicial problems for streaming copyright-protected materials and independent films. As of May 2020, though, a number of copycat sites were still accessible.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content? 2.002 4.004

Courts continue to consider lawsuits from individuals requesting that search engines and platforms take down certain material. Judges have ordered search engines and social networks to remove content based on the right to honor and privacy, which is guaranteed under Civil Code (art. 52) and allows Argentinian citizens to prevent or repair any damage to their reputation. Press freedom groups such as the Inter-American Press Association (SIP) and Association of Argentine Journalism Entities (ADEPA) have raised concerns about attempts by individuals and companies to seek the removal of content from both search engines and online newspapers.1 In August 2019, the Federal Criminal and Correctional Chamber ordered Google and Yahoo to delist search results of a false news story about the arrest of the son of then-congresswoman Elise Carrió.2 This decision was later reversed after Google appealed, and the judges conceded that the court did not have jurisdiction over the search engine’s foreign domains.3 In February 2020, a civil judge ruled in favor of a “right to be forgotten” case and ordered Google to delist search results of keywords referring to the actress Natalia Denegri’s involvement in a 1990s scandal. The decision noted that this content lacked “journalistic relevance” and was not in the public interest.4 In January, another civil court had ordered YouTuber Martín Cirio, known as La Faraona, to refrain from speaking publicly about his former partner, with whom he was involved in a labor lawsuit, including by removing posts and videos that referenced her. The judge also ordered Cirio to include messages on his social media accounts explaining the judicial decision.5

On the other hand, during the reporting period there were also several cases in which courts denied the deindexing of information from search engines. In August 2019, the National Chamber of Civil and Commercial Appeals ruled that it would be unreasonable to oblige search engines to detect different combinations of keywords and remove all relevant web pages. Specific URLs would thus need to be identified for removal.6 In December 2019, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s decision that had ordered Google to remove a search suggestion and several links related to an official from the National University of La Matanza. The court referred to the previous ruling as a form of censorship and determined that the relevant content was in the public interest.7 In a January 2020 case, a civil and commercial court reversed a decision in which Google was ordered to remove and block three URLs to two news sites’ reporting of alleged sexual abuse by a former public official against an employee. In their decision, the judges cited the constitutional right to freedom of expression.8

A data-protection bill submitted before Congress in September 2018 established an individual’s right to erase personal data when it is no longer necessary for its original purpose, or when there is no public purpose, together with some exceptions to protect freedom of expression.9 The bill lost parliamentary status on February 29, 2020.10

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

ENACOM publishes an online repository of websites that have been blocked or reinstated or both after judicial court orders.1 However, the tool does not specify the rules or criteria behind these decisions. The vast majority of website blocks concern online gambling (with over 20 cases in the last three quarters of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020), which is regulated differently in each province.

Recent court decisions have established takedown criteria to avoid potential abuse of generic injunctions to restrict freedom of expression.2 A landmark ruling by the Argentine Supreme Court in 2014 confirmed that intermediaries should not be liable for third-party content if they did not have knowledge of alleged third-party violations.3 It also established that intermediaries must remove unlawful content only if they are notified by a judicial order, thus favoring a judicial takedown regime over a “notice-and-takedown” system. On the other hand, however, the court stated that if the content involves “manifest illegality,” a private notification to the intermediary is sufficient. A recent court ruling by the Supreme Court in September 2017 reaffirmed these standards in the Gimbutas vs Google case.4

However, a bill that established that in all cases a judicial order was necessary to remove online content was dropped in late 2018. Arguments against the bill had noted the difficulty for the judiciary to address requests in a timely way and the vagueness of “self-regulation mechanisms” contained in Article 7.5 Another set of arguments was related with copyright and the lack of enforcement and instruments provided in the bill.6

Other legislative initiatives proposed in 2018 raised some concerns for encouraging censorship by online platforms and services, though they do not appear to have advanced. According to one proposal yet to be discussed by legislators entitled “Protection of Freedom of Expression, Privacy and Honor,” intermediaries are not held liable for third-party content, as long as the authors of the content are clearly identifiable, and as long as the intermediaries can demonstrate that they were not aware of the illegal nature of the content.7 Another proposal, the draft “Regulation of the Open Internet,” instructs online providers to implement a system for rating audiovisual content according to audience ages, in order to provide mechanisms for parental control.8

During 2019, new bills were submitted before Congress that could facilitate content restriction. One proposed bill is based on article 16 of the 2000 data protection law, which provides the right to rectify, update, or delete personal data. The proposed law would allow people to request the delisting of specific URLs indexed by search engines if the links contained information that was harmful to them; search results in the public interest would not be eligible.9 Another bill proposed the introduction of a legal regime for apps and websites that are used to exercise professional activities, and would create, under ENACOM, a national registry of these platforms. ENACOM would issue registrations and be able to enforce sanctions, including blocking apps and websites that violate the law.10

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Self-censorship among bloggers and internet users is not widespread in Argentina, although some isolated instances of harassment might elicit self-censorship in particular cases. Aggressive and hateful commentary surrounding sensitive debates online, such as those regarding an abortion bill discussed in Congress in August 2018, may discourage some social media users from expressing their opinions freely.1

In February 2020, the Inter-American Press Association raised concerns about a bill submitted before the Senate that would limit investigative journalism related to corruption2 and could increase self-censorship among journalists working both online and offline. As of July 2020, the bill was under review by the Justice and Criminal Affairs Commission.3 In another move that could encourage self-censorship, as part of an investigation into alleged extortion by lawyer Marcelo D’Alessio, the journalist Daniel Santoro of Clarín, was summoned in June 2019 to reveal information about his sources, and his phone records were subpoenaed. The Argentine Forum of Journalism (FOPEA) criticized the move, expressing concern that it would hinder the ability of journalists to communicate with their sources.4

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 3.003 4.004

There have been repeated episodes of seemingly organized digital behavior through bots, trolls and personal accounts, mainly on Twitter, connected to political campaigning.1 The election commission has also investigated claims that Cambridge Analytica had worked on Macri’s 2015 presidential campaign; the firm has been accused of keeping massive data files on individuals without their permission, and other wrongdoing.2 A United Kingdom–based investigation into Cambridge Analytica's parent company, SCL Elections, noted that “confidential evidence” related to an anti-Kirchner campaign in Argentina suggested the creation of false social media accounts.3

Ahead of the general elections in October 2019, Argentina’s National Electoral Chamber (CNE) announced a series of measures to address disinformation and other manipulation techniques on social media, including requesting that candidates register their social media accounts and official websites, and to share information about audiovisual campaign materials that they planned to share online. The CNE would also monitor manipulation efforts during the election campaign period.4 In May 2019, the election commission got political parties and social media companies to adhere to an “ethical digital commitment” seeking to prevent the spread of disinformation during the campaign,5 while in June the CNE held a meeting with WhatsApp executives to discuss their concerns about the political use of the platform by the electoral campaigns.6

In September 2019, civil society groups called on Facebook, Twitter, and Google to strengthen their policies and transparency around political advertising in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly given the various electoral campaigns taking place in the region throughout 2019.7 Later in the month, in the run-up to Argentina’s general elections, Facebook, after promising to apply transparency practices globally, introduced changes to their political ads policy in the country. The new policy sought to improve transparency by identifying campaign ads and including information about who had bankrolled them.8

False news about various candidates and campaign issues spread in the months leading up to the elections.9 In September 2019, the investigative journalist Hugo Alconada Mon published an exposé about several agencies working to develop tailored social media campaigns for presidential candidates ahead of the presidential elections, using trolls and bots to promote narratives against opponents. The efforts also relied on private databases segmented by demographics like gender, age, and location to create targeted messages on behalf of various campaigns.10

In May 2019, a consortium of fact-checking and journalism organizations, in partnership with more than 80 media outlets and tech companies, founded Reverso, an online platform to counteract disinformation campaigns during the 2019 elections, from June 11 until December 11.11 Although disinformation did not appear to have been a major issue during the Argentine presidential elections, Reverso published a summary of the most viral posts on Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. Such posts included a doctored video circulated on Facebook in which President Alberto Fernández appeared to call the Kirchners criminals; tweets falsely claiming that a legislator had not finished high school and would receive a large salary; Facebook posts falsely claiming the former governor of Buenos Aires had bought a $10 million house; and inaccurate content about legislative bills that appeared on WhatsApp.12

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

State advertising is typically allocated to traditional media outlets, placing some economic constraints on digital outlets.

The new government has taken some steps to correct the political allocation of official advertising during Macri’s administration, which had played a major role in shaping media content at both the federal and local levels.1 Although Macri’s administration reduced expenditure on advertising,2 large amounts were still invested in outlets and stations that produced friendly coverage.3 Published figures show that the Macri-friendly media conglomerate Clarín Group benefitted the most from official advertising between 2016 and 2019, according to a February 2020 investigation, with a total of 6.8 billion pesos ($99.3 million). This represented 10.5 percent of its annual gross income in 2016, but decreased to 8 percent in 2017 and 5.5 percent in 2018.4 Moreover, 60 percent of the total investment in official advertisement is concentrated in the city of Buenos Aires.5

While both public and private advertising to digital outlets have increased in recent years, in 2018, just three, progovernment websites collected 53 percent of all state advertising for online media: Clarín, Infobae, and La Nación.6

By the end of his term in office, Macri’s administration had spent 11 billion pesos (around $160.64 million) from 2016 until 2019. According to Chequeado, this represents a bit more than half of what the previous president, Cristina Kirchner, spent from 2012 until 2015. During his inauguration speech in early December 2019, Alberto Fernández announced that his administration would alter the guidelines for state advertising to focus on improving the overall quality of education,7 though the impact on online outlets remains unclear. According to one analyst, shifting advertising to an educational slant will be difficult, given that children, teenagers, and young adults are the least connected to traditional media like newspapers, television, and radio.8

In April 2019, the Senate approved a new law regulating the financing of political campaigns.9 It notably mandates that 60 percent of public resources for political party digital advertising be allocated to digital news sites that generate content, 35 percent to outlets providing national coverage, and 25 percent to provincial outlets focusing on local content. This responds to media associations’ demands to compensate for losses due to the migration of advertising to search engines and social networks.10

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity? 3.003 4.004

Argentina has an open and diverse online media environment, as well as high rates of social media use that allow people to access and produce different content. A July 2018 report found that Argentina ranks globally as the country with the fifth-highest proportion of social media users (above 70 percent).1 Its digital ecosystem is populated with initiatives and content that reflect the interests of different groups, including indigenous groups,2 LGBT+ people,3 feminists,4 and various religious congregations.5

On the other hand, media ownership in Argentina is highly concentrated, which may in turn affect the diversity of news in the market.6 The Media Ownership Monitor report produced by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) notes that Macri’s government made significant changes in the media landscape, marked by deregulation policies, closure of media outlets, greater concentration of large players, and greater job insecurity.7 Of the six main digital media with the largest audience analyzed as part of this research, four belonged to Clarín Group.8

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Score Change: The score improved from 5 to 6 because campaigns and protests can be freely organized through social media and other online tools.

Argentinians continue to use social media as a tool for political mobilization. Digital activism has played a crucial role in rallying protests to advocate for concrete action to reduce violence against women.1 The hashtag #NiUnaMenos (Not One Less) went viral on social media in June 2015,2 and continued to be one of the most tweeted hashtags in 20183 and 2019.4 The hashtag #abortolegal (legal abortion) was widely used in 2018 during discussions of a bill that decriminalized abortion in Argentina, but which was rejected by senators that August. In February 2020, a protest movement that drew thousands into the streets of Buenos Aires in support of decriminalization was accompanied by mobilization over social media; hashtags used included #19F (referring to a proposed bill), #Pañuelazo (referring to a green handkerchief, a symbol in the campaign), and #AbortoLegal2020.5 Activism continued online during the COVID-19 pandemic and the related lockdown.6

C Violations of User Rights

Several problematic investigations were launched during the coverage period, including one against a cybersecurity expert who had shared information about a hacking, and at least two users who were charged with spreading false information about the COVID-19 pandemic. “Cyberpatrolling” operations, in which law enforcement agents monitor social media to identify illicit activity, continued despite insufficient transparency measures and other safeguards. A fact-checking organization experienced a denial-of-service (DoS) attack during an electoral debate.

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 4.004 6.006

Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution,1 as well as through Argentina’s ratification of regional and international human rights treaties that share constitutional status.2 Argentina also explicitly established online freedom of expression protections through a presidential decree issued in 1997.3 These were expanded by Congress in 2005 to include “the search, reception, and dissemination of ideas and information of all kinds via internet services.”4 Defamatory statements regarding matters of public interest were decriminalized in 2009,5 following the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ ruling in Kimel vs. Argentina.6 A national freedom of information law came into force in 2016.7

Argentina’s judicial system has long been plagued by inefficiencies and accusations of politicization. In 2019, civil rights groups denounced a decision to investigate a federal judge who was looking into allegations of illegal surveillance operations and extortion, with potential links to government allies.8 Meanwhile, press freedom groups expressed alarm when several journalists were named in the judge’s investigation, decrying a judicial attempt to “criminalize interviews and professional secrecy.”9

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities? 2.002 4.004

Some laws impose criminal and civil liability for online activities. Law 11.723 holds liable those who reproduce content that violates intellectual property by any means, and establishes sanctions ranging from fines to six years in prison. In November 2013, Congress approved a law amending the penal code and establishing penalties of up to four years imprisonment for online contact with a minor carried out “with the purpose of committing a crime against [the minor’s] sexual integrity.”1 The proposal had sparked criticism among academics and legislators due to a vague wording that would have criminalized any online interaction with minors, issuing the same sentence that is mandated for cases of abuse.2

A 2008 law on cybercrime amended the Argentine Criminal Code to prohibit distribution and possession of child abuse images online, interception of communications and informatics systems, hacking, and electronic fraud. Some of the terms used in the legislation have been criticized as ambiguous, which could lead to overly broad interpretation.3

In March 2020, a municipal ordinance, heavily criticized by the Argentine Federation of Press Workers (FATPREN), was ratified by the city council of Pichanal, in the province of Salta. It imposes a 20,000 peso ($290) fine on anyone who distributes or shares false information about COVID-19 through any technological means. An equivalent fine would be given to “those who change or falsify official information in response to a state of emergency.”4 In June, after a reporter was fined over a Facebook post (see C3), the council repealed the ordinance, citing the mayor’s selective use of it against journalists.5

Other bills that could be used to punish certain forms of online speech due to broad wording were still under review at the end of the coverage period:

  • Legislative initiatives that emerged in 2018 propose to reform the criminal code to penalize identity theft online.6 One presented in June 2018 (3868-D-2018) proposes to criminalize digital theft with prison sentences of up to four years if the activity was sustained over a long period of time.7 While it exempts parody accounts, the provision refers to parody accounts that are “clearly identifiable for that purpose.” Similar bills proposed in 2018 are still pending discussion.8 One of these bills, (2630/18) was resubmitted in March 2020 under a new case file (0091/20),9 and a separate draft on the same topic, case file 0230/19, was resubmitted from an earlier bill.10
  • A bill to reform the criminal code submitted to Congress in March 2019 would criminalize the dissemination of nonconsensual intimate images, providing prison sentences of six months to two years, or a fine.11 In June 2019, another bill was submitted to add a new article to the Criminal Code on the criminalization of the same act.12
  • A new bill was submitted in July 2019 to Congress to include the usurpation of digital identity as a crime in the Criminal Code. It would provide a prison sentence of one month to two years, but does not clearly define the crime, providing only a broad statement of the usurpation of any identity exercised in a digital format.13
  • Other bills proposed new provisions for the Criminal Code in order to criminalize “cyberbullying”14 and stalking.15
C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities? 4.004 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 5 to 4 due to a criminal investigation that was initiated, based on little evidence, against a cybersecurity expert, as well as charges leveled against at least two users who were accused during the coverage period of spreading false information about the COVID-19 pandemic.

Internet users do not generally face politically motivated arrests or prosecutions for online speech, but during the COVID-19 pandemic at least two people were charged for disseminating false information related to the virus on social media, in response to social media posts where they speculated about a politician’s potential infection. During Macri’s administration, from 2016 until 2019, there appeared to be a rise in investigations that originated from social media posts—particularly on Twitter—led by the Ministry of Security, in which users published alleged threats to public officials, including the president and his family.1

Following an August 2019 hacking against the Ministry of Security (see C8), cybersecurity expert and critic of electronic voting Javier Smaldone said he was being wrongfully investigated for the crime.2 The federal police identified Smaldone as a suspect through a “cyberpatrolling” operation (see C5) into his social media posts. Smaldone had tweeted about the hack and warned people not to download any illicit material that was leaked. Based only on Smaldone’s tweets, in October 2019 police raided his home, seized his electronic devices, and detained him for 6 hours.3 Civil society groups strongly criticized the investigation;4 the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), for instance, raised concerns about Argentina’s tendency to pursue cases against critics of electronic voting.5 Smaldone has since appealed the seizure of his devices.6

In March 2020, Matías Schrank, a former reality-show contestant, was arrested by the province of Misiones’ cybercrime division for allegedly spreading false information. In a tweet, he had claimed that the president of the provincial legislature, Carlos Rovira, could have been infected with coronavirus after a trip to Thailand and was not respecting quarantine. He was charged under article 211 of the Criminal Code, which carries a penalty of 2 to 6 years in prison for spreading public fear or inciting unrest.7

The news site Realpolitik also suggested that Rovira had contracted the virus, along with his mother, who died shortly after his return. A judge denied these claims and initiated an investigation that led to a raid on the home of the activist Alicia Arruda, who over Facebook had allegedly shared false information about the virus and called for a protest. She was also charged under article 211 of the Criminal Code. In addition, the judge on the case based the investigation on an alleged infringement of the government-imposed lockdown by both Arruda and Argentina’s energy minister, who was found at her home during the raid.8

A federal prosecutor dismissed in May 2020 a criminal complaint filed against the organizers of an antilockdown protest. The complaint requested that an investigation be started for, among other things, promoting the march through WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. The prosecutor established that the actions listed in the complaint did not amount to punishable behavior that should be investigated.9

Other cases related to the dissemination of false information about the COVID-19 pandemic occurred after the coverage period. In June 2020, journalist Ariel Barrios was accused of spreading false information about the pandemic on Facebook and fined 40,000 pesos ($580) under Pichanal’s March ordinance (see C2).10 Salta’s press union, as well as FATPREN, condemned the fine.11 Towards the end of the month, Pichanal’s city council repealed the ordinance, and the fine against Barrios was reversed.12

Also in June, a judge in the city of Roque Sáenz Peña, in the province of Chaco, sent the national gendarmerie to the home of journalist Gustavo Raúl Romero.13 Romero was accused of spreading false information about COVID-19 through Facebook, and the warning issued by the gendarmerie stated that if he continued with such practices, he would face a criminal trial under article 211 of the Criminal Code. According to FOPEA, Romero had posted information about new COVID-19 cases that were officially confirmed afterwards.14

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

The Argentine government does not impose restrictions on anonymity or encryption for internet users, but registration requirements are in place for obtaining a mobile phone or a domain name. Bloggers and internet users are not required to register with the government and can post anonymous comments freely in online forums. A 2018 bill regarding online identity proposed to make platforms responsible for the authentication of users’ identity. Accounts would either be marked as “verified” or “unverified.”1 The bill was still under review at the end of the coverage period.

Telecom operators must register users’ identification information before selling them mobile phones or prepaid SIM cards.2 A resolution signed in October 2016 established a database of personal information, requiring ENACOM to adopt measures to identify all mobile communications users in a national registry.3 Mobile service providers must store the information in a safe and auditable manner, and supply information on request to members of the judiciary or public prosecutors. It does not state how long the information must be stored. Civil society groups criticized the policy for undermining anonymity and freedom of expression, citing other countries as examples where the same policy had been lifted because of its uselessness to deter crime.4

In July 2016, the National Directorate for the Registry of Internet Domain Names launched a new regulation for the administration of domain names.5 In order to register, transfer, or cancel a domain, individuals must apply for a “tax password” (Clave Fiscal) by providing the Federal Administration of Public Revenues (AFIP) with fingerprints, a facial photo, and their signature. AFIP assured local media that “it will not have information on the administration of domains and NIC Argentina will not have tax information either. The processes are independent.”6

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

In general, Argentina has strong privacy standards rooted in the constitution, and though covert or unlawful surveillance does not seem to be widespread, some sectors have attempted to spy on internet users. Government agencies do not systematically collect or access internet users’ metadata directly, but they may request it from service providers with a warrant,1 which has been upheld by the judiciary regarding information like geolocation data.2 Interception of private communications requires judicial authorization.3 In May 2019, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy conducted a mission to Argentina to assess the country’s privacy standards. His preliminary statement noted that Argentina does not appear to have advanced technical capabilities to carry out surveillance. However, he said levels of oversight by the Bicameral Commission on Intelligence were insufficient, and recommended the creation of a new independent oversight body.4 It had yet to be established by the end of the coverage period.

Under Macri’s government, the entity in charge of interceptions of communications was transferred from the Public Ministry to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court established an Office of Capturing of Communications (OCC), within the Directorate of Judicial Assistance in Complex and Organized Crimes.5 Digital rights groups have raised concerns about the office’s lack of institutional autonomy within a directorate dedicated to criminal investigations.6

After a 2017 hacking against the Ministry of Security, the ministry began to more consistently promote a new approach, known as “cyberpatrolling,” to the federal police. The strategy emphasizes taking a proactive approach to finding illicit activities online, mainly by searching social media platforms.7 Rights experts stated that cyberpatrolling operations by national law enforcement agencies have been carried out without appropriate transparency measures and safeguards, citing concerns for such rights as privacy and freedom of expression.8

In April 2020, amid rising concerns over the use of cyberpatrolling to criminalize legitimate behavior and speech online, the Ministry of Security prepared a protocol to determine how law enforcement agencies would proceed when carrying out such activities. While it specified, for example, that a court authorization would be required to intercept communications via phone and private social networks,9 the draft was strongly criticized by civil society organizations, which called for security forces to cease cyberpatrolling operations until adequate safeguards are put in place10 and regulation providing robust protections was discussed in Congress.11 In May, the ministry published a protocol through Resolution 144/2020, incorporating some of the recommendations made by civil society but ignoring calls for a legislative debate.12

Several initiatives to combat the COVID-19 pandemic were implemented during the coverage period. For example, in March 2020, residents of the cities of Santa Fé and Rosario who broke lockdown orders were required to have a tracking app installed on their phones. Interfering with the app, whether by deleting or uninstalling it, could subject them to six months to two years imprisonment.13 Other provincial governments have also released coronavirus apps, which have generated concern for lack of clarity around data retention and data-sharing between state bodies, among other issues.14 During March, the Secretariat of Public Innovation released an app allowing people to assess themselves for COVID-19 symptoms; however, installing it on an Android requires users to provide, in addition to their national ID number, email, and phone number, access to the phone’s calendar, contacts, geolocation data, microphone, and camera, and full access to the network.15 Such excessive permissions were ultimately removed. Provincial governments have also released similar apps

Results from an audit by prosecutor Cristina Caamaño into the Federal Intelligence Agency were presented in June 2020 to the Eleventh Federal Criminal and Correctional Court, and stated that agents had monitored and stored personal information on over 400 journalists seeking to cover major international summits held in Buenos Aires in 2017 and 2018, including the ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the summit of the Group of 20 (G20). The agents had assembled detailed profiles of individuals who requested accreditation, which include photos, employers, and social media profiles and posts, as well as comments about their political ideology or opinions. Those deemed critical of Macri, who was president at the time, were noted as having a “critical political posture.”16 Also in June 2020, in another case involving the Federal Intelligence Agency, a judge at the Federal Court of Lomas de Zamora presented evidence that journalist Hugo Alconada Mon had been a target of illegal, offline surveillance in 2018. Alconada had been investigating corruption at the time, and has alleged that there had been an effort by intelligence agents to identify his sources.17

Legislation and other policies impacting users’ right to privacy have also been put forward. Proposed amendments to Buenos Aires’ Criminal Procedure Code drafted in late 2016 sought to broaden government surveillance powers by introducing “special measures of investigation,” including remote surveillance of computer equipment, and surveillance through image capturing, localization, and monitoring. However, following heavy opposition and concerns raised by digital rights groups, these measures were omitted from the version that was finally approved in December 2018.18 In June 2019, though, one of two chambers in the province of Mendoza’s legislature voted to pass a bill that aims to reform the province’s criminal procedure code, in order to include remote surveillance.19

In July 2016, an administrative resolution authorized the transfer of personal information of Argentinian citizens contained in the databases of the social security authority (ANSES), such as name, ID number, telephone number, and email address, to the Public Communication Secretary.20 Civil society organizations questioned the use of such data by the agency, which manages communication strategy for official activities.21 The decision was validated by the data protection authority;22 opposition party legislators challenged the resolution but their claim was rejected.23 However, in September 2018 a court, citing the Data Protection Law, ruled that ANSES could not share a woman’s phone number and email address for the Publication Communication Secretary’s database without the woman’s consent.24

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are service providers and other technology companies required to aid the government in monitoring the communications of their users? 4.004 6.006

A number of measures to protect Argentine users’ data and communications are in place, and the courts have upheld rulings that protect privacy. However, there are some mechanisms by which service providers and companies can be compelled to provide user information under certain circumstances.

In 2009, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling that 2003 data retention legislation representation a violation of privacy rights.1

A 2013 resolution by the Communications Secretariat of the Ministry of Federal Planning introduced data retention requirements for the purpose of assessing the quality of services, requiring providers to store data related to quality indicators for three years. It states that providers should guarantee the telecommunications regulator “free access” to installations, and should provide “all the information that is required in the set manner and timeframe.”2 There has been no evidence to suggest that this provision was implemented in an unlawful or abusive way.

The Criminal Procedure Code states that, if a judge orders them to do so, communication service providers must be able to immediately intercept data for a period of up to 30 days, with the possibility of an extension. Providers are held criminally liable in cases of noncompliance.3 Companies can also be sanctioned for not complying with a provision under the Argentina Digital Act (Law 27.078), which mandates ICT providers to share information with competent authorities when requested.4

Some data protection measures are in place. The Access to Public Information Agency (AAIP), in charge of enforcing the data protection law,5 presented a draft bill to reform the Data Protection Law in 2017, following a series of consultations.6 The executive finally submitted the bill to Congress in September 2018.7 On February 29, 2020, the bill to reform the data protection law lost its parliamentary status.8 The AAIP has issued legal requirements and privacy recommendations on a range of issues in the past, including video surveillance footage,9 the development of digital applications,10 use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones,11 guidelines and best practices to comply with the data protection law,12 and health data, amid the COVID-19 outbreak.13

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in retribution for their online activities? 4.004 5.005

Violence in reprisal for digital activities is rare, though journalists and activists, including those who work online, are subject to intimidation, harassment and smear campaigns on social media. The Argentine Forum of Journalism (FOPEA) reported 58 cases of harassment against journalists in 2019, compared to 51 in 2018. Of the total cases reported, 21 involved intimidation, 15 physical aggression, and four threats of physical aggression. Several others involved the state abusing its power.1

While such cases remain rare, in January 2020, the journalist Carlos Walker, who has a radio show and contributes to the news site El Marplatense, faced an attack on his home: two individuals, in the middle of the night, shot at least 13 bullets at the apartment, located in the city of Mar del Plata. No one was injured.2 In an interview, Walker suggested that the mob-like attack was related to his reporting, which includes topics such as corruption linked to the city’s night life.3

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because, during an electoral debate, a fact-checking organization experienced a denial-of-service (DoS) attack from outside the country, forcing them to close their site to foreign visitors.

Digital media outlets have suffered technical attacks in recent years,1 and during the reporting period a fact-checking organization was the victim of an attack. After the first presidential debate in October, prior to the 2019 general elections, Chequeado issued a statement in which they disclosed an alleged DoS attack on their server coming from computers located outside the country. Chequeado, which conducts live fact-checking during debates, revealed that their website received over 39 million server requests coming from abroad during a 6-hour time frame before and during the debate. They blocked international visitors for several days to ensure users within Argentina could continue accessing their content. During the same time, thousands of bias claims against Chequeado surfaced on Twitter, and received apparently fabricated threats of legal action, claiming to be from a commercial and civil court body, which they nevertheless interpreted as a threat.2

In March 2020, the national government reported that the Official Gazette had been hacked, and that a false announcement about the COVID-19 outbreak had been published to its website. Independent analysis on the incident later confirmed that the hacking had not happened and was instead a DoS attack against its servers due to an increase in traffic. The hike in traffic came after a viral WhatsApp message with a false screenshot of the gazette circulated; it announced that state employees at risk of contracting the virus would be exempt from going to work.3 A criminal investigation for public intimidation and interruption of communications was initiated to determine who had created the fake version. As part of the investigation, phone records of the suspect were requested, and their house was searched for electronic devices.4

Argentina has also seen cybersecurity incidents targeting companies and government entities. In December 2018, the government confirmed that cyberattacks were directed against the Security Ministry, National Gendarmerie, Naval Prefecture, and Airport Security Police earlier that year.5 More recently, a day after holding primary elections on August 12, 2019, hackers leaked troves of sensitive data belonging to the Ministry of Security, and momentarily took over the Argentine Naval Prefecture’s Twitter account to disseminate disinformation and links to the leaked information.6 This followed a similar hacking incident against the ministry in 2017.7 The 2019 leaks included 700 GB of private information, including emails, contacts, phone interception records, and even fingerprints. The AAIP sanctioned the federal police for not cooperating with the subsequent investigation in which the AAIP found that the police had not put into place proper security measures to protect personal data.8

In December 2019, within a day of being sworn into office, the personal Twitter account of the new minister of security, Sabina Frederic, was compromised, and several tweets were sent in her name.9

Government agencies have sought to strengthen their cybersecurity capacity. The Ministry of Defense inaugurated the National Cyber Defense Center in November 2019.10 In January 2016, the president created the post of Undersecretary of Technology and Cyber Security under the former Ministry of Modernization, in charge of developing the strategy for technological infrastructure, as well as a national cybersecurity agenda.11 Before the change in administration, the modernization ministry (now the public innovation secretariat) published in May 2019 the country’s first National Cybersecurity Strategy.12 Experts stated that this was a welcomed first step, but the strategy arrived late and only covered very basic ground.13 In response to increasing cyberincidents against states, a new bill was submitted to Congress in May 2019 to create a cybersecurity institute;14 as of May 2020, the bill was under review by three commissions.15

A survey released in February 2020 by the market research company Ipsos indicated that, of the 29 percent of companies that had experienced some kind of cyberattack, 35 percent of those incidents occurred in the past year. The incidents resulted in damage to systems or software, temporary or permanent data loss, and destruction of personal data. Just over half of businesses admitted feeling vulnerable to further cyber incidents.16

In June 2020, the electric company Edesur suffered from technical issues, as a result of a ransomware attack against its managing company, the Italian firm Enel Group. Edsel’s internal services were restored the following day.17

On Argentina

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    85 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    73 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    Yes